WEBVTT 00:00:03.720 --> 00:00:10.005 This Commission meeting is called to order. It is pursuant 00:00:10.030 --> 00:00:15.574 to the California Government Code Section 11125.5, which provides for 00:00:15.599 --> 00:00:21.633 a state body to hold an emergency meeting to address an emergency situation 00:00:21.658 --> 00:00:27.349 which must be determined by a majority of the members of the Commission 00:00:27.374 --> 00:00:32.937 at the beginning of this meeting. To satisfy this requirement, I will 00:00:32.962 --> 00:00:38.659 now identify the emergency situation. Pacific Gas and Electric Company, 00:00:38.684 --> 00:00:44.394 PG&E, initiated a series of public safety power shut offs, PSPS events, 00:00:44.419 --> 00:00:50.183 during the week of October 7th. These PSPS events affected up to 700,000 00:00:50.208 --> 00:00:55.933 accounts that serve approximately two million California residents. Not 00:00:55.958 --> 00:01:01.897 only did this event have an unprecedented scale, but it turns out that the 00:01:01.922 --> 00:01:08.270 company's implementation of the PSPS Protocol was flawed. Unless it is executed 00:01:08.295 --> 00:01:14.222 well, shutting off power has severe public health and safety consequences, 00:01:14.247 --> 00:01:19.648 from effects on transportation and roadways to effects on safety of 00:01:19.673 --> 00:01:25.526 residents at critical facilities such as hospitals and residents who need 00:01:25.551 --> 00:01:31.416 electricity for medical equipment, basic mobility or storage of medicine. 00:01:31.441 --> 00:01:37.123 These impacts are at their most severe in isolated, rural and-or tribal 00:01:37.147 --> 00:01:43.425 communities. The public health and safety impacts become even more detrimental 00:01:43.450 --> 00:01:48.988 when electric service is shut off over a large area without effective 00:01:49.013 --> 00:01:54.485 coordination that prevents emergency personnel from county or tribal 00:01:54.510 --> 00:02:00.591 governments to do their jobs. At this time, Northern California continues to 00:02:00.616 --> 00:02:06.570 have a fire risk. And additional PSPS events may occur, again, at any time 00:02:06.595 --> 00:02:12.365 if weather conditions change. Without an effective best event evaluation 00:02:12.390 --> 00:02:18.569 and swift charges, excuse me, changes in both PG&E's policy and the company's 00:02:18.594 --> 00:02:24.194 ability to implement them, the events of the week of October 7th could 00:02:24.219 --> 00:02:29.700 be repeated. The threat of a poorly executed, wide-scale PSPS events 00:02:29.725 --> 00:02:35.975 compromise a delivery of electricity to the public, including homes, hospitals 00:02:35.999 --> 00:02:41.626 and public facilities. Until PG&E's conduct is reviewed and corrective 00:02:41.652 --> 00:02:47.730 action are identified and implemented, there remains a substantial risk that 00:02:47.755 --> 00:02:53.785 the public health and safety of Californians will be severely impaired with 00:02:53.810 --> 00:02:59.418 potentially catastrophic results. I now ask my fellow Commissioners to 00:02:59.443 --> 00:03:05.143 confirm the situation qualifies as an emergency situation as defined by 00:03:05.168 --> 00:03:10.843 Government Code Section 11125.5. Clerk, could you please call the roll? 00:03:10.868 --> 00:03:13.611 For item one Commissioner 00:03:13.623 --> 00:03:17.245 Shiroma. Aye 00:03:17.270 --> 00:03:21.514 Commissioner Guzman Aceves. Aye. 00:03:21.539 --> 00:03:25.157 Commissioner Randolph. Aye. 00:03:25.182 --> 00:03:28.672 Commissioner Rechtschaffen. 00:03:32.125 Rechtschaffen>Aye. President Batjer. 00:03:32.149 --> 00:03:43.517 Aye. Thank you. Please rise and 00:03:43.542 --> 00:03:55.540 join me for the Pledge of Allegiance. (sound cuts out) 00:03:55.540 --> 00:04:01.864 Edgar. Robert. Could you please play the safety 00:04:01.889 --> 00:04:07.554 information and announcement for everyone? 00:04:55.949 --> 00:05:01.651 I don't want to delay any further. So I'm going to read the emergency 00:05:01.676 --> 00:05:08.005 instructions. As you all are aware, our number one priority is indeed safety. 00:05:08.030 --> 00:05:13.801 As such, we will address certain safety concerns in this venue. In the 00:05:13.826 --> 00:05:19.735 event of an emergency, please calmly proceed out the exits. We have four 00:05:19.759 --> 00:05:25.862 exits, two in the rear and one on either side of the dais. In the event we 00:05:25.887 --> 00:05:31.802 need to evacuate the building, our assembly point is at the Garden Plaza 00:05:31.827 --> 00:05:37.673 area between the War Memorial Herbs Theater and the War Memorial Opera. 00:05:37.698 --> 00:05:43.357 You can see that on the video. When going out the rear exit, head out 00:05:43.382 --> 00:05:49.162 through the courtyard and down the front steps, then across McAllister 00:05:49.187 --> 00:05:55.268 Street, south on Van Ness, and continue to the Garden Plaza area, which is 00:05:55.293 --> 00:06:01.468 immediately to the right after passing the War Memorial Theater. When going 00:06:01.493 --> 00:06:07.399 out the side exits, go out either exit and you will find yourself on the 00:06:07.424 --> 00:06:13.361 Golden Gate Avenue. From there, proceed east, turned south into Van Ness 00:06:13.386 --> 00:06:19.298 Avenue, and walk towards McAllister Street, then cross McAllister Street 00:06:19.323 --> 00:06:25.329 to Garden Plaza area, which is immediately to the right after passing the 00:06:25.353 --> 00:06:31.171 War Memorial Herbs Theater. In the event of an emergency, our Executive 00:06:31.197 --> 00:06:37.060 Director will call 911. Today that is Ed Randolph, sitting in for Alice 00:06:37.085 --> 00:06:43.168 Stebbins. Public advisors, Alison Brown is certified in CPR and first aid. 00:06:43.193 --> 00:06:49.125 Again, thank you very much for your attention. Sorry, that our video did 00:06:49.150 --> 00:06:55.139 not work. Okay, some housekeeping rules before we begin. At this meeting, 00:06:55.164 --> 00:07:01.509 we will hold public comment after we hear from the PG&E representatives. This 00:07:01.534 --> 00:07:07.529 will give the public a chance to hear the discussion and provide feedback 00:07:07.554 --> 00:07:13.236 on what was said in their public comments. You may notice that we are 00:07:13.262 --> 00:07:19.244 using American Sign Language virtual interpretation for this meeting. For 00:07:19.268 --> 00:07:25.372 those who are hard of hearing or hearing impaired, this means that we will 00:07:25.397 --> 00:07:31.314 have a sign language interpreter at an off-site location who is shown on 00:07:31.339 --> 00:07:37.106 a computer monitor for those in the room who need such assistance. Can 00:07:37.131 --> 00:07:43.279 someone raise their hand as to where we are in the monitor? We've attempted 00:07:43.304 --> 00:07:48.995 to secure an in-person sign language interpreter through our existing 00:07:49.020 --> 00:07:54.930 sign language contracts with partners in Communications and the Bay Area 00:07:54.956 --> 00:08:00.798 Communication Access, as our protocol calls for. We also reached out to 00:08:00.823 --> 00:08:06.883 other state agencies and five vendors, but none were able to accommodate a 00:08:06.908 --> 00:08:12.935 request on such a short notice. We hope that the virtual translator meets 00:08:12.960 --> 00:08:18.555 the needs of those in attendance. We will also have the text of this 00:08:18.580 --> 00:08:24.594 meeting posted to our website next week for the accommodation of the deaf 00:08:24.619 --> 00:08:30.608 and the hearing impaired. Further, I ask those who will be speaking today 00:08:30.634 --> 00:08:36.736 to adhere to the time frames shown on the agenda. I will be trying to keep 00:08:36.761 --> 00:08:43.163 track of the times as well. At this time, may I please ask the representatives 00:08:43.188 --> 00:08:48.789 from, I'm sorry. Wait. We have to go back on the record. Okay, we're 00:08:48.815 --> 00:08:54.473 back on the record. And staff, I'll ask you to take your seats in the 00:08:54.497 --> 00:09:00.602 audience, and at this time, I will ask for the representatives of PG&E who 00:09:00.627 --> 00:09:06.707 will be speaking to please take their seats at the hearing table here. You 00:09:06.733 --> 00:09:12.338 can come up Mr. Johnson or separately, and then we'll have the other 00:09:12.363 --> 00:09:18.756 representatives join you when it's time. If that's appropriate. Sir. I'll make 00:09:18.781 --> 00:09:24.799 a statement first. I'm sorry, I was waiting for you to get settled. Thank 00:09:24.824 --> 00:09:30.654 you. Okay. First, I would like to thank my fellow Commissioners and all 00:09:30.678 --> 00:09:36.602 in attendance for making today's emergency meeting on such short notice. 00:09:36.627 --> 00:09:42.607 Just this past week, we recognized the two-year anniversary of the Tubb’s 00:09:42.632 --> 00:09:48.495 Fire in Napa and Sonoma counties. October 8, 2017. 22 people lost their 00:09:48.520 --> 00:09:54.683 lives and more than 5600 structures were destroyed. And in just a few weeks 00:09:54.708 --> 00:10:00.721 from now, we’ll mark the one anniversary of the campfire in Butte County, 00:10:00.746 --> 00:10:07.059 November 8, 2018. The deadliest and most destructive wildfire in California's 00:10:07.084 --> 00:10:12.859 history. 86 people tragically lost their lives and a staggering 18,804 00:10:12.884 --> 00:10:19.203 structures were destroyed. Many of us in this room have a personal connection 00:10:19.229 --> 00:10:24.504 to those destructive wildfires, and we will always recognize the 00:10:24.529 --> 00:10:30.591 tremendous loss of friends, family and loved ones. This brings us to today 00:10:30.615 --> 00:10:36.637 where we're at a historic peak of the wildfire season, and time is of the 00:10:36.662 --> 00:10:42.578 essence. I called today's emergency meeting and required the presence of 00:10:42.603 --> 00:10:48.694 the executives and board members from the Pacific Gas and Electric Company 00:10:48.719 --> 00:10:54.541 in an effort to ensure all CPUC regulated utilities are better prepared 00:10:54.567 --> 00:11:00.502 and that their customers are better served when our state faces the next 00:11:00.527 --> 00:11:06.030 wildfire threat and, if warranted, another power shut off incident. 00:11:06.054 --> 00:11:12.057 California has been a global leader in implementing, excuse me, adjusting 00:11:12.082 --> 00:11:17.979 my mic, in implementing laws to reduce the causes and impacts of climate 00:11:18.004 --> 00:11:23.867 change. It has also been a leader in supporting climate research, which 00:11:23.892 --> 00:11:29.649 has forecasted increasing threats and impacts from wildfires in coming 00:11:29.674 --> 00:11:35.525 decades. And sadly, the state has learned too well in recent years, the 00:11:35.550 --> 00:11:41.701 level of destruction climate-changed induced weather events can have on our 00:11:41.726 --> 00:11:47.909 communities when combined with neglect, negligent maintenance of electrical 00:11:47.934 --> 00:11:54.010 infrastructure. California will become more resilient. But resilience will 00:11:54.035 --> 00:11:59.799 not and should never translate to California's being willing to put up 00:11:59.824 --> 00:12:05.887 with inadequate execution of measures that are supposed to keep them safe. 00:12:05.912 --> 00:12:11.691 And for the CPUC, although utilities are responsible for keeping their 00:12:11.716 --> 00:12:17.795 infrastructure safe, we cannot and should never stop demanding better ways 00:12:17.820 --> 00:12:23.749 to reduce fire wildfire risk and to reduce the use, scope and impacts of 00:12:23.774 --> 00:12:29.678 a power shutoff without compromising public safety. What we saw play out 00:12:29.703 --> 00:12:35.720 by PG&E last week cannot be repeated. I've only been at the CPUC a couple 00:12:35.745 --> 00:12:41.411 months, but it does not take long to see the privilege investor-owned 00:12:41.436 --> 00:12:47.196 utilities have in being a unique provider of essential services to the 00:12:47.221 --> 00:12:53.200 public. It also has not taken me long to realize how some utilities fail, 00:12:53.225 --> 00:12:59.412 understand what a privilege it is. And that with such privilege comes great 00:12:59.437 --> 00:13:05.355 responsibility to those who they serve. It is the CPUC’s responsibility, 00:13:05.380 --> 00:13:11.392 therefore, to identify and correct such failures. This is why we are here 00:13:11.417 --> 00:13:17.079 today. My specific goals with this meeting is to make sure any future 00:13:17.104 --> 00:13:23.122 power shutoff event is never like the one of last week. In the past year, 00:13:23.147 --> 00:13:29.059 the CPUC adopted the wildfire mitigation plan for PG&E and protocols for 00:13:29.084 --> 00:13:35.171 power shut offs and continues to examine current practices from each power 00:13:35.196 --> 00:13:41.014 shut off event. The utility's plans for these events, however, are only 00:13:41.039 --> 00:13:47.060 effective when they are implemented in a reasonable and competent manner. 00:13:47.085 --> 00:13:52.837 This did not happen last week. We will question and assess today, what 00:13:52.863 --> 00:13:59.034 we will question and assess today is the scope and scale of the last week's 00:13:59.059 --> 00:14:04.799 power shut off event, and equally important, it's inadequate execution 00:14:04.824 --> 00:14:10.351 by PG&E. The impact of the scope and scale of the power shut off to 00:14:10.376 --> 00:14:16.366 lives, businesses and the economy cannot be overstated. The loss of power 00:14:16.391 --> 00:14:22.475 endangers lives, especially those individuals who are reliant on power for 00:14:22.500 --> 00:14:28.559 medical reasons. It also imposes additional burdens on our most vulnerable 00:14:28.584 --> 00:14:32.236 populations, and it causes major disruptions 00:14:32.248 --> 00:14:35.016 to businesses, hospitals, schools 00:14:35.041 --> 00:14:40.716 and transportation networks as well strains state and local emergency 00:14:40.741 --> 00:14:46.672 and public safety resources. To exacerbate the situation, PG&E was not 00:14:46.697 --> 00:14:52.441 fully prepared to manage such a large scale power shut off. Throughout 00:14:52.466 --> 00:14:58.485 the event, PG&E had multiple issues with communications, coordination and 00:14:58.510 --> 00:15:04.748 event and resource management. Among various problems identified, we witness 00:15:04.773 --> 00:15:10.698 be PG&E not adequately prepared or scale its business operations for the 00:15:10.723 --> 00:15:16.379 increase in customers contacting the utility during the power shutoff 00:15:16.404 --> 00:15:22.426 events, including the crashing of its website and its inability to answer 00:15:22.451 --> 00:15:28.611 the calls of customers seeking assistance and critical information. We have 00:15:28.636 --> 00:15:34.564 also heard from local and tribal governments on the lack of coordination 00:15:34.590 --> 00:15:40.575 until the power shutoffs commenced, the lack of critical information flow 00:15:40.599 --> 00:15:47.103 and in some instances, total breakdowns in communication. The CPUC acknowledges 00:15:47.128 --> 00:15:52.712 PG&E’s staff cooperated with the state agencies and were transparent 00:15:52.738 --> 00:15:58.822 with problems as they arose. Such collaboration is imperative in emergency 00:15:58.847 --> 00:16:04.663 situations and must continue into the future. This level of cooperation 00:16:04.688 --> 00:16:10.549 also needs to be inclusive of all emergency response personnel impacted 00:16:10.574 --> 00:16:16.166 by these events, particularly county and tribal governments. We also 00:16:16.191 --> 00:16:22.202 acknowledge the contributions of the frontline utility workers. They face 00:16:22.227 --> 00:16:28.376 risks themselves as they work long hours, often in rough terrain, to notify 00:16:28.401 --> 00:16:34.337 customers in remote areas, monitor the system during turnoff events, and 00:16:34.362 --> 00:16:40.192 restore service as quickly as possible afterwards. However, failures in 00:16:40.217 --> 00:16:46.384 execution combined with the magnitude of this event created an unacceptable 00:16:46.409 --> 00:16:52.227 situation that should never be repeated, and that requires scrutiny and 00:16:52.252 --> 00:16:58.435 correction. While PG&E spent significant resources warning the public about 00:16:58.460 --> 00:17:04.130 the risk of the power shutoff events and what the public should do to 00:17:04.155 --> 00:17:10.326 prepare for an event, it is not clear that PG&E spent the time it should to 00:17:10.351 --> 00:17:16.253 make sure the utility was prepared. Today, we focus on what we can learn 00:17:16.278 --> 00:17:22.130 to ensure their significant improvement in determining the need and, if 00:17:22.155 --> 00:17:28.063 required, the execution of any future power shut off events initiated by 00:17:28.087 --> 00:17:34.170 PG&E. With that, I would like Mr. Johnson to introduce himself and provide 00:17:34.195 --> 00:17:39.847 his opening statement. Mic needs to be on. Sorry, sir. Closer to you. 00:17:39.872 --> 00:17:44.212 Try that again. I’m Bill Johnson, the president 00:17:44.237 --> 00:17:48.552 and CEO of PG&E. So President Batjer, Commissioners, Members of 00:17:48.577 --> 00:17:52.904 the Commission staff, members of the public. Good afternoon. As 00:17:52.930 --> 00:17:57.097 the president said, we're here to discuss today the difficult 00:17:57.122 --> 00:18:01.524 decision PG&E made last week to turn off power for safety across 00:18:01.549 --> 00:18:05.723 hundreds of communities and 35 counties, a decision I believe 00:18:05.747 --> 00:18:10.069 achieved its essential purpose, but one that also suffered from 00:18:10.094 --> 00:18:14.864 significant shortcomings in execution. Given those shortcomings, we're 00:18:14.889 --> 00:18:19.091 also here to discuss how we're improving for the next time we 00:18:19.116 --> 00:18:23.496 might need to turn off power if weather conditions require that. 00:18:23.520 --> 00:18:27.777 We're also here to begin discussing how we're working toward a 00:18:27.802 --> 00:18:32.237 future in California, where these types of shutoffs are no longer 00:18:32.262 --> 00:18:36.864 necessary. Let me assure you, we do not like to turn off the power. 00:18:36.889 --> 00:18:41.466 It runs contrary to the reason any of us ever got in this business. 00:18:41.491 --> 00:18:45.742 But as I look back at last week, one of the things that stands 00:18:45.766 --> 00:18:49.992 out in my mind, we actually didn't have any catastrophic fires 00:18:50.017 --> 00:18:54.423 in Northern and Central California, and that was the sole intent 00:18:54.448 --> 00:18:58.694 of the PSPS. Now it's hard to prove a negative. We can't prove 00:18:58.719 --> 00:19:02.977 our decision avoided fires that otherwise would have occurred. 00:19:03.003 --> 00:19:07.304 But we do know this: that winds above 45 miles an hour create a 00:19:07.328 --> 00:19:11.660 high risk of vegetation contacting distribution, and vegetation 00:19:11.685 --> 00:19:16.195 contacting those lines is the most common cause of fire related to 00:19:16.221 --> 00:19:20.676 electrical equipment. So in this event we saw winds above 45 mile 00:19:20.701 --> 00:19:24.861 per hour in many locations for sustained periods of time, and 00:19:24.886 --> 00:19:28.950 we have more than 100 confirmed cases of wind damage to our 00:19:28.975 --> 00:19:33.353 electric system, things like trees and branches and other things 00:19:33.379 --> 00:19:37.905 coming into contact with our lines and actually power lines on the 00:19:37.929 --> 00:19:42.160 ground. And these instances were widespread across the system. 00:19:42.185 --> 00:19:46.447 Contact of this type is known to cause ignition when lines are 00:19:46.472 --> 00:19:50.979 energized, which is what CalFire concluded cause many of the North 00:19:51.004 --> 00:19:55.321 Bay fires two years ago. We would never want to experience that 00:19:55.346 --> 00:19:59.705 again. No one ever wants to see anything like that again. And it 00:19:59.730 --> 00:20:04.137 is our sincere commitment at PG&E to make sure that we don't. So 00:20:04.162 --> 00:20:08.476 how did PG&E, how did California Utilities, and now many of the 00:20:08.501 --> 00:20:12.884 utilities across the West, get into this condition where we have 00:20:12.896 --> 00:20:17.223 to shut off power? And the answer is the risk of fire has grown 00:20:17.248 --> 00:20:21.778 significantly in recent years, driven by climate change in various 00:20:21.803 --> 00:20:25.902 forms. PG&E's example is this. In 2012, the state's elevated 00:20:25.914 --> 00:20:30.247 fire threat designation applied to 15% of our territory, a very 00:20:30.272 --> 00:20:34.580 large territory. Today, more than 50% of our territory has that 00:20:34.605 --> 00:20:39.124 designation. So in response to this increase in risk and after the 00:20:39.136 --> 00:20:43.531 horrific campfire in 2018, PG&E did several things to reduce the 00:20:43.543 --> 00:20:47.932 risk of wildfire. Inspected and repaired as needed on a priority 00:20:47.944 --> 00:20:52.345 basis all of its assets in the Tier 2 and Tier 3 fire districts. 00:20:52.357 --> 00:20:56.810 Adopted and implementing much more aggressive enhanced vegetation 00:20:56.822 --> 00:21:00.882 management. Accelerated a plan to harden its system through 00:21:00.894 --> 00:21:05.150 changes in equipment and materials. And developing more robust 00:21:05.162 --> 00:21:09.702 PSPS program, which it submitted to this Commission as part of its 00:21:09.727 --> 00:21:14.448 wildfire safety plan, and that plan is built on strong meteorological 00:21:14.460 --> 00:21:18.517 capability, situational awareness and analytical predictive 00:21:18.529 --> 00:21:22.715 analytics. And that's the plan and the program we followed in 00:21:22.727 --> 00:21:27.399 instituting this PSPS. Perhaps because of the history of significant 00:21:27.411 --> 00:21:31.865 events of this company, I have heard and read a lot of skepticism 00:21:31.877 --> 00:21:35.936 about our actions. I hear skepticism about whether the shut 00:21:35.948 --> 00:21:40.069 off was truly necessary and whether the scope was too large. 00:21:40.081 --> 00:21:44.485 Skepticism that we did this to save our own skin rather than for 00:21:44.497 --> 00:21:48.747 public safety. The fact is that we did this for one reason and 00:21:48.759 --> 00:21:53.290 that its safety. The only thing we cared about and all of this was 00:21:53.302 --> 00:21:57.490 the safety of our customers, our employees, and the people of 00:21:57.502 --> 00:22:02.243 California, and our efforts last week were a product of that mindset. 00:22:02.255 --> 00:22:06.575 You know, the reputation and condition of this company has been 00:22:06.587 --> 00:22:10.715 adversely affected by instances in the past where it did not 00:22:10.727 --> 00:22:14.985 keep people safe, and in this instance, we were doing our best 00:22:14.997 --> 00:22:19.403 to do just the opposite. Another misconception is that we turned 00:22:19.428 --> 00:22:23.946 off power because our system is in, quote, shambles. Actually, our 00:22:23.958 --> 00:22:28.150 system is in the vast fire threat areas we serve is in pretty 00:22:28.162 --> 00:22:32.686 good shape. We know this because we just finished an unprecedented 00:22:32.698 --> 00:22:36.828 inspection and repair process. So it's not accurate to state 00:22:36.840 --> 00:22:41.158 that the conditions of our system drove this PSPS. The PSPS was 00:22:41.170 --> 00:22:45.500 driven by a widespread wind event and the desire to keep people 00:22:45.512 --> 00:22:49.633 safe. But making the right decision on safety isn't the same 00:22:49.645 --> 00:22:53.981 thing as executing that decision well, and on this aspect, some 00:22:53.993 --> 00:22:58.377 skepticism is in order, and that's part of the reason we're here 00:22:58.389 --> 00:23:02.650 today. As I said, I believe shutting off the fire achieved its 00:23:02.662 --> 00:23:06.917 purpose, but it caused hardship and different safety risks for 00:23:06.929 --> 00:23:11.670 millions of our customers, friends, and neighbors. You know, any time 00:23:11.682 --> 00:23:16.205 when we have to live without power is difficult, but in this case, 00:23:16.217 --> 00:23:20.481 the hardship was widespread and was made worse by shortcomings 00:23:20.493 --> 00:23:24.683 in our communications, our online maps, and other areas. When 00:23:24.695 --> 00:23:29.236 people needed information, our website and call centers were under 00:23:29.248 --> 00:23:33.834 equipped to meet that challenge. When people could access our site, 00:23:33.846 --> 00:23:38.174 the map showing potentially impacted areas were not dependable. 00:23:38.186 --> 00:23:42.440 So I acknowledge these critical errors. They're not acceptable 00:23:42.452 --> 00:23:46.379 and they cannot happen again. So to our customers who are 00:23:46.391 --> 00:23:50.981 impacted by the shutoffs and to all of those who did not get timely 00:23:50.993 --> 00:23:55.189 accurate information about them, I apologize for the hardship 00:23:55.201 --> 00:23:59.525 and the lack of information, and we'll let you know this cannot 00:23:59.537 --> 00:24:03.874 happen again. There are others speaking behind me will give you 00:24:03.886 --> 00:24:08.407 more detail about what it is we're doing. But let me describe some 00:24:08.419 --> 00:24:12.816 of the errors we’re focused on. First, communication. Should the 00:24:12.828 --> 00:24:16.812 prospect of another safety shutoff authorize, we commit to 00:24:16.824 --> 00:24:21.499 communicating with the customers and communities with as much notice 00:24:21.511 --> 00:24:25.898 as possible, with as much clarity as possible, and as frequently 00:24:25.910 --> 00:24:30.107 as possible. We did not deliver on that commitment last week. 00:24:30.119 --> 00:24:34.378 Our website crashed several times. Our maps were inconsistent, 00:24:34.390 --> 00:24:38.660 perhaps incorrect. Our call centers were overloaded. So we are 00:24:38.672 --> 00:24:43.056 reinforcing our website and call centers to handle a much higher 00:24:43.068 --> 00:24:47.463 volume in these events. And we're working to improve the quality 00:24:47.475 --> 00:24:52.203 and accessibility of our outage maps. We will also continue improving 00:24:52.215 --> 00:24:56.345 coordination with our government agency partners. We welcome 00:24:56.357 --> 00:25:00.540 members of CalOES, CalFire, and CPUC staff into our emergency 00:25:00.552 --> 00:25:05.018 operations center. As we planned and executed the work, we sought 00:25:05.030 --> 00:25:09.016 and accepted feedback and counsel. We're grateful for that 00:25:09.028 --> 00:25:13.567 assistance. We will ask for it again and in fact we rely on it. So 00:25:13.579 --> 00:25:17.896 thank you to all those folks. Another area of focus where us is 00:25:17.908 --> 00:25:22.576 narrowing the scope of safety shut offs. We've made progress on this 00:25:22.588 --> 00:25:27.114 since last year, but more is needed, and we will use all the tools 00:25:27.126 --> 00:25:31.258 at our disposal. And those coming after me are more equipped 00:25:31.270 --> 00:25:35.793 to describe those tools. But in time we'll be able to use shutoffs 00:25:35.805 --> 00:25:40.002 with more precision so that fewer customers are impacted, and 00:25:40.014 --> 00:25:44.407 I believe, and I certainly hope that we get to a point where the 00:25:44.419 --> 00:25:48.689 PSPS is not needed at all, because ultimately, none of us want 00:25:48.701 --> 00:25:53.085 a future where these shutoffs are commonplace or even necessary. 00:25:53.097 --> 00:25:57.290 So we're working to reduce fire risks in a multitude of ways, 00:25:57.302 --> 00:26:01.963 and this will take some time. In the shorter term, if the conditions 00:26:01.975 --> 00:26:06.038 are right for wildfire, we might have to employ PSPS again. 00:26:06.050 --> 00:26:10.437 And we all need to be prepared for this eventuality and PG&E has 00:26:10.449 --> 00:26:14.712 to be better prepared than it was this time. If we do, we will 00:26:14.724 --> 00:26:19.185 do the best we can with the least impact possible. We're actually 00:26:19.197 --> 00:26:23.534 here to improve the quality of life, not burden. So to close, I 00:26:23.546 --> 00:26:28.270 want to thank the Commission for bringing us together this afternoon. 00:26:28.282 --> 00:26:32.409 This is a topic that millions of Californians, including us, 00:26:32.421 --> 00:26:36.542 care deeply about. We share a desire to get better at it and 00:26:36.554 --> 00:26:41.160 eventually to render it unnecessary. Our desire is to provide power 00:26:41.172 --> 00:26:45.561 to people, not to take it away. And most important, we all share 00:26:45.573 --> 00:26:49.770 a desire to prevent catastrophic wildfire in our communities. 00:26:49.782 --> 00:26:54.109 And I look forward to continuing our work together to meet that 00:26:54.121 --> 00:26:58.527 objective year after year. And those are my comments. Thank you. 00:26:58.552 --> 00:27:02.092 Thank you, Mr Johnson. I'm 00:27:02.104 --> 00:27:05.506 going to turn to my fellow Commissioners and 00:27:05.518 --> 00:27:09.024 ask whether they have questions of Mr. Johnson 00:27:09.036 --> 00:27:12.105 at this time. Yes. Commissioner Shiroma. 00:27:12.130 --> 00:27:19.367 Oh, yes. Good afternoon, Mr Johnson. You know, in 00:27:19.379 --> 00:27:26.335 September, PG&E conducted a PSPS events, in late September, and it was 00:27:26.347 --> 00:27:33.100 of less magnitude than the October period of time. And in the letter 00:27:33.112 --> 00:27:40.269 that was required by the CPUC to be submitted on that, on page eight, it 00:27:40.281 --> 00:27:47.496 talks about learning from that particular episode and as far as successes 00:27:47.508 --> 00:27:54.735 and things to improve. And are you able to or are your other team members 00:27:54.747 --> 00:28:01.773 able to speak to what things were identified to be improved, which were 00:28:01.785 --> 00:28:08.334 supposed to be used or maybe were used for the October PSPS event? 00:28:08.359 --> 00:28:13.693 That letter, I think those who come after me probably helped 00:28:13.705 --> 00:28:19.328 write that letter and are better able to speak to it. But a couple of the things 00:28:19.340 --> 00:28:24.888 were better communication and better coordination with the state agencies. Some 00:28:24.900 --> 00:28:30.461 of the things that we've mentioned. The scope of those prior events were in the 00:28:30.473 --> 00:28:35.861 tens of thousands of customers. This was in the hundreds of thousands. And so 00:28:35.873 --> 00:28:41.274 I think some of the things that appeared as weaknesses here probably wouldn't 00:28:41.286 --> 00:28:46.681 have been, you know, obvious in those smaller ones. But I think people behind 00:28:46.693 --> 00:28:52.169 me, and I will make sure there's someone behind, who can answer your question. 00:28:52.194 --> 00:28:57.023 Mr Johnson. Last Saturday, after the 00:28:57.035 --> 00:29:01.659 PSPS was over, you were quoted in an update saying something to 00:29:01.671 --> 00:29:06.144 the effect that wildfire risk is greater than ever and moving 00:29:06.156 --> 00:29:10.930 faster than regulation. Do you recall saying something like that? 00:29:10.955 --> 00:29:14.096 You know, I said a lot of things last 00:29:14.108 --> 00:29:17.085 week. I don't particularly recall that saying that. 00:29:17.110 --> 00:29:21.744 Okay, well, given the risks involved 00:29:21.756 --> 00:29:25.779 to the public, that was a very concerning statement to us 00:29:25.791 --> 00:29:30.154 because it suggested that the extent of your responsibility or 00:29:30.166 --> 00:29:34.749 duties were limited to regulatory compliance. And it's especially 00:29:34.761 --> 00:29:39.104 troubling given that we've been working with PG&E for the past 00:29:39.116 --> 00:29:43.401 almost-decade trying to instill a safety culture in a company 00:29:43.413 --> 00:29:47.901 that values continuous safety improvement beyond compliance. I'm 00:29:47.913 --> 00:29:52.204 just wondered if you wanted to comment now on that statement. 00:29:52.229 --> 00:29:55.998 Thank you for the opportunity. As I said, I 00:29:56.010 --> 00:29:59.666 don't remember saying that, and if I did, I certainly did 00:29:59.678 --> 00:30:03.390 not mean to imply that anything we're doing is hampered by 00:30:03.402 --> 00:30:07.127 regulation or the actions of this Commission or the state. 00:30:07.139 --> 00:30:10.518 Actually, it's quite the opposite. Your focus, as the 00:30:10.530 --> 00:30:14.423 Commission, on things like safety culture, on wildfire safety 00:30:14.435 --> 00:30:18.009 plans, on all of these things, is the right thing to do. 00:30:18.021 --> 00:30:21.543 And I'm not pointing a finger at anybody other than us. 00:30:21.568 --> 00:30:24.999 Commissioner Randolph. 00:30:25.023 --> 00:30:30.731 I appreciate your statement that you 00:30:30.743 --> 00:30:36.093 want to get to a point where the system, where widespread 00:30:36.105 --> 00:30:41.542 shut offs are not necessary on the system. But when do you 00:30:41.554 --> 00:30:46.818 anticipate getting to that point? And what are the steps 00:30:46.830 --> 00:30:52.240 and whether you or the next panel wants to provide further 00:30:52.252 --> 00:30:57.398 detail, you know, seeing a path to getting to the point 00:30:57.410 --> 00:31:03.011 where these widespread events are not necessary is, I think, 00:31:03.023 --> 00:31:08.175 where we all need to be. So how are we gonna get there? 00:31:08.200 --> 00:31:11.929 Thank you for that question, Commissioner. 00:31:11.941 --> 00:31:14.857 And there are people, I'm not deferring every 00:31:14.869 --> 00:31:18.224 question, but there are people specifically going to 00:31:18.236 --> 00:31:21.793 speak to that point. But some of the answers are in the 00:31:21.805 --> 00:31:25.474 shorter term, more sectionalizing equipment, particularly 00:31:25.486 --> 00:31:28.850 on subtransmission, so that you can take out smaller 00:31:28.862 --> 00:31:32.219 sections of line. I think there's a definite need to 00:31:32.231 --> 00:31:35.601 move towards some form of microgrid sectionalization 00:31:35.613 --> 00:31:38.828 so you can have small contained, you know, they do 00:31:38.840 --> 00:31:42.257 some of that in other parts of the state. You have to 00:31:42.269 --> 00:31:45.617 have some generation support behind that. The use of 00:31:45.629 --> 00:31:49.116 different materials like covered wire, will help some, 00:31:49.128 --> 00:31:52.726 so it's called tree wire hardening the system. Increased 00:31:52.738 --> 00:31:55.651 vegetation management, all these things, will 00:31:55.663 --> 00:31:59.077 help, and eventually, I think the technology will get 00:31:59.089 --> 00:32:02.262 us to a point where we don't need to be doing it. 00:32:02.287 --> 00:32:06.204 What is the timeline you see for that? 00:32:06.229 --> 00:32:11.736 So better every year. I think this is probably a 10-year timeline 00:32:11.748 --> 00:32:17.133 to get to a point where it's really ratcheted down significantly. I think it'll 00:32:17.145 --> 00:32:22.355 be better every year. I think everybody gets better at it every year and with 00:32:22.367 --> 00:32:27.589 every event, and we learn a lot from each other. But the risk is significant. 00:32:27.614 --> 00:32:31.629 Have you prepared sort of a 00:32:31.641 --> 00:32:36.579 prioritization of that, so that you can understand sort of which 00:32:36.591 --> 00:32:41.371 segments of your system would achieve the first, you know, the 00:32:41.383 --> 00:32:46.100 broadest benefit early in terms of making these improvements? 00:32:46.125 --> 00:32:53.789 The answer is yes. And the 00:32:53.801 --> 00:33:01.833 specifics will come from an expert after me. 00:33:01.858 --> 00:33:08.899 Commissioner Guzman Aceves. You're not on yet. 00:33:15.304 --> 00:33:22.100 As Commissioner Rechtschaffen stated, we've 00:33:22.112 --> 00:33:28.368 been looking within the safety culture proceeding and examining PG& 00:33:28.380 --> 00:33:34.906 E's treatment of its customers as if it's entitled to them. Thank you. 00:33:34.918 --> 00:33:41.548 It's treating its customers as if there's no way it could lose them. Is 00:33:41.560 --> 00:33:48.520 your lack of preparedness and consideration for your customers a reflection 00:33:48.532 --> 00:33:55.044 that, fundamentally, you believe that you are entitled to them instead 00:33:55.056 --> 00:34:01.746 of having the privilege to serve them? Do you think the lack of care you 00:34:01.758 --> 00:34:08.001 had for your customers merits you retaining them as your customers? 00:34:08.026 --> 00:34:12.946 I don't believe anybody should think, and I certainly do not 00:34:12.958 --> 00:34:17.634 think, that you're entitled to your customers. I think regardless of the 00:34:17.646 --> 00:34:22.187 system and whether it's, well regardless of it, I think our objectives 00:34:22.199 --> 00:34:26.944 should be every day to make sure that we feel like we can't keep them and 00:34:26.956 --> 00:34:31.559 doing everything we can to keep them. To me, one of the keys to success 00:34:31.571 --> 00:34:36.057 in his business is happy and satisfied customers, which we don't have 00:34:36.069 --> 00:34:40.485 today. So, I certainly don't think that myself and I don't think the 00:34:40.497 --> 00:34:45.566 organization as a whole thinks that. As far as whether that attitude permeated 00:34:45.578 --> 00:34:50.107 this event, I didn't see any of that. I see a lot of good people doing 00:34:50.119 --> 00:34:54.916 hard work every day, trying to do the right thing to serve the customer. I 00:34:54.928 --> 00:34:59.399 would tell you I haven't been there long and one of the things I have 00:34:59.411 --> 00:35:04.085 focused hard on, like in every meeting and every opportunity, that we're 00:35:04.097 --> 00:35:08.821 here to serve customers. That is our primary and only function. And so, I 00:35:08.833 --> 00:35:13.634 don't believe you should think you are gonna keep your customers. In fact, 00:35:13.646 --> 00:35:18.247 some of our customers are talking about doing something else right now, 00:35:18.259 --> 00:35:22.745 and I certainly don't think any of that attitude affected this event. 00:35:22.770 --> 00:35:27.249 Any other comments? I have 00:35:27.261 --> 00:35:31.274 one. I have one final when Mr Johnson. As 00:35:31.286 --> 00:35:39.610 was stated in my opening remarks, which I'm sure we'll engage the next panel in, I was 00:35:39.622 --> 00:35:43.912 absolutely astounded at what I saw as pretty 00:35:43.924 --> 00:35:48.036 simple preparedness for a major out outage 00:35:48.048 --> 00:35:52.536 like the PSPS we experienced last week. Simple 00:35:52.548 --> 00:35:56.665 things like you have already enumerated, I 00:35:56.677 --> 00:36:00.870 did in my letter to you, you did in some of 00:36:00.882 --> 00:36:05.279 your response back to me, of the website, the 00:36:05.291 --> 00:36:13.714 call center. But, you know, we'll be judged by outcomes and not by plans. So I'm really 00:36:13.726 --> 00:36:18.018 hoping that we hear today that you have done 00:36:18.030 --> 00:36:22.239 a tremendous amount of review of the plans, 00:36:22.251 --> 00:36:26.549 so we have much better outcomes. Okay. Thank 00:36:26.561 --> 00:36:30.488 you. Any other questions? Thank you, Mr. 00:36:30.500 --> 00:36:34.973 Johnson. Ask the next panel to please come up. 00:36:34.985 --> 00:36:39.089 And I think you may have a couple of folks 00:36:39.101 --> 00:36:43.676 that we didn't have on the agenda, so I'll just 00:36:43.688 --> 00:36:48.084 allow the executives to introduce themselves, 00:36:48.096 --> 00:36:56.117 once they get seated and settled. I'm going to have them introduce themselves right 00:36:56.129 --> 00:37:04.448 now. And then before you speak, it might be helpful for those recording to reintroduce 00:37:04.460 --> 00:37:08.553 yourself. And when you introduce yourself, 00:37:08.565 --> 00:37:12.861 if I may also ask you to provide your title. 00:37:12.873 --> 00:37:21.094 I think we do have tent cards. Thank you. We'll be discussing the issues and problems 00:37:21.106 --> 00:37:25.297 identified during the recent public service 00:37:25.309 --> 00:37:29.799 power shut off, the events, and the corrective 00:37:29.811 --> 00:37:37.751 actions taken to date. With that, we can turn to the panel for your presentations. 00:37:37.776 --> 00:37:41.422 Thank you President Batjer, Commissioners, 00:37:41.434 --> 00:37:44.374 Commission staff, and members of the public. 00:37:44.386 --> 00:37:47.842 Good afternoon. I'm Andy Visi, the CEO and President 00:37:47.854 --> 00:37:51.192 of the Pacific Gas and Electric Company. Thank you 00:37:51.204 --> 00:37:54.526 for your invitation to be here today. I've been at 00:37:54.538 --> 00:37:57.873 PG&E for just about two months. However, my entire 00:37:57.885 --> 00:38:01.148 41 year career has been in the energy and utility 00:38:01.160 --> 00:38:04.369 industry, both domestically and internationally. 00:38:04.381 --> 00:38:07.767 I'm an operator by training and at heart, and I can 00:38:07.779 --> 00:38:10.851 attest that no one gets into this line of work 00:38:10.863 --> 00:38:13.993 with the dream of having to turn the lights off 00:38:14.005 --> 00:38:17.279 on customers. It runs counter to our nature. It's 00:38:17.291 --> 00:38:20.418 not in our DNA, and it's not what our customers 00:38:20.430 --> 00:38:23.963 expect. But what is part of our DNA is keeping people 00:38:23.975 --> 00:38:27.043 safe. Throughout all the companies I've worked 00:38:27.055 --> 00:38:30.200 for safety is the golden thread. It's the value 00:38:30.212 --> 00:38:33.598 that comes before anything else. And I have learned 00:38:33.610 --> 00:38:36.877 the same is true at PG&E, and what that means is, 00:38:36.889 --> 00:38:40.215 when faced with a choice between turning off power 00:38:40.227 --> 00:38:43.565 or putting our communities at risk of catastrophic 00:38:43.577 --> 00:38:46.966 wildfire, we take the very difficult decision to go 00:38:46.978 --> 00:38:50.248 dark. We've made this decision a handful of times 00:38:50.260 --> 00:38:53.392 in the past couple of years, and unfortunately, 00:38:53.404 --> 00:38:56.549 we will likely need to continue doing so in the 00:38:56.561 --> 00:38:59.948 near term for the sake of public safety. So we need 00:38:59.960 --> 00:39:03.032 to keep getting better at doing it. We need to 00:39:03.044 --> 00:39:06.437 make it as minimally disruptive to our customers as 00:39:06.449 --> 00:39:09.789 possible by being more targeted and restoring more 00:39:09.801 --> 00:39:13.126 quickly. My colleagues and I will discuss specific 00:39:13.138 --> 00:39:16.409 ways we're doing this during the next two panels, 00:39:16.421 --> 00:39:19.555 but I'll also say it's our goal not to do these 00:39:19.567 --> 00:39:22.845 type of shut off at all. We want to be a safe and 00:39:22.857 --> 00:39:25.915 reliable operator, and that's going to require 00:39:25.927 --> 00:39:29.520 transformation in the years ahead to effectively adapt 00:39:29.532 --> 00:39:32.923 to the changes and the challenges of climate. We'll 00:39:32.935 --> 00:39:35.881 talk about that work today as well. So as an 00:39:35.893 --> 00:39:39.346 overview, let me lay out some general areas of focus 00:39:39.358 --> 00:39:42.366 of our improvement efforts. First, this works 00:39:42.378 --> 00:39:45.772 scaling our support functions, specifically, our IT 00:39:45.784 --> 00:39:49.060 Resources and call center workforce to handle the 00:39:49.072 --> 00:39:52.655 surge in activity that accompanies service disruptions 00:39:52.667 --> 00:39:55.804 of this type. No one likes being without power, 00:39:55.816 --> 00:39:58.881 but we can’t also leave the public in the dark 00:39:58.893 --> 00:40:02.233 when it comes to the information to help them plan 00:40:02.245 --> 00:40:05.242 and stay safe. Second, we have to improve our 00:40:05.254 --> 00:40:08.786 coordination with local and state governments, agency 00:40:08.798 --> 00:40:11.998 partners, and tribal governments. We need better 00:40:12.010 --> 00:40:15.549 processes and procedures for communicating with these 00:40:15.561 --> 00:40:19.143 various entities, so we're sharing timely and accurate 00:40:19.155 --> 00:40:22.160 information and collecting important feedback 00:40:22.172 --> 00:40:25.368 on our performance in real time. We need to team 00:40:25.380 --> 00:40:28.522 with these agencies to plan and scale for these 00:40:28.534 --> 00:40:31.596 shutoffs so they can effectively support their 00:40:31.608 --> 00:40:35.337 communities and maintain their critical services. Third, 00:40:35.349 --> 00:40:38.678 we must focus on improving the information content 00:40:38.690 --> 00:40:41.835 of our outage maps and develop better practices 00:40:41.847 --> 00:40:45.169 for sharing those maps. Millions of people need to 00:40:45.181 --> 00:40:48.385 be able to look up their addresses online to see 00:40:48.397 --> 00:40:51.987 whether their home or business is going to be impacted 00:40:51.999 --> 00:40:55.011 and had confidence in that information. While 00:40:55.023 --> 00:40:58.283 we believe that the operational components of the 00:40:58.295 --> 00:41:01.698 public safety power shut off were well-executed, we 00:41:01.710 --> 00:41:04.910 still have opportunities to improve the process. 00:41:04.922 --> 00:41:08.199 Specifically, the scope of those impacted and the 00:41:08.211 --> 00:41:11.791 speed of restoration. This is all about keeping people 00:41:11.803 --> 00:41:14.938 safe from catastrophic wildfires and minimizing 00:41:14.950 --> 00:41:18.078 the time customers are disrupted. We're working 00:41:18.090 --> 00:41:21.362 hard to narrow the scope and the frequency of the 00:41:21.374 --> 00:41:24.761 shutoffs and speeding restoration through a variety 00:41:24.773 --> 00:41:27.976 of near-term and longer-term efforts. As I said, 00:41:27.988 --> 00:41:31.250 safety shutoffs cannot be standard practice. It's 00:41:31.262 --> 00:41:34.601 simply not sustainable. Our challenge is to adapt, 00:41:34.613 --> 00:41:37.737 to rethink the system, to use technology to our 00:41:37.749 --> 00:41:41.147 advantage, and to enlist expertise from wherever it 00:41:41.159 --> 00:41:44.419 resides. The risk we all face is real. We operate 00:41:44.431 --> 00:41:47.770 an electric system in a growing tinderbox. This is 00:41:47.782 --> 00:41:51.366 the challenge of our time and one that we're committed 00:41:51.378 --> 00:41:54.583 to taking head on and solving with our customers 00:41:54.595 --> 00:41:57.662 and the communities we’re privileged to serve. 00:41:57.674 --> 00:42:00.884 What I want to say and I'm gonna go off prepared 00:42:00.896 --> 00:42:04.215 remarks because this is about learning and this is 00:42:04.227 --> 00:42:07.428 about improving. One of the things that was said 00:42:07.440 --> 00:42:10.504 earlier led me to this conclusion. It is about 00:42:10.516 --> 00:42:13.918 anticipation. As you approach these big events, you 00:42:13.930 --> 00:42:17.122 have to think broadly. Anticipation is clearly a 00:42:17.134 --> 00:42:20.599 part of a PSPS. We have to anticipate weather before 00:42:20.611 --> 00:42:23.940 it happens. We have to anticipate where we need to 00:42:23.952 --> 00:42:27.227 shut off the system. We have to think through how 00:42:27.239 --> 00:42:30.233 we're going to restore. But I have to say our 00:42:30.245 --> 00:42:33.970 anticipation was not adequate. We did not anticipate the 00:42:33.982 --> 00:42:37.243 large volumes that were going to our websites. We 00:42:37.255 --> 00:42:40.463 did not anticipate all the local needs that were 00:42:40.475 --> 00:42:44.061 not being served by the information we were providing. 00:42:44.073 --> 00:42:47.278 So one of the things that we need to do broadly, 00:42:47.290 --> 00:42:50.620 not just with PSPS, but as a company that deserves 00:42:50.632 --> 00:42:53.581 the right to serve the customer it has is we 00:42:53.593 --> 00:42:57.108 have to develop a mindset or culture of anticipation. 00:42:57.120 --> 00:43:00.321 What else can happen as we approach a PSPS? What 00:43:00.333 --> 00:43:03.527 if we had a PSPS and experience an earthquake at 00:43:03.539 --> 00:43:06.876 the same time? What happens in the local community 00:43:06.888 --> 00:43:10.013 that's ongoing that will be impacted negatively 00:43:10.025 --> 00:43:13.294 by shutting off power? What does this require? It 00:43:13.306 --> 00:43:16.896 requires scenario planning, running all the scenarios, 00:43:16.908 --> 00:43:19.855 asking all the tough questions, and tabletop 00:43:19.867 --> 00:43:23.253 exercises to see how we would perform. It requires, 00:43:23.265 --> 00:43:26.532 on an ongoing basis, scanning of the environment, 00:43:26.544 --> 00:43:30.001 intimate knowledge of the communities that we serve. 00:43:30.013 --> 00:43:33.090 So we understand what would be disrupted. What 00:43:33.102 --> 00:43:36.360 would be the additional safety concerns that they 00:43:36.372 --> 00:43:39.642 may be facing. This requires a greater engagement 00:43:39.654 --> 00:43:42.984 with our communities, and it also tells us that we 00:43:42.996 --> 00:43:46.141 should be thinking about PSPS all the time, not 00:43:46.153 --> 00:43:49.472 just seven days in advance when we see the weather 00:43:49.484 --> 00:43:52.751 changing. So there is significant work to do. And 00:43:52.763 --> 00:43:56.023 my colleagues at the table here will all tell you 00:43:56.035 --> 00:43:59.504 about what we're doing now and what we will continue 00:43:59.516 --> 00:44:02.773 to work on. So let me again introduce them before 00:44:02.785 --> 00:44:05.923 I conclude my remarks. We have Laurie Giammona, 00:44:05.935 --> 00:44:09.068 who is our Senior Vice President Chief Customer 00:44:09.080 --> 00:44:12.290 Officer. Michael Lewis, Senior Vice President of 00:44:12.302 --> 00:44:15.819 Electric Operations. Kathy Kay, Senior Vice President 00:44:15.831 --> 00:44:18.837 Chief Information Officer. And Aaron Johnson, 00:44:18.849 --> 00:44:22.307 who's Vice President of Customer Solutions. They all 00:44:22.319 --> 00:44:25.593 have an active part of these operations, but more 00:44:25.605 --> 00:44:28.930 importantly, they have an active part every day in 00:44:28.942 --> 00:44:32.475 making sure we live up to the expectations of serving 00:44:32.487 --> 00:44:35.489 our customers. So with that, I'll conclude my 00:44:35.501 --> 00:44:38.778 remarks and with your permission turn to Michael. 00:44:38.803 --> 00:44:41.473 Thank you, Andy. And good 00:44:41.485 --> 00:44:44.417 afternoon, everyone. My name is Michael Lewis. 00:44:44.442 --> 00:44:46.691 You need you're closer to 00:44:46.703 --> 00:44:49.013 the mic. Thank you very much. Thank you. Okay. 00:44:49.038 --> 00:44:52.720 My name is Michael Lewis, Senior 00:44:52.732 --> 00:44:56.204 Vice President of Electric Operations, PG&E. I 00:44:56.216 --> 00:44:59.756 want to thank you for this opportunity to share 00:44:59.768 --> 00:45:03.320 our lessons learned and corrective actions from 00:45:03.332 --> 00:45:07.239 the October 9 PSPS event. We strive to be a superior 00:45:07.251 --> 00:45:10.652 operating team. The pathway to this objective 00:45:10.664 --> 00:45:13.985 is to be highly self-critical and to embrace 00:45:13.997 --> 00:45:17.774 criticism as a means to improve. As the officer in 00:45:17.786 --> 00:45:21.470 charge of this event, the decision to de-energize 00:45:21.482 --> 00:45:24.955 power to 730,000 homes, businesses, and public 00:45:24.967 --> 00:45:28.435 service facilities was gut wrenching because I 00:45:28.447 --> 00:45:32.148 recognized the hardship that would create for our 00:45:32.160 --> 00:45:35.699 customers and our communities. I have been with 00:45:35.711 --> 00:45:39.409 PG&E for 14 months and in the industry for almost 00:45:39.421 --> 00:45:43.262 34 years. I have lead hurricane restoration efforts 00:45:43.274 --> 00:45:46.460 in Florida and the Carolinas for 14 years, 00:45:46.472 --> 00:45:50.081 so shutting the power off goes against all of my 00:45:50.093 --> 00:45:53.714 training and experience. With that said, it's my 00:45:53.726 --> 00:45:56.896 true belief that those actions prevented a 00:45:56.908 --> 00:46:00.905 catastrophic wildfire. From an operation perspective, 00:46:00.917 --> 00:46:04.529 allow me to share four items where we're working 00:46:04.541 --> 00:46:07.869 to get better. The first is integration. How 00:46:07.881 --> 00:46:11.424 PG&E’s electric operations can better integrate 00:46:11.436 --> 00:46:14.992 with state agencies such as CalOES and CalFire. 00:46:15.004 --> 00:46:18.689 This needs to be much more than just one way flow 00:46:18.701 --> 00:46:22.471 of communication or enhanced transparency. We will 00:46:22.483 --> 00:46:26.247 work to create a unified command structure so that 00:46:26.259 --> 00:46:29.666 PG&E and these safety-focused state agencies, 00:46:29.678 --> 00:46:33.439 communicate and coordinate effectively, especially 00:46:33.451 --> 00:46:36.632 when we are reaching a point of making key 00:46:36.644 --> 00:46:40.115 decisions during the operations. We will train 00:46:40.127 --> 00:46:43.758 all of our people who respond to PSPS events and 00:46:43.770 --> 00:46:47.083 emergencies on the protocols of standardized 00:46:47.095 --> 00:46:50.937 emergency management system, or SEMS protocol. This 00:46:50.949 --> 00:46:54.489 would ensure that we speak the same language as 00:46:54.501 --> 00:46:58.054 CalOES and CalFire. And we will improve both of 00:46:58.066 --> 00:47:01.899 precision and availability of our maps that overlay 00:47:01.911 --> 00:47:05.387 the footprint with our circuits so that all of 00:47:05.399 --> 00:47:08.720 us, PG&E, state agencies, local agencies and 00:47:08.732 --> 00:47:12.509 customers, are working from the same playbook. Let 00:47:12.521 --> 00:47:16.649 me just say that the question regarding lessons learned 00:47:16.661 --> 00:47:20.136 in the September event. We failed in executing 00:47:20.148 --> 00:47:23.763 the lessons of that event to provide mapping for 00:47:23.775 --> 00:47:27.033 this event. So that will be a primary focus 00:47:27.045 --> 00:47:30.436 for us to ensure that doesn't happen again. A 00:47:30.448 --> 00:47:33.999 second focus area for our team in Operations is 00:47:34.011 --> 00:47:37.630 to do a better job of making sure our grid is as 00:47:37.642 --> 00:47:41.124 prepared as possible for a PSPS event. We need 00:47:41.136 --> 00:47:44.967 to ensure that all circuits within a PSPS footprint 00:47:44.979 --> 00:47:48.231 are in service. During this event, we had a 00:47:48.243 --> 00:47:51.858 transmission line that was out of service due to 00:47:51.870 --> 00:47:55.571 planned maintenance, and it resulted in customers 00:47:55.583 --> 00:47:59.195 in the Humbodlt County being taken out of power. 00:47:59.207 --> 00:48:02.757 They need to be, which shouldn't have happened. 00:48:02.769 --> 00:48:06.313 Going forward, during pre-event planning, we'll 00:48:06.325 --> 00:48:09.659 make sure that all circuits are energized to 00:48:09.671 --> 00:48:13.282 ensure that doesn't happen again. Another lesson 00:48:13.294 --> 00:48:16.768 learned is what I call the societal continuity 00:48:16.780 --> 00:48:20.175 issues. Basically, that means we need to do a 00:48:20.187 --> 00:48:23.815 better job of planning for how a PSPS event will 00:48:23.827 --> 00:48:27.293 impact key pieces of infrastructure throughout 00:48:27.305 --> 00:48:30.931 our service area, including bridges, tunnels and 00:48:30.943 --> 00:48:34.711 mass trading systems like BART, light rail systems 00:48:34.723 --> 00:48:38.132 and others. During the event, we were able to 00:48:38.144 --> 00:48:41.605 successfully work with them to ensure that the 00:48:41.617 --> 00:48:45.313 tunnels and trains stayed energized This to place 00:48:45.325 --> 00:48:48.866 however during the execution of the operational 00:48:48.878 --> 00:48:52.654 phase of the event, rather than the planning prior 00:48:52.666 --> 00:48:56.204 to the event. We're gonna change that to ensure 00:48:56.216 --> 00:48:59.840 that we have a better plan to ensure we have all 00:48:59.852 --> 00:49:03.471 the communication and coordination done prior to 00:49:03.483 --> 00:49:06.891 moving into the execution phase of the event. 00:49:06.903 --> 00:49:10.514 We would do that with a robust inventory down to 00:49:10.526 --> 00:49:14.149 the city and county level, then factor in what's 00:49:14.161 --> 00:49:17.926 needed. The last area where we know we need to get 00:49:17.938 --> 00:49:21.567 better is involving our standard of restoration. 00:49:21.579 --> 00:49:25.045 We've been telling customers, stakeholders and 00:49:25.057 --> 00:49:28.608 our regulators that preparations should be made 00:49:28.620 --> 00:49:32.018 for outages lasting 3 to 5 days after the all 00:49:32.030 --> 00:49:35.439 clear signal was given. We now recognise that 00:49:35.451 --> 00:49:39.135 five days as a benchmark is unacceptable. In this 00:49:39.147 --> 00:49:42.622 event, the vast majority of our customers were 00:49:42.634 --> 00:49:46.250 restored within 48 hours, and, frankly, that now 00:49:46.262 --> 00:49:49.816 has to become the new benchmark for us to beat. 00:49:49.828 --> 00:49:53.515 In the future PSPS events, we will resource every 00:49:53.527 --> 00:49:57.226 circuit with a dedicated restoration team. Rather 00:49:57.238 --> 00:50:00.709 than this past event, it was everything 2 to 4 00:50:00.721 --> 00:50:04.130 circuits. If that requires mutual assistance, 00:50:04.142 --> 00:50:07.828 we would ask for it sooner and have outside crews 00:50:07.840 --> 00:50:11.464 on the ground before restoration begins. We also 00:50:11.476 --> 00:50:15.167 looked into the possibility of doing area patrols 00:50:15.179 --> 00:50:18.513 overnight. Right now, nearly all of our line 00:50:18.525 --> 00:50:21.917 inspection work occurs during daylight hours. 00:50:21.929 --> 00:50:25.556 There's a possibility that a fixed-wing aircraft 00:50:25.568 --> 00:50:29.337 equipped with infrared and high-definition cameras 00:50:29.349 --> 00:50:32.907 would allow us to see our lines, even at night. 00:50:32.919 --> 00:50:36.381 Also, I want to note that we're working with a 00:50:36.393 --> 00:50:40.237 consultant with much utility and emergency response 00:50:40.249 --> 00:50:43.716 experience to do several things for us. First, 00:50:43.728 --> 00:50:47.208 over the next 8 to 10 weeks, they’ll conduct a 00:50:47.220 --> 00:50:51.129 detailed assessment of our performance with the same 00:50:51.141 --> 00:50:54.692 critical eye that I mentioned earlier. It would 00:50:54.704 --> 00:50:58.397 help us with integrated SEMS protocols within our 00:50:58.409 --> 00:51:01.743 entire company, and they’ll take an advisory 00:51:01.755 --> 00:51:05.367 role as we incorporate improvements and initiate 00:51:05.379 --> 00:51:09.150 future PSPS events. In closing, I do wanna mention 00:51:09.162 --> 00:51:12.409 the incredible commitment of our employees. 00:51:12.421 --> 00:51:15.902 They didn't make the decision. I did, yet they 00:51:15.914 --> 00:51:19.454 carried it out in a way that humbles me to be a 00:51:19.466 --> 00:51:23.018 part of this organization. They did it in areas 00:51:23.030 --> 00:51:26.651 that I would consider to be hostile. Fundamental 00:51:26.663 --> 00:51:30.443 to our business is to ensure that they should also 00:51:30.455 --> 00:51:34.362 become unnecessary. As you heard from Bill and Andy, 00:51:34.374 --> 00:51:37.922 we’re hardening the electric grid with stronger 00:51:37.934 --> 00:51:41.551 poles and lines, putting power lines underground 00:51:41.563 --> 00:51:44.747 in certain areas, and add a new technology 00:51:44.759 --> 00:51:48.076 that will allow us to further specialize our 00:51:48.088 --> 00:51:51.640 system, in the end, allowing us to impact fewer 00:51:51.652 --> 00:51:55.493 customers with public safety power shut offs. These 00:51:55.505 --> 00:51:58.989 improvements, combined with the steps outlined 00:51:59.001 --> 00:52:02.465 previously, are going to help us minimize this 00:52:02.477 --> 00:52:06.027 tool, so that one day, PSPS becomes a true last 00:52:06.039 --> 00:52:09.657 resort. We're moving as quickly as we can on all 00:52:09.669 --> 00:52:13.521 these fronts. As that I've already said, this is an 00:52:13.533 --> 00:52:17.148 opportunity for our team to get better, to learn 00:52:17.160 --> 00:52:20.639 and adapt, so they will serve in our customers 00:52:20.651 --> 00:52:24.420 in the best and safest manner possible. So now our 00:52:24.432 --> 00:52:27.917 hand it over to my colleague, Laurie Giammona. 00:52:27.942 --> 00:52:32.285 Thank you. Good afternoon. My name is Laurie 00:52:32.297 --> 00:52:36.993 Giammona. I serve as PG&E’s Senior Vice President and Chief Customer 00:52:37.005 --> 00:52:41.626 Officer. On behalf of our more than 20,000 employees, we understand 00:52:41.638 --> 00:52:46.136 and feel significant impact that turning off the power has on the 00:52:46.148 --> 00:52:50.834 customers, on our customers, and on the communities we serve and the 00:52:50.846 --> 00:52:55.341 communities that we live in. I acknowledge that we were not fully 00:52:55.353 --> 00:52:59.977 prepared to support our customers to the best of our ability, given 00:52:59.989 --> 00:53:04.490 the size and scale of this public safety power shutoff event, and 00:53:04.502 --> 00:53:08.915 I am personally committed to fixing those gaps. Last week's PSPS 00:53:08.927 --> 00:53:13.760 highlighted the opportunity to further understand and more effectively 00:53:13.772 --> 00:53:18.259 plan for the various events, scenarios and the conditions that we 00:53:18.271 --> 00:53:22.769 were dealing with, as Andy stated, including the societal impacts 00:53:22.781 --> 00:53:27.606 that a disruption in service has on our customers and our communities. 00:53:27.618 --> 00:53:31.773 There are three areas of challenge that I'd like to focus on 00:53:31.785 --> 00:53:36.343 today, and what we're doing to address them immediately. The first 00:53:36.355 --> 00:53:41.061 relates to the impact in a dynamic and changing weather environment, 00:53:41.073 --> 00:53:45.689 and what that has on our customer notification protocol. The second 00:53:45.701 --> 00:53:49.921 was an impact to our customer communications from our website 00:53:49.933 --> 00:53:54.624 failure. And the third relates to our community resource centers and 00:53:54.636 --> 00:53:59.202 our engagement with our community partners. Our goal, depending on 00:53:59.214 --> 00:54:03.833 weather, is to send customer notifications once a decision has been 00:54:03.845 --> 00:54:08.545 made by the officer in charge, and the required agency notifications 00:54:08.557 --> 00:54:13.250 have occurred, at 48 hours, 24 hours, and just prior to shutting off 00:54:13.262 --> 00:54:17.832 the power. We use automated calls, texts and emails. Notifications 00:54:17.844 --> 00:54:22.393 were launched in English, and they're launched in Spanish to those 00:54:22.405 --> 00:54:27.035 customers that have designated language qualifications. For medical 00:54:27.047 --> 00:54:31.262 baseline customers that were unable to reach via our outbound 00:54:31.274 --> 00:54:35.842 messages and notifications, we continue to try to reach them on an 00:54:35.854 --> 00:54:40.338 hourly basis by contacting them via phone and other channels. But 00:54:40.350 --> 00:54:44.847 in addition, we preposition our field crews so that they are able 00:54:44.859 --> 00:54:49.213 to go and do home checks on our customers. So for those medical 00:54:49.225 --> 00:54:53.932 baseline customers that we're unable to contact via our notification 00:54:53.944 --> 00:54:58.492 channels, and we therefore don't receive positive confirmation, we 00:54:58.504 --> 00:55:03.063 actually send one of our employees to their home to check on them. 00:55:03.075 --> 00:55:07.561 Should they find that there is, that the customer has a need that 00:55:07.573 --> 00:55:12.207 can't be met, we partner with having them engage 911 or we escalate 00:55:12.219 --> 00:55:16.702 that through our emergency protocols. As part of our preparation, 00:55:16.714 --> 00:55:21.140 we fully staffed our call centers. We were ready for this event. 00:55:21.152 --> 00:55:25.368 We have four call centers that are served by our employees in 00:55:25.380 --> 00:55:30.085 California. In addition, we suppressed all of our credit billing and 00:55:30.097 --> 00:55:34.783 disconnect activity so that we could leverage our billing and credit 00:55:34.795 --> 00:55:39.152 representatives and they could take calls as well. We maximized 00:55:39.164 --> 00:55:43.719 overtime, we brought in all available staffing. However, as we saw 00:55:43.731 --> 00:55:48.298 during the latest PSPS event, the events were dynamic. The weather 00:55:48.310 --> 00:55:53.271 changed. Our notifications were large in scale, and as a result of that, 00:55:53.283 --> 00:55:57.780 we saw a tremendous surge in volume as we launched notifications. 00:55:57.792 --> 00:56:02.214 These notifications were certainly at a velocity that we had not 00:56:02.226 --> 00:56:06.455 launched before. I acknowledge that it's less than optimal to 00:56:06.467 --> 00:56:11.016 receive a notification that your power is going to be shut off and 00:56:11.028 --> 00:56:15.793 then not have your power shut off, but as both Andy and Michael said, 00:56:15.805 --> 00:56:20.359 we're working in a dynamic environment and we're working to really 00:56:20.371 --> 00:56:24.870 reduce the scope of the outages. So, unfortunately, customers did 00:56:24.882 --> 00:56:29.570 receive notifications and then did not receive a power shut off. And 00:56:29.582 --> 00:56:34.077 that creates a very uncomfortable situation for our customers and 00:56:34.089 --> 00:56:38.579 one that can create a hardship. As we launched our notifications, 00:56:38.591 --> 00:56:43.160 we saw a surge of volume come to our call centers and our website. 00:56:43.172 --> 00:56:47.518 They first start with our website. All of our notifications are 00:56:47.530 --> 00:56:52.228 directed to go to our website because that's where our customers can 00:56:52.240 --> 00:56:56.796 receive the most dynamic alerts, they can sign up for alerts. When 00:56:56.808 --> 00:57:01.376 we started to experience problems with the website, customers came 00:57:01.388 --> 00:57:05.873 back into the call center. As we prepared for this event, what we 00:57:05.885 --> 00:57:10.382 do in our call center is we upfront load emergency calls and PSPS 00:57:10.394 --> 00:57:14.817 calls so that customers that are calling in with an emergency or 00:57:14.829 --> 00:57:19.263 for PSPS purposes can be moved to the front of the queue. We put 00:57:19.275 --> 00:57:23.823 that in place. However, unfortunately, customers didn't all opt to 00:57:23.835 --> 00:57:28.326 go in to that first prompt and ended up in our general queue. Our 00:57:28.338 --> 00:57:32.756 plan for these events will be, going forward, that, as we launch 00:57:32.768 --> 00:57:37.606 notifications, we will immediately have the emergency and PSPS prompts 00:57:37.618 --> 00:57:42.169 upfront loaded and we will suppress all other call volume. We will 00:57:42.181 --> 00:57:46.743 use technology so that we can call customers back that are calling 00:57:46.755 --> 00:57:51.312 for general questions and enquiries, and we will focus immediately 00:57:51.324 --> 00:57:55.893 after notifications on our customers that are calling for the PSPS 00:57:55.905 --> 00:58:00.522 events. I think what's important to note is that, during our event, 00:58:00.534 --> 00:58:05.163 during the duration of our event, the maximum delay that a customer 00:58:05.175 --> 00:58:09.662 experienced if they were calling for a, and they were in the PSPS 00:58:09.674 --> 00:58:14.310 footprint, was 21 minutes. And that was on the day that our website 00:58:14.322 --> 00:58:19.078 was crashing. But overall, no emergency call or PSPS call held longer 00:58:19.090 --> 00:58:23.450 than 11 seconds, so we were able to handle all of our calls and 00:58:23.462 --> 00:58:27.815 then, as call volume dropped, we were able to bring back in our 00:58:27.827 --> 00:58:32.261 normal call volume. But as I said, going forward immediately, in 00:58:32.273 --> 00:58:37.026 all future PSPS events, when the notification protocol is higher than 00:58:37.038 --> 00:58:41.803 100,000 customers, we will immediately flip to our emergency protocol 00:58:41.815 --> 00:58:46.369 within the call center. The other area I'd like to focus on is our 00:58:46.381 --> 00:58:50.880 community resource centers. We built a plan to stand up community 00:58:50.892 --> 00:58:55.511 resource centers in advance of the power shutoff so that they would 00:58:55.523 --> 00:58:59.882 be open when customers’ power was shut off. Our plan was to put 00:58:59.894 --> 00:59:04.315 at least one customer resource center in each community and each 00:59:04.327 --> 00:59:08.965 county. These are sites that provide information for our customers, 00:59:08.977 --> 00:59:13.595 water, air conditioning, and charging opportunities. In this event, 00:59:13.607 --> 00:59:18.101 we were moving fast. We obviously were serving many counties, and 00:59:18.113 --> 00:59:22.668 we did not do a good job in coordinating with our counties. That's 00:59:22.680 --> 00:59:27.180 an opportunity for us. Going forward, we're gonna be working very 00:59:27.192 --> 00:59:31.540 closely to develop a playbook with each of our counties so that 00:59:31.552 --> 00:59:36.049 we have sites identified where we can stand up community resource 00:59:36.061 --> 00:59:40.756 centers and provide the communities with the support that they need. 00:59:40.768 --> 00:59:45.066 You have our commitment that we're going to have that playbook 00:59:45.078 --> 00:59:49.967 built out by the end of this year. So looking forward, we will continue 00:59:49.979 --> 00:59:54.539 to act to improve on the way we support our customers by listening 00:59:54.551 --> 00:59:58.764 to their concerns and making the following improvements. As I 00:59:58.776 --> 01:00:03.342 stated earlier, we will immediately implement our PSPS call center 01:00:03.354 --> 01:00:07.769 strategy, so that in the event customers begin to call, our PSPS 01:00:07.781 --> 01:00:12.412 customers will know they're at the head of the queue, and they will 01:00:12.424 --> 01:00:16.981 receive immediate service from our live agents. We've upgraded our 01:00:16.993 --> 01:00:21.494 notification system. We had upgraded it prior to coming into this 01:00:21.506 --> 01:00:26.124 event. This notification platform allowed for precise communication 01:00:26.136 --> 01:00:30.493 with our customers. But obviously, given the event dynamics and 01:00:30.505 --> 01:00:35.128 the movement of the weather, we over-communicated to some customers 01:00:35.140 --> 01:00:39.503 that did not otherwise have their power shutoff. Going forward, 01:00:39.515 --> 01:00:43.863 regardless of the size of the event, we’ll performance test our 01:00:43.875 --> 01:00:48.576 systems to ensure we don't have technical gaps or volume challenges. 01:00:48.588 --> 01:00:53.147 We're developing a more effective plan and will develop a playbook 01:00:53.159 --> 01:00:57.866 with local governments to understand their needs and preferences for 01:00:57.878 --> 01:01:02.630 our community resource centers while updating the criteria to include 01:01:02.642 --> 01:01:06.795 cell service availability in those sites. And we'll be doing 01:01:06.807 --> 01:01:11.498 that by the end of the year. And then we will continue to coordinate 01:01:11.510 --> 01:01:16.008 with CalOES for assistance with leading a comprehensive review of 01:01:16.020 --> 01:01:20.436 our potential customer impacts of PSPS as well as other extended 01:01:20.448 --> 01:01:25.011 outages, for example, earthquakes, on all major transit providers, 01:01:25.023 --> 01:01:29.854 refineries and business dependent on fuel for operations. With support 01:01:29.866 --> 01:01:34.299 from those customer agencies, as well as we’ll work closely with 01:01:34.311 --> 01:01:39.066 the other IOU's. Additionally, I wanted to mention we've been working 01:01:39.078 --> 01:01:43.709 very closely this year with CalOES, and Vance Taylor, specifically, 01:01:43.721 --> 01:01:48.004 who is the Access and Functional Needs chief for CalOES. We've 01:01:48.016 --> 01:01:52.584 been partnering with California Foundation for Independent Living. 01:01:52.596 --> 01:01:57.082 We have a contract under way with them. We're leveraging affinity 01:01:57.094 --> 01:02:01.727 groups so that we can really better serve our customers that are in 01:02:01.739 --> 01:02:06.094 need, be it backup generation or customers that have functional 01:02:06.106 --> 01:02:10.745 needs that we need to serve better during these outages. Thank you. 01:02:10.770 --> 01:02:12.970 Thank you. Who's next? Miss Kay? 01:02:12.970 --> 01:02:17.172 Yes. Good afternoon. My name is Kathy Kay. And I'm 01:02:17.197 --> 01:02:19.927 Move the mic a little closer. 01:02:19.939 --> 01:02:22.516 Thank you. You have to speak directly into it. 01:02:22.541 --> 01:02:26.465 Good afternoon. My name is Kathy Kay. I'm 01:02:26.477 --> 01:02:30.055 a Senior vice President and the Chief Information 01:02:30.067 --> 01:02:33.424 Officer at PG&E. From a technology standpoint, 01:02:33.436 --> 01:02:36.734 I acknowledge that we were not fully prepared 01:02:36.746 --> 01:02:40.530 to support our customers to the best of our ability. 01:02:40.542 --> 01:02:43.908 Given the size and scale of this public safety 01:02:43.920 --> 01:02:47.710 power shut off, our customer website crashed several 01:02:47.722 --> 01:02:51.094 times over the course of two days and this was 01:02:51.106 --> 01:02:54.960 extremely unfortunate and unacceptable. We have taken 01:02:54.972 --> 01:02:58.408 concrete steps to fix the issues and ensure our 01:02:58.420 --> 01:03:02.209 website is better prepared for future events. During 01:03:02.221 --> 01:03:05.663 the event, requests to our website increased by 01:03:05.675 --> 01:03:09.246 more than 250 times the peak load we've ever seen 01:03:09.258 --> 01:03:12.984 in the past from any of our previous PSPS events or 01:03:12.996 --> 01:03:16.501 weather events. To give you the size of this, we 01:03:16.513 --> 01:03:20.173 normally have about 7000 user requests an hour and 01:03:20.185 --> 01:03:23.752 we saw it spike to over 1.7 million user requests 01:03:23.764 --> 01:03:27.486 per hour. We did anticipate an increase in customer 01:03:27.498 --> 01:03:31.142 requests. We saw it in previous PSPS events and in 01:03:31.154 --> 01:03:34.739 other weather events, and we had more than scaled 01:03:34.751 --> 01:03:38.249 for that. In fact, our site is scaled for 3 to 4 01:03:38.261 --> 01:03:41.915 times the normal load and we have a spillover site 01:03:41.927 --> 01:03:45.503 that's over 100 times the scale of our peak load. 01:03:45.515 --> 01:03:48.815 But what we didn't anticipate, and this was a 01:03:48.827 --> 01:03:52.539 lesson learned, was the amount of external interest 01:03:52.551 --> 01:03:56.347 coming to our site from media outlets from agencies. 01:03:56.359 --> 01:03:59.718 We had media bots hitting the site repeatedly. 01:03:59.730 --> 01:04:03.244 We had a lot of traffic in terms of the download 01:04:03.256 --> 01:04:06.541 of the maps at much higher levels than we had 01:04:06.553 --> 01:04:10.566 anticipated, and that was the cause of what was causing 01:04:10.578 --> 01:04:14.515 a lot of the performance problems that we experienced. 01:04:14.527 --> 01:04:17.613 While we worked on the solution during the 01:04:17.625 --> 01:04:21.335 event, we provided information to customers through 01:04:21.347 --> 01:04:24.711 other channels. We used Facebook, nine Twitter 01:04:24.723 --> 01:04:28.152 accounts, and Next Door to share updates on the 01:04:28.164 --> 01:04:31.891 PSPS and event. And we also conducted more than 900 01:04:31.903 --> 01:04:35.186 interviews with media during the event. But I 01:04:35.198 --> 01:04:39.210 acknowledge this was not enough for our customers. They 01:04:39.222 --> 01:04:42.654 needed a lot more information than we were able 01:04:42.666 --> 01:04:46.253 to provide on those channels and even when we did 01:04:46.265 --> 01:04:49.618 provide it, it was hard for them to see. So, I 01:04:49.630 --> 01:04:53.712 acknowledge that this was not an acceptable alternative. 01:04:53.724 --> 01:04:57.441 As learning, we should have put up a static website 01:04:57.453 --> 01:05:01.039 much earlier than we did. That would have allowed 01:05:01.051 --> 01:05:04.479 our customers to have some information while we 01:05:04.491 --> 01:05:08.074 were stabilizing the site. Instead, our customers 01:05:08.086 --> 01:05:11.519 were unable at times to get into the site. When 01:05:11.531 --> 01:05:15.192 they did get into it, it was slow. Sometimes, they 01:05:15.204 --> 01:05:18.699 couldn't get information at all, and other times 01:05:18.711 --> 01:05:22.505 they received error messages. By having put a static 01:05:22.517 --> 01:05:26.091 website up earlier, they would have had access to 01:05:26.103 --> 01:05:29.616 some basic information about the PSPS event. And 01:05:29.628 --> 01:05:33.342 that is a lesson learned. And we have already built 01:05:33.354 --> 01:05:37.079 a static site should we ever need to leverage it in 01:05:37.091 --> 01:05:40.811 the future. There's three things that customers are 01:05:40.823 --> 01:05:44.340 looking for during a PSPS event. They want maps. 01:05:44.352 --> 01:05:47.992 They want to be able to look at where the impacted 01:05:48.004 --> 01:05:51.585 areas will be. Our local governments also want to 01:05:51.597 --> 01:05:55.028 look at that, and we have an information portal 01:05:55.040 --> 01:05:58.626 that's available for map files, also, behind PG&E 01:05:58.638 --> 01:06:02.210 dot com. The second thing they want to look at is 01:06:02.222 --> 01:06:05.662 is whether they will be personally impacted. So 01:06:05.674 --> 01:06:09.324 they want to be able to enter their address and be 01:06:09.336 --> 01:06:12.997 able to learn whether they're impacted or not. And 01:06:13.009 --> 01:06:16.790 then the third thing is, when the power is shut off, 01:06:16.802 --> 01:06:20.667 they want to be able to see when it will be restored. 01:06:20.679 --> 01:06:24.108 All three of those capabilities had significant 01:06:24.120 --> 01:06:27.633 load that we had not anticipated. And so, during 01:06:27.645 --> 01:06:31.143 the event, we focused on stabilizing those three 01:06:31.155 --> 01:06:35.023 features. During the event itself, we solved a number 01:06:35.035 --> 01:06:38.251 of problems. We were increasing capacity. We 01:06:38.263 --> 01:06:41.922 actually moved the maps to a cloud-based solution, 01:06:41.934 --> 01:06:45.430 leveraging Amazon Web Services. It allowed us to 01:06:45.442 --> 01:06:49.022 scale dynamically. And what I mean by that is, as 01:06:49.034 --> 01:06:52.249 the traffic was coming, it could scale up in 01:06:52.261 --> 01:06:55.918 capacity to meet the load of the demand of the map 01:06:55.930 --> 01:06:59.644 requests. We also reached out to many of our vendor 01:06:59.656 --> 01:07:03.167 partners. We leveraged EZRI. I mentioned AWS. we 01:07:03.179 --> 01:07:06.900 leverage service watch. We also sought and received 01:07:06.912 --> 01:07:10.429 assistance and guidance from Amy Tong, the State 01:07:10.441 --> 01:07:13.936 CIO, and her team. In fact, she had three people 01:07:13.948 --> 01:07:17.599 who joined us Wednesday evening and stayed with us 01:07:17.611 --> 01:07:21.112 until Friday afternoon. We also got guidance and 01:07:21.124 --> 01:07:25.068 advice from Deputy Executive Director Liza Malashenko. 01:07:25.080 --> 01:07:28.291 As we prepare for the next event, we've made 01:07:28.303 --> 01:07:32.315 improvements to the site already. Mainly at these three 01:07:32.327 --> 01:07:35.760 features. They all can scale now dynamically in 01:07:35.772 --> 01:07:39.216 different environments. So we've moved the load 01:07:39.228 --> 01:07:42.725 all to a Web-based cloud in AWS. We can scale it 01:07:42.737 --> 01:07:46.318 dynamically. So if people want maps, it scales to 01:07:46.330 --> 01:07:50.047 whatever traffic we see. Address look-up now scales 01:07:50.059 --> 01:07:53.789 as well. So that as customers want to look at their 01:07:53.801 --> 01:07:57.516 addresses on and see if they're impacted, we have a 01:07:57.528 --> 01:08:01.184 site that does that. And then from the restoration 01:08:01.196 --> 01:08:04.845 perspective, we also have the capability in an AWS 01:08:04.857 --> 01:08:08.159 environment that scales as well. We've tested 01:08:08.171 --> 01:08:11.666 them all to two times the peak load that we saw, 01:08:11.678 --> 01:08:15.185 that 1.7 million, and we're testing them to even 01:08:15.197 --> 01:08:18.698 higher levels this weekend. In addition to that, 01:08:18.710 --> 01:08:22.366 we've leveraged a content-delivery network to take 01:08:22.378 --> 01:08:26.091 some of the load off of our environment, so that if 01:08:26.103 --> 01:08:29.685 pgande.com starts to experience problems, they're 01:08:29.697 --> 01:08:33.416 still able to see the content, and we're leveraging 01:08:33.428 --> 01:08:36.872 Alcamy to do that. That also has been done, and 01:08:36.884 --> 01:08:40.595 we are testing that this weekend, so it'll be ready 01:08:40.607 --> 01:08:43.829 for Monday. We also, in the future, we’ll be 01:08:43.841 --> 01:08:47.559 building a whole new site that really is solely for 01:08:47.571 --> 01:08:51.229 weather events and PSPS events, so that all of the 01:08:51.241 --> 01:08:54.883 critical information for these types of events are 01:08:54.895 --> 01:08:58.191 really going to be on a whole different site, 01:08:58.203 --> 01:09:01.780 externally accessible, so that the main usage for 01:09:01.792 --> 01:09:05.669 pgande dot com will be for the normal things that our 01:09:05.681 --> 01:09:09.033 customers typically leverage it for, which are 01:09:09.045 --> 01:09:12.768 things like looking at their accounts, paying their 01:09:12.780 --> 01:09:16.425 bills and looking at energy usage. This will allow 01:09:16.437 --> 01:09:19.878 us to scale it dynamically as needed to respond 01:09:19.890 --> 01:09:23.389 to any of the events and any of the traffic that 01:09:23.401 --> 01:09:26.983 we are unable to anticipate. In the meantime, the 01:09:26.995 --> 01:09:30.643 entry point for PG&E dot com will remain the same. 01:09:30.655 --> 01:09:34.172 But we've made the adjustments that I've already 01:09:34.184 --> 01:09:37.825 mentioned, have tested them, and are ready for the 01:09:37.837 --> 01:09:41.633 next PSPS event. I think it's important to note that 01:09:41.645 --> 01:09:45.363 the immediate challenges we faced have been solved. 01:09:45.375 --> 01:09:48.747 But going forward as part of any pre-event, we 01:09:48.759 --> 01:09:52.259 will performance test to high volumes that we've 01:09:52.271 --> 01:09:55.998 seen to make sure that the sites are all responding 01:09:56.010 --> 01:09:59.445 as we expect, so that we’ll be ready for future 01:09:59.457 --> 01:10:03.190 events. With that, I'm gonna turn it over to Aaron. 01:10:03.190 --> 01:10:06.718 Good afternoon. My name is Aaron Johnson 01:10:06.730 --> 01:10:09.721 and I serve as PG&E’s Vice President of Customer 01:10:09.733 --> 01:10:12.839 Energy Solutions and have been working in Electric 01:10:12.851 --> 01:10:16.031 Operations on the design of the Public Safety Power 01:10:16.043 --> 01:10:19.085 Shutoff program. During the October PSPS event, I 01:10:19.097 --> 01:10:22.641 supported the company's liaison function in the Emergency 01:10:22.653 --> 01:10:25.823 Operations Center, or EOC. Specifically, I lead the 01:10:25.835 --> 01:10:29.140 operations briefings for the local, the various local 01:10:29.152 --> 01:10:32.499 agencies impacted by the event, including counties and 01:10:32.511 --> 01:10:35.747 tribal governments. I'm going to provide an overview 01:10:35.759 --> 01:10:38.928 of our coordination efforts with local governments, 01:10:38.940 --> 01:10:41.938 discuss where we fell short and what we're doing 01:10:41.950 --> 01:10:45.177 to fix these challenges. To start, we understand and 01:10:45.189 --> 01:10:48.428 recognize the significant impact that this event had 01:10:48.440 --> 01:10:51.612 on our customers and communities. We also recognize 01:10:51.624 --> 01:10:54.808 that, in many ways, we fell short of what our local 01:10:54.820 --> 01:10:58.105 government partners expected of us, and frankly, what 01:10:58.117 --> 01:11:01.108 we expected of ourselves. And those shortcomings 01:11:01.120 --> 01:11:04.288 resulted in considerable frustration. We have to do 01:11:04.300 --> 01:11:07.848 better and we are taking steps to be better. To that end, 01:11:07.860 --> 01:11:10.841 PG&E leadership held 2 hot wash conference calls 01:11:10.853 --> 01:11:14.031 with counties impacted by the recent PSPS events on 01:11:14.043 --> 01:11:17.459 Wednesday. The focus was on quick wins or things we can 01:11:17.471 --> 01:11:20.777 do immediately to improve collaboration during a PSPS 01:11:20.789 --> 01:11:24.074 event. In the coming weeks, PG&E leadership will also 01:11:24.086 --> 01:11:27.079 hold in-person meetings with counties and tribal 01:11:27.091 --> 01:11:30.138 governments impacted by the latest PSPS event for 01:11:30.150 --> 01:11:33.516 individual after-action reviews to add to our internal 01:11:33.528 --> 01:11:36.939 review and improvement plan. On the hot wash calls this 01:11:36.951 --> 01:11:40.375 week, we received feedback on the operations briefings, 01:11:40.387 --> 01:11:43.560 having dedicated points of contact, our agency data 01:11:43.572 --> 01:11:46.634 transfer portal, maps, and the community resource 01:11:46.646 --> 01:11:49.992 centers. I will touch briefly on each of these. During 01:11:50.004 --> 01:11:53.178 the most recent PSPS event, PG&E utilized a regular 01:11:53.190 --> 01:11:56.480 cadence of operational briefings that were held three 01:11:56.492 --> 01:11:59.917 times per day to keep county and tribal representatives 01:11:59.929 --> 01:12:03.338 updated. These calls were a direct response to feedback 01:12:03.350 --> 01:12:06.283 during previous PSPS events and the 17 planning 01:12:06.295 --> 01:12:09.527 workshops held this summer with our local government 01:12:09.539 --> 01:12:12.538 partners who expressed a desire for updated real 01:12:12.550 --> 01:12:15.836 time information as well as a single source of direct 01:12:15.848 --> 01:12:19.330 information from PG&E and from our EOC. While we receive 01:12:19.342 --> 01:12:22.634 positive feedback for improved sharing of information 01:12:22.646 --> 01:12:25.766 and insights on the operational briefings, there's 01:12:25.778 --> 01:12:29.006 clearly room for improvement. As the leader of these 01:12:29.018 --> 01:12:32.257 calls, I did not clearly enough establish or enforce 01:12:32.269 --> 01:12:35.564 the purpose of these calls early on, which is overall 01:12:35.576 --> 01:12:38.577 situational awareness rather than the resolution 01:12:38.589 --> 01:12:41.690 of individual issues. The overwhelming interest in 01:12:41.702 --> 01:12:44.938 the calls, from government partners, starting in the 01:12:44.950 --> 01:12:48.180 2 to 400 entity range and surpassing 1000 callers at 01:12:48.192 --> 01:12:51.250 peak, necessitated a shift in technology and call 01:12:51.262 --> 01:12:54.550 format. The changes we made improved the capacity and 01:12:54.562 --> 01:12:57.679 structure of the calls. We will continue utilizing 01:12:57.691 --> 01:13:01.046 this operator-moderated calling format for future PSPS 01:13:01.058 --> 01:13:04.303 events and are exploring a WebEx approach that would 01:13:04.315 --> 01:13:07.663 allow the sharing of documents and the ability to take 01:13:07.675 --> 01:13:10.973 questions in writing. In addition, PG&E will consider 01:13:10.985 --> 01:13:14.094 a regional call structure for future large events, 01:13:14.106 --> 01:13:17.227 as suggested by this Commission. But many counties 01:13:17.239 --> 01:13:20.468 indicated a preference for a single call with a more 01:13:20.480 --> 01:13:23.659 streamlined structure. The early calls were flooded 01:13:23.671 --> 01:13:27.089 with individual questions. In response, PG&E identified 01:13:27.101 --> 01:13:30.225 a dedicated single point of contact that supported 01:13:30.237 --> 01:13:33.459 each impacted county and a dedicated tribal liaison. 01:13:33.471 --> 01:13:36.766 At the counties request, that single point of contact 01:13:36.778 --> 01:13:39.762 was embedded in the counties EOC. Eight counties 01:13:39.774 --> 01:13:43.014 took us up on this offer. This approach approved our 01:13:43.026 --> 01:13:46.251 coordination, received significant positive feedback 01:13:46.263 --> 01:13:49.683 from the counties. PG&E will continue this practice for 01:13:49.695 --> 01:13:52.987 all future events, recognizing that the single tribal 01:13:52.999 --> 01:13:56.304 liaison was insufficient for the tribal needs in this 01:13:56.316 --> 01:13:59.600 event, and so we will be expanding our staffing there 01:13:59.612 --> 01:14:02.909 for future events. We also received feedback from our 01:14:02.921 --> 01:14:06.090 local government partners regarding the agency data 01:14:06.102 --> 01:14:09.588 transfer portal we used to share information. Challenges 01:14:09.600 --> 01:14:12.520 we heard included gaining access to the portal, 01:14:12.532 --> 01:14:15.526 access to confidential customer information, the 01:14:15.538 --> 01:14:18.832 organization of data and maps in the portal, and more 01:14:18.844 --> 01:14:22.211 clearly signaling when new and changed information was 01:14:22.223 --> 01:14:25.506 placed into that portal. As immediate action, we will 01:14:25.518 --> 01:14:28.631 be doing outreach to counties and tribes to update 01:14:28.643 --> 01:14:31.933 and validate portal access lists and improve the user 01:14:31.945 --> 01:14:35.002 experience of the portal layout and design. These 01:14:35.014 --> 01:14:38.362 actions will be completed in two weeks. In addition, I 01:14:38.374 --> 01:14:41.796 want to thank CPUC staff for helping us resolve privacy 01:14:41.808 --> 01:14:45.162 issues to get specific medical, baseline, and critical 01:14:45.174 --> 01:14:48.173 facility information to counties and tribes that 01:14:48.185 --> 01:14:51.531 wanted it, and that will be our practice going forward 01:14:51.543 --> 01:14:54.474 in future events. The lack of precision and the 01:14:54.486 --> 01:14:57.777 maps we provided was also raised by the counties. The 01:14:57.789 --> 01:15:00.970 maps were developed in consultation with CalOES and 01:15:00.982 --> 01:15:04.393 provided outage polygons or broader affected geographic 01:15:04.405 --> 01:15:07.767 areas, rather than precise meter by meter delineation, 01:15:07.779 --> 01:15:11.073 which can understate affected areas. Checking whether 01:15:11.085 --> 01:15:13.902 specific facilities were affected, especially 01:15:13.914 --> 01:15:17.075 on the boundaries of those maps, was intended to be 01:15:17.087 --> 01:15:20.444 accomplished on the Online Address Checker Tool, which 01:15:20.456 --> 01:15:23.745 was not available given the website challenges. Going 01:15:23.757 --> 01:15:26.753 forward, we will be drawing tighter polygons and 01:15:26.765 --> 01:15:30.051 exploring suggestions from CalOES and the counties to 01:15:30.063 --> 01:15:33.301 provide a more seamless data transfer capability for 01:15:33.313 --> 01:15:36.605 their GIS needs, as well as developing the capability 01:15:36.617 --> 01:15:39.738 for counties and tribes to use the address checker 01:15:39.750 --> 01:15:42.974 tool with batches of facilities. Checking individual 01:15:42.986 --> 01:15:46.100 facilities when they were concerned about hundreds 01:15:46.112 --> 01:15:49.342 of facilities was a challenge in the event. Finally, 01:15:49.354 --> 01:15:52.596 on community resource centers, I want to acknowledge 01:15:52.608 --> 01:15:55.651 that we missed the mark on collaborating with the 01:15:55.663 --> 01:15:59.147 counties and tribes on where to locate these facilities. 01:15:59.159 --> 01:16:02.453 Laurie spoke to our plan to better predetermine these 01:16:02.465 --> 01:16:05.710 locations with counties and tribes in advance. Going 01:16:05.722 --> 01:16:08.701 forward for all events, site selection will be a 01:16:08.713 --> 01:16:12.253 collaborative process, with counties and tribes. Stepping 01:16:12.265 --> 01:16:15.372 back from all of these specific items, the broader 01:16:15.384 --> 01:16:18.502 way to enhance our partnership with the tribes and 01:16:18.514 --> 01:16:21.863 counties is working with them to better understand the 01:16:21.875 --> 01:16:25.052 electric grid in their jurisdictions. Some examples 01:16:25.064 --> 01:16:28.418 include what facilities are on which circuits, how the 01:16:28.430 --> 01:16:31.613 local grid is configured and what areas are more or 01:16:31.625 --> 01:16:34.911 less likely to be affected by a PSPS, and what is the 01:16:34.923 --> 01:16:38.221 likely sequencing when it comes time for restoration? 01:16:38.233 --> 01:16:41.035 In sum, a more technical deep dive to provide 01:16:41.047 --> 01:16:44.535 transparency into the operation of the grid to help them 01:16:44.547 --> 01:16:47.713 with their planning. We have done this with certain 01:16:47.725 --> 01:16:51.148 counties that have asked for more specific information, 01:16:51.160 --> 01:16:54.210 but we will be doing this systematically with all 01:16:54.222 --> 01:16:57.468 counties and tribes in the coming months. Thank you. 01:16:57.493 --> 01:17:03.237 Thank you, Mr Johnson. We'll now turn to questions 01:17:03.249 --> 01:17:09.168 by the Commissioners of each panel member. Okay, Commissioner Randolph.. 01:17:09.193 --> 01:17:13.123 This is a question for 01:17:13.135 --> 01:17:17.487 Laurie. And I want to focus on vulnerable customers. 01:17:17.499 --> 01:17:21.599 So first, do you have records of all the contacts 01:17:21.611 --> 01:17:25.311 that you made for, you know, with vulnerable 01:17:25.323 --> 01:17:29.338 customers, and kind of the results of those that 01:17:29.350 --> 01:17:33.541 you could provide? But then also, you know, as you 01:17:33.553 --> 01:17:37.821 know, medical baseline is really a very crude proxy 01:17:37.833 --> 01:17:41.783 for trying to identify vulnerable customers. So 01:17:41.795 --> 01:17:45.962 what are the steps that you are making to identify 01:17:45.974 --> 01:17:49.825 beyond just medical baseline? And then I think 01:17:49.837 --> 01:17:53.764 my last question is the anecdotal evidence that 01:17:53.776 --> 01:17:58.043 I've heard is that some of those contacts were like 01:17:58.055 --> 01:18:02.142 gee, sorry, tou know, there's not much we can do. 01:18:02.154 --> 01:18:05.926 And so I want to kind of understand how those 01:18:05.938 --> 01:18:09.786 contacts can be improved and how the potential 01:18:09.798 --> 01:18:14.068 solutions for vulnerable customers can be improved. 01:18:14.093 --> 01:18:17.238 Great, thank you for the 01:18:17.250 --> 01:18:20.909 question. So we don't disagree that, you know, the 01:18:20.921 --> 01:18:24.215 proxy of Medical Baseline doesn't capture the 01:18:24.227 --> 01:18:27.389 entire population. But I'll address Medical 01:18:27.401 --> 01:18:30.692 Baseline, and then, I'll talk about how we're 01:18:30.704 --> 01:18:34.582 extending the outreach to connect with more customers 01:18:34.594 --> 01:18:37.819 that might not have this designation. So for 01:18:37.831 --> 01:18:40.997 this event we had 34,568 customers that had 01:18:41.009 --> 01:18:44.729 medical baseline designee designation. When we sent 01:18:44.741 --> 01:18:48.115 the outbound notifications to those customers, 01:18:48.127 --> 01:18:51.638 we received confirmation, in our initial bursts, 01:18:51.650 --> 01:18:54.526 as we got confirmation back from 32,670 01:18:54.538 --> 01:18:58.118 of those customers. That left 1877 customers that 01:18:58.130 --> 01:19:01.507 we needed to contact before we shut off power. 01:19:01.519 --> 01:19:04.818 We scheduled our available field personnel to 01:19:04.830 --> 01:19:08.212 make home visits and assure that they received 01:19:08.224 --> 01:19:11.513 positive confirmation. Of those, 743 received 01:19:11.525 --> 01:19:14.897 face-to-face communications. 702, there was no 01:19:14.909 --> 01:19:18.204 access, they were not at home, we door tagged 01:19:18.216 --> 01:19:21.667 and continued to call those customers And then, 01:19:21.679 --> 01:19:25.115 another 432 customers, we had no, they were not 01:19:25.127 --> 01:19:28.646 home, we rolled several trucks, we left the door 01:19:28.658 --> 01:19:32.172 hanger, continued to contact them. So as we look 01:19:32.184 --> 01:19:35.421 at that for our medical baseline population, 01:19:35.433 --> 01:19:38.796 you know, that is a focus that we continue our 01:19:38.808 --> 01:19:42.182 hourly to focus on to ensure that we know that 01:19:42.194 --> 01:19:45.418 those customers have been reached. I'll give 01:19:45.430 --> 01:19:48.810 you an example of a situation that we had with 01:19:48.822 --> 01:19:52.116 the customer who did not have the designation 01:19:52.128 --> 01:19:55.577 of medical baseline, but was actually a hospice 01:19:55.589 --> 01:19:58.816 customer. As I mentioned, we've been working 01:19:58.828 --> 01:20:02.355 with CalOES and certain foundations and affinity 01:20:02.367 --> 01:20:05.940 groups to reach these customers. We've been doing 01:20:05.952 --> 01:20:09.107 that in preparation of these events, but in 01:20:09.119 --> 01:20:12.699 this event, we received a call in the call center 01:20:12.711 --> 01:20:15.943 from a customer. And actually, it wasn't the 01:20:15.955 --> 01:20:18.957 customer of record. It was actually their 01:20:18.969 --> 01:20:22.414 hospice provider, and the customer had a do not 01:20:22.426 --> 01:20:26.008 resuscitate order. Therefore, they were they were 01:20:26.020 --> 01:20:29.400 not going to be able to transport the customer 01:20:29.412 --> 01:20:32.915 to the hospital. They lived in the Half Moon Bay 01:20:32.927 --> 01:20:36.227 area. We took the call in the call center. We 01:20:36.239 --> 01:20:39.892 escalated it to the emergency center. The customer 01:20:39.904 --> 01:20:42.922 branch worked with CalOES as well as with 01:20:42.934 --> 01:20:46.081 one of our agency partners. And through our 01:20:46.093 --> 01:20:49.539 agency partner, we were able to have the agency 01:20:49.551 --> 01:20:52.848 partner deliver a generator to the customer's 01:20:52.860 --> 01:20:56.456 home. They did not have an interruption of power. 01:20:56.468 --> 01:20:59.970 And in fact, one of our linemen went and visited 01:20:59.982 --> 01:21:03.138 the customer throughout the duration of the 01:21:03.150 --> 01:21:06.515 outage because we flagged that and was able to 01:21:06.527 --> 01:21:10.119 ensure that the generator had fuel throughout the 01:21:10.131 --> 01:21:13.708 duration of the outage. I share that example with 01:21:13.720 --> 01:21:16.951 you because that's how, you know, we believe 01:21:16.963 --> 01:21:20.402 that through partnerships, through the affinity 01:21:20.414 --> 01:21:23.722 groups, through CalOES and their partnerships 01:21:23.734 --> 01:21:27.238 is the best way that we can reach this community 01:21:27.250 --> 01:21:30.192 group because they don't have a designee 01:21:30.204 --> 01:21:33.570 potentially of medical baseline. So that is an 01:21:33.582 --> 01:21:37.392 example of how we're leveraging our partnerships and 01:21:37.404 --> 01:21:40.695 we're leveraging affinity groups to reach out 01:21:40.707 --> 01:21:44.082 to those vulnerable customers. We’re not done. 01:21:44.094 --> 01:21:47.320 We know we can do a lot more and we're gonna 01:21:47.332 --> 01:21:50.713 continue that outreach with those partnerships 01:21:50.738 --> 01:21:54.485 And so you'll expand the number of groups you're 01:21:54.497 --> 01:21:57.850 interacting with and the information that you can provide to them? 01:21:57.850 --> 01:21:59.743 Absolutely. 01:21:59.768 --> 01:22:01.823 Yes, of course, Commissioner Guzman? 01:22:01.848 --> 01:22:05.591 What about the leveraging 01:22:05.603 --> 01:22:09.223 of the partnership that the counties? I don't know if 01:22:09.235 --> 01:22:12.984 you saw the counties letter, but they were particularly 01:22:12.996 --> 01:22:16.420 available for this population and having even more 01:22:16.432 --> 01:22:20.111 resources and more connectivity. And I've heard, you 01:22:20.123 --> 01:22:24.015 know, some efforts with the counties, But this has really 01:22:24.027 --> 01:22:27.712 been like the most disappointing element of not having 01:22:27.724 --> 01:22:31.487 that pre-existing relationship with all the elements of 01:22:31.499 --> 01:22:34.900 operationalizing county relationships. And Mr Visi 01:22:34.912 --> 01:22:38.526 talked about anticipation, partnerships and long term 01:22:38.538 --> 01:22:42.480 relationships and understanding your customers. Sure, it'd 01:22:42.492 --> 01:22:46.380 be helpful for them to understand your distribution grid, 01:22:46.392 --> 01:22:49.930 but what about you understanding your customers? Did 01:22:49.942 --> 01:22:53.558 you work with the counties? You mentioned you had 722 01:22:53.570 --> 01:22:57.449 customers that you did not get to? Did you give that list 01:22:57.461 --> 01:23:01.285 to the counties? Did you say can you help us find these? 01:23:01.310 --> 01:23:04.768 Thank you for the question. Yes. We've 01:23:04.780 --> 01:23:08.011 been working with the counties throughout the year as 01:23:08.023 --> 01:23:11.188 we've been preparing for these power shut offs. And, 01:23:11.200 --> 01:23:14.557 certainly as part of emergency preparation, we're gonna 01:23:14.569 --> 01:23:17.671 be doing more work with the counties so that we can 01:23:17.683 --> 01:23:21.216 leverage their resources, and we can provide them with the 01:23:21.228 --> 01:23:24.936 information that's necessary for their customer demographics. 01:23:24.948 --> 01:23:27.768 We do have a lot of customer information. With 01:23:27.780 --> 01:23:31.000 this population though we don't have a a designee. So 01:23:31.012 --> 01:23:34.244 some of these customers don't self-identify through a 01:23:34.256 --> 01:23:37.542 process by which we can segment those customers. So to 01:23:37.554 --> 01:23:40.732 answer your question, we will be working much closer 01:23:40.744 --> 01:23:44.027 with the counties to not only leverage their resources 01:23:44.039 --> 01:23:47.275 but provide them the information that we have so that 01:23:47.287 --> 01:23:50.696 we can partner on supporting these customers. And we are 01:23:50.708 --> 01:23:53.949 leveraging our community-based organizations as well. 01:23:53.974 --> 01:23:56.430 So did you give 01:23:56.442 --> 01:23:58.588 that 722 list of people to the counties? 01:23:58.613 --> 01:24:01.829 Yes, we were communicating with the 01:24:01.841 --> 01:24:05.304 counties on our medical baseline contacts and the contacts 01:24:05.316 --> 01:24:08.420 we had made with the customers and those that we had 01:24:08.432 --> 01:24:11.666 not. We believe these customers, these were homes that 01:24:11.678 --> 01:24:15.058 were not available. So, you know, we don't have positive, 01:24:15.070 --> 01:24:17.936 there were some customers we don't have positive 01:24:17.948 --> 01:24:21.392 confirmation on. We're also checking and going back in the 01:24:21.404 --> 01:24:24.920 records to ensure that they're still the customer of record 01:24:24.945 --> 01:24:26.546 Commissioner Rechtschaffen. 01:24:26.571 --> 01:24:31.879 I would like to follow up on the larger point 01:24:31.891 --> 01:24:37.141 that Commissioners Guzman Aceves made about coordination with the counties 01:24:37.153 --> 01:24:42.327 and local governments and also go back to something that President Batjer 01:24:42.339 --> 01:24:47.595 said. We've received scathing letters of criticism from local governments. 01:24:47.607 --> 01:24:50.740 I'm sure you've seen them as well, including 01:24:50.752 --> 01:24:53.408 one from rural county representatives 01:24:53.420 --> 01:24:58.113 who said communication needs to be vastly improved as the existing 01:24:58.125 --> 01:25:03.302 processes have proven neither timely nor effective. And perhaps even more 01:25:03.314 --> 01:25:08.362 damning, they feel like they're not listened to. We have systematically 01:25:08.374 --> 01:25:13.754 heard that there has been little follow through when IOUs are given feedback 01:25:13.766 --> 01:25:19.018 from local jurisdiction. I've received briefings from PG&E staff about the 01:25:19.030 --> 01:25:24.485 number of meetings in town halls and outreach efforts that PG&E's undertaken. 01:25:24.497 --> 01:25:29.334 But clearly they're not working. My question is a two-part question. 01:25:29.346 --> 01:25:34.869 What's gonna be different this time? And more particularly, what outcome-based 01:25:34.881 --> 01:25:39.785 measures are you going to report to us? It's not gonna be okay simply 01:25:39.797 --> 01:25:45.046 to say we had another town hall meeting or 500 meetings. What are we gonna 01:25:45.058 --> 01:25:50.318 hear from you about outcome-based measures that you're gonna report to us? 01:25:50.343 --> 01:25:54.345 Let me start since I have overall responsibly 01:25:54.357 --> 01:25:57.690 to this. Commissioner, I’ll address the question 01:25:57.702 --> 01:26:01.574 you asked, but I’d like to go back, Commissioner Aceves, 01:26:01.586 --> 01:26:05.062 to you. We're facing a new and different challenge 01:26:05.074 --> 01:26:08.670 in the industry, and this last event made it crystal 01:26:08.682 --> 01:26:12.291 clear where the shortcomings were, as it's stressed, 01:26:12.303 --> 01:26:16.178 everything that we did. And we're acknowledging that, as 01:26:16.190 --> 01:26:19.873 I said, that this whole idea of anticipation requires 01:26:19.885 --> 01:26:23.344 intimacy, which is a different level of engagement 01:26:23.356 --> 01:26:27.099 with the communities and customers. We don't have that 01:26:27.111 --> 01:26:30.984 right now. The time of unilateralism, in terms of action 01:26:30.996 --> 01:26:34.541 that a utility can take when it comes to these type 01:26:34.553 --> 01:26:38.083 of crisis situations, no longer works. It no longer 01:26:38.095 --> 01:26:41.910 works for a number of reasons. One is that the needs of 01:26:41.922 --> 01:26:45.253 individual communities, individual customers are 01:26:45.265 --> 01:26:49.290 paramount. The impact of shutting off power impacts people 01:26:49.302 --> 01:26:53.032 differently, and our ability to do it right requires a 01:26:53.044 --> 01:26:56.787 very deep knowledge of our communities, our customers, 01:26:56.799 --> 01:27:00.468 and others who have to serve them as well. And we are 01:27:00.480 --> 01:27:04.160 not there. We need to get there. We need to establish 01:27:04.172 --> 01:27:07.701 different inter-relationships and connections on an 01:27:07.713 --> 01:27:11.527 ongoing basis with local communities. One of the things 01:27:11.539 --> 01:27:15.074 that is apparent, at least to me from where we sit, 01:27:15.086 --> 01:27:18.701 is that there has been a lot of consolidation, a lot 01:27:18.713 --> 01:27:22.513 of bringing to the center, a lot of bringing to the top 01:27:22.525 --> 01:27:26.065 in a way of creating efficiencies and productivity. 01:27:26.077 --> 01:27:29.679 Much is lost in that. Indeed one of the things about 01:27:29.691 --> 01:27:33.509 this industry over my 41 years of experience, it's very 01:27:33.521 --> 01:27:37.052 local. It's very much based and integrated with the 01:27:37.064 --> 01:27:40.742 communities we serve. Most of our people, our tens of 01:27:40.754 --> 01:27:44.564 thousands of employees, are part of and integrated with 01:27:44.576 --> 01:27:48.124 these communities. Yet somehow when we come to take 01:27:48.136 --> 01:27:51.524 decisions, we withdraw from that because it was a 01:27:51.536 --> 01:27:55.412 standard service provided broadly to a homogenized group 01:27:55.424 --> 01:27:59.022 of recipients. That doesn't work anymore. It doesn't 01:27:59.034 --> 01:28:02.712 work anymore because technology allows us to get more 01:28:02.724 --> 01:28:06.523 granular, gets us, allows us to disaggregate, allows us 01:28:06.535 --> 01:28:10.278 to get information, allows us to know things we didn't 01:28:10.290 --> 01:28:13.959 know before, and be much more effective with granular 01:28:13.971 --> 01:28:17.652 data than with broad assumptions about our customers. 01:28:17.664 --> 01:28:21.257 We’re in that transition now, and we have to quickly 01:28:21.269 --> 01:28:25.147 find stopgap measures to become more intimate with these 01:28:25.159 --> 01:28:28.758 communities. So all these issues you pulling out are 01:28:28.770 --> 01:28:32.381 on point. We have to develop standing relationships. 01:28:32.393 --> 01:28:36.194 We have to develop trusted interactions with the people 01:28:36.206 --> 01:28:39.610 we serve. Some of the steps that we're gonna take 01:28:39.622 --> 01:28:42.951 immediately is to appoint individuals whose only 01:28:42.963 --> 01:28:46.714 responsibility it will will be to understand and learn 01:28:46.726 --> 01:28:50.250 those things. One of the things I had in my written 01:28:50.262 --> 01:28:54.071 comments were that we were going to solve this problem. 01:28:54.083 --> 01:28:58.022 And the original wording was we will solve this on behalf 01:28:58.034 --> 01:29:01.509 of our customers, and I looked at it and I changed 01:29:01.521 --> 01:29:05.116 the wording to We will work with the communities and 01:29:05.128 --> 01:29:08.736 customers to solve this, because we have to know the 01:29:08.748 --> 01:29:12.485 intimate details of the relationship that the services 01:29:12.497 --> 01:29:15.838 we provide with the people who use them. It is a 01:29:15.850 --> 01:29:19.512 shortcoming, and it's something we have to get on and 01:29:19.524 --> 01:29:23.198 Commission Rechtschaffen, we don't have those outcome 01:29:23.210 --> 01:29:26.742 based measures yet, but we need to get them to hold 01:29:26.754 --> 01:29:30.639 ourselves accountable to the performance that we have to 01:29:30.651 --> 01:29:34.452 provide. And so this whole experience is not just about 01:29:34.464 --> 01:29:38.210 improving the way we do PSPS. It's fundamentally about 01:29:38.222 --> 01:29:42.029 pivoting on the way we interact and serve our customers 01:29:42.041 --> 01:29:45.520 every day, and that's what we have to think about. 01:29:45.520 --> 01:29:49.026 So I was just gonna, I 01:29:49.038 --> 01:29:53.220 appreciate that. But the only thing specific I heard from that 01:29:53.232 --> 01:29:56.976 is you're gonna hire some additional people whose job it 01:29:56.988 --> 01:30:00.744 is just to develop relationships with local governments. 01:30:00.769 --> 01:30:04.785 Well, we're not gonna hire people. We're going to assign 01:30:04.797 --> 01:30:08.652 people people, such as Aaron Johnson, whose role will come to be a 01:30:08.664 --> 01:30:12.571 much more integrated liaison with communities. And we'll do that as 01:30:12.583 --> 01:30:16.502 much as we need to do to refocus our people to get more regional in 01:30:16.514 --> 01:30:20.403 the way we react without customers. It's a pivot in our business. I 01:30:20.415 --> 01:30:24.661 didn't say we have to hire anybody, but we have to change our priorities, 01:30:24.673 --> 01:30:28.454 and the way we interact with it and understand what our customers 01:30:28.466 --> 01:30:32.316 needs are in a real time basis, and not just during times of PSPS. 01:30:32.341 --> 01:30:38.765 It seems extraordinary to me, extraordinary, that we're two or 01:30:38.777 --> 01:30:42.254 three PSPSs in and, other IOUs too, and that 01:30:42.266 --> 01:30:45.523 you're just now realizing that you really 01:30:45.535 --> 01:30:49.009 oughta have a liaison designated to each one 01:30:49.021 --> 01:30:52.275 of your impacted counties and that you're 01:30:52.287 --> 01:30:55.535 just realizing that maybe you should have 01:30:55.547 --> 01:30:59.040 done some preplanning to have your community 01:30:59.052 --> 01:31:02.524 resource center's already sited and that you 01:31:02.536 --> 01:31:05.789 don't have your liasons SEMS trained. I'm 01:31:05.801 --> 01:31:09.203 hearing, we're gonna, we're planning, we're 01:31:09.215 --> 01:31:12.783 gonna have a playbook by the end of the year. 01:31:12.795 --> 01:31:19.306 This isn't hard. This is not hard. You've been in the business 41 years. You gave a 01:31:19.318 --> 01:31:22.256 very nice speech or a few words about 01:31:22.268 --> 01:31:26.073 anticipation. I can tell you, you guys failed on 01:31:26.085 --> 01:31:29.784 so many levels on pretty simple stuff. Creating 01:31:29.796 --> 01:31:32.966 liaisons, setting up CRCs, understanding 01:31:32.978 --> 01:31:39.406 that your website needed to scale. In the response to me that Mr Johnson gave, you 01:31:39.418 --> 01:31:42.578 spoke about possible 5.2 million people. 01:31:42.590 --> 01:31:46.227 Doubtful it'll happen. But it's a possibility. 01:31:46.239 --> 01:31:52.828 You're gonna scale to 1.7. I will get to some more questions on the website shortly. 01:31:52.840 --> 01:31:56.464 You said we need to get there. You need to get 01:31:56.476 --> 01:31:59.802 there now. Not at the end of the year. How 01:31:59.814 --> 01:32:06.400 many counties have you talked to since last week? How many? How many county managers 01:32:06.412 --> 01:32:12.992 or how many direct EOC managers have you already called And said whoops, we blew it. 01:32:13.004 --> 01:32:19.518 But we're gonna have a better relationship and it's going to start today. Have you? 01:32:19.543 --> 01:32:23.733 Well, the hot wash calls that I described 01:32:23.757 --> 01:32:25.477 I don't what hot wash is. 01:32:25.502 --> 01:32:30.702 Sorry to use jargon. It's sort of an after-action review of the 01:32:30.714 --> 01:32:36.184 events. So we met with, we invited all 35 counties' emergency managers to be on that 01:32:36.196 --> 01:32:41.369 conversation. We had the vast majority of them participate on very short notice. 01:32:41.381 --> 01:32:46.503 I spoke with a couple of them individually, myself and other folks on our team. 01:32:46.528 --> 01:32:49.286 And I understand about eight right 01:32:49.298 --> 01:32:51.917 now. Liasons that you've sort of identified, right? 01:32:51.942 --> 01:32:57.355 No. We have relationships with each county and people designated both 01:32:57.367 --> 01:33:02.730 from a government affairs perspective and from a public safety perspective, all those 01:33:02.742 --> 01:33:07.911 roles exist. Many of them serve multiple counties. And so what we did in the event 01:33:07.923 --> 01:33:13.105 was narrow their focus and and assigned more people to that role so that they were 01:33:13.117 --> 01:33:16.022 serving individually. We had eight actually go 01:33:16.034 --> 01:33:18.766 to the EOCs at the request of the counties. 01:33:18.778 --> 01:33:23.879 Many of the other county said we want, we would prefer to work with you by phone. 01:33:23.891 --> 01:33:29.111 We don't actually need someone here. But those are the numbers that you were asking 01:33:29.123 --> 01:33:34.354 about. I don't want to leave the impression that I believe that that is sufficient. 01:33:34.379 --> 01:33:37.226 Well, I just repeat, you 01:33:37.238 --> 01:33:39.843 need to do it now. Commissioner Shiroma? 01:33:39.868 --> 01:33:43.436 Thank you. I have a 01:33:43.448 --> 01:33:47.190 comment and then, I have three questions. You 01:33:47.202 --> 01:33:50.857 know, trying to think of sort of an analogy, 01:33:50.869 --> 01:33:54.128 and I keep coming back to the Wizard of 01:33:54.140 --> 01:34:01.061 Oz, where, you know, smoke and mirrors and this and that, and then you pull back the 01:34:01.073 --> 01:34:04.731 curtain and there's some guy back there, you 01:34:04.743 --> 01:34:08.494 know, tryingto do publicity and and some sort 01:34:08.506 --> 01:34:11.994 of an impression of what the entity is all 01:34:12.006 --> 01:34:15.668 about. And look, I know that the five of you 01:34:15.680 --> 01:34:22.691 are taking responsibility, alright? And at first, Mr Lewis, I thought, are you taking 01:34:22.703 --> 01:34:26.519 it on the chin for everyone by saying you made 01:34:26.531 --> 01:34:29.953 the decision on those PSPSs. But all five 01:34:29.965 --> 01:34:33.135 of you are taking responsibility and I 01:34:33.147 --> 01:34:36.818 appreciate it. I wasn't sure if you got some 01:34:36.830 --> 01:34:40.724 sort of short straw to take the responsibility. 01:34:40.736 --> 01:34:44.154 Now, look, back on that April 10th letter 01:34:44.166 --> 01:34:47.659 from you all, PG&E to us, it says in there 01:34:47.671 --> 01:34:51.338 the kind of criteria that are used for PSPS, 01:34:51.350 --> 01:34:58.435 and, of course, redfire zone, temperatures, humidity, wind speeds and so forth. But it 01:34:58.447 --> 01:35:02.106 has in there, from you all, from PG&E to the 01:35:02.118 --> 01:35:05.626 Commission, the inadequacy of alternatives 01:35:05.638 --> 01:35:09.370 to deenergization, such as additional patrols 01:35:09.382 --> 01:35:12.393 and repairs or vegetation management 01:35:12.405 --> 01:35:19.336 work, that could be completed before the predicted event time. And in the footnotes, 01:35:19.348 --> 01:35:22.513 saying PG&E is also pursuing long-term 01:35:22.525 --> 01:35:26.436 mitigation through its wildfire mitigation plan 01:35:26.448 --> 01:35:30.190 such as sytem harding to reduce the frequency 01:35:30.202 --> 01:35:33.384 of PSPSs. So here are my questions for 01:35:33.396 --> 01:35:37.295 the 100 incidents identified, are you analyzing 01:35:37.307 --> 01:35:40.403 how good was your prediction in terms 01:35:40.415 --> 01:35:47.597 of where those located? What was cause? Was it the vegetation? Was it wires? There were 01:35:47.609 --> 01:35:54.458 pictures on TV and what have you of those. And to do that deep analysis of how good 01:35:54.470 --> 01:35:58.297 you're doing, all the predictions too. How far 01:35:58.309 --> 01:36:01.740 in advance are you asking for mutual aid, 01:36:01.752 --> 01:36:05.082 especially in the sheer magnitude of the 01:36:05.094 --> 01:36:08.925 shutdown and all the inspections that had been 01:36:08.937 --> 01:36:12.681 done? I heard that you did ask for mutual aid 01:36:12.693 --> 01:36:16.040 and you were able to get everything back 01:36:16.052 --> 01:36:23.068 on in 48 hours. But really, how far it goes to advance planning. And then three, have 01:36:23.080 --> 01:36:26.337 you talked with your line crews and the 01:36:26.349 --> 01:36:30.108 workers and the members of IBW1245 and others 01:36:30.120 --> 01:36:34.264 to hear feedback from your workers on improvements 01:36:34.276 --> 01:36:37.454 to be made, observations in the field, 01:36:37.466 --> 01:36:44.405 and so forth. And in around that, involved them and looking at, especially Mr Lewis, 01:36:44.417 --> 01:36:47.912 you have deep experience from Duke Energy, 01:36:47.924 --> 01:36:51.595 hurricanes and so forth, I imagine. Have you 01:36:51.607 --> 01:36:55.271 looked at the worst case scenario that, like 01:36:55.283 --> 01:36:58.551 you said before, there's an earthquake? 01:36:58.563 --> 01:37:02.220 There's the 30 hour, 45 mile per hour winds, 01:37:02.232 --> 01:37:05.411 the humidity and so forth. And maybe a 01:37:05.423 --> 01:37:08.677 couple of tanks exploding, you know, in 01:37:08.689 --> 01:37:12.609 Crockett. Have you looked at and done that deep 01:37:12.621 --> 01:37:19.638 analysis of what do you do in a worst case analysis? And what do you do ahead of time 01:37:19.650 --> 01:37:23.398 towards addressing it and then mitigating it? 01:37:23.410 --> 01:37:26.843 Those three questions for the time being. 01:37:26.868 --> 01:37:32.389 Thank you for the questions. I'll answer all three. And 01:37:32.401 --> 01:37:37.782 so let me begin with the preparation. Back in April, I assigned one of 01:37:37.794 --> 01:37:43.321 my senior directors to develop a playbook in all in all of our divisions 01:37:43.333 --> 01:37:48.493 to expedite the restoration in case of a worst case scenario. So we 01:37:48.505 --> 01:37:53.877 drilled. We actually staged the actual PSPSs throughout the summer. We 01:37:53.889 --> 01:37:59.274 shut down operations completely to facilitate not just a tabletop, but 01:37:59.286 --> 01:38:04.512 actually, we flew helicopters. We did everything in real time except 01:38:04.524 --> 01:38:09.990 power off in preparation for the worst case scenario. As I mentioned in 01:38:10.002 --> 01:38:15.742 my opening comments, this number was the actual benchmark. Five days. Okay, 01:38:15.754 --> 01:38:21.052 so that was where, in my view, there needs to be improvement. Because 01:38:21.064 --> 01:38:26.204 if benchmark was two days, I would have asked the mutual assistance 01:38:26.216 --> 01:38:31.520 earlier. I did ask for mutual assistance, but it was in the operation 01:38:31.532 --> 01:38:37.047 phase when that occurred, and we did receive a few crews. By the way, is 01:38:37.059 --> 01:38:42.360 not mandatory. That we get resources. They have to choose to come and 01:38:42.372 --> 01:38:47.667 support us and we have teams from Oregon and other places that was on 01:38:47.679 --> 01:38:52.985 site, ready to work, but there was still a small number of resources. 01:38:53.010 --> 01:38:56.711 I want to interrupt for one minute. 01:38:56.723 --> 01:38:59.972 Because I was PSPS s calls and OES, I don't know 01:38:59.984 --> 01:39:03.691 what hour this was, maybe the second or third. Probably 01:39:03.703 --> 01:39:06.891 the third PSPS called. Offered to help you with 01:39:06.903 --> 01:39:10.523 mutual aid. Eric Lamoreaux said, Do you need help with 01:39:10.535 --> 01:39:13.838 mutual aid? We're here to help you. We're here to 01:39:13.850 --> 01:39:17.543 make the calls for you. Create the relationships if you 01:39:17.555 --> 01:39:20.995 don't have them The answer is we got it, we got it. 01:39:21.020 --> 01:39:24.995 So after that call, I had a conversation 01:39:25.007 --> 01:39:28.925 with Mark Garaducci and we reversed that decision. Okay. 01:39:28.950 --> 01:39:31.717 I just wanted that 01:39:31.729 --> 01:39:35.149 clarification for Commissioner Shiroma's point. 01:39:35.174 --> 01:39:38.340 So, in terms of preparation 01:39:38.352 --> 01:39:40.895 for worst case scenario, this event 01:39:40.907 --> 01:39:46.285 here was the worst case scenario as far as history is concerned. It mirrors 01:39:46.297 --> 01:39:51.882 the October 17th wind event in every way. And so having this type of impact in 01:39:51.894 --> 01:39:57.420 terms of, originally, it was 4.6 million customers and we did reconfigure our 01:39:57.432 --> 01:40:03.085 system in a way to get that down to 738. Furthermore, we're able to reconfigure 01:40:03.097 --> 01:40:08.691 about 48,000 customers after we did a shut off and turn it back on with sooner 01:40:08.703 --> 01:40:14.291 because we were able to reconfigure the service of the one's that were in Tier 01:40:14.303 --> 01:40:19.549 1 get back on active service sooner than waiting for the all clear. So we 01:40:19.561 --> 01:40:25.203 accomplished a lot of reconfiguration on the front end and in the back end. But 01:40:25.215 --> 01:40:30.941 we're still left with the 738,000 customers to keep deenergized. (inaudible from 01:40:30.953 --> 01:40:36.813 off-mic) Yes ma'am. 100 instances, we're still we're still going to the evaluation 01:40:36.825 --> 01:40:41.991 of those events right now, trying to categorize them in ways to see, you 01:40:42.003 --> 01:40:47.436 know, are we getting a pattern in terms of where we are with our maintenance 01:40:47.448 --> 01:40:53.105 program and particularly our enhanced vegetation management program. Where does 01:40:53.117 --> 01:40:58.698 that allow with these particular events themselves? We have not concluded that 01:40:58.710 --> 01:41:04.515 analysis yet. I'm able to speak about a pattern in terms of our current findings. 01:41:04.540 --> 01:41:08.605 And will that be included in the report due 01:41:08.617 --> 01:41:12.394 to the CPUC within 10 days of the PSPS. You're working on that 01:41:12.406 --> 01:41:16.388 communique to us and by the way, this letter that I'm referring to 01:41:16.400 --> 01:41:20.393 is on our website. This October 10 letter from the September PSPS. 01:41:20.418 --> 01:41:23.230 Another follow-up 01:41:23.242 --> 01:41:26.124 question about restoration. We've heard from the 01:41:26.136 --> 01:41:29.013 general manager of the Northern California Power 01:41:29.025 --> 01:41:31.560 Association who said that they had offered 01:41:31.572 --> 01:41:34.371 to establish mutual aid relationships with you. 01:41:34.383 --> 01:41:36.960 They had field crews available and that you 01:41:36.972 --> 01:41:39.778 didn't call them to ask for help until the very 01:41:39.790 --> 01:41:42.666 end of the PSPS. You want to comment about that? 01:41:42.691 --> 01:41:48.657 As I stated, you know, earlier, we, with the given five-day 01:41:48.669 --> 01:41:55.034 benchmark, we had a plan, had resources available, we had over 6000 resources. 41 01:41:55.046 --> 01:42:01.639 helicopters, all prepositioned to execute the restoration effort. So initially, yes, 01:42:01.651 --> 01:42:05.214 we did have the event, for my way of thinking 01:42:05.226 --> 01:42:08.101 in terms of restoration performance, 01:42:08.113 --> 01:42:14.314 covered. As we got into the event, we decided to pursue more resources to bring 01:42:14.326 --> 01:42:20.462 that restoration time further in. So beginning, absolutely, as already stated, 01:42:20.474 --> 01:42:26.759 we did not pursuit mutual assistance. We did receive resourceis into our service 01:42:26.771 --> 01:42:32.602 territory. But I'm not familiar with the specifics of this one engagement. 01:42:32.627 --> 01:42:36.913 Commissioner Randolph. Oh, I'm sorry 01:42:36.938 --> 01:42:40.448 And feedback from your workers, 01:42:40.460 --> 01:42:43.920 your line crew workers and the folks who are out there 01:42:43.932 --> 01:42:47.165 inspecting, are you including their feedback in the 01:42:47.177 --> 01:42:50.610 lessons learned and actions to be taken in the future? 01:42:50.610 --> 01:42:54.851 Yes. In fact, we are, out of our practices that we 01:42:54.863 --> 01:42:59.303 have in place now, from our workers, for example, we deenergize all of 01:42:59.315 --> 01:43:03.500 ourre closers for the for the full wildfire season. Whereas before 01:43:03.512 --> 01:43:07.833 we were, you know, as we have a red flag warning we would take them, 01:43:07.845 --> 01:43:11.949 re-closing status. That came one from one of our operators. We're 01:43:11.961 --> 01:43:16.638 constantly gaining insight from field workforce who knows this better than 01:43:16.650 --> 01:43:21.134 anyone to ensure they're incorporated in our overall plan. Se we gather 01:43:21.146 --> 01:43:25.268 make their feedback as well, as part of our interaction with you. 01:43:25.293 --> 01:43:30.381 Okay, I just have a quick question, from what 01:43:30.393 --> 01:43:35.133 you're all are saying, it sounds like electric operations was the 01:43:35.145 --> 01:43:40.130 only group that did tabletop exercises, scenario planning. It doesn't 01:43:40.142 --> 01:43:44.782 sound like any of you other divisions did that. Is that correct? 01:43:44.807 --> 01:43:48.891 We do a tabletop all as a whole 01:43:48.903 --> 01:43:53.079 event. So we're all involved in tabletop exercises. 01:43:53.104 --> 01:43:57.400 Okay. On the customer side, though, how much 01:43:57.412 --> 01:44:01.536 of that, kind of scenario work did you do ahead of time? Because I 01:44:01.548 --> 01:44:05.696 heard a commitment from Mr Visi that that was going to increase. So 01:44:05.708 --> 01:44:09.868 I'm just trying to understand why there wasn't more of that before. 01:44:09.893 --> 01:44:15.200 Yeah, I think that,you know, really as Andy stated, I 01:44:15.212 --> 01:44:20.530 think, we've been planning for wildfire season and now we're in wildfire 01:44:20.542 --> 01:44:25.782 season. And so we've had multiple events back to back, and we're trying 01:44:25.794 --> 01:44:30.608 to move quickly with the lessons learned. But we do do integrated 01:44:30.620 --> 01:44:35.875 table tops. I think what Michael was specifically referring to with the 01:44:35.887 --> 01:44:41.081 divisions was the restoration work that he planned for and tested from 01:44:41.093 --> 01:44:46.500 an electric perspective. So I think we've been, as we do tabletops, we do 01:44:46.512 --> 01:44:51.712 it integrated across the organization. Does that answer your question? 01:44:51.737 --> 01:44:54.490 Yes, Commissioner Rechtschaffen? 01:44:54.515 --> 01:44:57.613 I have questions 01:44:57.625 --> 01:45:00.602 about the community resource centers without 01:45:00.614 --> 01:45:03.818 relitigating the failure to identify in advance. 01:45:03.830 --> 01:45:06.979 Are they all accessible to the disabled people? 01:45:07.004 --> 01:45:10.084 So we, as we were planning 01:45:10.096 --> 01:45:12.650 for the wildfire season and beginning 01:45:12.662 --> 01:45:18.118 our work with the communities to identify locations, we identified 200 locations 01:45:18.130 --> 01:45:23.176 that we already have land agreements on. We've been vetting those with the 01:45:23.188 --> 01:45:28.718 communities. There are base camp locations, some are accessible and some are not. 01:45:28.730 --> 01:45:31.744 Some would be appropriate and some would not 01:45:31.756 --> 01:45:34.446 be appropriate for use for our customer 01:45:34.458 --> 01:45:39.783 resource centers. Our intention, as we build out this model, is that there are 01:45:39.795 --> 01:45:44.843 versions of a customer resource center, based on what the needs are of the 01:45:44.855 --> 01:45:50.590 community. Our optimal location would be some of the locations that we had in Sonoma 01:45:50.602 --> 01:45:55.837 County, where they were a hardened facility that had, you know, proper indoor 01:45:55.849 --> 01:45:58.192 restrooms, et cetera, and had full 01:45:58.204 --> 01:46:01.500 accessibility. For the other sites that we stood 01:46:01.512 --> 01:46:06.888 up, we worked to ensure that they were ADA compliant and accessible. But I will 01:46:06.900 --> 01:46:12.153 tell you, in some of our more rural areas, that was that more of a challenge. 01:46:12.165 --> 01:46:17.335 And our plan is to work very closely with our communities. In some cases, we 01:46:17.347 --> 01:46:19.893 leveraged our sprinters to very small 01:46:19.905 --> 01:46:22.934 populations. But as you can imagine, in some 01:46:22.946 --> 01:46:28.257 of these communities, the roads are not lit even when there is power. So we're 01:46:28.269 --> 01:46:33.660 gonna that is an area that we have to continue to work on with the communities. 01:46:33.685 --> 01:46:36.954 Why were you limited to areas where you 01:46:36.966 --> 01:46:40.297 just, where you had pre-existing land agreements? Because it seems 01:46:40.309 --> 01:46:43.361 like one opportunity in working with counties is to say, hey, 01:46:43.373 --> 01:46:46.535 County, do you have something we can use on an emergency basis? 01:46:46.560 --> 01:46:51.468 Yeah, and, you know, unfortunately, I mean, we have, 01:46:51.480 --> 01:46:55.922 you know, in our own portfolio, we had a vast amount of land. As 01:46:55.934 --> 01:47:00.301 we got into these events and back to back events, in the in the 01:47:00.313 --> 01:47:05.102 Sierra Foothills and Sonoma county, we have areas that we have agreed 01:47:05.114 --> 01:47:09.803 upon are the right locations. In some cases, we have recommendations 01:47:09.815 --> 01:47:14.175 by the counties that we then pursue. But maybe the owner of the 01:47:14.187 --> 01:47:18.745 property does not want us to be there, or it's a merchant. So it's 01:47:18.757 --> 01:47:23.532 clearly an opportunity for us as we build this out with our counties. 01:47:23.557 --> 01:47:26.440 Will you commit to making them all accessible? 01:47:26.440 --> 01:47:30.166 Absolutely. We were committed 01:47:30.178 --> 01:47:33.993 to making them ADA accessible and we're committed 01:47:34.005 --> 01:47:37.661 to providing any resource is that are necessary 01:47:37.673 --> 01:47:41.112 for customers. We've not designed, these are 01:47:41.124 --> 01:47:44.854 not designed to be overnight shelters. These are 01:47:44.866 --> 01:47:48.607 designed to be resource centers that provide for 01:47:48.619 --> 01:47:52.125 charging, provide for cell service, WiFi were 01:47:52.137 --> 01:47:55.961 available, restrooms, cooling, heating and water. 01:47:55.986 --> 01:47:59.810 How late do you plan to keep them 01:47:59.822 --> 01:48:03.599 open. That was another concern, that they closed early evening. 01:48:03.624 --> 01:48:06.505 In this event, we worked 01:48:06.517 --> 01:48:09.608 with the counties and they provided additional 01:48:09.620 --> 01:48:12.836 security measures for us. And where it was safe, 01:48:12.848 --> 01:48:15.747 we kept them open until 8 p.m. So after the 01:48:15.759 --> 01:48:18.907 dinner hours and into the evening. So our hours 01:48:18.919 --> 01:48:21.947 of operation in most locations were 8 AM M to 01:48:21.959 --> 01:48:25.178 8 PM. Through the duration of the outage, we did 01:48:25.190 --> 01:48:28.158 not demobilize any of the sites until we had 01:48:28.170 --> 01:48:31.373 confirmation from the counties that we had their 01:48:31.385 --> 01:48:34.140 approval to demobilize. We also partnered 01:48:34.152 --> 01:48:37.164 with State and with the counties individually 01:48:37.176 --> 01:48:40.266 to ensure that we had appropriate security. We 01:48:40.278 --> 01:48:43.418 provided security. But as we got into the later 01:48:43.430 --> 01:48:46.452 hours of the evening, we partnered with local 01:48:46.464 --> 01:48:49.281 law enforcement and the county sheriffs to 01:48:49.293 --> 01:48:52.386 ensure that customers and employees were safe. 01:48:52.411 --> 01:48:56.208 Ms Commissioner Guzman Aceves? 01:48:56.233 --> 01:49:00.388 Thank you President Batjer. Mr 01:49:00.400 --> 01:49:04.568 Lewis. I wanted to agree with the point you made earlier and 01:49:04.580 --> 01:49:08.468 acknowledge that all of your hard working men and women, 01:49:08.480 --> 01:49:13.064 particularly those restoring the lines, did a tremendous amount of 01:49:13.076 --> 01:49:17.576 work. Everybody who was doing their best at the call centers, all 01:49:17.588 --> 01:49:21.827 of your workforce, and I appreciate you taking responsibility 01:49:21.839 --> 01:49:25.935 that was a decision and a lack of planning and preparedness 01:49:25.947 --> 01:49:29.850 by the executive management. And I think we agree in the 01:49:29.862 --> 01:49:34.079 failure being there. I wanted to ask a two-part question, Mr. 01:49:34.091 --> 01:49:38.456 Visi. Mr Lewis actually mentioned that some of the populations, 01:49:38.468 --> 01:49:42.417 most notably Humboldt County, did not have to lose power. 01:49:42.429 --> 01:49:46.596 Will you be reimbursing those customers and other customers? 01:49:46.608 --> 01:49:50.759 Obviously, the Governor has asked you to provide a rebate to 01:49:50.771 --> 01:49:55.071 all customers. And as a second part of the question, could you 01:49:55.083 --> 01:49:58.967 also clarify what funding was used to fund the exclusive 01:49:58.979 --> 01:50:03.285 dinner that took place in Napa for some of your gas customers? 01:50:03.310 --> 01:50:08.223 So the answer to the first question is that the issue 01:50:08.235 --> 01:50:12.646 of reimbursement of customers for a service disruption is a 01:50:12.658 --> 01:50:17.652 topic that is appropriately discussed here. I don't have a response 01:50:17.664 --> 01:50:22.301 you at the moment. It is not our intention, at this moment, to 01:50:22.313 --> 01:50:27.211 undertake a reimbursement for those customers, or other customers, 01:50:27.223 --> 01:50:32.060 that suffered consequential damages as a result of this. However, 01:50:32.072 --> 01:50:37.270 that said, that is a conversation and deliberations that appropriately 01:50:37.282 --> 01:50:41.611 with this Commission and with us for future conversations. 01:50:41.636 --> 01:50:44.121 So is that say, just to 01:50:44.133 --> 01:50:46.538 clarify, that you will not be reimbursing customers 01:50:46.550 --> 01:50:48.925 unless you're mandated to? Even those customers and 01:50:48.937 --> 01:50:51.417 you just acknowledged should never have been cut off? 01:50:51.442 --> 01:50:56.153 What I'm saying at this point in time, we are not committed to 01:50:56.165 --> 01:51:00.950 making those reimbursements. At this moment. We have not taken that decision. 01:51:00.950 --> 01:51:02.322 Argue that you 01:51:02.334 --> 01:51:03.688 don't need this venue to make that decision. 01:51:03.713 --> 01:51:05.176 We'll take that under advisement. 01:51:05.188 --> 01:51:06.537 I'm just answering the question that asked. 01:51:06.562 --> 01:51:07.663 Okay, you can answer the second one. 01:51:07.688 --> 01:51:13.242 Yu'll have to remind me now of what the second one was. I apologize. 01:51:13.267 --> 01:51:18.342 It was reported that PG&E had a 01:51:18.354 --> 01:51:23.605 very lucrative and expensive dinner in Napa County, same day as 01:51:23.617 --> 01:51:28.944 the anniversary of the Santa Rosa Fires and all the North Valley 01:51:28.956 --> 01:51:33.720 fires. What is the funding source for those expenditures? 01:51:33.720 --> 01:51:36.508 That funding source of those expenses 01:51:36.520 --> 01:51:39.321 will not be the customer. All right, I'm answering 01:51:39.333 --> 01:51:41.742 it to you that way because I don't know the 01:51:41.754 --> 01:51:44.616 details, but it will not be. If it was, it will not 01:51:44.628 --> 01:51:47.364 be. It's not the intention there. And we've taken 01:51:47.376 --> 01:51:50.400 actions to deal with accountability for that decision. 01:51:50.412 --> 01:51:52.879 Both Bill Johnson and I were in the EOC when 01:51:52.891 --> 01:51:55.591 that event happened. We were not aware of it. We 01:51:55.603 --> 01:51:58.660 have taken appropriate measures to ensure it will never 01:51:58.672 --> 01:52:01.357 happen again, and that there will be no customer 01:52:01.369 --> 01:52:03.884 funds that will support any of the activities 01:52:03.896 --> 01:52:06.642 that took place there. I just can't tell you this 01:52:06.654 --> 01:52:09.330 moment where they were, but I will tell you what 01:52:09.342 --> 01:52:11.975 the commitment is, is that they are will not be 01:52:11.987 --> 01:52:14.724 funded other than out of shareholders pockets and 01:52:14.736 --> 01:52:17.430 those type events will not happen going forward. 01:52:17.455 --> 01:52:20.095 Okay, how are you goiing 01:52:20.107 --> 01:52:22.704 to assure that's not gonna happen going forward? 01:52:22.729 --> 01:52:28.498 We, Bill Johnson and I, have been clear. We have communicated 01:52:28.510 --> 01:52:34.291 it broadly. Everybody understands that, and the actions that were taken as 01:52:34.303 --> 01:52:39.729 a result, how the accountability was acted on, sends a very clear and 01:52:39.741 --> 01:52:45.955 significant message that that will no longer be an acceptable practice at PG&E. 01:52:45.980 --> 01:52:51.006 Thank you. I have a question for Miss Kay. Please. 01:52:51.018 --> 01:52:55.418 There were several things that you listed, that I'm aware of, 01:52:55.430 --> 01:53:00.037 from the letter that Mr Johnson sent to me that you are doing or 01:53:00.049 --> 01:53:04.667 have done. And some of those were actually done during the PSPS. 01:53:04.679 --> 01:53:09.424 Some of them, I think, were initiated by the California Department 01:53:09.436 --> 01:53:13.910 of Technology, in real time, actually, with your team and some 01:53:13.922 --> 01:53:18.673 of your vendors. We were pretty surprised that you had not already 01:53:18.685 --> 01:53:23.307 had Cloud Services as part of your services and that your server 01:53:23.319 --> 01:53:27.983 was on the premise. And some of the other things. You didn't have 01:53:27.995 --> 01:53:32.458 the proper testing software. My understanding is yes, ESRI was 01:53:32.470 --> 01:53:37.140 there, AWS was there, Microsoft was there, but they weren't, they 01:53:37.152 --> 01:53:41.763 were people that perhaps couldn't even make real time decisions. 01:53:41.775 --> 01:53:46.726 They were junior in nature. And that we helped you all make real time 01:53:46.738 --> 01:53:51.346 contact up the chain of command so we could get quick decisions, 01:53:51.358 --> 01:53:55.676 the best minds at the table at the time. Is there a resource 01:53:55.688 --> 01:54:00.160 issue or is there a lack of attention on your technology shop? 01:54:00.185 --> 01:54:04.213 I think this is an area that we need 01:54:04.225 --> 01:54:08.103 to improve. I can talk about cloud first. We do 01:54:08.115 --> 01:54:11.987 leverage cloud services. In this space, though, 01:54:11.999 --> 01:54:15.803 you're absolutely right, our customer website, 01:54:15.815 --> 01:54:20.008 PG&E dot com is still on-prem. Some of the services 01:54:20.020 --> 01:54:23.739 behind it are in the cloud. You know, they're 01:54:23.751 --> 01:54:27.383 served by SAS providers, suffer as a service 01:54:27.395 --> 01:54:31.606 providers. As for the utilization of our vendors, I 01:54:31.618 --> 01:54:35.960 am accountable for the fact that we were not engaging 01:54:35.972 --> 01:54:39.600 at the right level. I do appreciate the help 01:54:39.612 --> 01:54:43.718 we got when Amy's team came. They were able to get 01:54:43.730 --> 01:54:47.606 resources at higher levels. We had been working 01:54:47.618 --> 01:54:51.640 with a lot of the teams. We had a lot of the work 01:54:51.652 --> 01:54:55.364 completed, but you are absolutely right. They 01:54:55.376 --> 01:54:59.081 helped us with the testing at a level that we 01:54:59.093 --> 01:55:03.133 weren't able to do in that evening at that speed. 01:55:03.158 --> 01:55:05.885 Right? My understanding at the 01:55:05.897 --> 01:55:08.690 time was that it was quoted to me that it was gonna 01:55:08.702 --> 01:55:11.300 take 12 hours to do the test and CDD said, we'll 01:55:11.312 --> 01:55:13.923 take it to the data center and do it in an hour. 01:55:13.948 --> 01:55:16.341 Actually, they did it in the cloud. 01:55:16.366 --> 01:55:19.771 Yeah, yeah, cloud environment. 01:55:19.783 --> 01:55:23.468 Well, it's very concerning to me that a corporation, a 01:55:23.480 --> 01:55:27.092 company of your size, seems to be very lacking or not 01:55:27.104 --> 01:55:30.661 very modern in your IT practices and infrastructure. 01:55:30.673 --> 01:55:33.879 I've sat in many a legislative hearing with Amy 01:55:33.891 --> 01:55:37.244 Tong and her team, who used to report to me in my 01:55:37.256 --> 01:55:40.736 previous job, where we would take a little bit of a 01:55:40.748 --> 01:55:44.241 scolding because what were we doing in the IT Area? 01:55:44.253 --> 01:55:47.852 Because, after all, we're the home of Silicon Valley, 01:55:47.864 --> 01:55:51.274 and we should have the best and the brightest. I'm 01:55:51.286 --> 01:55:54.488 very proud of her team.And so is the Governor's 01:55:54.500 --> 01:55:57.983 office. And I think for allowing us to be a partner 01:55:57.995 --> 01:56:01.463 with you. But we were pretty astonished at the lack 01:56:01.475 --> 01:56:04.754 of your infrastructure. May I ask you, too, Miss 01:56:04.766 --> 01:56:08.172 Kay, were you there that the whole time during the 01:56:08.184 --> 01:56:11.670 the outage, the PSPS, and when the website crashed? 01:56:11.670 --> 01:56:15.954 Yeah, I was not there on Tuesday. I was 01:56:15.966 --> 01:56:19.938 actually, right as the site started experiencing 01:56:19.950 --> 01:56:23.835 problems, I was actually flying to a meeting of 01:56:23.847 --> 01:56:27.581 all this CIOs of 20 utilities. When I landed, 01:56:27.593 --> 01:56:31.536 I started troubleshooting with my team. I was on 01:56:31.548 --> 01:56:35.583 WebEx throughout the night. The next morning when 01:56:35.595 --> 01:56:39.543 it started experiencing problems, I flew back. I 01:56:39.555 --> 01:56:43.273 never did participate in any of the meetings. 01:56:43.298 --> 01:56:45.663 Okay. Thank you. Are there 01:56:45.675 --> 01:56:48.051 any other questions of the panel at this time? 01:56:48.050 --> 01:56:57.610 Okay, I thank you very much. Appreciate it. We're going to now ask our next 01:56:57.610 --> 01:57:03.680 panel to come to the table, please. And I do thank you for waiting. 01:58:03.525 --> 01:58:07.069 Okay, Thank you. If you will please introduce yourself. This 01:58:07.081 --> 01:58:10.593 panel, we're going to discuss the scope and scale of the recent PSPS events and 01:58:10.605 --> 01:58:14.089 expectation for the future. Some of that obviously has already taken place. But 01:58:14.101 --> 01:58:17.641 that is the subject of this panel. So please introduce yourself with your title. 01:58:17.666 --> 01:58:21.710 Absolutely. Thank you, President Batjer, 01:58:21.722 --> 01:58:25.564 and respectful Commissioners. My name is Sumeet Singh 01:58:25.576 --> 01:58:29.340 and I lead PG&E's Community Wildfire Safety program. 01:58:29.352 --> 01:58:33.058 As part of our discussion, I will also be referring 01:58:33.070 --> 01:58:37.117 to some slides which I will also navigate as part of the 01:58:37.129 --> 01:58:40.974 discussion. So, to your point,, President Batjer, the 01:58:40.986 --> 01:58:44.825 focus of this discussion will be focused on using the 01:58:44.837 --> 01:58:48.616 past PSPS events to provide insights on the approach 01:58:48.628 --> 01:58:52.460 and the process that PG&E uses to inform the scope of 01:58:52.472 --> 01:58:56.315 such events. We’ll focus the discussion on leveraging 01:58:56.327 --> 01:58:59.808 the most recent event, which by all accords, was 01:58:59.820 --> 01:59:03.812 unprecedented for PG&E and perhaps the electric utility 01:59:03.824 --> 01:59:08.157 industry in terms of the number of customers and communities 01:59:08.169 --> 01:59:11.588 involved. As can be seen from this table, these 01:59:11.600 --> 01:59:15.655 are the four events that PG&E implemented, public safety 01:59:15.667 --> 01:59:19.448 power shutoff for this year. The recorded wind gusts 01:59:19.460 --> 01:59:23.291 and the amount of damage we experienced on our system 01:59:23.303 --> 01:59:27.359 from the October 9th event was significant. As stated by 01:59:27.371 --> 01:59:31.279 Mr Johnson, no catastrophic wildfires occurred, but we 01:59:31.291 --> 01:59:35.068 understand the hardship of this event, and potential 01:59:35.080 --> 01:59:38.772 events of this scale, have to our customers and our 01:59:38.784 --> 01:59:42.915 communities and have an unwavering focus on doing better, 01:59:42.927 --> 01:59:46.624 I believe, Commissioner Shiroma, you had requested, 01:59:46.636 --> 01:59:50.345 what were some of the lessons learned, specifically 01:59:50.357 --> 01:59:54.189 from the September 23rd to 26th PSPS event? Think you 01:59:54.201 --> 01:59:58.188 might have been referring to Section 14 of that October 01:59:58.200 --> 02:00:02.038 10th letter, and there were three specific items that 02:00:02.050 --> 02:00:05.900 were identified within that letter. The first related 02:00:05.912 --> 02:00:09.391 to the scope refinement process, and through our 02:00:09.403 --> 02:00:13.606 discussion, I will touch on that in terms of the practices 02:00:13.618 --> 02:00:17.745 that we have employed to target, from a scale standpoint, 02:00:17.757 --> 02:00:21.039 not only narrowing the scope of the event but 02:00:21.051 --> 02:00:24.811 also minimizing the duration of the outages that our 02:00:24.823 --> 02:00:28.950 customers and communities experience. The second item was 02:00:28.962 --> 02:00:32.727 around the accuracy and timeliness of submitting the 02:00:32.739 --> 02:00:36.587 notification forms to the state agency CalOES, and we 02:00:36.599 --> 02:00:40.718 put a significant focus on this past October 9th event to 02:00:40.730 --> 02:00:44.647 have dedicated members within our emergency operations 02:00:44.659 --> 02:00:48.284 center that are focused on ensuring the timely and 02:00:48.296 --> 02:00:52.005 accurate reporting of the data related to the event 02:00:52.017 --> 02:00:55.634 to the respective state agency. And then the third 02:00:55.646 --> 02:00:59.276 lesson learned that we stated was notification and 02:00:59.288 --> 02:01:03.197 communication process. And I think the panel before me 02:01:03.209 --> 02:01:07.202 addressed that. Given the scale and scope of this event 02:01:07.214 --> 02:01:11.049 and the unprecedented nature, we have a lot more work 02:01:11.061 --> 02:01:14.836 to do in that space. Go to the next slide. Our focus 02:01:14.848 --> 02:01:18.546 as part of the PSPS events is the prevention of any 02:01:18.558 --> 02:01:22.554 potential ignition caused by utility assets, especially 02:01:22.566 --> 02:01:26.611 during conditions of high fire risk. As you started off, 02:01:26.623 --> 02:01:30.608 our engagement today in the hearing today, Commissioner 02:01:30.620 --> 02:01:34.243 Batjer, you talked about the destructive nature of 02:01:34.255 --> 02:01:37.819 the fires that we have all experienced within our 02:01:37.831 --> 02:01:41.309 service territory, both in 2017 and last year in 02:01:41.321 --> 02:01:45.238 Paradise, and that cannot be repeated. And that is our 02:01:45.250 --> 02:01:49.090 unwavering focus, as part of our PSPS events, and our 02:01:49.102 --> 02:01:53.382 broader Community Wildfire Safety Program, while minimizing 02:01:53.394 --> 02:01:57.441 the impact to our customers and communities. And really, 02:01:57.453 --> 02:02:01.369 that minimization we focus on is two dimensions. First 02:02:01.381 --> 02:02:05.219 dimension is number of customers and counties. I will 02:02:05.231 --> 02:02:09.153 touch on this in more detail. And the second dimension 02:02:09.165 --> 02:02:13.143 is the duration of the shut off itself. So what you see 02:02:13.155 --> 02:02:16.932 in these maps is, if you look at the map on the left 02:02:16.944 --> 02:02:20.785 hand side that has the label of 3.8 million customers 02:02:20.797 --> 02:02:24.365 on the top, this map shows the potential customer 02:02:24.377 --> 02:02:28.350 impact as a result of an overlay of high fire risk with 02:02:28.362 --> 02:02:32.632 critical burn environment designation. And this designation 02:02:32.644 --> 02:02:36.480 is the highest fire risk rating that is issued by the 02:02:36.492 --> 02:02:40.127 North and the South Operations Predictive Services 02:02:40.139 --> 02:02:43.972 which, to our understanding, is an interagency entity 02:02:43.984 --> 02:02:47.829 that's used by CalFire to inform the fire risk within 02:02:47.841 --> 02:02:51.680 the state of California. So you can see the footprint 02:02:51.692 --> 02:02:55.401 for this specific event in regards to the high fire 02:02:55.413 --> 02:02:59.173 risk and critical burn environment as it pertains to 02:02:59.185 --> 02:03:03.100 our service territory. The next map that you see, from 02:03:03.112 --> 02:03:07.235 the left of that which has the heading of the 2.1 million 02:03:07.247 --> 02:03:10.954 customers, shows the potential customer impact as a 02:03:10.966 --> 02:03:14.871 result of an overlay of the red flag warning. And this 02:03:14.883 --> 02:03:18.516 is issued by the National Weather Service. The map 02:03:18.528 --> 02:03:22.226 that you see next to that of 1.6 million customers. 02:03:22.238 --> 02:03:26.305 That's an overlay of PG&E's utility potential fire risk, 02:03:26.317 --> 02:03:30.646 and in two slides, I will discuss the underlying methodology 02:03:30.658 --> 02:03:34.145 that we use to help inform our utility potential 02:03:34.157 --> 02:03:37.994 fire risk. The utility potential fire risk is in part 02:03:38.006 --> 02:03:41.712 informed by the National Weather Service as well as 02:03:41.724 --> 02:03:45.558 the Northern Operations Predictive Services on PG&E's 02:03:45.570 --> 02:03:49.202 predefined fire index areas. And these are regions 02:03:49.214 --> 02:03:53.054 that have been used by the state and federal agencies 02:03:53.066 --> 02:03:56.989 such as CalFire and the U. S. Forest Services. They’re 02:03:57.001 --> 02:04:01.047 designated as fire danger rating areas. And we leveraged 02:04:01.059 --> 02:04:04.476 these areas to further align with the high fire 02:04:04.488 --> 02:04:08.255 threat district maps that were issued by the CPUC in 02:04:08.267 --> 02:04:12.403 January of last year. And in essence, what the fire index 02:04:12.415 --> 02:04:16.535 areas do is, they further breakdown our service territory 02:04:16.547 --> 02:04:20.252 that's made up of about 38,000 square miles of high 02:04:20.264 --> 02:04:23.891 fire threat districts, which represents 54% of our 02:04:23.903 --> 02:04:27.757 overall service territory, and we have 109 fire index 02:04:27.769 --> 02:04:31.599 areas that cover the 38,000 square miles. And we have 02:04:31.611 --> 02:04:35.596 planned and canned execution playbooks at each of these 02:04:35.608 --> 02:04:39.588 respective fire index levels, so that we can streamline 02:04:39.600 --> 02:04:43.448 the notification to state agencies, counties, cities, 02:04:43.460 --> 02:04:47.009 customers and have detailed steps to de-energize, 02:04:47.021 --> 02:04:51.080 inspect, and subsequently restore service. But given the 02:04:51.092 --> 02:04:54.789 scale of this event of October 9th, we did not rest 02:04:54.801 --> 02:04:58.581 on the fire index areas. And this is the number that 02:04:58.593 --> 02:05:02.353 Mr Lewis cited as part of his comments in regards to 02:05:02.365 --> 02:05:05.996 the 1.6 million customers. We further narrowed and 02:05:06.008 --> 02:05:09.917 targeted our focus on areas within the FIA's that have 02:05:09.929 --> 02:05:13.850 the highest potential for the utility fire risk. As an 02:05:13.862 --> 02:05:17.840 example, as part of this effort, we were able to narrow 02:05:17.852 --> 02:05:21.913 down 42,000 potential customers impacted in Kern County, 02:05:21.925 --> 02:05:25.623 which would have been the impact if we just focused 02:05:25.635 --> 02:05:29.417 on the fire index areas and reduce that down to 4000 02:05:29.429 --> 02:05:33.545 customers as part of the event. Our weather forecasts are 02:05:33.557 --> 02:05:37.329 informed by the broader meteorology community within 02:05:37.341 --> 02:05:40.965 the state of California. We do not do this work in 02:05:40.977 --> 02:05:44.969 isolation. As an example, for this specific event, five 02:05:44.981 --> 02:05:49.029 days before the event, on a daily basis, our meteorology 02:05:49.041 --> 02:05:52.744 team was engaged, and interacting with the Northern 02:05:52.756 --> 02:05:56.668 Operations Predictive Services as well as the National 02:05:56.680 --> 02:06:00.318 Weather Services. And additionally given the scope 02:06:00.330 --> 02:06:04.234 and scale of this event, we, at the request of CalOES, 02:06:04.246 --> 02:06:08.020 held an inter-agency video conference on October 6th 02:06:08.032 --> 02:06:11.870 with the referenced agencies to review in detail what 02:06:11.882 --> 02:06:15.590 we were forecasting in regards to a widespread high 02:06:15.602 --> 02:06:19.367 risk event with the potential for significant fires, 02:06:19.379 --> 02:06:23.155 an event that was looking like the highest fire risk 02:06:23.167 --> 02:06:27.080 event of the season, and likely the strongest offshore 02:06:27.092 --> 02:06:31.018 wind event since October 2017. And there was consensus 02:06:31.030 --> 02:06:34.931 in that community of meteorologists in regards to that 02:06:34.943 --> 02:06:38.785 assessment. Although we reduced the scope of the PSPS 02:06:38.797 --> 02:06:42.775 from the initial projections, as you can see from these 02:06:42.787 --> 02:06:46.564 maps, we know we need to do better going forward and 02:06:46.576 --> 02:06:50.409 we will discuss our approach and how we plan to do so 02:06:50.421 --> 02:06:54.195 further. Our focus on reducing impact is not only on 02:06:54.207 --> 02:06:58.046 the number of customers, as we discussed in the prior 02:06:58.058 --> 02:07:01.909 slide, but it is also to minimize the duration of the 02:07:01.921 --> 02:07:05.895 outage based on the weather forecast and the associated 02:07:05.907 --> 02:07:09.822 fire risk. And what you can actually see in this chart 02:07:09.834 --> 02:07:13.886 is the X Axis shows the number of customers impacted and 02:07:13.898 --> 02:07:17.605 the, I'm sorry, it's the opposite. The Y Axis shows 02:07:17.617 --> 02:07:21.523 the number of customers impacted, and the X axis shows 02:07:21.535 --> 02:07:25.452 the respective timeline. And given the scope and scale 02:07:25.464 --> 02:07:29.376 of the weather impact, the event evolved through early 02:07:29.388 --> 02:07:33.027 morning on Wednesday, 10-9, into Friday afternoon, 02:07:33.039 --> 02:07:37.012 10-11. And as can be seen on this chart, some customers 02:07:37.024 --> 02:07:41.152 were restored as other customers were being de-energized, 02:07:41.164 --> 02:07:44.573 given the fact that the fire risk varied in our 02:07:44.585 --> 02:07:48.220 service territory at different points in time. And 02:07:48.232 --> 02:07:51.923 as Mr. Lewis stated in his comments right after the 02:07:51.935 --> 02:07:55.923 de-energization happened on Phase One, we were actually 02:07:55.935 --> 02:07:59.847 able to further reconfigure our grid through switching 02:07:59.859 --> 02:08:03.568 operations to provide an alternate supply source to 02:08:03.580 --> 02:08:07.626 restore service to 48,000 customers that were outside of 02:08:07.638 --> 02:08:11.482 the potential fire risk before the all clear. Another 02:08:11.494 --> 02:08:15.332 takeaway from this chart is that nearly all customers 02:08:15.344 --> 02:08:18.767 were restored within 48 hours, as Mr Lewis also 02:08:18.779 --> 02:08:22.471 mentioned, but as was stated, we know we need to do 02:08:22.483 --> 02:08:26.402 better and we're committed to do so. The next slide, I 02:08:26.414 --> 02:08:30.327 will touch on the underlying basis and the methodology 02:08:30.339 --> 02:08:34.263 that we used to help inform the scope. So the scope of 02:08:34.275 --> 02:08:38.106 our public safety power shutoff event is based on two 02:08:38.118 --> 02:08:42.245 primary factors. The first factor is something called the 02:08:42.257 --> 02:08:46.236 outage-producing wind, which is, the way to think about 02:08:46.248 --> 02:08:50.025 it is, the likelihood of an ignition that could take 02:08:50.037 --> 02:08:53.942 place from a utility asset in our asset. And then, the 02:08:53.954 --> 02:08:57.728 second parameter is a fire potential index, which is 02:08:57.740 --> 02:09:01.794 if an ignition happens, what's the likelihood of spread, 02:09:01.806 --> 02:09:05.443 meaning fire turning into a catastrophic wildfire. 02:09:05.455 --> 02:09:09.430 Let me first touch on the fire potential index. It uses 02:09:09.442 --> 02:09:13.214 both weather, which includes wind speed, temperature 02:09:13.226 --> 02:09:17.136 and relative humidity, and fuel loading factors, which 02:09:17.148 --> 02:09:21.069 includes the type of vegetation on the ground, because 02:09:21.081 --> 02:09:24.844 that's a proxy for fuel, and the associated moisture 02:09:24.856 --> 02:09:28.561 content. And this is a very similar approach to the 02:09:28.573 --> 02:09:32.414 spread element that is used by the US Forest Services 02:09:32.426 --> 02:09:36.207 to inform the National Fighter Danger Rating system. 02:09:36.219 --> 02:09:39.837 Regarding the outage producing winds, what we have 02:09:39.849 --> 02:09:43.549 done, and you'll see this in one of my slides, that 02:09:43.561 --> 02:09:47.755 correlates the damage that we found as part of this event, 02:09:47.767 --> 02:09:51.544 because we were forecasting that I think there was a 02:09:51.556 --> 02:09:55.604 question in regards to the forecasted damage, the actual 02:09:55.616 --> 02:09:59.391 damage compared to our forecast, and what we've done 02:09:59.403 --> 02:10:03.030 is we've established and correlated sustained wind 02:10:03.042 --> 02:10:07.108 speeds which directly correlate to wind gusts and looked 02:10:07.120 --> 02:10:11.166 at last 10 years of data regarding outages and the cause 02:10:11.178 --> 02:10:14.738 of the outages as it pertains to our distribution 02:10:14.750 --> 02:10:18.232 system, aligned with the peak wind gusts and the 02:10:18.244 --> 02:10:22.308 sustained wind gusts. So we have leverage nearly 300,000 02:10:22.320 --> 02:10:26.013 data points regarding the performance of the system 02:10:26.025 --> 02:10:29.873 to be able to help inform how it's gonna perform over 02:10:29.885 --> 02:10:33.512 the course off a certain forecasted wind speed. We 02:10:33.524 --> 02:10:37.521 further calibrated this model using 1600 fires that are 02:10:37.533 --> 02:10:41.292 greater than, approximately 1600 fires, greater than 02:10:41.304 --> 02:10:45.146 40 acres from the US Forest Service's data set, which 02:10:45.158 --> 02:10:49.422 dated back to 1992, and this is the basis of our forecasted 02:10:49.434 --> 02:10:53.068 utility risk model. The map on the slide shows the 02:10:53.080 --> 02:10:56.914 primary basis of the outage producing winds, which is 02:10:56.926 --> 02:11:00.842 directly correlated to the sustained and the peak wind 02:11:00.854 --> 02:11:05.050 gusts. And as Mr Johnson mentioned, at the speeds of about 02:11:05.062 --> 02:11:08.842 40 to 45 miles an hour, for our distribution system, 02:11:08.854 --> 02:11:12.686 we start to see vegetation coming in contact with our 02:11:12.698 --> 02:11:16.470 lines, and what you can see is there's a significant 02:11:16.482 --> 02:11:20.249 footprint within our service territory that exceeded 02:11:20.261 --> 02:11:24.182 that threshold for this particular event in October 9. 02:11:24.194 --> 02:11:28.171 The scope that we specifically identify is based on the 02:11:28.183 --> 02:11:31.887 forecasted wind speed, coupled with our assets that 02:11:31.899 --> 02:11:35.882 are located in the high fire risk areas. So areas that, 02:11:35.894 --> 02:11:39.605 where our assets traverse, high fire spread coupled 02:11:39.617 --> 02:11:43.519 with high wind gusts. So one example I'll point you to 02:11:43.531 --> 02:11:47.445 the map is, if you look at the Sacramento Valley area, 02:11:47.457 --> 02:11:51.294 you can see that the wind peak wind gusts were fairly 02:11:51.306 --> 02:11:55.226 high. However, we did not include this area within our 02:11:55.238 --> 02:11:59.215 scope, and the reason is because it's primarily located 02:11:59.227 --> 02:12:03.002 in Tier 1, which has a low potential for fire spread 02:12:03.014 --> 02:12:06.782 risk. And as can also be seen, the damaged locations 02:12:06.794 --> 02:12:10.504 that we've identified and confirmed so far, the 100 02:12:10.516 --> 02:12:14.419 plus, which is the blue dots that show up on this map, 02:12:14.431 --> 02:12:18.347 there's a strong correlation to what we forecasted and 02:12:18.359 --> 02:12:22.269 the confirmed hazards and damages that were identified 02:12:22.281 --> 02:12:26.060 on the system as we did the safety inspections after 02:12:26.072 --> 02:12:30.122 the all clear. One other item I want to touch o, because 02:12:30.134 --> 02:12:33.839 we've received a lot of questions from a lot of our 02:12:33.851 --> 02:12:37.407 customers and counties is, well, where I was in a 02:12:37.419 --> 02:12:41.272 particular county or a location, I did not experience 02:12:41.284 --> 02:12:45.186 the high wind gust or the extreme wind gusts, however, 02:12:45.198 --> 02:12:49.041 you still turned my power off. And this example is an 02:12:49.053 --> 02:12:53.388 actual depiction of the October 9th event, which illustrates 02:12:53.400 --> 02:12:56.892 an example of a radio distribution system within 02:12:56.904 --> 02:13:00.952 the City of Pinole. So if you look at the Pink Triangle, 02:13:00.964 --> 02:13:04.453 which is the substation, and think about that as 02:13:04.465 --> 02:13:08.233 the supply source of electricity, that supply source 02:13:08.245 --> 02:13:12.097 has to traverse that yellow shaded area, which is the 02:13:12.109 --> 02:13:15.941 high fire threat district, through the lines that are 02:13:15.953 --> 02:13:19.868 shaded in orange, because those are the lines that are 02:13:19.880 --> 02:13:24.075 the high fire risk areas that we were looking to mitigate. 02:13:24.087 --> 02:13:27.509 And as we de-energized those lines, we also had 02:13:27.521 --> 02:13:31.570 an unintended impact to customers in the lower fire risk 02:13:31.582 --> 02:13:35.287 area. So for example, if you take your attention to 02:13:35.299 --> 02:13:39.140 the north section of that illustration and schematic, 02:13:39.152 --> 02:13:42.934 hard to see, but that's Pinole Valley Road. But that 02:13:42.946 --> 02:13:46.492 entire community is served through that one radio 02:13:46.504 --> 02:13:50.632 distribution system, And in this specific instance, there 02:13:50.644 --> 02:13:54.767 were approximately 4000 customers that were impacted that 02:13:54.779 --> 02:13:58.557 were in the lower fire risk areas. Now there's other 02:13:58.569 --> 02:14:02.546 circumstances that were part of this event in a similar 02:14:02.558 --> 02:14:06.190 configuration. If you reflect on the comments that 02:14:06.202 --> 02:14:09.757 Mr Johnson made in regards to the installation of 02:14:09.769 --> 02:14:13.836 sectionalization devices, sectionalization devices help. 02:14:13.848 --> 02:14:17.609 But in the instances, and this specific depiction, a 02:14:17.621 --> 02:14:21.537 sectionalization device would not help in the isolated 02:14:21.549 --> 02:14:25.602 section in the north part of that system because there's 02:14:25.614 --> 02:14:29.251 no additional supply source. This is where there's 02:14:29.263 --> 02:14:33.170 the opportunity to integrate microgrids as a potential 02:14:33.182 --> 02:14:36.745 supply source. So the sectionalization devices is 02:14:36.757 --> 02:14:40.670 not the panacea. It's one tool within the tool kit for 02:14:40.682 --> 02:14:44.393 us to be able to reduce the overall impact of PSPS. 02:14:44.418 --> 02:14:49.954 Just a follow up question to that, Mr Singh. I 02:14:49.966 --> 02:14:55.442 assume there are many communities like this, and investing in microgrids is 02:14:55.454 --> 02:15:00.744 not something that will be cheap. Do you have some thoughts on how you're 02:15:00.756 --> 02:15:06.345 planning to prioritize the investment of microgrids in communities like this? 02:15:06.370 --> 02:15:11.753 That prioritization, that we are looking at, really is based on 02:15:11.765 --> 02:15:17.430 three parameters, and that parameter really is around the areas of our circuit that 02:15:17.442 --> 02:15:22.764 traverse the highest fire risk areas. So when you look at the high fire threat 02:15:22.776 --> 02:15:28.649 district maps, even the Tier 2 and Tier 3, there's some communities that are at higher 02:15:28.661 --> 02:15:31.680 risk as compared to others. So we're looking 02:15:31.692 --> 02:15:34.588 at not only the performance of our system, 02:15:34.600 --> 02:15:39.998 the condition of the vegetation in and around the area, but also looking at the 02:15:40.010 --> 02:15:45.537 spread likelihood, in terms of catastrophic wildfires, including communities that 02:15:45.549 --> 02:15:51.156 are challenged from an egress standpoint. As we all reflect on the lessons learned 02:15:51.168 --> 02:15:53.714 from Paradise, we understand what the 02:15:53.726 --> 02:15:56.822 implication was, given the limited egress for 02:15:56.834 --> 02:16:02.231 that community. We are also looking at, and we've done a 30-year climatological 02:16:02.243 --> 02:16:07.971 study to help inform 30 years of wind speed history with a specific focus on looking 02:16:07.983 --> 02:16:13.453 at the phenomenon of the Northeast wind pattern, which is something what we call 02:16:13.465 --> 02:16:18.650 Diablo Winds here. It's very similar to the Santa Ana winds down in Southern 02:16:18.662 --> 02:16:24.332 California, and we have a prioritization model to identify those communities, those 02:16:24.344 --> 02:16:29.872 circuits, and those are the ones that we're going after first. In regards to your 02:16:29.884 --> 02:16:35.763 microgrid question, then we further expand that to identify the communities that would 02:16:35.775 --> 02:16:38.789 be the greatest impact as a result of a PSPS 02:16:38.801 --> 02:16:41.491 de-energization. And those would be the 02:16:41.503 --> 02:16:46.895 areas that we would prioritize first. One item I did want to touch on. We don't 02:16:46.907 --> 02:16:52.495 have an example here but turning to our transmission system and our higher voltage 02:16:52.507 --> 02:16:58.108 system because that is also in scope of the public safety power shut off, and that 02:16:58.120 --> 02:17:01.203 was in scope for this event on. I know that's 02:17:01.215 --> 02:17:03.840 a question on top of a lot of people's 02:17:03.852 --> 02:17:09.179 minds as well. Our higher voltage systems, which is 115 kV. The 230 kV and the 02:17:09.191 --> 02:17:14.850 500, which really is the interconnection between us and the CalISO, the independent 02:17:14.862 --> 02:17:20.532 system operator for California. They tend to be more networked in nature, given the 02:17:20.544 --> 02:17:26.330 reliability standards that are promulgated by the North American Electric Reliability 02:17:26.342 --> 02:17:31.601 Corporation. So one example that'll point to on the October 9th event. Of the 02:17:31.613 --> 02:17:37.135 738,000 customers that were impacted, roughly 16% of those were directly impacted 02:17:37.147 --> 02:17:42.546 as a result of transmission. So that's about 120,000 customers. And as Mr Lewis 02:17:42.558 --> 02:17:48.212 previously mentioned, 80,000 of the 120 were in the Humboldt area, and that was not 02:17:48.224 --> 02:17:51.247 a direct impact as a result of transmission. 02:17:51.259 --> 02:17:53.890 The issue there was that we had one of 02:17:53.902 --> 02:17:56.518 our lines out of service for a planned 02:17:56.530 --> 02:17:59.697 project, and that's one of the lessons learned 02:17:59.709 --> 02:18:02.128 that he spoke of, in regards to our 02:18:02.140 --> 02:18:05.179 operational learning. So to really narrow it 02:18:05.179 --> 02:18:08.421 If I may interrupt, excuse 02:18:08.433 --> 02:18:11.619 me. But how long before a maintenance planned 02:18:11.631 --> 02:18:15.052 outage, do you plan the outage? Like how close to 02:18:15.064 --> 02:18:18.429 this weather event was that maintenance planned? 02:18:18.429 --> 02:18:22.033 It varies on its not necessarily just a 02:18:22.045 --> 02:18:25.918 maintenance outage. So if it's a maintenance outage, we can 02:18:25.930 --> 02:18:29.605 typically plan that was in 60 to 90 to 120 days. I mean, 02:18:29.617 --> 02:18:33.626 unless it's an immediate safety issue, then we will take that 02:18:33.638 --> 02:18:37.244 action right away, because we do have reliability built 02:18:37.256 --> 02:18:41.004 into the network system. In regards to this specific type 02:18:41.016 --> 02:18:44.758 of a project, it could be a multi-year project because of 02:18:44.770 --> 02:18:48.523 the permitting and the environmental restrictions that we 02:18:48.535 --> 02:18:52.326 have to follow to be able to get the permit to do the work 02:18:52.338 --> 02:18:56.141 itself. But we do look at all of the work that's happening 02:18:56.153 --> 02:19:00.079 within our system, so that at any given point in time, we're 02:19:00.091 --> 02:19:03.576 not compromising the overall reliability of the grid. 02:19:03.588 --> 02:19:07.382 And in this specific instance, one of the learnings we had 02:19:07.394 --> 02:19:11.200 is this type of work, now we're gonna plan in the shoulder 02:19:11.212 --> 02:19:14.947 months, which would be outside of the peak time period of 02:19:14.959 --> 02:19:18.577 when we anticipate or experience the highest fire risk. 02:19:18.602 --> 02:19:21.375 Increasingly, though, I 02:19:21.387 --> 02:19:24.400 mean, as our fire season gets longer, it's a little, 02:19:24.412 --> 02:19:27.191 it's gonna get more challenging to schedule that 02:19:27.203 --> 02:19:30.450 maintenance, right, because you want to avoid the summer 02:19:30.462 --> 02:19:33.451 months but you also want to avoid, you know, October 02:19:33.463 --> 02:19:36.351 because wildfire season, you know, October's a key 02:19:36.363 --> 02:19:39.416 month. But as wildfire season gets longer, it's gonna 02:19:39.428 --> 02:19:42.208 get more challenging scheduling that maintenance 02:19:42.233 --> 02:19:46.212 It is. And that's an element that we are looking at 02:19:46.224 --> 02:19:50.273 from an asset strategy perspective for the current transmission grid 02:19:50.285 --> 02:19:54.445 that we have and identifying are there areas where we need to bring in 02:19:54.457 --> 02:19:58.513 additional resiliency? For example, switching stations to be able to 02:19:58.525 --> 02:20:02.667 provide additional flexibility on the system to be able to continue to 02:20:02.679 --> 02:20:06.659 enable us to do the important safety work that we need to do on the 02:20:06.671 --> 02:20:10.878 system yet ensure were meeting the reliability standards that we've put 02:20:10.890 --> 02:20:14.934 forward and the various regular regulating entities have put forward 02:20:14.959 --> 02:20:19.146 On the topic of transmission, 02:20:19.158 --> 02:20:22.746 you know, as you noted, those lines can have a 02:20:22.758 --> 02:20:26.721 significant impact in terms of number of customers. 02:20:26.733 --> 02:20:30.786 Are there any operational steps that you can take to 02:20:30.798 --> 02:20:34.663 protect those lines and potentially avoid PSPSs in 02:20:34.675 --> 02:20:38.629 particular locational ized areas that might serve a 02:20:38.641 --> 02:20:42.741 lot of customers or you might want to try to do other 02:20:42.753 --> 02:20:46.560 ways to keep that transmission line on energized? 02:20:46.560 --> 02:20:50.228 You know, thank you for that question. 02:20:50.240 --> 02:20:54.256 Absolutely. So when you look at our transmission lines, not 02:20:54.268 --> 02:20:58.143 every line is the same, right? Even in terms of the right 02:20:58.155 --> 02:21:01.975 of way. And when you start looking at some of our higher 02:21:01.987 --> 02:21:05.792 voltage lines that I spoke of, we tend to have a greater 02:21:05.804 --> 02:21:09.823 right of way and a greater clearance. So the likelihood of, 02:21:09.835 --> 02:21:13.646 for example, vegetation impacting our lines, creating an 02:21:13.658 --> 02:21:17.548 ignition, is much lower, as compared to some of our lower 02:21:17.560 --> 02:21:21.422 voltage transmission lines. For example, when you look at 02:21:21.434 --> 02:21:25.309 our 60 kV or 70 kV, which we refer to as subtransmission, 02:21:25.321 --> 02:21:28.921 tend to be very similar in terms of our right of away 02:21:28.933 --> 02:21:32.680 and have a much tighter right of way. So one example is 02:21:32.692 --> 02:21:36.691 identifying the lines of 60 kV, 70 kV, that provide service 02:21:36.703 --> 02:21:40.513 to a significant amount of customers and creating a much 02:21:40.525 --> 02:21:44.598 broader right of way as part of that risk reduction measure. 02:21:44.610 --> 02:21:48.359 And that's exactly some of the things that we're doing. 02:21:48.359 --> 02:21:54.172 A quick question. I'm sorry. Commissioner Rechtschaffen. 02:21:54.197 --> 02:21:56.570 I don't know if we're finished. Are 02:21:56.582 --> 02:21:58.967 you finished? I want to let you finish, and then I have questions. 02:21:58.992 --> 02:22:03.975 Sure, I've got two more slides if you'll be able to get 02:22:03.987 --> 02:22:09.120 through in short order. So on slide seven, I think, Commissioner Shiroma, 02:22:09.132 --> 02:22:14.121 you had asked this question in regards to the assessment of the hazard. 02:22:14.133 --> 02:22:18.717 So what we've done is for the confirmed locations of our hazards, 02:22:18.729 --> 02:22:23.714 we have correlated, specifically, the location, the type of the hazard, 02:22:23.726 --> 02:22:28.307 and our teams are currently identifying what work was done from a 02:22:28.319 --> 02:22:33.311 maintenance perspective previously. The specific type of work. When was 02:22:33.323 --> 02:22:37.979 it done. To be ableto further help inform the effectiveness of our 02:22:37.991 --> 02:22:42.836 risk reduction measures. But one thing I do want to highlight on this 02:22:42.848 --> 02:22:47.566 slide, there's a couple of things. So if you look at the map on the 02:22:47.578 --> 02:22:52.429 right hand side, it basically shows, in blue shade, the area that was 02:22:52.441 --> 02:22:57.443 in scope or that was impacted as a result of PSPS and those exclamation 02:22:57.455 --> 02:23:02.234 points as the location of the confirmed hazards or damages. And what 02:23:02.246 --> 02:23:06.828 you can see is that there's a fairly strong correlation. And this 02:23:06.840 --> 02:23:11.972 really speaks to the statistical-based 10-year model in terms of forecast 02:23:11.984 --> 02:23:16.642 versus the actuals of what we observed. The other takeaway is that 02:23:16.654 --> 02:23:21.147 the hazards included trees or branches into lines, downed wires, 02:23:21.159 --> 02:23:25.942 fallen poles, and the work that we are doing, and the other IOU's in 02:23:25.954 --> 02:23:30.452 California are doing, does not necessarily guarantee that we can 02:23:30.464 --> 02:23:35.531 eliminate all PSPS events because we do have bare conductor in a dynamic 02:23:35.543 --> 02:23:40.316 environment. But we fully realize that that's the future that we are 02:23:40.328 --> 02:23:45.322 aspiring towards, so I'll give you a few examples as to why I make that 02:23:45.334 --> 02:23:50.044 statement. The first example is the additional vegetation work that 02:23:50.056 --> 02:23:54.917 we're doing, on enhanced vegetation, which goes beyond the regulatory 02:23:54.929 --> 02:23:59.771 requirements, does not guarantee that a tree branch, that maybe 40 or 02:23:59.783 --> 02:24:04.914 more feet away from our line, cannot come in contact with the line during 02:24:04.926 --> 02:24:09.565 a high wind event. So it's not immune to that. Or having a covered 02:24:09.577 --> 02:24:14.506 conductor. It's not immune to a large tree from fielding into the line 02:24:14.518 --> 02:24:19.779 and leading to a wires down situation. So when we have a covered conductor, 02:24:19.791 --> 02:24:24.370 the potential ignition likelihood is far lower than it is for the 02:24:24.382 --> 02:24:29.163 current bare conductors that we have or the bare wires, but there is 02:24:29.175 --> 02:24:33.899 still the likelihood of ignition as a result of the down conductor. 02:24:33.899 --> 02:24:36.136 Do you take those 02:24:36.148 --> 02:24:38.069 things into account in determining where 02:24:38.081 --> 02:24:40.206 they shut off the power? Your prior hardening 02:24:40.218 --> 02:24:42.309 efforts? Your vegetation management efforts? 02:24:42.334 --> 02:24:46.831 Thank you for that question, sir. So we're in the first 02:24:46.843 --> 02:24:51.414 evolution as part of the implementation of those risk reduction measures 02:24:51.426 --> 02:24:56.116 for system hardening. So far, we've done about 100 miles, for our enhanced 02:24:56.128 --> 02:25:00.267 vegetation, a little north of 1000. We don't have enough data set 02:25:00.279 --> 02:25:04.763 yet, and actually, this is what we are doing, working jointly with CPUC 02:25:04.775 --> 02:25:09.333 Safety and Enforcement Division as well as the other California IOU's to 02:25:09.345 --> 02:25:14.085 evaluate the operational performance of those circuits to really understand 02:25:14.097 --> 02:25:18.349 the data-driven effective risk reduction measure of those measures. 02:25:18.374 --> 02:25:21.445 So right now you don't do it. 02:25:21.470 --> 02:25:25.423 We do not currently leverage that information, 02:25:25.435 --> 02:25:28.645 but we plan to do that on a going forward basis as 02:25:28.657 --> 02:25:32.302 we continue to collect the data set. And this is one area 02:25:32.314 --> 02:25:35.907 that I think us working jointly with the CPUC as well as 02:25:35.919 --> 02:25:39.545 the other IOUs, because they've got a broader data set as 02:25:39.557 --> 02:25:43.258 well that we can really leverage and leapfrog the state of 02:25:43.270 --> 02:25:46.713 California and the utilities on a much faster pace, as 02:25:46.725 --> 02:25:50.432 opposed to each of our IOUs only relying on our data sets. 02:25:50.457 --> 02:25:54.226 Could you repeat the number of lines? I think 02:25:54.238 --> 02:25:57.848 you said 100 miles and 1000 lines? Could you repeat that again? 02:25:57.873 --> 02:26:01.604 Sure, President Batjer, I apologize 02:26:01.616 --> 02:26:05.142 for rambling so many numbers. So in our wildfire 02:26:05.154 --> 02:26:08.531 mitigation plan we had put forward goal of 150 02:26:08.543 --> 02:26:11.859 miles for system hardening and we're at about 02:26:11.871 --> 02:26:15.370 north of 100 miles. At the moment, year to date. 02:26:15.382 --> 02:26:18.463 And for our Enhanced Vegetation Management 02:26:18.475 --> 02:26:22.052 program, we had put forward 2455 miles on. We are 02:26:22.064 --> 02:26:25.653 north of 1000 miles of that work being completed. 02:26:25.678 --> 02:26:29.603 I know, more numbers, but can you give, for all 02:26:29.615 --> 02:26:33.436 of our edification, mostly the public's, what would be your total 02:26:33.448 --> 02:26:37.177 miles? I mean, how far are you into your vegetation reaching the 02:26:37.189 --> 02:26:41.045 total? And how far are you into your hardening reaching the total? 02:26:41.070 --> 02:26:44.998 So, in terms of our hardening, its 02:26:45.010 --> 02:26:48.718 envisioned to be a 10 to 14 year program. We're 02:26:48.730 --> 02:26:52.897 targeting 7100 miles of the highest risk miles within 02:26:52.909 --> 02:26:57.010 our high fire threat districts, and for the Enhanced 02:26:57.022 --> 02:27:01.088 Vegetation Management Program, it's intended to be a 02:27:01.100 --> 02:27:05.255 eight-year program because we're targeting all of the 02:27:05.267 --> 02:27:09.032 miles, which is the 25,000 miles of distribution 02:27:09.044 --> 02:27:13.128 that we have within the High Fire Threat District's. 02:27:13.153 --> 02:27:16.832 We interrupted you again. I'm sorry. 02:27:16.857 --> 02:27:22.220 No problem. This is the last slide, and what I was gonna share 02:27:22.232 --> 02:27:27.812 here is that there's no silver bullet to solving this issue. But we will leave no 02:27:27.824 --> 02:27:33.261 rock unturned to leverage every tool, every technology, that's available in the 02:27:33.273 --> 02:27:39.063 industry to address the ongoing risk of not just the unprecedented wildfire risk but 02:27:39.075 --> 02:27:44.169 the risk presented as a result of a PSPS event of this scale. And as we've 02:27:44.181 --> 02:27:49.968 discussed, right, the fundamental redesign of the electric infrastructure to be more 02:27:49.980 --> 02:27:55.693 resilient and flexible will take time, as we just discussed. And this also includes 02:27:55.705 --> 02:28:01.362 the installation of permanent microgrids and discreeted generation as we discussed 02:28:01.374 --> 02:28:04.414 Commissioner. But what we're doing now is to 02:28:04.426 --> 02:28:07.342 implement mitigations that can potentially 02:28:07.354 --> 02:28:12.451 reduce the impact of our customers and communities during a PSPS event. So 02:28:12.463 --> 02:28:14.895 Mr Johnson mentioned the additional 02:28:14.907 --> 02:28:17.961 installation of sectionalization devices and 02:28:17.973 --> 02:28:23.484 that actually benefited us in this specific event from October 9th. So far we've 02:28:23.496 --> 02:28:28.855 installed, this year, more than 200 sectionalization devices, and as a result, 02:28:28.867 --> 02:28:34.306 in this event, we were able to mitigate impact to 77,000 customers. So there is 02:28:34.318 --> 02:28:39.684 benefit that we can draw upon now as a result of this. And we have plans to do 02:28:39.696 --> 02:28:42.815 more than 550 devices and get those installed 02:28:42.827 --> 02:28:45.209 within the next 12 months or less. 02:28:45.234 --> 02:28:48.762 When you say mitigate, what do you mean? 02:28:48.774 --> 02:28:52.100 Do you mean like those 77,000 customers were not de-energized? 02:28:52.100 --> 02:28:58.083 De-energized. Another item that we actually employed as part of 02:28:58.095 --> 02:29:03.864 the October 9th event is the Resilient Zones. So we have a Resilient zone in 02:29:03.876 --> 02:29:09.940 Angwin that was operational during the event that maintained service to critical 02:29:09.952 --> 02:29:15.653 services within community like the fire station. And we have plans to do an 02:29:15.665 --> 02:29:21.950 additional 40 or more. And the last item is where we've provided backup generation, 02:29:21.962 --> 02:29:27.810 both at the grid level. So specifically in the October 9th event, we did roll 02:29:27.822 --> 02:29:30.731 in mobile generation within one of our 02:29:30.743 --> 02:29:34.189 substations and were able to maintain service 02:29:34.201 --> 02:29:39.980 to downtown Calistoga even during the de-energized event. And we also worked 02:29:39.992 --> 02:29:46.266 with some of the critical infrastructure entities like CalTrans to maintain service 02:29:46.278 --> 02:29:51.890 to mass transit like Caldicott Tunnel. So those are all of the things that 02:29:51.902 --> 02:29:55.255 we are doing now on. We're going to continue 02:29:55.267 --> 02:29:58.033 to do more of very aggressively. The 02:29:58.045 --> 02:30:03.813 last thing I'll state is that it's gonna be imperative for us to continue to 02:30:03.825 --> 02:30:10.102 engage and partner very closely, not only with the CPUC, CalOES, CalFire, counties, 02:30:10.114 --> 02:30:15.804 cities, our customers to really work as a collective Us because that's what 02:30:15.816 --> 02:30:21.800 it's gonna take to face this unprecedented risk our customers or committees are 02:30:21.812 --> 02:30:27.433 facing. And also addressing the ongoing risk of this scale of PSPS events. 02:30:27.458 --> 02:30:32.149 Commissioner Shiroma? 02:30:32.149 --> 02:30:36.584 So, Sumeet, question. What is your timeframe for these 02:30:36.596 --> 02:30:40.987 40 other Angwin-type of microgrids. Are they located all over your territory? 02:30:41.012 --> 02:30:46.377 Yes, Commissioner, so they're specifically targeted using the 02:30:46.389 --> 02:30:51.559 same prioritization methodology that I articulated previously. In terms of 02:30:51.571 --> 02:30:56.529 likelihood of ignition, the consequence of a fire spread turning into a 02:30:56.541 --> 02:31:02.200 catastrophic wildfire, egress, as well as looking at the Northeast wind patterns. 02:31:02.212 --> 02:31:07.080 So those are all of the elements. Initially, the plans that we had put 02:31:07.092 --> 02:31:12.385 forward were approximately three years. But we know we need to do better and 02:31:12.397 --> 02:31:17.410 are in the process of reevaluating our plans to identify what we can get 02:31:17.422 --> 02:31:22.652 done and how quickly we can get some of these things done in a safe manner. 02:31:22.677 --> 02:31:27.131 My last question for you, at this point, 02:31:27.143 --> 02:31:31.196 is you're the Vice president of Asset and Risk Management, 02:31:31.208 --> 02:31:35.393 Wildfire Safety Program, are you also involved in enterprise 02:31:35.405 --> 02:31:39.877 risk management and assessment? In so far as did you participate 02:31:39.889 --> 02:31:44.191 in in looking at ahead of time at the worst possible situation 02:31:44.203 --> 02:31:48.653 that could occur? And also in the enterprise of risk management, 02:31:48.665 --> 02:31:52.424 are you involved in looking at the core culture of the 02:31:52.436 --> 02:31:56.619 utility, which seems to me to be a part of the the risk map? 02:31:56.644 --> 02:32:01.820 My specific focus is on the risks related to electrical 02:32:01.832 --> 02:32:06.588 operations and all the electrical operations assets. But we work, 02:32:06.600 --> 02:32:11.350 and I work, very closely, and my team works very closely with our 02:32:11.362 --> 02:32:16.629 enterprise risk management team to ensure that the work that we're doing 02:32:16.641 --> 02:32:22.016 as part of the RAMP proceedings within the CPUC risk assessment mitigation 02:32:22.028 --> 02:32:26.626 phases are completely in sync with the methodology that's being 02:32:26.638 --> 02:32:31.445 used at the enterprise level as well as the granular risk analysis 02:32:31.457 --> 02:32:36.204 that our teams are doing within Electric Operations. That is yes. 02:32:36.229 --> 02:32:39.578 Have you done any 02:32:39.590 --> 02:32:43.263 analysis in looking at all the map that showed 02:32:43.275 --> 02:32:46.551 where the damage was identified? Have you 02:32:46.563 --> 02:32:50.164 done any analysis about where those locations 02:32:50.176 --> 02:32:56.943 were, kind of, in your prioritization list, in your veg management program and in your 02:32:56.955 --> 02:33:00.371 hardening program, were there any locations 02:33:00.383 --> 02:33:03.967 where the veg management was behind the plan? 02:33:03.992 --> 02:33:08.790 So Commissioner Randolph that that's the work that's 02:33:08.802 --> 02:33:13.194 happening at the moment. What I could tell you is that when we 02:33:13.206 --> 02:33:18.221 did look at some of the hazards and damages, we did have some locations 02:33:18.233 --> 02:33:22.491 where tree branches impacted or came in contact with covered 02:33:22.503 --> 02:33:27.425 conductor. So that's an indication of where we've actually done system 02:33:27.437 --> 02:33:31.955 hardening work. So there are instances where we have implemented 02:33:31.967 --> 02:33:36.548 the risk reduction measures to your point, but that full analysis 02:33:36.560 --> 02:33:41.223 of the 100 plus confirmed hazards and damage locations is ongoing. 02:33:41.248 --> 02:33:44.313 Quick follow-up 02:33:44.325 --> 02:33:46.667 question. Did your fire index tool 02:33:46.679 --> 02:33:52.109 accurately predict where the damage was going to occur and where it didn't occur? 02:33:52.134 --> 02:33:55.236 Yeah, so if we go back to slide 02:33:55.248 --> 02:33:58.751 seven. Right? When you just overlay, and that was the 02:33:58.763 --> 02:34:02.130 intent of this map here, what we forecasted is what 02:34:02.142 --> 02:34:05.197 shaded in blue because that's what we made the 02:34:05.209 --> 02:34:08.428 decision on in regards to the scope of the public 02:34:08.440 --> 02:34:11.929 safety power shut off event. And as you can see, with 02:34:11.941 --> 02:34:15.166 the confirmed hazard and damage locations so far, 02:34:15.178 --> 02:34:18.609 there's a good correlation in terms of that overlay. 02:34:18.609 --> 02:34:23.592 Let me ask you a question about, I 02:34:23.604 --> 02:34:28.830 don't if you were gonna, San Diego Gas and Electric is state of the 02:34:28.842 --> 02:34:33.946 art. They do a simulation where they run 10,000 wildfire scenarios 02:34:33.958 --> 02:34:38.845 a day. Are you capable of doing that with your fire index tool? 02:34:38.870 --> 02:34:44.951 We are, Commissioner. We're actually leveraging in working with the 02:34:44.963 --> 02:34:50.839 same entity and service provider, and we have actually deployed that fire spread 02:34:50.851 --> 02:34:53.665 tool and capability. So that's another 02:34:53.677 --> 02:34:57.084 analytical element that comes into play, which 02:34:57.096 --> 02:35:02.905 is not just the potential forecast of an outage, because an outage is a leading 02:35:02.917 --> 02:35:08.476 indicator for a fire ignition, but also if that outage does result in a fire 02:35:08.488 --> 02:35:14.637 ignition, based on the weather forecast, what would be the potential spread and what 02:35:14.649 --> 02:35:20.504 could be the associated consequence? So we have a model, and it's the same exact 02:35:20.516 --> 02:35:26.382 vendor, same exact methodology that we are employing and using for that purpose. 02:35:26.407 --> 02:35:32.310 Are there any other operational things? 02:35:32.322 --> 02:35:37.873 You mentioned increasing the corridor on the subtransmission 02:35:37.885 --> 02:35:43.840 lines. This fire season are their operational things that you can 02:35:43.852 --> 02:35:49.728 do to help you be able to limit deenergization in certain areas? 02:35:49.753 --> 02:35:53.127 So those are the things I spoke of, 02:35:53.139 --> 02:35:56.720 Commissioner, in regards to the continued installation 02:35:56.732 --> 02:36:00.046 of the sectionalization devices, which we're doing 02:36:00.058 --> 02:36:03.711 identifying areas within our substations because that's 02:36:03.723 --> 02:36:07.556 a supply source that are not in high fire threat districts 02:36:07.568 --> 02:36:10.696 and bring in mobile generation just like we did 02:36:10.708 --> 02:36:14.156 for Calistoga. Just given the fact that a lot of the 02:36:14.168 --> 02:36:17.432 infrastructure related upgrades to align with the 02:36:17.444 --> 02:36:20.811 level of risk that we're seeing in the environment, 02:36:20.823 --> 02:36:24.072 they take a bit of time because we go through the 02:36:24.084 --> 02:36:27.718 permitting process. That's a planned execution of work, 02:36:27.730 --> 02:36:31.310 including getting qualified personnel to do that work. 02:36:31.322 --> 02:36:35.018 But outside of the elements that I talked about in terms 02:36:35.030 --> 02:36:38.412 of the shorter term, which we're already employing, 02:36:38.424 --> 02:36:42.191 the physical upgrade to the infrastructure is challenging 02:36:42.203 --> 02:36:45.135 to do within this current short time period, 02:36:45.160 --> 02:36:47.933 What about more weather, 02:36:47.945 --> 02:36:50.577 more rapid deployment of weather stations? You have 02:36:50.589 --> 02:36:53.216 three times the number of San Diego Gas & Electric, 02:36:53.228 --> 02:36:55.917 but they're in one county in your 49 or 50 counties. 02:36:55.942 --> 02:37:00.661 Yes, sir. So, coming into last year, over the 12 02:37:00.673 --> 02:37:05.478 months, we've installed 600 weather stations, 100 high definition 02:37:05.490 --> 02:37:09.851 cameras, and we have plans to get to more than 1300 weather 02:37:09.863 --> 02:37:14.381 stations, within the next 18 to 24 months or less, and get to 02:37:14.393 --> 02:37:19.097 additional 500 cameras for a total of 600 within the next couple 02:37:19.109 --> 02:37:23.534 of years as well. So those are elements in all of the things 02:37:23.546 --> 02:37:28.111 that we're working on rapidly as well. And this year alone, in 02:37:28.123 --> 02:37:32.699 nine months, we've installed 400 incremental weather stations. 02:37:32.699 --> 02:37:38.650 Are those weather stations that are in this area of the 02:37:38.662 --> 02:37:44.390 impact for the October 9 to 12 PSPS, were they all activated and useful? 02:37:44.415 --> 02:37:47.771 They were, President Batjer, 02:37:47.783 --> 02:37:51.076 and we make all of that information that we 02:37:51.088 --> 02:37:54.301 have, for situational awareness, available 02:37:54.313 --> 02:37:57.987 publicly through our website pgedotcom backslash 02:37:57.999 --> 02:38:04.141 weather. But we are actively using those weather stations, not just to inform our 02:38:04.153 --> 02:38:07.668 forecasts, but also to monitor the actual wind 02:38:07.680 --> 02:38:11.057 conditions and relative humidity conditions. 02:38:11.082 --> 02:38:16.262 I have a question for Mr Visi. We've had a lot 02:38:16.274 --> 02:38:21.177 of conversations, you know, with Aaron about communicating with the 02:38:21.189 --> 02:38:26.303 counties, with Laurie about vulnerable populations, with Sumeet on the 02:38:26.315 --> 02:38:31.730 operational issues. Where does the buck stop? Because everybody here has a 02:38:31.742 --> 02:38:36.853 different has a job in addition to this that they're working on. So as 02:38:36.865 --> 02:38:42.132 you are looking at all the things you want to do better, who is going to 02:38:42.144 --> 02:38:47.406 be, like at the VP level or higher, who is gonna be responsible over the 02:38:47.418 --> 02:38:52.402 next several weeks and months to make sure that this work gets done? 02:38:52.427 --> 02:38:55.551 Well, that lays, the buck stops with 02:38:55.563 --> 02:38:58.511 me. That's my accountability working with this 02:38:58.523 --> 02:39:01.339 team to make sure that all these things that 02:39:01.351 --> 02:39:04.305 we are talking about are implemented correctly 02:39:04.330 --> 02:39:07.168 . But you have a lot on your 02:39:07.180 --> 02:39:10.029 plate too. So is there somebody who can just do this? 02:39:10.054 --> 02:39:13.404 Well, just doing this is a team effort. 02:39:13.416 --> 02:39:16.462 You look at what's going on here. It is a close 02:39:16.474 --> 02:39:19.703 coordination between the actual prosecution of our 02:39:19.715 --> 02:39:23.148 wild safety, wildfire safety program, which sits with 02:39:23.160 --> 02:39:26.387 Sumeet. With the engagement of the communities and 02:39:26.399 --> 02:39:29.764 our customers and understanding their needs, it sits 02:39:29.776 --> 02:39:32.818 with our Chief Customer Officer. Where it's the 02:39:32.830 --> 02:39:36.266 overall day to day operations of our electric system, 02:39:36.278 --> 02:39:39.439 it sits with Michael. With the supporting efforts 02:39:39.451 --> 02:39:42.752 on IT, it sits with CIO. But I want to let you know 02:39:42.764 --> 02:39:46.249 that this is a full out team effort. One of the things 02:39:46.261 --> 02:39:49.505 in coming here to do this was the priority of this 02:39:49.517 --> 02:39:52.745 effort in a big way. This is a major threat to our 02:39:52.757 --> 02:39:55.997 customers and to the citizens of California. We’re 02:39:56.009 --> 02:39:59.307 part of it. There is almost no higher priority that 02:39:59.319 --> 02:40:02.501 I have than to make sure we're on top of this and 02:40:02.513 --> 02:40:06.119 that we do it in a competent and we do it quickly. Quite 02:40:06.131 --> 02:40:09.304 honestly. It's a lot of pieces. It's complicated. 02:40:09.316 --> 02:40:12.483 It's also fully integrated into what we do day to 02:40:12.495 --> 02:40:15.864 day. It's all about service to the customer that the 02:40:15.876 --> 02:40:19.358 increasing interaction and growing intimacy with needs 02:40:19.370 --> 02:40:22.482 of our customers supports our regular businesses 02:40:22.494 --> 02:40:25.982 as well as it supports this. The quality and integrity 02:40:25.994 --> 02:40:28.985 of our assets and increasing their flexibility 02:40:28.997 --> 02:40:32.096 will not only serve us well in the prevention of 02:40:32.108 --> 02:40:35.346 events like catastrophic wildfires, but as we move 02:40:35.358 --> 02:40:38.462 to much more decentralized grid and more control 02:40:38.474 --> 02:40:41.718 with the consumer, it will support that, having an 02:40:41.730 --> 02:40:44.768 agile, flexible and resilient grid will support 02:40:44.780 --> 02:40:47.957 that. Applying ourselves to increasing ability to 02:40:47.969 --> 02:40:51.268 communicate with our customers through the Internet 02:40:51.280 --> 02:40:54.654 and other means of communication which will support, 02:40:54.666 --> 02:40:58.269 this supports the daily business. So many of the lessons 02:40:58.281 --> 02:41:01.388 learned that we have in these kind of disruptive 02:41:01.400 --> 02:41:04.692 events, there are learnings for the whole business, 02:41:04.704 --> 02:41:07.817 so they're not separate and apart from, and it's 02:41:07.829 --> 02:41:11.054 always on our mind. It's a coordinated effort. And 02:41:11.066 --> 02:41:14.303 I will also tell you we don't limit it to just the 02:41:14.315 --> 02:41:17.419 groups that you see here. During the PSPS event, 02:41:17.431 --> 02:41:20.674 we utilize a number of our field people in the Gas 02:41:20.686 --> 02:41:24.163 Operations to go on and knock on doors to get in touch 02:41:24.175 --> 02:41:27.347 with the vulnerable customers, so it's a full-out 02:41:27.359 --> 02:41:30.589 company effort. But that said, the buck stops with 02:41:30.601 --> 02:41:33.843 me. The messages and the improvement opportunities 02:41:33.855 --> 02:41:37.081 that we discussed here are my responsibility. This 02:41:37.093 --> 02:41:40.459 is a high functioning team. They work together quite 02:41:40.471 --> 02:41:43.894 well. There was an underlying cultural aspect of this 02:41:43.906 --> 02:41:47.151 that we need to deal with. That it's a change from 02:41:47.163 --> 02:41:50.258 past performance and we need to up our game, get 02:41:50.270 --> 02:41:53.505 very focused and increase the speed by which we're 02:41:53.517 --> 02:41:57.000 executing. It’s all in front of us. And the end of the 02:41:57.012 --> 02:42:00.189 day is I have and hold for the operations of PG&E 02:42:00.201 --> 02:42:03.491 that accountability. I'm accountable not only to my 02:42:03.503 --> 02:42:06.804 shareholders, but our customers as well and to this 02:42:06.816 --> 02:42:10.366 Commission, and I will stand to those accountabilities. 02:42:10.378 --> 02:42:13.304 It's a lot of work. It's a big effort and you 02:42:13.316 --> 02:42:16.730 asked the question, How do you prioritize? Well, it's 02:42:16.742 --> 02:42:19.915 always about prioritization, and that's something 02:42:19.927 --> 02:42:23.285 that we think about all the time, in terms of impact 02:42:23.297 --> 02:42:26.539 that our ability to execute and to peel back risks 02:42:26.551 --> 02:42:29.588 every day so we can get to a place where we can 02:42:29.600 --> 02:42:33.030 operate and rebuild the confidence that our customers 02:42:33.042 --> 02:42:36.148 have to have in our ability to perform our jobs. 02:42:36.160 --> 02:42:39.405 So the answer, the questions that it sits with me. 02:42:39.430 --> 02:42:44.786 And just a follow up to that. And it's a question on 02:42:44.798 --> 02:42:49.972 prioritization that you just mentioned . Mr Visi, do you know where Roseland is? 02:42:49.997 --> 02:42:51.273 No, I do not. 02:42:51.298 --> 02:42:55.402 Do you know where Agua Calliente is? 02:42:55.427 --> 02:42:57.613 No, I do not. 02:42:57.638 --> 02:43:03.784 Okay. I'm just wondering why Calistoga was 02:43:03.796 --> 02:43:09.532 chosen as one of the communities that received the backup power. Is 02:43:09.544 --> 02:43:15.736 that your decision? Is there some prioritzation? Is wealth or accumulated 02:43:15.748 --> 02:43:21.449 wealth a factor there, or is that just a on unforeseen correlation? 02:43:21.474 --> 02:43:25.171 ? It was not attributed to the wealth or 02:43:25.183 --> 02:43:28.957 any of those elements driving that prioritization factor. 02:43:28.969 --> 02:43:32.737 This was intended to be the opportunity for us to be able 02:43:32.749 --> 02:43:36.595 to pilot the installation of the mobile generation through 02:43:36.607 --> 02:43:40.437 preinstalled hubs, and this is a blueprint now that we are 02:43:40.449 --> 02:43:44.422 establishing, and it also is, it speaks to the configuration 02:43:44.434 --> 02:43:47.683 of the great itself. So having a mobile generator 02:43:47.695 --> 02:43:51.870 interconnected in a substation that maybe in a high fire threat 02:43:51.882 --> 02:43:55.710 district creates another potential ignition source through 02:43:55.722 --> 02:43:59.302 that mobile generation. So we also have to look at the 02:43:59.314 --> 02:44:03.475 configuration of the grid, the location of the electric supply, 02:44:03.487 --> 02:44:07.073 and the ability for us and that specific station to be 02:44:07.085 --> 02:44:10.852 able to take the infrastructure and the amount of upgrade 02:44:10.864 --> 02:44:14.773 we have to make to the infrastructure to be able to connect 02:44:14.785 --> 02:44:18.688 a mobile generator. So those were the primary elements that 02:44:18.700 --> 02:44:22.289 were used to be able to help drive the prioritization. 02:44:22.314 --> 02:44:25.793 When you report back, 02:44:25.805 --> 02:44:29.632 please include what that decision making was in terms of 02:44:29.644 --> 02:44:33.230 those limited resources on backup generation that you 02:44:33.242 --> 02:44:36.973 were supplying and how you prioritize those. Thank you. 02:44:36.998 --> 02:44:38.118 Willl do. 02:44:38.143 --> 02:44:47.344 Are there any other questions of Mr Singh or Mr Visi? Okay. 02:44:47.356 --> 02:44:56.224 Seeing none. Thank you, gentlemen. We're going to move on to the next panel. 02:44:56.236 --> 02:45:01.518 So our final panel is entitled Accountability 02:45:01.530 --> 02:45:05.098 and Commitments. And like your 02:45:05.110 --> 02:45:14.445 other colleagues, I would like you each to introduce yourselves and your titles. 02:45:14.470 --> 02:45:19.348 My name is Nora Mead Brownell, and I'm the Chair of the 02:45:19.360 --> 02:45:24.376 corporation, and I'm happy to be here again. I've spent many hours in this room 02:45:24.388 --> 02:45:29.021 as a matter of fact. On behalf of the board, I want to extend my personal 02:45:29.033 --> 02:45:33.992 appreciation to the first responders and community leaders and to the governor 02:45:34.004 --> 02:45:38.822 and the Commissioners and all of their staffs for the continued guidance and 02:45:38.834 --> 02:45:41.645 oversight. And I want to thank our customers 02:45:41.657 --> 02:45:43.853 for working with us in our efforts 02:45:43.865 --> 02:45:48.752 to keep our community safe. I spent much of my professional life as a utility 02:45:48.764 --> 02:45:53.412 regulator, both with the state and federal governments, and I realize the 02:45:53.424 --> 02:45:58.554 importance of collaboration. And I think we've heard some good examples today and 02:45:58.566 --> 02:46:03.458 I think we've heard some examples where we could do a vast improvement, and I 02:46:03.470 --> 02:46:08.733 give you my personal commitment that we will be far more engaged in those community 02:46:08.745 --> 02:46:13.328 efforts than we have been because that's gonna be critical. I understand 02:46:13.340 --> 02:46:18.223 that we have a different job here and we all have a difficult job here. But I 02:46:18.235 --> 02:46:23.255 deeply believe that safety is our common purpose. Safety is the primary mission 02:46:23.267 --> 02:46:27.905 of PG&E and as a board, it's our responsibility to ensure that mission is 02:46:27.917 --> 02:46:32.817 fulfilled, and I'm gonna go into some detail as we go on about how we're from 02:46:32.829 --> 02:46:38.022 feeling that oversight role. We recognize the PG&E's operations have a significant 02:46:38.034 --> 02:46:42.799 impact on the public life, public safety, health and personal health in the 02:46:42.811 --> 02:46:47.382 communities that we serve, and that the issues we discuss here today are 02:46:47.394 --> 02:46:49.643 critically important to millions of 02:46:49.655 --> 02:46:52.480 Californians as we move into a new regime, a 02:46:52.492 --> 02:46:57.248 new environment, and new critical customer importance needs. And that's why 02:46:57.260 --> 02:47:02.028 my board colleagues and I, along with our CEO's Bill Johnson and Andy Visi, 02:47:02.040 --> 02:47:07.054 joined this company. Collectively, we bring decades of experience in the energy 02:47:07.066 --> 02:47:11.966 and technology industries to our roles, and we're here to use that experience 02:47:11.978 --> 02:47:14.344 to help transform PG&E's culture, its 02:47:14.356 --> 02:47:17.172 operational health, its financial stability, 02:47:17.184 --> 02:47:21.951 and to restore the public's trust. We want to provide you with an increased 02:47:21.963 --> 02:47:27.038 level of transparency that will allow all of us to do our jobs more effectively. 02:47:27.050 --> 02:47:31.760 Building that trust depends on our actions and not mere words. We've taken 02:47:31.772 --> 02:47:36.592 actions. In the last six months, we brought together 13 new board members to 02:47:36.604 --> 02:47:41.311 our boards. Just two this week John Willard and Bill Smith, who bring deep 02:47:41.323 --> 02:47:46.275 expertise on innovating and scaling world-class complex grid and network based 02:47:46.287 --> 02:47:51.189 technologies which I think will help with a lot of the issues we've discussed 02:47:51.201 --> 02:47:55.828 here today. As a board, safety is our most important oversight, and we've 02:47:55.840 --> 02:48:00.982 intentionally assembled boards with the right experience to provide oversight and 02:48:00.994 --> 02:48:05.564 guidance, maybe more guidance some days than they would like, to our new 02:48:05.576 --> 02:48:08.389 management. Individual members of our boards 02:48:08.401 --> 02:48:10.787 have a deep technical and operational 02:48:10.799 --> 02:48:16.057 experience related to gas pipeline safety, electronic transmission and distribution 02:48:16.069 --> 02:48:20.900 safety, electric generation safety, nuclear safety, and occupational safety. 02:48:20.912 --> 02:48:25.611 We also have members with expertise related to physical asset security and 02:48:25.623 --> 02:48:30.460 cyber threats, enterprise risk management, safety culture, and restructuring 02:48:30.472 --> 02:48:35.477 culture. We're working closely, cross functionally, to leverage the individual, 02:48:35.489 --> 02:48:40.381 sorry, I'm just getting a little note here, individual expertise to add value 02:48:40.393 --> 02:48:45.091 as a group. Having served on boards of other large energy companies, I can 02:48:45.103 --> 02:48:49.875 tell you this board is exceptionally active and engaged, meeting as a board 02:48:49.887 --> 02:48:54.707 at least once a week, meeting as committees and individuals more frequently, 02:48:54.719 --> 02:48:59.426 some weeks, than that. We review on those meetings the decisions on issues 02:48:59.438 --> 02:49:03.950 ranging from operations to wildfire safety to bankruptcy proceedings to 02:49:03.962 --> 02:49:09.114 developing cultural change mechanisms and to dealing with compensation issues. We 02:49:09.126 --> 02:49:14.005 understand the need to be more engaged than any usual board would be, working 02:49:14.017 --> 02:49:18.846 with everyone at every level in PG&E in order to make those changes that are 02:49:18.858 --> 02:49:21.665 desperately needed to improve the trajectory 02:49:21.677 --> 02:49:23.994 of our performance. We’re absolutely 02:49:24.006 --> 02:49:28.715 committed to taking the actions needed to accomplish that. We visited many 02:49:28.727 --> 02:49:33.610 of the communities damaged by catastrophic wildfires, including Paradise, and 02:49:33.622 --> 02:49:38.641 the cities in North Bay. We visited San Bruno, the site of the explosion caused 02:49:38.653 --> 02:49:43.542 by our gas pipeline. We've met with community leaders, spoken to victims, and 02:49:43.554 --> 02:49:48.203 seeing the lasting devastation firsthand. We have instituted a program of 02:49:48.215 --> 02:49:53.033 field safety visits for each board member to inform our understanding of the 02:49:53.045 --> 02:49:57.874 company's critical operations. This perspective is always with us as we make 02:49:57.886 --> 02:50:03.150 important decisions and move the company forward. I'd like to take this opportunity 02:50:03.162 --> 02:50:07.872 to speak briefly about the board's oversight function, our focused on wild 02:50:07.884 --> 02:50:12.894 fire safety and our view of events last week. Our top priority as board members 02:50:12.906 --> 02:50:17.676 is to get wildfire victims paid. One of our first actions was aboard was to 02:50:17.688 --> 02:50:22.703 set up $100 million Housing Assistance Fund to support wildfire victims who had 02:50:22.715 --> 02:50:27.492 lost their homes. We've settled with two of the three groups of victims and 02:50:27.504 --> 02:50:32.757 we're committed to fairly resolving claims from the remaining group of individuals. 02:50:32.769 --> 02:50:37.408 We’re guiding the company as it works through the Commission's regulatory 02:50:37.420 --> 02:50:40.225 processes in order to emerge from bankruptcy 02:50:40.237 --> 02:50:42.366 before the end of next June so we 02:50:42.378 --> 02:50:47.148 can participate in the states Go Forward Wildfire Fund. We've increased the 02:50:47.160 --> 02:50:52.291 board's oversight of our wildfire safety plan, and we do this as a full board and 02:50:52.303 --> 02:50:57.258 also through our board committee structure. In addition to operating oversight 02:50:57.270 --> 02:51:01.906 by our Safety and Nuclear Ops Committee, our Compliance and Public Policy 02:51:01.918 --> 02:51:06.941 Committee receives regular reports from management on our progress implementing 02:51:06.953 --> 02:51:11.958 and complying with that plan. And this is a good example of where there's a lot 02:51:11.970 --> 02:51:16.798 of cross functional dialogue with the two committees to make sure that we're 02:51:16.810 --> 02:51:21.820 covering all aspects of that, both from a safety and a performance perspective. 02:51:21.832 --> 02:51:26.227 Critical part of that plan has been vastly improving our awareness of 02:51:26.239 --> 02:51:31.058 weather conditions that create an unacceptably high threat of PG&E equipment 02:51:31.070 --> 02:51:36.089 becoming damaged and starting fires. That information, as you know, informs our 02:51:36.101 --> 02:51:40.863 PSPS decision making, which is guided by the most conservative framework we 02:51:40.875 --> 02:51:45.650 feel is prudent as we balance public safety against the disruption of power 02:51:45.662 --> 02:51:48.589 loss. With each PSPS events, and unfortunately 02:51:48.601 --> 02:51:50.665 we've had three this fire season 02:51:50.677 --> 02:51:55.630 alone, we're gaining critical insight into how we improve the process involved 02:51:55.642 --> 02:52:00.526 in shutting down and restarting our core services efficiently. Operationally, 02:52:00.538 --> 02:52:05.183 I think we have made progress. But as you clearly heard today, and I feel 02:52:05.195 --> 02:52:10.327 your sense of urgency, our communications and coordination and that collaboration 02:52:10.339 --> 02:52:15.044 needs to improve and it does need to improve now. Our PSPS event last week 02:52:15.056 --> 02:52:20.006 was an example of some of these things. Along with other members of the board, 02:52:20.018 --> 02:52:24.792 I was in the EOC during the shutdown, both before and during, observing and 02:52:24.804 --> 02:52:29.997 drawing lessons from that event. We've executed our decision making implementation 02:52:30.009 --> 02:52:34.649 of the safety shutdown according to the protocols and procedures outlined 02:52:34.661 --> 02:52:39.484 in our wildfire safety management plan. That's obviously not enough. We were 02:52:39.496 --> 02:52:44.331 able to restore power consistent with industry safety practices, but we want 02:52:44.343 --> 02:52:49.414 to improve on that record. However, we obviously, as we've discussed, fell short 02:52:49.426 --> 02:52:54.132 on our customer facing issues, and I've made this commitment again that we 02:52:54.144 --> 02:52:59.033 will be more engaged in our oversight of those activities and more personally 02:52:59.045 --> 02:53:04.008 involved in meeting with community members. It's incumbent upon the management 02:53:04.020 --> 02:53:08.898 team to do better and for our boards to hold them accountable to do so. There 02:53:08.910 --> 02:53:13.925 is no doubt there are many lessons from last week's events and the changes that 02:53:13.937 --> 02:53:18.821 management must make. As you've heard, improvements have begun and we will be 02:53:18.833 --> 02:53:23.540 monitoring very closely the commitments they've made in there filings with 02:53:23.552 --> 02:53:28.496 you, but also the recommendations that the board has. To be clear, we do stand 02:53:28.508 --> 02:53:33.526 behind management's decision to implement the PSPS event. That decision, though 02:53:33.538 --> 02:53:38.236 very difficult and of major consequence to everyone, was the right one for 02:53:38.248 --> 02:53:43.084 public safety. But we could do it better. Further, I'd like to reiterate our 02:53:43.096 --> 02:53:47.976 board's confidence in our management team to run PG&E safely and responsibly, 02:53:47.988 --> 02:53:52.879 both in making the tough operational decisions like the power shut off and in 02:53:52.891 --> 02:53:57.902 making the needed changes for the future we've been discussing today and making 02:53:57.914 --> 02:54:02.748 those changes in a timely and expedited fashion. None of us as Board members 02:54:02.760 --> 02:54:07.768 or members of leadership came into these roles expecting to be able to fix PG&E 02:54:07.780 --> 02:54:12.737 overnight. Our progress will come in stages, but those stages will move faster 02:54:12.749 --> 02:54:17.637 than anyone would like. But it is our goal for all of us to move in the right 02:54:17.649 --> 02:54:22.424 direction and to do so, as I said, expeditiously. Part of that is expanding 02:54:22.436 --> 02:54:25.238 our communications with you, the Commission, 02:54:25.250 --> 02:54:27.440 the community, government leaders, 02:54:27.452 --> 02:54:32.091 as well as customers and employees. More importantly, we're expanding our 02:54:32.103 --> 02:54:37.050 deployment of new technologies that give us better tools to manage and protect 02:54:37.062 --> 02:54:42.147 our assets from wildfire threats. And we're including, in our review, both other 02:54:42.159 --> 02:54:47.292 utilities throughout the country, other utilities here, but also the universities 02:54:47.304 --> 02:54:52.009 and our advanced technology center that I had the opportunity to visit the 02:54:52.021 --> 02:54:56.908 other day. As we move forward, we will continue to depend on the constructive 02:54:56.920 --> 02:55:01.569 engagement of all of our stakeholders to prepare for future events and to 02:55:01.581 --> 02:55:06.398 collaborate on long term solutions to the growing wildfire threat facing our 02:55:06.410 --> 02:55:11.427 state. And we will hold our leadership team accountable for making improvements 02:55:11.439 --> 02:55:16.200 we've talked about today. I commit to you that we can and we will do better 02:55:16.212 --> 02:55:20.858 for our customers. But President Batjer, I'm very, very grateful that you 02:55:20.870 --> 02:55:25.753 recognized our line employees who are working under a serious duress. They're 02:55:25.765 --> 02:55:30.535 our neighbors, our friends, our families, and they're working hard and they 02:55:30.547 --> 02:55:35.687 deserve our respect. And I hope that we can all give them a round of applause for 02:55:35.699 --> 02:55:40.537 the extraordinary work that they're doing on behalf of all of us. Thank you. 02:55:40.562 --> 02:55:42.203 Thank you, Miss Brownell. 02:55:42.228 --> 02:55:45.158 And I'd like to introduce Jeff, who 02:55:45.170 --> 02:55:48.010 is my colleague, who is the chair of the Utility Board. 02:55:48.010 --> 02:55:51.480 Thank you. President Batjer. I'm 02:55:51.492 --> 02:55:55.119 Jeff Bleich, a member of both the corporate board 02:55:55.131 --> 02:55:58.535 and the utility board, and I chair the utility 02:55:58.547 --> 02:56:02.108 board. I want to thank you and the other members 02:56:02.120 --> 02:56:06.028 of the Commission for this opportunity to participate 02:56:06.040 --> 02:56:09.162 in today's very important discussion. As a 02:56:09.174 --> 02:56:12.799 longtime California resident, I'm also a longtime 02:56:12.811 --> 02:56:16.011 customer of PG&E. I live in a town that was 02:56:16.023 --> 02:56:19.495 affected by the recent public safety power shut 02:56:19.507 --> 02:56:23.208 off. One that lost partial or complete power along 02:56:23.220 --> 02:56:26.552 with many other towns here in California. And 02:56:26.564 --> 02:56:30.199 like all my neighbors, I count on PG&E to provide 02:56:30.211 --> 02:56:33.831 safe, reliable, clean and affordable energy. So I 02:56:33.843 --> 02:56:37.257 depend on its long term success in doing that. 02:56:37.269 --> 02:56:40.604 I joined the board this year and became chair 02:56:40.616 --> 02:56:43.963 of the board of the utility with that mission 02:56:43.975 --> 02:56:47.591 in mind. And now I'm responsible, along with Nora 02:56:47.603 --> 02:56:51.086 and the other board members, to ensure that the 02:56:51.098 --> 02:56:54.575 leadership of PG&E and he has the right skills, 02:56:54.587 --> 02:56:57.930 resources, and incentives to make the changes 02:56:57.942 --> 02:57:01.416 that we've talked about here today. Last week's 02:57:01.428 --> 02:57:05.205 power shut off accomplished our primary goal, which 02:57:05.217 --> 02:57:08.406 was to reduce the risk of catastrophic fire 02:57:08.418 --> 02:57:11.982 during high risk conditions, but in part because 02:57:11.994 --> 02:57:15.394 we're doing something that we've never done at 02:57:15.406 --> 02:57:18.672 this scope or scale before, we had some real 02:57:18.684 --> 02:57:22.308 system failures, particularly on our website, and 02:57:22.320 --> 02:57:25.737 then the cascading effect that had on our call 02:57:25.749 --> 02:57:29.879 centers. We know these failures caused major disruptions 02:57:29.891 --> 02:57:33.088 in a large swath of the state. They created 02:57:33.100 --> 02:57:36.654 confusion, anxiety, hardship and, in some cases, 02:57:36.666 --> 02:57:39.868 justifiable anger. We've talked extensively 02:57:39.880 --> 02:57:43.348 today about the changes we’re already making to 02:57:43.360 --> 02:57:46.768 ensure that any future power shutoffs affect a 02:57:46.780 --> 02:57:50.399 smaller number of customers, are limited in their 02:57:50.411 --> 02:57:54.115 frequency, and are communicated early and clearly. 02:57:54.127 --> 02:57:57.235 It's up to our leadership to execute those 02:57:57.247 --> 02:58:00.948 changes, and it's up to all of us on the board, to 02:58:00.960 --> 02:58:04.437 Nora, to me and our colleagues on the boards of 02:58:04.449 --> 02:58:07.865 directors, to hold our leadership accountable, 02:58:07.877 --> 02:58:11.202 and I can assure you that we will do that. As 02:58:11.214 --> 02:58:14.695 to Bill Andy and the other top leaders of PG&E, 02:58:14.707 --> 02:58:18.183 we have confidence that they are the right team 02:58:18.195 --> 02:58:21.537 to lead the company into this future. This is 02:58:21.549 --> 02:58:24.949 not the old PG&E as Nora mentioned nearly. Our 02:58:24.961 --> 02:58:28.373 entire board is new. Bill and Andy are new and 02:58:28.385 --> 02:58:31.718 they bring significant operational safety and 02:58:31.730 --> 02:58:35.293 leadership experience to this critical task. The 02:58:35.305 --> 02:58:39.064 scope and scale of last week's events is a reminder 02:58:39.076 --> 02:58:42.340 of the complexity facing California. Most of 02:58:42.352 --> 02:58:45.681 the system was built during the last climate. 02:58:45.693 --> 02:58:49.253 Since then, temperatures here in California have 02:58:49.265 --> 02:58:53.245 risen by twice the global average. And as Commissioner 02:58:53.257 --> 02:58:56.451 Randolph pointed out, our wildfire seasons, 02:58:56.463 --> 02:59:00.231 they used to be five months long. They've increased 02:59:00.243 --> 02:59:03.297 by more than 50%. Now, they're eight plus 02:59:03.309 --> 02:59:06.561 months long. As climate changes and the risk 02:59:06.573 --> 02:59:09.983 profile in PG&E’s service area increases, PG&E 02:59:09.995 --> 02:59:13.471 must continue to mitigate, found wildfire risk, 02:59:13.483 --> 02:59:16.972 transform its grid and develop into the utility 02:59:16.984 --> 02:59:20.530 that the people of this great state deserve. And 02:59:20.542 --> 02:59:24.100 I take that as a solemn responsibility. So thank 02:59:24.112 --> 02:59:27.227 you for holding today's proceeding and for 02:59:27.239 --> 02:59:30.949 ensuring that we received your important feedback. 02:59:30.974 --> 02:59:35.973 Thank you, sir. Are there comments to 02:59:35.985 --> 02:59:40.909 be made by the president or the CEO? I mean, CEO and COO. 02:59:40.934 --> 02:59:45.459 They are always get the last word. 02:59:45.484 --> 02:59:48.222 And they will be brief, 02:59:48.234 --> 02:59:51.396 relatively brief. Bill Johnson, President and 02:59:51.408 --> 02:59:57.193 CEO of PG&E. When I got in this business almost four decades ago, I was taught that 02:59:57.205 --> 03:00:02.985 our mission was safe, reliable, affordable energy customers. That was the standard. 03:00:02.997 --> 03:00:05.674 We then added the word clean into that 03:00:05.686 --> 03:00:08.789 standard, safe, reliable, affordable, clean. 03:00:08.801 --> 03:00:14.577 That started here in California. But it seems to be catching on elsewhere. And four 03:00:14.589 --> 03:00:20.447 decades later, I still believe our mission as an industry and at PG&E is that: safe, 03:00:20.459 --> 03:00:23.339 reliable, affordable, clean energy to our 03:00:23.351 --> 03:00:26.587 customers. Those words of mission are actually 03:00:26.599 --> 03:00:32.186 quite important to me. They're why I came the PG&E in California and those words 03:00:32.198 --> 03:00:37.836 are why I'm still laboring in the vineyards at a time in an age when I would most 03:00:37.848 --> 03:00:40.936 appropriately be retired. But I am here. I'm 03:00:40.948 --> 03:00:43.842 a person who takes my accountability very 03:00:43.854 --> 03:00:47.008 seriously. I'm accountable for this PSPS. I'm 03:00:47.020 --> 03:00:49.842 accountable for the performance of PG&E. 03:00:49.854 --> 03:00:55.578 And I feel my highest accountability is safety. I believe PG&E, this Commission’s, 03:00:55.590 --> 03:01:01.506 the state’s, our society's highest priority has to be safety, so I will do everything 03:01:01.518 --> 03:01:04.332 I can to keep customers, employees, that 03:01:04.344 --> 03:01:07.446 public, everyone safe. But those other words 03:01:07.458 --> 03:01:13.311 reliable, affordable, clean and customer also have meaning to me. I believe focus on 03:01:13.323 --> 03:01:16.416 and service to the customers the best course 03:01:16.428 --> 03:01:19.050 of action for any business, including 03:01:19.062 --> 03:01:24.695 this one. And in this event, we focused on the issue of safety with less focus on 03:01:24.707 --> 03:01:30.351 the customer and the public. We focused on the important operational aspects with 03:01:30.363 --> 03:01:33.721 insufficient attention to the customer in public 03:01:33.733 --> 03:01:36.622 facing aspects. And for that I apologize. 03:01:36.634 --> 03:01:39.791 Let me thank our customers for their patience 03:01:39.803 --> 03:01:42.422 with us. Thank you to this Commission 03:01:42.434 --> 03:01:48.345 and the governor for your unwavering focus on safety. And I wanna thank everybody who 03:01:48.357 --> 03:01:51.513 helped this last week. You know, our decision 03:01:51.525 --> 03:01:54.211 to turn out the power had consequences 03:01:54.223 --> 03:01:57.445 for customers, for everybody. And we recognize 03:01:57.457 --> 03:02:00.347 that California as a leader in technology 03:02:00.359 --> 03:02:05.805 and so many other areas must have a utility position to power consistently and 03:02:05.817 --> 03:02:11.727 reliably, even in the face of extraordinary wildfire risk and climate. I was asked, I 03:02:11.739 --> 03:02:17.592 believe by Commissioner Randolph, how long a period before we're out of PSPS? I said 03:02:17.604 --> 03:02:23.381 10 year answer. Now I didn't mean to say it will be doing that at this scale for 10 03:02:23.393 --> 03:02:26.414 years. I think they'll decrease in size and 03:02:26.426 --> 03:02:29.528 scope every year. But at the same time we're 03:02:29.540 --> 03:02:35.314 doing this, the risk is not static. It's dynamic and it goes up every year. And you 03:02:35.326 --> 03:02:40.975 saw from Sumeet’s presentation several programs that go on for 8 to 10 years. The 03:02:40.987 --> 03:02:43.728 Wildfire Fund under AB1054 is a 10-year 03:02:43.740 --> 03:02:46.836 construct, so I think our focus ought to be, 03:02:46.848 --> 03:02:52.848 every year, reducing scope, reducing scale and giving California the utility it needs. 03:02:52.873 --> 03:02:58.041 Andy Visi, Chief Executive Officer PG&E Company. Let me briefly echo 03:02:58.053 --> 03:03:00.946 Bill's comments on behalf of the utility. The 03:03:00.958 --> 03:03:03.548 scope and scale of last week's operation 03:03:03.560 --> 03:03:08.481 burdened our state and our local agencies, first responders, local businesses 03:03:08.493 --> 03:03:13.615 and, of course, our customers. We thank you for your patience, last week, as our 03:03:13.627 --> 03:03:18.671 employees and contractors worked tirelessly to inspect our lines, repair damage 03:03:18.683 --> 03:03:23.802 from the wind event, and restore power as quickly as possible. In many cases, to 03:03:23.814 --> 03:03:28.864 their own homes and communities. We thank you for your partnership and for your 03:03:28.876 --> 03:03:34.064 constructive feedback as we work to improve our systems and processes to meet the 03:03:34.076 --> 03:03:39.119 challenges facing California. As we discussed, we have a lot of hard work ahead 03:03:39.131 --> 03:03:44.122 of us. It will take time for PG&E to harden its systems to the ever-increasing 03:03:44.134 --> 03:03:49.246 risks in its service territory and to transform its assets into the flexible and 03:03:49.258 --> 03:03:54.445 resilient grid this new reality demands. In the meantime, I commit to you that we 03:03:54.457 --> 03:03:59.502 will work to narrow the scope of future PSPS events and minimize their impacts. 03:03:59.514 --> 03:04:01.841 We appreciate the areas of focus the 03:04:01.853 --> 03:04:04.698 Commission identified for improvement of the 03:04:04.710 --> 03:04:10.141 PSPS program, and we're working to address them quickly and deliberately. We likewise 03:04:10.153 --> 03:04:15.090 appreciate the opportunity to hear directly from the public today. Thank you. 03:04:15.090 --> 03:04:20.228 Thank you, Mr Visi.Are there any questions of the 03:04:20.240 --> 03:04:25.538 panel on by the Commissioner's at this time? Yes, Commissioner Shiroma? 03:04:25.563 --> 03:04:30.361 I'll start. Thank you very much. 03:04:30.373 --> 03:04:35.520 Appreciate the introductory statements and I have a question 03:04:35.532 --> 03:04:40.335 for our Chairwoman Brownell, and then also, for CEO Bill 03:04:40.347 --> 03:04:44.825 Johnson. Miss Brownell, I really appreciate that you 03:04:44.837 --> 03:04:49.806 have served on a Commission, just as this, and you've also 03:04:49.818 --> 03:04:54.631 served on FERC as an appointee. And also you've been the 03:04:54.643 --> 03:04:59.787 president or chair of the NARUC. And recently I had a chance 03:04:59.799 --> 03:05:04.364 to attend the policy conference of NARUC, and we went 03:05:04.376 --> 03:05:09.417 through a poverty simulation there. It was very insightful, 03:05:09.429 --> 03:05:13.977 as far as walking in the shoes of people who are just 03:05:13.989 --> 03:05:18.952 trying to survive, and oftentimes, don't even have a phone 03:05:18.964 --> 03:05:23.349 to even know what's going on. And information is so 03:05:23.361 --> 03:05:28.152 important. As someone who has sat in our chairs and held 03:05:28.164 --> 03:05:32.968 utilities accountable, what specific advice or specific, 03:05:32.980 --> 03:05:37.946 laser-like things. If if you're sitting here, you would be 03:05:37.958 --> 03:05:42.936 telling PG&E to effectuate in the aftermath of thes PSPSs? 03:05:42.961 --> 03:05:48.061 Well, thanks for the question, and I wouldn't presume 03:05:48.073 --> 03:05:53.252 to tell you how to do your jobs. But I think that the letters this week, for 03:05:53.264 --> 03:05:58.236 example, and the ongoing focus on very specific outcome-based measures is 03:05:58.248 --> 03:06:03.365 very, very, very important. I think it's one thing to talk platitudes. It's 03:06:03.377 --> 03:06:08.615 another to actually measure people by the outcomes that you talked about and, 03:06:08.627 --> 03:06:13.944 in fact, at NARUC, at FERC, even when I was a Pennsylvania State Commissioner, 03:06:13.956 --> 03:06:19.065 we talked a lot about moving from that rate-based model to a business model 03:06:19.077 --> 03:06:23.929 that was more performance-based. And in fact, as you may know, I served 03:06:23.941 --> 03:06:29.042 on the Board of National Grid, which is headquartered, although they have a 03:06:29.054 --> 03:06:34.168 lot of US assets, in the U. K. where they have a performance based business 03:06:34.180 --> 03:06:39.691 model that focuses more on the outcomes that they have identified, the regulators 03:06:39.703 --> 03:06:44.486 have identified, as important. Efficiency gains, operating excellence, 03:06:44.498 --> 03:06:49.872 safety outcomes. So I'd be happy to follow up with you and talk about some more 03:06:49.884 --> 03:06:54.933 specifics. I think one of the things that's a challenge as a Commissioner, 03:06:54.945 --> 03:07:00.123 it certainly was for me, although I'd come from banking, which had undergone 03:07:00.135 --> 03:07:04.718 a massive transformation in an IT early early days. If you remember 03:07:04.730 --> 03:07:09.898 the first stages of ATMs, I'm that old. I think what we all have a challenge 03:07:09.910 --> 03:07:14.956 about is learning and what is the best IT platform look like? What are the 03:07:14.968 --> 03:07:19.872 technologies that can really make a difference? And we don't get as much 03:07:19.884 --> 03:07:25.138 opportunity, I think, as Commissioners, as we should toe understand the tools 03:07:25.150 --> 03:07:30.455 that are out there. One of the things that we did at the FERC, actually one of 03:07:30.467 --> 03:07:35.718 the things we did when we co-chaired a Commission meeting with the California 03:07:35.730 --> 03:07:40.638 Commission and the CEC, during the energy crisis in 2000, 2001, was hold 03:07:40.650 --> 03:07:45.569 technical conferences to get really smart people with no vested interest 03:07:45.581 --> 03:07:51.155 to give us a lot of information, to give us a lot of data about what was out there 03:07:51.167 --> 03:07:56.416 to help solve this problem. Those were early days of artificial intelligence, 03:07:56.428 --> 03:08:01.267 of massive databases, of hard wired technologies, but it was enormously 03:08:01.279 --> 03:08:06.264 helpful. I'd encourage you to do that, or have your staff do that because 03:08:06.276 --> 03:08:11.449 we learned a lot during that process and leveraged, as I said, a lot of very 03:08:11.461 --> 03:08:16.578 expensive but free to us advice to do that. So those are some of the things 03:08:16.590 --> 03:08:21.364 that that I think I would focus on. That help? And again, I'm happy to 03:08:21.376 --> 03:08:26.432 follow up. I always have. I always have lots of ideas, sometimes too many. 03:08:26.457 --> 03:08:28.200 are other questions? 03:08:28.200 --> 03:08:33.236 Yes, and this is for Mr Johnson now. Now, I'm 03:08:33.248 --> 03:08:38.007 a lifetime PG&E customer. First, as child in Ocampo, just outside 03:08:38.019 --> 03:08:42.411 of Lodi, and then in Davis, going to university, and then in 03:08:42.423 --> 03:08:47.548 Sacramento, as a gas customer. Even as child growing up in poverty, on 03:08:47.560 --> 03:08:52.455 a couple of occasions when the PG&E rep needed to come and turn off 03:08:52.467 --> 03:08:57.156 our electricity because Mom didn't pay our bill, and thankfully, 03:08:57.168 --> 03:09:01.852 we got it turned back on. That individual was very kind and just 03:09:01.864 --> 03:09:06.921 really felt that person was a member of the community. And this leads 03:09:06.933 --> 03:09:11.970 back to my question. You sent a letter to the governor today, October 03:09:11.982 --> 03:09:16.381 18, and I appreciate that much responsibility has been taken 03:09:16.393 --> 03:09:21.292 and expressed today, many apologies and so forth. But I'm perplexed 03:09:21.304 --> 03:09:25.854 about one thing you say in this letter and I thought would you 03:09:25.866 --> 03:09:30.617 clarify? Please? You said you want to be transparent with thought 03:09:30.629 --> 03:09:35.609 process, that you've read and heard comments about PG&E’s motives in 03:09:35.621 --> 03:09:40.234 instituting the PSPS and whether you could be trusted to do the 03:09:40.246 --> 03:09:45.160 right thing. And in that vein, you want a policy conversation about 03:09:45.172 --> 03:09:50.203 whether somebody else should make this decision. You're not trying to 03:09:50.215 --> 03:09:55.187 shirk the responsibility, but you want to bolster public confidence. 03:09:55.199 --> 03:09:59.732 Honestly, I'm just a human being, but I took that to mean that 03:09:59.744 --> 03:10:04.433 you were looking to give somebody else the responsibility versus 03:10:04.445 --> 03:10:09.335 digging down deep and looking at what meaningful changes need to be 03:10:09.347 --> 03:10:14.394 made for the future. It's advanced communication. I mean, information 03:10:14.406 --> 03:10:19.014 is a key thing. I was in (unclear) pre-earthquake 30 years ago. 03:10:19.026 --> 03:10:23.501 I was here in San Francisco on the way to the airport to pick 03:10:23.513 --> 03:10:27.969 up my father in law, and I’ll tell you information, real time 03:10:27.981 --> 03:10:32.954 information was key for figuring out how did we get from the airport 03:10:32.966 --> 03:10:37.717 back to Sacramento? And I'll tell you, the radio at that point in 03:10:37.729 --> 03:10:42.563 time was really helpful. Which bridges were closed? Which parts of 03:10:42.575 --> 03:10:47.612 San Francisco were on fire? So forth. So I just wanted you to clarify 03:10:47.624 --> 03:10:52.311 that it's not that you were, you know, I mean, I know it's hard, 03:10:52.323 --> 03:10:57.293 it stings. It stings to be criticized. But I surely hope you weren't 03:10:57.305 --> 03:11:01.710 trying to say, well, never mind, you know, you guys take it. 03:11:01.735 --> 03:11:05.565 Oh, no. I was absolutely not trying to say 03:11:05.577 --> 03:11:09.159 that. And I'm not trying to evade liability or inverse 03:11:09.171 --> 03:11:12.485 or any of those things at all. It just seems, in a 03:11:12.497 --> 03:11:16.085 effort of this size, public confidence in the decision 03:11:16.097 --> 03:11:19.734 is really important. That drives public safety. I think 03:11:19.746 --> 03:11:23.265 it drives a number of things. There is commentary out 03:11:23.277 --> 03:11:26.986 there that we can't be trusted to do this. I've actually 03:11:26.998 --> 03:11:30.523 seen transcripts from legislative hearings where this 03:11:30.535 --> 03:11:34.228 has been the issue. And I'm not suggesting that we won't 03:11:34.240 --> 03:11:38.076 do it or not. I'm not suggesting if the decision authority 03:11:38.088 --> 03:11:41.396 goes somewhere else, we would still all do all the 03:11:41.408 --> 03:11:44.923 analysis and everything else. I do think in Australia 03:11:44.935 --> 03:11:48.631 and perhaps in Europe, this is the way the system works. 03:11:48.643 --> 03:11:51.895 But, you know, just a moment ago said I'd take my 03:11:51.907 --> 03:11:55.479 accountability seriously and I will keep this one. I'm 03:11:55.491 --> 03:11:59.140 really looking for the best answer here for the public. 03:11:59.140 --> 03:12:03.339 Are there any other questions of this panel? 03:12:03.364 --> 03:12:07.193 What are the cultural change 03:12:07.205 --> 03:12:10.786 mechanisms and incentive changes you are referring to? 03:12:10.811 --> 03:12:14.583 I think, you mean, when 03:12:14.608 --> 03:12:18.109 I talked about performance based outcomes? 03:12:18.134 --> 03:12:20.425 You said we're looking 03:12:20.450 --> 03:12:22.500 at cultural change mechanisms and compensation. 03:12:22.500 --> 03:12:23.450 Yes. So 03:12:23.475 --> 03:12:26.301 As part of your supervision of management. 03:12:26.313 --> 03:12:32.019 Yes. So we have a pretty active compensation committee. In 03:12:32.044 --> 03:12:38.006 fact, I met with them this morning looking to make sure that, even though we've made 03:12:38.031 --> 03:12:43.584 changes, to make sure that objectives and payments are made in accordance with 03:12:43.609 --> 03:12:46.830 performance-based safety outcomes. We want to 03:12:46.855 --> 03:12:49.981 continue to fine tune that. So, compensation 03:12:50.006 --> 03:12:56.128 is one way to do that. Training is another way to do that, that you invest in training 03:12:56.153 --> 03:13:01.828 people to do the things that you need them to do. Making sure that we have tools 03:13:01.853 --> 03:13:07.540 making sure all our linemen, for example, have electronic communications so that 03:13:07.565 --> 03:13:13.156 they're not stuck with paperwork. And they can focus on the job more carefully. 03:13:13.181 --> 03:13:19.206 Making sure superintendents are doing what Superintendents should be doing instead of 03:13:19.218 --> 03:13:25.184 filling out paperwork. Rewarding people for making tough decisions. Rewarding people 03:13:25.196 --> 03:13:31.226 for making sensitive decisions or those who are showing exemplary care for customers. 03:13:31.238 --> 03:13:36.719 Finding reward systems that aren't necessarily monetary. That are recognizing 03:13:36.731 --> 03:13:42.617 outstanding performance. Those are many of the ways. We're also talking to a number 03:13:42.629 --> 03:13:48.036 of consultants about how we can more effectively lead cultural change. But I 03:13:48.048 --> 03:13:53.660 think I've always been suspicious about programs because they end up being just 03:13:53.672 --> 03:13:59.577 that, a program. How do you incorporate them into the everyday way you do business? 03:13:59.602 --> 03:14:03.219 Well, it's it sounds pretty 03:14:03.231 --> 03:14:07.235 unspecific, and we've been struggling to get the corporation to 03:14:07.247 --> 03:14:11.276 change, so it would be very helpful if you could come back to us 03:14:11.288 --> 03:14:15.205 and tell us, specifically, what you're doing that's different. 03:14:15.230 --> 03:14:19.264 Okay, I would be happy to. But I will 03:14:19.276 --> 03:14:23.322 say one thing that I think is a difference from every other 03:14:23.334 --> 03:14:27.306 corporation I've been involved in. Including when I worked 03:14:27.318 --> 03:14:31.303 at one, and every other board I've served on, is we have a 03:14:31.315 --> 03:14:35.554 continuous feedback loop, so that, in our weekly meetings, but 03:14:35.566 --> 03:14:39.480 often five days a week, myself, Jeff and committee heads, 03:14:39.492 --> 03:14:43.332 particularly, are communicating directly with management 03:14:43.344 --> 03:14:47.197 and others about things that we need, we believe need to 03:14:47.209 --> 03:14:51.235 change and need to change quickly. And it's a collaborative 03:14:51.247 --> 03:14:55.084 effort, but it is one in which we are, I think, possibly 03:14:55.096 --> 03:14:59.196 more actively involved in in day-to-day management decisions 03:14:59.208 --> 03:15:03.186 than you otherwise would be. But we recognize, as does the 03:15:03.198 --> 03:15:06.958 management with whom we're working pretty successfully, 03:15:06.970 --> 03:15:11.079 understand this is different times, and and you have asked a 03:15:11.091 --> 03:15:14.992 lot and frankly, haven't gotten as much as you would like 03:15:15.004 --> 03:15:18.917 in return. But I'm happy to get back to you with details. 03:15:18.942 --> 03:15:22.912 Chair Brownell, l I'd like to 03:15:22.924 --> 03:15:27.146 follow up on what you just said. In that, you have a 03:15:27.158 --> 03:15:31.453 feedback loop with with management. Does that work in 03:15:31.465 --> 03:15:35.693 terms of conversations? Is it something that you get 03:15:35.705 --> 03:15:39.897 in written form? How honest and open is the feedback 03:15:39.909 --> 03:15:44.113 loop? And how deep into the organization does it go? 03:15:44.125 --> 03:15:48.165 Is it just a C suite to the board? Is it everybody 03:15:48.177 --> 03:15:52.467 with a VP title and above? And how open is that loop? 03:15:52.492 --> 03:15:57.363 You can ask the team. I think possibly they would 03:15:57.375 --> 03:16:02.258 say it's more open and frequent than they're used to. That is typically 03:16:02.270 --> 03:16:07.215 found, as I said, but they understand the commitment that this board has 03:16:07.227 --> 03:16:11.912 made, and they understand the need to expand the kind of information 03:16:11.924 --> 03:16:16.662 and feedback that you get. In a typical utility, there isn't a lot of 03:16:16.674 --> 03:16:21.221 dialogue. It's a risk averse operation. The business model doesn't 03:16:21.233 --> 03:16:25.909 lend itself to that. That's something that's changing along with the 03:16:25.921 --> 03:16:30.609 externalities that are driving change, whether they be storms in the 03:16:30.621 --> 03:16:35.765 Northeast, weather that which I experienced a lot of. Whether they be fires 03:16:35.777 --> 03:16:40.526 in California, whether they be the need to communicate with customers 03:16:40.538 --> 03:16:45.213 differently. So that involves different skill sets, different way of 03:16:45.225 --> 03:16:49.776 looking at the world. So I think it's very open. It's very candid. 03:16:49.788 --> 03:16:54.595 No, it's not written down, you must do this, you must do that. It's a, 03:16:54.607 --> 03:16:59.359 look, I see this, I really feel we have to pay attention to it, let's 03:16:59.371 --> 03:17:04.253 sit down and talk about it, let's put together a team. It's not limited 03:17:04.265 --> 03:17:08.819 to any level. One of the things that we instituted as as soon as I 03:17:08.831 --> 03:17:13.698 arrived is, we call them safety visits, but they're also visits just to 03:17:13.710 --> 03:17:18.386 get to know employees at every level, to get their feedback, to give 03:17:18.398 --> 03:17:23.135 observations. You know, when you walk by people working in the middle 03:17:23.147 --> 03:17:27.897 of the street with equipment and an open manhole, as one of our board 03:17:27.909 --> 03:17:32.780 members did the other day, and you see people on their cell phones. You 03:17:32.792 --> 03:17:37.403 say, we need to work differently, can we talk about that? So it is, 03:17:37.415 --> 03:17:42.223 it's an effort for all of us to improve every day and the only way you 03:17:42.235 --> 03:17:47.124 do that, in my opinion, is to have very open conversations. And I think 03:17:47.136 --> 03:17:51.734 you've all probably been through a situation where you have to give 03:17:51.746 --> 03:17:56.965 evaluations to employees every year. Well, I learned pretty young, everybody 03:17:56.977 --> 03:18:01.649 hates them. Nobody does them very well that. You have to consider it 03:18:01.661 --> 03:18:06.344 as ongoing coaching and ongoing coaching does not happen once. We're 03:18:06.356 --> 03:18:11.364 not hearing from you once. We shouldn't hear from you once. We're hearing 03:18:11.376 --> 03:18:15.988 from you on a continuous basis. And we hope to. It's the same thing 03:18:16.000 --> 03:18:20.675 that we really are working on with all of us. But ask the people who 03:18:20.687 --> 03:18:25.305 are living the dream. So I don't know, Andy, how you feel, Or Bill. 03:18:25.330 --> 03:18:28.891 Folks that are sitting behind you, and the folks 03:18:28.903 --> 03:18:32.114 actually that are sitting behind them, and behind them, and I 03:18:32.126 --> 03:18:35.357 mean that not literally. I mean that figuratively. So we won't 03:18:35.369 --> 03:18:38.715 do that. We won't go there, I think. Martha, you had a question. 03:18:38.740 --> 03:18:43.739 Thank you, President Batjer. Mr. Johnson, 03:18:43.751 --> 03:18:48.484 you were mentioning that the primary driver for the calling of this 03:18:48.496 --> 03:18:53.083 large scale PSPS was safety. And I certainly acknowledge that and 03:18:53.095 --> 03:18:58.112 appreciate that difficult call. I think what we've heard from the local 03:18:58.124 --> 03:19:02.917 governments and in their formal statements, even including the other 03:19:02.929 --> 03:19:07.873 extreme of that, which is that you did not consider the safety impacts 03:19:07.885 --> 03:19:12.615 of the PSPS and the lack of coordination with the local governments 03:19:12.627 --> 03:19:17.089 that lead to near-deaths, as they stated, that there could have 03:19:17.101 --> 03:19:21.753 been had another 24 or 48 hours elapsed, even more deaths than the 03:19:21.765 --> 03:19:26.708 fires themselves. And that, of course, is another safety issue. I want 03:19:26.720 --> 03:19:31.308 a couple that with a statement that was made by one of your board 03:19:31.320 --> 03:19:36.060 members. And I'm sorry if I pronounce your last name wrong. Bleach? 03:19:36.072 --> 03:19:40.797 That inherently spoke of the value of being a Californian, of being 03:19:40.809 --> 03:19:45.616 connected to the communities who are being disconnected, and I can't 03:19:45.628 --> 03:19:50.568 help but notice the three of you today don't, well, currently you live 03:19:50.580 --> 03:19:55.183 here, but I'm not sure, Ms. Brownwell, if you live in California? 03:19:55.208 --> 03:19:58.143 I have family here with whom I've 03:19:58.155 --> 03:20:00.997 been staying, and I have an apartment in Redwood City. 03:20:01.022 --> 03:20:04.758 Thank you. This seems 03:20:04.770 --> 03:20:08.446 to me like something that I would really see value 03:20:08.458 --> 03:20:11.911 in a board, a PG&E board, that really reflected 03:20:11.923 --> 03:20:15.894 California. That reflected in terms of the communities 03:20:15.906 --> 03:20:19.284 that are impacted, and certainly reflected the 03:20:19.296 --> 03:20:23.480 demographics of California. And I saw your noted the next 03:20:23.492 --> 03:20:27.020 two board members. One is a Californian, and two 03:20:27.032 --> 03:20:30.717 white men, but, well, at least one is Californian. 03:20:30.729 --> 03:20:34.313 So I just, I want to, you know, ask the question, 03:20:34.325 --> 03:20:37.561 is the board demographics and experience and 03:20:37.573 --> 03:20:41.307 knowledge of California? I Asked Mr Visi earlier on 03:20:41.319 --> 03:20:44.993 if he knew of the communities of Roseland and Agua 03:20:45.005 --> 03:20:48.664 Calliente to communities in Sonoma County that are 03:20:48.676 --> 03:20:52.203 low-resourced and and terribly important for the 03:20:52.215 --> 03:20:56.024 economy of Sonoma County. How important is it to you 03:20:56.036 --> 03:20:59.569 that your board be representative of California? 03:20:59.594 --> 03:21:04.438 My personal opinion, and I'm gonna turn to the Chair because 03:21:04.450 --> 03:21:08.927 I don't get to comment on the other board members. I think it's really 03:21:08.939 --> 03:21:13.536 important to have a board that reflects the constituency of the customer 03:21:13.548 --> 03:21:18.031 base, the state, and understands it, and I think eventually this board 03:21:18.043 --> 03:21:22.748 will get there. I think this board was assembled in unusual circumstances, 03:21:22.760 --> 03:21:27.225 having to do with the bankruptcy and some other things. But as to your 03:21:27.237 --> 03:21:32.073 basic premise about how a board should look and should it be able to relate, 03:21:32.085 --> 03:21:36.682 particularly utility board, to the utility customers, I agree with that. 03:21:36.707 --> 03:21:39.608 I'd liketo add to that 1 03:21:39.620 --> 03:21:43.116 observation that I've had being a member of the 03:21:43.128 --> 03:21:46.473 board. The other board members, those who are 03:21:46.485 --> 03:21:49.915 not originally from California and I have been 03:21:49.927 --> 03:21:53.196 traveling all over the state. We've been two 03:21:53.208 --> 03:21:56.634 substations in counties up and down the state. 03:21:56.646 --> 03:21:59.629 We have been, as Nora said, to places in 03:21:59.641 --> 03:22:02.927 which disasters have occurred to which we're 03:22:02.939 --> 03:22:06.207 connected. We have been everywhere from, you 03:22:06.219 --> 03:22:09.717 know, Diablo Canyon to up in Orville and to the 03:22:09.729 --> 03:22:13.221 CalIso, and we have spent a lot of time touring 03:22:13.233 --> 03:22:16.226 the state of California together. And in 03:22:16.238 --> 03:22:19.873 those conversations, we've had a chance to really 03:22:19.885 --> 03:22:23.095 talk about the unique values and challenges 03:22:23.107 --> 03:22:26.164 here in California, and the importance of 03:22:26.176 --> 03:22:29.464 really understanding and being empathetic to 03:22:29.476 --> 03:22:33.029 the people who are struggling to find confidence 03:22:33.041 --> 03:22:36.097 in their energy system in a very stressed 03:22:36.109 --> 03:22:39.595 environment. I think that I've seen tremendous, 03:22:39.607 --> 03:22:42.596 the tremendous development in our board, 03:22:42.608 --> 03:22:45.800 as one that is California focused, and have 03:22:45.812 --> 03:22:49.088 great confidence in my colleagues to reflect 03:22:49.100 --> 03:22:52.444 those values in our decision making and to be 03:22:52.456 --> 03:22:55.812 aware of it. I think also just spending a lot 03:22:55.824 --> 03:22:59.160 of time out there in the field and talking to 03:22:59.172 --> 03:23:02.375 people who work day in, day out for PG&E on 03:23:02.387 --> 03:23:05.729 the line. You know, either underground on the 03:23:05.741 --> 03:23:09.023 gas operation or for up on the poles turning 03:23:09.035 --> 03:23:12.301 wrenches with our linemen. I mean, these are 03:23:12.313 --> 03:23:15.518 these are individuals who we're all getting 03:23:15.530 --> 03:23:18.803 to know and becoming part of our family. And 03:23:18.815 --> 03:23:22.099 I think that makes a big difference as well. 03:23:22.111 --> 03:23:26.961 I appreciate your commenting on the fact that you 03:23:26.973 --> 03:23:32.252 visited various places in the state and where you have facilities, and most 03:23:32.264 --> 03:23:37.120 importantly, that you're visiting the hardworking folks that work for 03:23:37.132 --> 03:23:42.069 PG&E out on the line. They have to have tough jobs, especially in this 03:23:42.081 --> 03:23:47.264 atmosphere. But I don't need to be, I don't mean to be snarky, but you all 03:23:47.276 --> 03:23:52.402 were ordered by a judge to go to Paradise. I just want to make that final 03:23:52.414 --> 03:23:57.673 point, and I think you probably learned from that. But that was long before 03:23:57.685 --> 03:24:02.539 I came here. I was reading in the paper like any other citizen. But I 03:24:02.564 --> 03:24:07.415 that's absolutely right. And I will say, though, that like many 03:24:07.427 --> 03:24:12.352 of us, really, you know, we're already planning to go, and and some had already 03:24:12.364 --> 03:24:17.067 visited. I know that Bill's been up there at least four times. This is, it's 03:24:17.079 --> 03:24:21.548 not by compunction, I think, it's, you know, it's coming from the heart. 03:24:21.573 --> 03:24:25.598 President Batjer. I just would like to 03:24:25.610 --> 03:24:30.044 comment. I appreciated the judge's order. The fact is, and there's 03:24:30.056 --> 03:24:34.484 probably a note to somebody from this, the first thing I did, upon 03:24:34.496 --> 03:24:38.936 joining the board was to say, we must go to these communities, but 03:24:38.948 --> 03:24:43.572 more than that, we must go more extensively to all of the communities 03:24:43.584 --> 03:24:47.623 and the facilities that we serve. So I respect his order and 03:24:47.635 --> 03:24:51.867 we did learn a lot and continue to learn a lot. And I can't say 03:24:51.879 --> 03:24:56.057 it any better than Jeff has said it. This is a group of people 03:24:56.069 --> 03:25:00.352 with broad experience in various areas that we need, and they're 03:25:00.364 --> 03:25:04.989 bringing those experiences to California with a goal of understanding 03:25:05.001 --> 03:25:09.091 California. When I talked about cross-functional meetings and 03:25:09.103 --> 03:25:13.007 work, that also includes really understanding the critical 03:25:13.019 --> 03:25:17.503 issues that face California, that are unique, for example, in terms 03:25:17.515 --> 03:25:21.548 of climate change. But we've had people trying to figure out 03:25:21.560 --> 03:25:26.050 how to solve affordable housing, health care, on our trips. There's 03:25:26.062 --> 03:25:30.035 a lot of commitment to really being part of this community. 03:25:30.060 --> 03:25:34.485 Were there any other comments before 03:25:34.497 --> 03:25:39.089 we go to closing? We are going to be taking public comment 03:25:39.101 --> 03:25:43.454 shortly and I do ask, we all have been here a long time 03:25:43.466 --> 03:25:47.908 this afternoon, but our public members have been waiting 03:25:47.920 --> 03:25:52.347 a very long time to comment. So I do hope and trust that 03:25:52.359 --> 03:25:56.565 you will remain until the public comment has finished 03:25:56.577 --> 03:26:01.323 after we have made comments and then gone, move on to public 03:26:01.335 --> 03:26:05.546 comments. So I really appreciate Chair Brownwell, you 03:26:05.558 --> 03:26:10.218 pointing out how important the outcomes are. I think I said 03:26:10.230 --> 03:26:14.668 earlier to Mr Johnson, that I really do believe you all, 03:26:14.680 --> 03:26:19.268 we all, will be judged by the outcomes, not the plans. Not 03:26:19.280 --> 03:26:23.568 all these plans, even in some ways, I must say, poorly 03:26:23.580 --> 03:26:27.775 executed as they were. Again, I would like to express 03:26:27.787 --> 03:26:31.994 my appreciation to my fellow Commissioners and all in 03:26:32.006 --> 03:26:36.441 attendance and appreciate so much for the long afternoon 03:26:36.453 --> 03:26:41.057 of staying here with us for this emergency meeting. In the 03:26:41.069 --> 03:26:45.255 days, the weeks, and months to come, we will continue 03:26:45.267 --> 03:26:49.544 to examine last week's events and monitor how well the 03:26:49.556 --> 03:26:54.294 commitments made today and the corrective actions identified 03:26:54.306 --> 03:26:58.822 are indeed implemented. Within a few days, we expect PG&E 03:26:58.834 --> 03:27:03.335 to submit a detailed report on last week's power shut off 03:27:03.347 --> 03:27:07.471 events, which will be followed by a staff report and 03:27:07.483 --> 03:27:12.146 investigation. In addition, we will be working on advancing 03:27:12.158 --> 03:27:16.678 the second phase of the PSPS proceedings here at the PUC. 03:27:16.690 --> 03:27:20.800 And we're planning to update the wildfire mitigation 03:27:20.812 --> 03:27:25.090 plans to be considered by the first half of next year. 03:27:25.102 --> 03:27:29.919 However, despite the importance of these regulatory processes 03:27:29.931 --> 03:27:34.137 and these actions, they are meaningless to the public 03:27:34.149 --> 03:27:38.652 unless they translate into real world demonstrations that 03:27:38.664 --> 03:27:43.257 the PG&E and other utilities are truly taking actions that 03:27:43.269 --> 03:27:47.466 place the safety of the public before their financial 03:27:47.478 --> 03:27:51.999 interests. Commissioners. I welcome your remarks as well. 03:27:51.999 --> 03:27:56.213 I'll just be very brief 03:27:56.225 --> 03:28:00.538 because I really do want to hear from the public. 03:28:00.550 --> 03:28:04.597 We've had a lot of conversation about specific 03:28:04.609 --> 03:28:08.755 things that went wrong and specific things that 03:28:08.767 --> 03:28:13.416 we would like to see. And so I just want to reiterate 03:28:13.428 --> 03:28:17.312 my earlier point that, you know, there needs 03:28:17.324 --> 03:28:21.548 to be, there needs to be progress, someone needs 03:28:21.560 --> 03:28:25.363 to be coordinating this group of people and 03:28:25.375 --> 03:28:29.580 making sure to fulfill the commitments that have 03:28:29.592 --> 03:28:34.068 been made here in front of us. And I recognize that 03:28:34.080 --> 03:28:38.204 de energization is a safety imperative. But the 03:28:38.216 --> 03:28:42.526 scope of it, the timing of it, the communication, 03:28:42.538 --> 03:28:46.746 the implementation of it, all of those are areas 03:28:46.758 --> 03:28:50.891 where we have not seen the performance that the 03:28:50.903 --> 03:28:55.376 people of California deserve. And so I look forward 03:28:55.388 --> 03:28:59.183 to seeing improvements in that performence. 03:28:59.208 --> 03:29:03.791 I think it's important as we sit 03:29:03.803 --> 03:29:08.325 here and talk about technical fixes, that we don't lose sight 03:29:08.337 --> 03:29:12.999 of the impact, the human dimension of what the's power shutoffs 03:29:13.011 --> 03:29:17.320 entail. They have potentially devastating consequences and 03:29:17.332 --> 03:29:22.137 the poor and the vulnerable are the most at risk. As Commissioner 03:29:22.149 --> 03:29:26.163 Guzman Aceves said, we're very, very lucky that people 03:29:26.175 --> 03:29:30.621 didn't die or are suffer injury from this event. Some of the 03:29:30.633 --> 03:29:35.310 failures that you've testified today are astonishing, given the 03:29:35.322 --> 03:29:39.833 amount of time to prepare for this. These have to be executed 03:29:39.845 --> 03:29:44.296 as well as possible, using the best technology, the state of 03:29:44.308 --> 03:29:49.045 the art RT, and so forth. And, to the new the new board members, 03:29:49.057 --> 03:29:53.367 I just want to say one thing. We had a hearing in April in 03:29:53.379 --> 03:29:57.674 our safety culture proceeding, where we've been struggling 03:29:57.686 --> 03:30:02.139 to figure out how to instill a safety culture at G&E because 03:30:02.151 --> 03:30:06.672 traditional fines and penalties, even $1.5 billion fine after 03:30:06.684 --> 03:30:11.363 the San Bruno accident, haven't deterred ongoing violations. In 03:30:11.375 --> 03:30:16.391 April, we were dealing with Paradise, which was the most destructive 03:30:16.403 --> 03:30:20.484 and deadly fire ever, as well as Revelations about 2017 03:30:20.496 --> 03:30:24.716 fires where PG&E was the cause of 12 fires that caused 20 03:30:24.728 --> 03:30:29.398 deaths as well as serious safety violations in the gasline, the 03:30:29.410 --> 03:30:34.211 locate it and mark program, which included falsification of data. 03:30:34.223 --> 03:30:38.526 And your predecessor Chair Kelly said, I absolutely commit 03:30:38.538 --> 03:30:42.980 to you, it's different day, safety and compliance are at the 03:30:42.992 --> 03:30:47.300 top of our list. So Mr Visi, when you, or Mr Johnson, when 03:30:47.312 --> 03:30:51.746 you talk about your surprise or concern about the skepticism 03:30:51.758 --> 03:30:55.986 surrounding the decision to do the power shut offs by the 03:30:55.998 --> 03:31:00.512 public and others. That's why. You have a very, very long way 03:31:00.524 --> 03:31:04.976 to go to rebuild the trust and confidence of the public, the 03:31:04.988 --> 03:31:09.499 Legislature, and us as regulators. Because we have heard this 03:31:09.511 --> 03:31:13.961 before multiple times. We heard it just four months ago from 03:31:13.973 --> 03:31:18.927 your predecessor. So we really will expect you to deliver different 03:31:18.939 --> 03:31:23.249 results in order for us to change our thinking. Thank you. 03:31:23.249 --> 03:31:25.259 Commissioner Shiroma? 03:31:25.284 --> 03:31:31.296 I'll go next. Thank you. As I mentioned before, 03:31:31.308 --> 03:31:36.747 your enterprise risk map surely must include the safety culture, 03:31:36.759 --> 03:31:42.526 your customer service, your customer experience, and in having those 03:31:42.538 --> 03:31:47.983 elements in your enterprise risk map, it means that real changes 03:31:47.995 --> 03:31:54.010 must occur bottom to top, top to bottom. And there are specific metrics 03:31:54.022 --> 03:31:59.380 along the way that have be met. That is how businesses and what 03:31:59.392 --> 03:32:05.162 have you deal with risks. And I have no doubt that the people on the 03:32:05.174 --> 03:32:10.873 ground, your employees, they know it, they live it, they're working 03:32:10.885 --> 03:32:16.062 on it every single day. And I am just perplexed and astounded 03:32:16.074 --> 03:32:21.597 that, why isn't there absolutely a viewpoint? But the system, the 03:32:21.609 --> 03:32:27.210 utility, the various pieces of it, they're the crown jewels of the 03:32:27.222 --> 03:32:33.003 utility. And why not? Why isn't there more and you're new and you're 03:32:33.015 --> 03:32:38.865 expressing that you're committing to it and so forth. But they're the 03:32:38.877 --> 03:32:44.403 crown jewels of the utility. It's what makes the whole thing work 03:32:44.415 --> 03:32:50.019 and the customers are so key to it, and the customer satisfaction, 03:32:50.031 --> 03:32:55.732 and the customer experience with you. I mentioned the very kind guy 03:32:55.744 --> 03:33:01.835 who came by and was so sorry you had to turn off our electricity because 03:33:01.847 --> 03:33:07.197 Mama couldn't pay the bill. These things all make a difference. 03:33:07.209 --> 03:33:12.972 And your economic engine for the California as fifth largest economy 03:33:12.984 --> 03:33:18.173 in the world, you have a key part in that. It's essential and 03:33:18.185 --> 03:33:23.777 important, and, you know, I don't know how else to express it, but 03:33:23.789 --> 03:33:29.226 the deep love of where we live, of California, and your role for 03:33:29.238 --> 03:33:35.004 California is so essential. And a deep course correction needs to be 03:33:35.016 --> 03:33:41.045 made and and the real tangible results from that. And we just had an en 03:33:41.057 --> 03:33:46.732 banc in the Silicon Valley on the economic vitality of contracting. 03:33:46.744 --> 03:33:52.514 And again, I'm from the San Joaquin Valley. You are there in the San 03:33:52.526 --> 03:33:58.123 Joaquin Valley and the impact that you have with your contracting, 03:33:58.135 --> 03:34:03.744 the people who work for you, and the buying power and so forth. It 03:34:03.756 --> 03:34:09.266 is essential. So your ????, your enterprise risk map must include 03:34:09.278 --> 03:34:14.968 these elements. And, as you've committed to, you must address these 03:34:14.980 --> 03:34:20.496 things. I'm looking forward to hearing from the public. We're all 03:34:20.508 --> 03:34:26.287 their gonna be here til the last person has spoken to us. Thank you. 03:34:26.312 --> 03:34:28.384 Commissioner Guzman Aceves? 03:34:28.409 --> 03:34:31.190 Thank you. 03:34:31.202 --> 03:34:34.267 I'll be very brief and agree with everything 03:34:34.279 --> 03:34:39.534 my fellow Commissioners have said. I believe, Jeff, excuse me, you mentioned 03:34:39.546 --> 03:34:44.795 that customers are justifiably angry, and I heard an apology from all of you 03:34:44.807 --> 03:34:50.478 acknowledging that justified anger. I would just call upon you again, particularly 03:34:50.490 --> 03:34:55.583 as board members, to show a little, in the form of action, and provide the 03:34:55.595 --> 03:35:01.109 rebate that the Governor is called for. As board members, that is a decision you 03:35:01.121 --> 03:35:06.424 obviously can take and ensure happens quickly and justifiably. So I would ask 03:35:06.436 --> 03:35:11.751 that you do that and not have to go down a longer route. Thank you very much. 03:35:11.776 --> 03:35:14.531 Thank you. Thank you all very 03:35:14.543 --> 03:35:17.145 much. If you could take your seats back in the 03:35:17.157 --> 03:35:20.056 audience because staff needs to come now back to the 03:35:20.068 --> 03:35:22.759 table for a public comment. Thank you very much. 03:36:04.760 --> 03:36:08.278 Okay, We're now moving on 03:36:08.290 --> 03:36:11.819 to the public comments section of our meeting 03:36:11.831 --> 03:36:15.432 today. I'm going to call the elected officials 03:36:15.444 --> 03:36:18.595 who were in the room first. G. Khalsa is 03:36:18.607 --> 03:36:22.032 Chief Deputy County Council for Kern County. 03:36:22.044 --> 03:36:25.709 Could you please come forward? The podium here, 03:36:25.721 --> 03:36:32.300 and, sir, if you could just state your name and your title for the record. Thank you. 03:36:32.312 --> 03:36:35.880 Good afternoon, Madam President. My name is 03:36:35.892 --> 03:36:39.697 Gurujodha Khalsa. K H A L S A. As you said, I'm a chief deputy with 03:36:39.709 --> 03:36:43.339 Kern County. I'd like to present some comments on behalf of Kern 03:36:43.351 --> 03:36:47.105 county. We've also submitted some written comments as well. So let 03:36:47.117 --> 03:36:50.913 me just jump in with Kern's experience, our principal concerns, and 03:36:50.925 --> 03:36:54.508 some recommendations for remediation. Rather than rehashing all 03:36:54.520 --> 03:36:57.985 of the things that have been said here today, I want to do, I 03:36:57.997 --> 03:37:01.642 want to focus on communication as a key aspect of remedying this 03:37:01.654 --> 03:37:05.504 situation and kind of the bad outcome that we've experienced at Kern 03:37:05.516 --> 03:37:09.154 County. The conference calls that were scheduled, were scheduled 03:37:09.166 --> 03:37:13.078 with too many people on the line. And the post event conference calls 03:37:13.090 --> 03:37:16.622 had 18 to 20 counties on the line. One size really doesn't fit 03:37:16.634 --> 03:37:20.431 all, so really, in terms of recommendations for remedy there really 03:37:20.443 --> 03:37:23.916 does need to be an effort on behalf of PG&E to come to a more 03:37:23.928 --> 03:37:27.674 granular level, to come to the county by county level because each 03:37:27.686 --> 03:37:31.333 county has its own distinct demographics and geographic elements 03:37:31.345 --> 03:37:34.970 that need to be addressed with respect to these power shut offs. 03:37:34.982 --> 03:37:38.619 For example, in one of our communities, Bear Valley and Stallion 03:37:38.631 --> 03:37:42.543 Springs, they lost their landline phone capability as a result of the 03:37:42.555 --> 03:37:46.254 shut off. This was about 8000 people who were negatively affected 03:37:46.266 --> 03:37:49.950 by the shut off. Again, knowing the grid, knowing the elements of 03:37:49.962 --> 03:37:53.714 the community, is extremely important. Access to emergency medical 03:37:53.726 --> 03:37:57.248 care. These are some concerns that my board wanted me to raise 03:37:57.260 --> 03:38:00.962 with your board. We believe that PG&E needs to share their action 03:38:00.974 --> 03:38:04.993 plan, their mitigation plan, with the counties in advance of submission 03:38:05.005 --> 03:38:08.475 to allow us to comment on some of the elements that they plan 03:38:08.487 --> 03:38:12.288 to implement to make sure that they're going to work in the various 03:38:12.300 --> 03:38:15.777 geographic areas where they're going to be implemented. There 03:38:15.789 --> 03:38:19.082 does need to be an adherence to the Standardized Emergency 03:38:19.094 --> 03:38:22.959 Management System, SEMS. There was some inaccurate communication and 03:38:22.971 --> 03:38:26.775 information that was given to Kern county, some of it in a critical 03:38:26.787 --> 03:38:30.266 regard because some misinformation was given to a health care 03:38:30.278 --> 03:38:34.181 provider, a large health care provider, and this was documented to my 03:38:34.193 --> 03:38:37.940 office by our emergency services personnel. So again, the critical 03:38:37.952 --> 03:38:41.637 need for clear information, accurate information, from PG&E can't 03:38:41.649 --> 03:38:45.122 be underestimated. We've heard comments today about intimacy. 03:38:45.134 --> 03:38:48.648 PG&E is already in everybody's house, in everybody's business, 03:38:48.660 --> 03:38:52.242 so I think it's time for them to understand and get to know the 03:38:52.254 --> 03:38:56.166 people they serve. This is going to require them to be on the ground, 03:38:56.178 --> 03:38:59.710 have boots on the ground, talking to people, understanding the 03:38:59.722 --> 03:39:03.458 needs of the community and addressing those needs in advance. This 03:39:03.470 --> 03:39:07.107 fire emergency situation is not going away, it's relatively long 03:39:07.119 --> 03:39:10.749 standing. It's an opportunity for a dialogue. Finally, I want to 03:39:10.761 --> 03:39:14.403 focus on a better provision and planning for medically sensitive 03:39:14.415 --> 03:39:17.987 residents. This is of extreme concern to Kern county. We have a 03:39:17.999 --> 03:39:21.750 large county, perhaps the largest geographic county in California. 03:39:21.762 --> 03:39:25.508 Many of our residents in far out places, in Ridgecrest, in Mojave, 03:39:25.520 --> 03:39:29.277 they don't have access to emergency medical care, they're on their 03:39:29.289 --> 03:39:33.137 own. If the power goes out, they're in dire circumstances. So again, 03:39:33.149 --> 03:39:36.953 PG&E should consider, I think, several things. Consider circulating 03:39:36.965 --> 03:39:40.595 a written authorization to their customers that can be responded 03:39:40.607 --> 03:39:43.968 to as part of the building that gives PG&E the authority to 03:39:43.980 --> 03:39:47.439 share their medical information with county providers, county 03:39:47.451 --> 03:39:51.257 emergency folks so that they don't run into HIPA issues. They could 03:39:51.269 --> 03:39:55.126 consider public service announcements on TV and radio, so that these 03:39:55.138 --> 03:39:58.671 folks, many of whom watch hours and hours of television, could 03:39:58.683 --> 03:40:02.420 be better prepared in the event of one of these emergencies. While 03:40:02.432 --> 03:40:06.069 I don't want to suggest that your board, perhaps on it's website 03:40:06.081 --> 03:40:09.824 or through another mechanism, developed a PG&E report card so that 03:40:09.836 --> 03:40:13.480 the counties, thank you very much, so that the counties can give 03:40:13.492 --> 03:40:17.064 their feedback substantively in a very clarified manner to many 03:40:17.076 --> 03:40:20.772 of the action steps that PG&E has represented they're going to be 03:40:20.784 --> 03:40:24.250 taking. We could give you a report as to whether or not those 03:40:24.262 --> 03:40:28.020 things have actually been done. Thank you very much for your time. 03:40:28.020 --> 03:40:34.367 Thank you, Mr Khalsa. I should have reminded the public 03:40:34.379 --> 03:40:40.822 before I opened up comments that we do have limited time. I apologize. We're 03:40:40.834 --> 03:40:47.104 two minutes? Three minutes? Three minutes. Three minutes for each speaker. 03:40:47.116 --> 03:40:53.565 So Mark Checkalabain, please. Okay, you're going to pass. Okay. Diane Dylan. 03:40:53.590 --> 03:40:59.823 Thank you. Diane Dylan, Napa County Supervisor. Thank you for the 03:40:59.835 --> 03:41:06.234 opportunity. My board hasn't met, didn't have this agendaized for last Tuesday. So 03:41:06.246 --> 03:41:12.562 I'm here on my own. But I've been very active with this issue over the last year. 03:41:12.574 --> 03:41:18.748 As a local government representative, I can say that we felt that we were heard 03:41:18.760 --> 03:41:25.073 by you when the decision came down about de energization last May. Unfortunately, 03:41:25.085 --> 03:41:31.410 I don't think PG&E heard you because they were unable to carry out that directive 03:41:31.422 --> 03:41:37.664 in the way that I think we all anticipated and hoped that they would do. So your 03:41:37.676 --> 03:41:43.621 letter, Chair, last Monday night, was most welcome and most agreed with. And 03:41:43.633 --> 03:41:49.945 so thank you very much. I'd be remiss if I didn't mention something that we don't 03:41:49.957 --> 03:41:56.280 hear. We haven't heard it all afternoon, and it's the context in which, at least, 03:41:56.292 --> 03:41:59.747 my constituents live. And that's the context 03:41:59.759 --> 03:42:02.687 of having PG&E having four companies, 03:42:02.699 --> 03:42:08.720 subcontractors, doing vegetation management work in our county on a continual 03:42:08.732 --> 03:42:14.815 basis, almost in a frenzy since, for almost a year. Cutting hundreds of trees, 03:42:14.827 --> 03:42:18.287 trimming thousands of others because of work 03:42:18.299 --> 03:42:21.385 that hasn't been done for decades that, 03:42:21.397 --> 03:42:27.795 yes, we've had, it's caused us to be in the situation we're in. It's not all about 03:42:27.807 --> 03:42:33.676 climate change. So living in that context and hearing, oh, this is all just 03:42:33.688 --> 03:42:39.840 for your safety. Well, yes, but it's because of actions that weren't taken that 03:42:39.852 --> 03:42:46.247 should have been. The other thing I'd like to emphasize is that many of the things 03:42:46.259 --> 03:42:52.571 that you've heard today, and many of the things we saw in your letter, are things 03:42:52.583 --> 03:42:58.829 we have been asking PG&E to let us work with them on, and I'll give you a couple 03:42:58.841 --> 03:43:04.996 of examples. We didn't anticipate media interest. We have been trying to engage 03:43:05.008 --> 03:43:11.406 with PG&E for the last year about how to message what we anticipated would happen. 03:43:11.418 --> 03:43:17.502 We experienced the first big PSPS last October and could foresee that a larger 03:43:17.514 --> 03:43:23.532 one wouldn't go down very well. We have a lot of experience doing media work. 03:43:23.544 --> 03:43:29.928 We had three fires happen simultaneously in our county two years ago and worldwide 03:43:29.940 --> 03:43:35.951 media attention. And I dare say, and this is not boastful, that we handled it 03:43:35.963 --> 03:43:42.122 a little better than PG&E handled three days last week. And I mentioned that to 03:43:42.134 --> 03:43:48.228 say we've had experience, we know how to reach locals. And we we've asked PG&E 03:43:48.240 --> 03:43:54.782 repeatedly to engage with us. Hearing eight years, 10 years, 14 years today? I don't 03:43:54.794 --> 03:44:00.885 know how I'm going to convey that message to the small business owners, to the 03:44:00.897 --> 03:44:06.982 people who live paycheck to paycheck, that these events are going to go on for 03:44:06.994 --> 03:44:13.323 that long. Thank you so much for your actions taken on local government's behalf. 03:44:13.348 --> 03:44:16.405 Thank you, Supervisor Dylan. 03:44:16.417 --> 03:44:19.048 Appreciate it very much. We will now move 03:44:19.060 --> 03:44:21.591 to the general public. I'm going to call 03:44:21.603 --> 03:44:24.395 Miss Shaw and Miss Hall will be right after. 03:44:39.550 --> 03:44:44.393 My name is Marissa Straw. I live in Richmond. I need 03:44:44.405 --> 03:44:49.331 to tell you that I'm deeply rooted within my community of people with 03:44:49.343 --> 03:44:54.052 disabilities. And no one that I know received notification, either 03:44:54.064 --> 03:44:58.784 written or phonecall or otherwise. Many years ago I was on medical 03:44:58.796 --> 03:45:03.784 baseline. And so PG&E should have my documentation. Currently, though, 03:45:03.796 --> 03:45:08.584 however, I live in a Section Eight development, so my landlord pays 03:45:08.596 --> 03:45:13.871 the PG&E. It's part of my rent. The reason why I mentioned that is because 03:45:13.883 --> 03:45:18.536 people like me and others like me, who live in different types of 03:45:18.548 --> 03:45:23.464 housing, will wind up through the cracks unless something is done. We 03:45:23.476 --> 03:45:28.403 had the administrator said that they reached out. I think 7000 people 03:45:28.415 --> 03:45:33.478 and other people weren't home. My population wasn't in that at all, and 03:45:33.490 --> 03:45:38.282 I live in Section Eight. If they had work closer with the counties, 03:45:38.294 --> 03:45:43.424 in my case, Contra Costa County. And I know, also, in Berkeley. Berkeley 03:45:43.436 --> 03:45:48.014 wanted PG&E's assistance and guidance and got nothing. So let me 03:45:48.026 --> 03:45:53.091 also just say that their community resource centers, well, they didn't, 03:45:53.103 --> 03:45:57.758 they don't serve people with disabilities. And why do I say that? 03:45:57.770 --> 03:46:02.750 People with disabilities have, as you mentioned, specialized equipment 03:46:02.762 --> 03:46:07.614 and need specialized care. And also the Oakland Center, which was in 03:46:07.626 --> 03:46:12.613 the Hills, I can't get to. For specialized populations, there needs to 03:46:12.625 --> 03:46:17.412 be centers near BART stations and major hubs of transportation. And 03:46:17.424 --> 03:46:22.408 also there needs to be some sort of plan for people with disabilities. 03:46:22.420 --> 03:46:27.204 I don't hear anything from any of execs saying that they will reach 03:46:27.216 --> 03:46:31.854 out to populations, people with disabilities, or have any type of 03:46:31.866 --> 03:46:36.727 special meetings regarding our needs or anything. And there needs to 03:46:36.739 --> 03:46:41.439 be specialized plans for this specialized community of people with 03:46:41.451 --> 03:46:46.445 disabilities. And also there needs to be a specialized group, sorry, I 03:46:46.457 --> 03:46:51.516 got distracted, group and discussion for people on ventilators, because 03:46:51.528 --> 03:46:56.035 without that people will die and PG&E will have further born on 03:46:56.047 --> 03:47:01.102 their hands. And the other thing, I want to just say, that none of this 03:47:01.114 --> 03:47:05.830 has happened and it could all be avoided. So this is ridiculous. I 03:47:05.842 --> 03:47:10.622 don't support what PG&E is saying, that they've done their outreach 03:47:10.634 --> 03:47:15.496 because it's absolutely ridiculous, and this could be totally fixed. 03:47:15.521 --> 03:47:20.984 Thank you, Miss Shaw, very much. I appreciate that. 03:47:20.996 --> 03:47:26.395 And I trust that the executives of PG&E have just heard that. That you 03:47:26.407 --> 03:47:31.913 have a gap in your notifications, particularly with folks who are in the 03:47:31.925 --> 03:47:37.216 baseline or critical care in Section Eight Housing. Could Marge Hall? 03:47:37.241 --> 03:47:38.424 I'm right here. 03:47:38.450 --> 03:47:39.302 Oh, sorry. 03:47:39.327 --> 03:47:44.844 Yes, I am a disability climate activist. When my son was in high 03:47:44.856 --> 03:47:50.104 school, in the principal's office, there was a sign. It said, your lack of 03:47:50.116 --> 03:47:55.639 planning is not my emergency. I kind of feel like your lack of planning is now 03:47:55.651 --> 03:48:01.326 our emergency. As we said to teenagers, you could have seen it coming. You could 03:48:01.338 --> 03:48:06.858 have invested in a green infrastructure that would have been clean, resilient, 03:48:06.870 --> 03:48:12.612 decentralized, democratic and safe. But here we are. I've collected three stories 03:48:12.624 --> 03:48:18.150 from people with disabilities who live in the East Bay Hills who were affected 03:48:18.162 --> 03:48:23.560 by this recent shut off. I really, really ask you please to take the time to 03:48:23.572 --> 03:48:29.300 read them. I've just given them to you. I think that will open your eyes a little 03:48:29.312 --> 03:48:34.913 bit to what I'm going to say, because my comments are based upon those stories. 03:48:34.925 --> 03:48:40.239 The harsh reality is there's no infrastructure in place to help people with 03:48:40.251 --> 03:48:45.647 disabilities. What everyone fails to understand is that backup batteries for 03:48:45.659 --> 03:48:50.970 medical devices like ventilators only come with batteries that last several 03:48:50.982 --> 03:48:56.445 hours. So then what? Dirty, noisy generators may be possible in certain rural 03:48:56.457 --> 03:49:01.985 areas, but they're not appropriate for cities and apartments, and nor can many 03:49:01.997 --> 03:49:07.676 people manage to operate them safely. Furthermore, there's wheelchair-accessible 03:49:07.688 --> 03:49:13.411 shelter problems. It's very hard to find, especially in an emergency. Many people 03:49:13.423 --> 03:49:18.738 who are low income have significant constraints. Not everyone can afford an 03:49:18.750 --> 03:49:24.270 accessible hotel room. Some are even afraid to call 911 or go to the emergency 03:49:24.282 --> 03:49:29.813 room because of the cost and stress. Besides, do you really want the emergency 03:49:29.825 --> 03:49:35.131 room to be the default solution here? As you will see in these stories, the 03:49:35.143 --> 03:49:40.741 PG&E Resource centers are a joke. More than that, they are, in fact, dangerous. 03:49:40.753 --> 03:49:45.855 This is because they promote to the public the illusion of being able to 03:49:45.867 --> 03:49:51.261 help people. But they really can't help you if you're running out of battery 03:49:51.273 --> 03:49:56.297 life for your ventilator at 7 PM. Reliable information is important and 03:49:56.309 --> 03:50:02.116 notification essential, but this is a very low bar. The discussion is through this 03:50:02.128 --> 03:50:07.298 room is claustrophobic. Even if the notification was perfect, people with 03:50:07.310 --> 03:50:12.773 disabilities and old people would be in a world of hurt. Expecting low income 03:50:12.785 --> 03:50:18.372 people and people with disabilities to, quote, plan accordingly, when they have 03:50:18.384 --> 03:50:23.914 limited options is disturbingly clueless and reeks of ableism and class tunnel 03:50:23.926 --> 03:50:29.169 vision. This is a lot more than an inconvenience or, quote, hardship. It's 03:50:29.181 --> 03:50:34.717 life threatening. This is naked abandonment of poor, disabled, and old people. 03:50:34.742 --> 03:50:43.359 Oh, Will Abrams, please. And next will be Shirley Bennett. 03:50:43.384 --> 03:50:49.397 Thanks very much. My name is Will Abrams, I’m a resident of Sonoma 03:50:49.409 --> 03:50:52.483 County, and I appreciate the Commission's 03:50:52.495 --> 03:50:55.801 look at this. This certainly is an emergency 03:50:55.813 --> 03:51:01.685 situation, and I appreciate you treating it as such. As I reach out to wildfire 03:51:01.697 --> 03:51:07.507 survivors in my community, such as myself, there's a lot of sense that there's 03:51:07.519 --> 03:51:10.809 incompetence from PG&E, and what I saw today 03:51:10.821 --> 03:51:13.609 and what I've seen before is anything 03:51:13.621 --> 03:51:16.990 but. I think there's a lot of competent folks 03:51:17.002 --> 03:51:19.869 who are trying to get things done. But 03:51:19.881 --> 03:51:26.197 what the public sees is a disparity. So in the communications plans, post-public shut 03:51:26.209 --> 03:51:32.243 off, there was a lot of communications around pictures of all the trees that were 03:51:32.255 --> 03:51:35.397 not trimmed prior to, that ended up in the 03:51:35.409 --> 03:51:38.710 wires. There was a very deliberate strategic 03:51:38.722 --> 03:51:44.381 public relations campaign around that. Prior to, I go to an open house in my 03:51:44.393 --> 03:51:50.561 community to understand what's going to be in store for power safety shut offs, and 03:51:50.573 --> 03:51:56.752 I asked, how are these going? Well, they're going pretty good, was the response. No 03:51:56.764 --> 03:52:00.201 customer satisfaction survey, no understanding 03:52:00.213 --> 03:52:03.149 of whether the message they were trying 03:52:03.161 --> 03:52:09.264 to get across was received. Basic blocking and tackling for a communications plan, 03:52:09.276 --> 03:52:15.447 not there. Similarly, on the dollars. I don't understand. On the one hand, you come 03:52:15.459 --> 03:52:21.273 to the public and say we need a $21 billion fund of which we expect you to pay 03:52:21.285 --> 03:52:27.514 half. 10.5 billion. On the other hand, you come today with a very reasonable request 03:52:27.526 --> 03:52:33.401 from the governor for $100 rebate, oh, sorry, we have to, we have to talk about 03:52:33.413 --> 03:52:39.281 that one. So when it's time for handouts, everything's okay. When it's time for 03:52:39.293 --> 03:52:45.614 making good on your responsibilities, that isn't there. Then we look at your wildfire 03:52:45.626 --> 03:52:48.913 mitigation plan. There is absolutely nothing 03:52:48.925 --> 03:52:51.711 in that wildfire mitigation plan that 03:52:51.723 --> 03:52:54.797 measures risk. Nothing that measures risk 03:52:54.809 --> 03:52:58.115 reduction. I hear today, when you're talking 03:52:58.127 --> 03:53:01.564 about covered conductors, I hear it referenced 03:53:01.576 --> 03:53:04.439 that, well, yes, we think that's gonna 03:53:04.451 --> 03:53:10.481 help some. Great. Help some. There needs to be more analytics around those things 03:53:10.493 --> 03:53:16.430 for safety. The same way you're measuring things around your profitability. That 03:53:16.442 --> 03:53:22.317 needs to come. Look, there are a lot of wonderful people who work for PG&E, and 03:53:22.329 --> 03:53:28.419 certainly we respect the work that they provide, but it needs to be more targeted. 03:53:28.431 --> 03:53:34.607 There needs to be measures. There needs to be responsibility built within PG&E. And 03:53:34.619 --> 03:53:40.779 that's how they need to be coming forward. And the last statement I would say, so I 03:53:40.791 --> 03:53:44.086 heard Mr. Singh talk about fire index areas, 03:53:44.098 --> 03:53:46.890 and I certainly hope those aren't the 03:53:46.902 --> 03:53:53.069 same fire index areas that are referenced in your plan, which were developed in the 03:53:53.081 --> 03:53:56.379 1950s and last updated in 1962. So I'm happy 03:53:56.391 --> 03:53:59.186 to hear that they weren't. Thank you. 03:54:07.550 --> 03:54:11.114 Good afternoon. My name is Shirley 03:54:11.126 --> 03:54:14.305 Bennett. I am also a resident of Sonoma County, 03:54:14.317 --> 03:54:17.489 Santa Rosa. And I know where Agua Calliente and 03:54:17.501 --> 03:54:20.553 Roseland are. I'm also a ratepaying member of 03:54:20.565 --> 03:54:23.933 the public, reliant upon PG&E, and I am a survivor 03:54:23.945 --> 03:54:26.728 of the recent, disastrously conceived and 03:54:26.740 --> 03:54:29.916 implemented shutdown by PG&E. And I am an angry 03:54:29.928 --> 03:54:33.381 survivor. My State Senator, Mike Maguire, attempted 03:54:33.393 --> 03:54:36.428 to coordinate with PG&E on this issue before, 03:54:36.440 --> 03:54:39.487 during and after the PSPS. Remarks today have 03:54:39.499 --> 03:54:42.938 concerned last week's event, but I believe a deeper 03:54:42.950 --> 03:54:45.936 and broader review and restructuring of PG&E 03:54:45.948 --> 03:54:48.986 is what we really need to look at. PG&E’s job 03:54:48.998 --> 03:54:52.181 is to provide an essential, indeed existential, 03:54:52.193 --> 03:54:54.971 service to the public. They also have the 03:54:54.983 --> 03:54:58.637 responsibility to keep their equipment updated in safe 03:54:58.649 --> 03:55:02.015 working order. They have failed miserably in this. 03:55:02.027 --> 03:55:05.206 They insist that customers pay for the service, 03:55:05.218 --> 03:55:08.126 and we paid for it. And indeed, they have a 03:55:08.138 --> 03:55:11.389 request for a hike. At the moment. The structure 03:55:11.401 --> 03:55:14.571 of PG&E needs to be totally overhauled. And the 03:55:14.583 --> 03:55:17.898 CPUC should do its mandated job in overseeing and 03:55:17.910 --> 03:55:20.821 regulating this unwieldy, irresponsible and 03:55:20.833 --> 03:55:24.087 dangerous mega-company. The shutdown was far too 03:55:24.099 --> 03:55:27.268 massive, ill-conceived, misimplemented, and put 03:55:27.280 --> 03:55:30.593 thousands of people in an extremely difficult, if 03:55:30.605 --> 03:55:33.912 not life and economy threatening situations. PG&E 03:55:33.924 --> 03:55:37.045 did a horrendous job of interfacing before and 03:55:37.057 --> 03:55:40.427 during the event with governmental entities on the 03:55:40.439 --> 03:55:43.623 state, county and city levels. This is not what 03:55:43.635 --> 03:55:47.145 a public utility should do. Both of PG&E's websites, 03:55:47.157 --> 03:55:50.081 its primary and a hastily created secondary 03:55:50.093 --> 03:55:53.191 one, crashed quickly, even though they had had 03:55:53.203 --> 03:55:56.446 been advised earlier, more than once, to upgrade 03:55:56.458 --> 03:55:59.628 to other, more powerful platforms. If there had 03:55:59.640 --> 03:56:02.624 been a true natural rather than manufactured 03:56:02.636 --> 03:56:05.936 disaster, like this one, how would they have been 03:56:05.948 --> 03:56:09.128 communicated by PG&E? This is not what a public 03:56:09.140 --> 03:56:12.380 utility should be. Going forward, I believe that 03:56:12.392 --> 03:56:15.444 the monopoly needs to be broken up. I believe 03:56:15.456 --> 03:56:18.556 that the, since PG&E was able to create a fund 03:56:18.568 --> 03:56:21.813 for the victims of the wildfires, I believe they 03:56:21.825 --> 03:56:24.997 should create a fund for the victims of PSPS. I 03:56:25.009 --> 03:56:28.259 believe that profits and bonuses should be taxed 03:56:28.271 --> 03:56:31.507 heavily and create a funding stream for lawsuits 03:56:31.519 --> 03:56:34.700 and mismanagement. I know that AB1054 addresses 03:56:34.712 --> 03:56:37.754 this issue, and it ties executive salaries to 03:56:37.766 --> 03:56:41.086 safety records. The grid needs to be upgraded and 03:56:41.098 --> 03:56:44.065 future-ized to adapt to the changing climate 03:56:44.077 --> 03:56:47.452 impacts of droughts, weather and fires, as well as 03:56:47.464 --> 03:56:50.503 reducing emissions, increasing the production 03:56:50.515 --> 03:56:53.698 of on-site and neighborhood renewables, move to 03:56:53.710 --> 03:56:56.680 100% clean energy, and make battery storage, 03:56:56.692 --> 03:57:00.204 islanding and microgrid components common. Shutdowns 03:57:00.216 --> 03:57:03.523 of this magnitude cannot continue. PG&E must find 03:57:03.535 --> 03:57:06.522 ways to upgrade their equipment at their own 03:57:06.534 --> 03:57:09.635 costs as soon as possible, not over five or 10 03:57:09.647 --> 03:57:13.157 years, but now since it is PG&E, which has neglected 03:57:13.169 --> 03:57:16.342 its duty for decades. They must also find a way 03:57:16.354 --> 03:57:19.207 to update technology immediately, and they 03:57:19.219 --> 03:57:22.389 should establish a dedicated safety department. 03:57:22.401 --> 03:57:25.516 What they have done over the years is shameful 03:57:25.528 --> 03:57:28.771 and needs to be totally revamped. That is what a 03:57:28.783 --> 03:57:31.904 public utility should do. Thank you very much. 03:57:42.059 --> 03:57:45.009 Thank you, Commissioners, 03:57:45.021 --> 03:57:47.917 for calling this meeting this afternoon. To 03:57:47.929 --> 03:57:50.556 the PG&E executives, my name is Melissa 03:57:50.568 --> 03:57:53.734 Kasnitz. I'm the legal director with the Center 03:57:53.746 --> 03:57:56.699 for Accessible Technology, where I regularly 03:57:56.711 --> 03:57:59.478 represent the interests of customers with 03:57:59.490 --> 03:58:02.515 disabilities here before the Public Utilities 03:58:02.527 --> 03:58:05.036 Commission. If you ask your attorneys 03:58:05.048 --> 03:58:10.646 and regulatory staff, I believe you'll find I'm well known here, and I like to think 03:58:10.658 --> 03:58:16.267 that they would say that while I'm willing to take PG&E to task, I'm also willing to 03:58:16.279 --> 03:58:19.299 work constructively with the utility wherever 03:58:19.311 --> 03:58:22.014 possible to advance the interests of the 03:58:22.026 --> 03:58:27.641 people that I represent. I'm here today to express my deep frustration with what I'm 03:58:27.653 --> 03:58:30.604 hearing, where all the executives are saying 03:58:30.616 --> 03:58:33.315 that the problems that took place in the 03:58:33.327 --> 03:58:36.350 recent power shut off were unanticipated. I'm 03:58:36.362 --> 03:58:39.067 here to say that every problem that took 03:58:39.079 --> 03:58:44.417 place not only was predictable but was actually predicted in filings before this 03:58:44.429 --> 03:58:47.389 Commission, where numerous parties expressed 03:58:47.401 --> 03:58:50.373 concern that exactly the types of harms that 03:58:50.385 --> 03:58:53.139 people suffered were likely to take place 03:58:53.151 --> 03:58:56.115 during an extended power shut off. Each time 03:58:56.127 --> 03:58:59.152 someone today referenced the recent events as 03:58:59.164 --> 03:59:02.068 a learning opportunity, they diminished the 03:59:02.080 --> 03:59:07.817 actual harm suffered by people who suffered through extended power outages. People who 03:59:07.829 --> 03:59:13.446 didn't have money to buy supplies, people who didn't know if their medical equipment 03:59:13.458 --> 03:59:19.049 was going to continue to function, people who didn't know what was happening or what 03:59:19.061 --> 03:59:24.862 they could do. It's not enough to do better in the future when the harms were predicted 03:59:24.874 --> 03:59:30.471 and known and took place. Now, real people experienced real fear, real out-of-pocket 03:59:30.483 --> 03:59:36.290 costs, real medical costs, lost wages, lost schooling for their children. And for every 03:59:36.302 --> 03:59:41.896 executive to say, wow, now we know need to do better next time. You should have done 03:59:41.908 --> 03:59:47.513 better this time. A lot of the conversation today was in abstractions, but the harms 03:59:47.525 --> 03:59:50.544 people suffered were real. There were too few 03:59:50.556 --> 03:59:53.257 resource centers with short hours and no 03:59:53.269 --> 03:59:56.360 transportation. Support that wasn't accessible 03:59:56.372 --> 03:59:59.079 to people with disabilities. We've heard 03:59:59.091 --> 04:00:04.684 dismissive responses about customer losses and questions about whether reimbursement 04:00:04.696 --> 04:00:07.651 would be possible. We heard one heartwarming 04:00:07.663 --> 04:00:10.498 story about one generator provided for one 04:00:10.510 --> 04:00:16.043 hospice customer. But we have no idea how many customers were in similar situations 04:00:16.055 --> 04:00:18.551 and simply weren't able to access any 04:00:18.563 --> 04:00:21.665 resources. The costs of the shut off are being 04:00:21.677 --> 04:00:24.627 externalized on to people who aren't capable 04:00:24.639 --> 04:00:27.404 of absorbing them. This isn't okay. Every 04:00:27.416 --> 04:00:33.024 time PG&E considers turning off the power, they must think about the risks that come 04:00:33.036 --> 04:00:38.703 with the shut off, and the real harm that people will suffer, as well as the risks of 04:00:38.715 --> 04:00:41.411 keeping the power on. That needs to be a 04:00:41.423 --> 04:00:44.395 fundamental part of any equation. Thank you. 04:00:44.420 --> 04:00:49.530 Thank you. Next is Deborah 04:00:49.542 --> 04:00:53.900 Kaplan, and she will be followed by Tom 04:00:53.912 --> 04:01:03.295 Dalzell. Miss Kaplan. I believe she's left. Oh, she's right here. Thank you very much. 04:01:03.320 --> 04:01:09.148 Thank you very much for holding this hearing. 04:01:09.160 --> 04:01:14.908 I'm a person. I live in Oakland. A person with a disability. I 04:01:14.920 --> 04:01:20.389 live in an apartment building where I get to my place in an 04:01:20.401 --> 04:01:26.247 elevator. I have to power my electric wheelchair every night. I 04:01:26.259 --> 04:01:32.546 sleep with a ventilator with oxygen in an electric bed. If a shutoff 04:01:32.558 --> 04:01:38.036 happened to me, which it didn't, I honestly don't know what 04:01:38.048 --> 04:01:43.976 I would have done, and I think my situation is not that unusual. 04:01:43.988 --> 04:01:49.472 And in varying degrees, many people, even those who rely on 04:01:49.484 --> 04:01:55.313 refrigeration for medications, I don't know what they would do. 04:01:55.325 --> 04:02:01.075 So, I think the risks are very, very broad. People with a wide 04:02:01.087 --> 04:02:07.288 variety of disabilities. I think it's a shame, though, that we need 04:02:07.300 --> 04:02:13.148 to sort of parade our stories in trying to evoke attention, but 04:02:13.160 --> 04:02:18.627 at the risk of evoking stereotypes about disabled people as 04:02:18.639 --> 04:02:25.031 vulnerable and as victims, when the reality is we’re some of the best 04:02:25.043 --> 04:02:30.973 solution providers, innovators, because we have to think outside 04:02:30.985 --> 04:02:36.744 the box and solve problems every day. The problem of providing 04:02:36.756 --> 04:02:42.670 alternative power storage and generation for people who need it, 04:02:42.682 --> 04:02:48.244 who have no alternative, who can't just go somewhere else is 04:02:48.256 --> 04:02:54.085 very, very complex one. It involves many actors in the state in 04:02:54.097 --> 04:02:59.938 order to figure out what can be done and can be done quickly. I 04:02:59.950 --> 04:03:05.958 think your job as Commissioners is to figure out what is possible 04:03:05.970 --> 04:03:11.534 within your purview, within the authority that you currently 04:03:11.546 --> 04:03:17.744 got. But I'm afraid that's probably fairly limited. I think you do, 04:03:17.756 --> 04:03:23.508 though, have a major role to play as leaders in this state and 04:03:23.520 --> 04:03:29.710 making sure that other state agencies, legislators, and people with 04:03:29.722 --> 04:03:35.559 disabilities at the table to help figure out what the solutions 04:03:35.571 --> 04:03:41.219 are and should be, all get together and act quickly and don't 04:03:41.231 --> 04:03:47.347 forget about this when the public attention shifts elsewhere. That 04:03:47.359 --> 04:03:53.278 really is the challenge that I think you have and that we expect 04:03:53.290 --> 04:03:58.855 you to do. If you don't do it, we'll do it ourselves. But we 04:03:58.867 --> 04:04:04.701 need help because we need a program that will guarantee that we 04:04:04.713 --> 04:04:10.741 are not casualties during the next Shut off. Thank you very much. 04:04:10.753 --> 04:04:15.440 Thank you Miss Kaplan. Moving to Tom Dalzell. 04:04:15.439 --> 04:04:21.629 Good afternoon. My name is Tom Dalzell. I am the business manager of 04:04:21.641 --> 04:04:27.696 IBW Local 1245. We represent 12,000 PG&E employees and about 6000 members who are 04:04:27.708 --> 04:04:33.904 working for contractors doing vegetation management and line work. Madam President, 04:04:33.916 --> 04:04:39.607 I cannot thank you enough for your mention of the extraordinary job that our 04:04:39.619 --> 04:04:43.146 members did. And, both the PG&E and contractor, 04:04:43.158 --> 04:04:45.812 in the restoration, that was really 04:04:45.824 --> 04:04:51.734 our role, and it's been largely missing in the public narrative, and several of 04:04:51.746 --> 04:04:57.945 you have mentioned it, and we thank, on behalf of my members, I thank you for that. 04:04:57.957 --> 04:05:04.021 I also appreciate the acknowledgement of the extremely difficult conditions under 04:05:04.033 --> 04:05:09.929 which they did their job. It's tough work to start with, but then, when you add 04:05:09.941 --> 04:05:15.923 to the normal hazards of the job, there was physical danger. Many of our members 04:05:15.935 --> 04:05:22.206 were insulted and verbally abused in the field. One was shot at driving down Highway 04:05:22.218 --> 04:05:28.059 55. The bullet lodged in the padding on the dashboard. That anger is misplaced 04:05:28.071 --> 04:05:31.451 and counterproductive. Our members were there 04:05:31.463 --> 04:05:34.339 to restore and should not be subjected 04:05:34.351 --> 04:05:40.041 to threats, insults and bullets. What it points to is how careful we have to 04:05:40.053 --> 04:05:43.363 be, and the Commission is, on the criticism. 04:05:43.375 --> 04:05:46.254 That it's constructive criticism. It's 04:05:46.266 --> 04:05:52.109 not just saying PG&E doesn't care about its customers. It's really, the letter 04:05:52.121 --> 04:05:58.159 that you sent to PG&E was the most focused and articulate document that I've ever 04:05:58.171 --> 04:06:04.443 seen from the Commission. It was really, really zeroed in. You can't cascade nuance. 04:06:04.455 --> 04:06:10.130 And, I think your criticisms today have been fair and will not lead to angry 04:06:10.142 --> 04:06:16.125 people taking it as their mission to avenge PG&E's wrongs. You know, significant 04:06:16.137 --> 04:06:22.031 fast change is possible, and Commissioner Shiroma and I have talked about SMUD. 04:06:22.043 --> 04:06:28.096 1978, the third worst nuclear accident in American history. 92% weight, set, rate 04:06:28.108 --> 04:06:34.378 increase in one year, 39% capacity. Today, a brilliant utility. Big change, quickly. 04:06:34.390 --> 04:06:40.449 And the same, way all hold San Diego up as the gold standard for the work they're 04:06:40.461 --> 04:06:46.575 doing on their system. The parent company ? ??, We're not that far away from Aliso 04:06:46.587 --> 04:06:52.344 Canyon. We're not that far away from the disaster at San Onofre. Now there's a 04:06:52.356 --> 04:06:58.402 company that had made big mistakes and they're doing it, and I have confidence in 04:06:58.414 --> 04:07:04.472 PG&E. Eternal vigilance by the Commission is really important. And the last thing 04:07:04.484 --> 04:07:10.527 that I would say really quickly is you want to know how long the PSPS will go on. 04:07:10.539 --> 04:07:16.446 I would look at San Diego because they know that they're the gold standard. And 04:07:16.458 --> 04:07:22.359 for seven years, they've been doing it. They still have PSPS. But maybe there's 04:07:22.371 --> 04:07:28.358 something to be learned from there on how quickly it can happen here. Thank you. 04:07:28.383 --> 04:07:32.433 Thank you, sir. Miss Elkins. Followed by Eric Pain. 04:07:32.458 --> 04:07:35.700 Good afternoon. This is Lisa 04:07:35.712 --> 04:07:39.411 Elkins. Senior Deputy City Attorney with the City 04:07:39.423 --> 04:07:42.967 of San Jose. On behalf of the City of San Jose, 04:07:42.979 --> 04:07:46.536 I want to thank the Commission for calling this 04:07:46.548 --> 04:07:49.645 special meeting. San Jose is conducting a 04:07:49.657 --> 04:07:53.506 comprehensive evaluation of the impact of the power 04:07:53.518 --> 04:07:57.066 outage of last week and we will present written 04:07:57.078 --> 04:08:00.341 comments in due time. At this time, we have 04:08:00.353 --> 04:08:03.671 identified some preliminary issues I want to 04:08:03.683 --> 04:08:07.234 present to you today. The power outage impacted 04:08:07.246 --> 04:08:10.347 20,000 accounts in San Jose. About 60,000 04:08:10.359 --> 04:08:13.992 residents. Many neighborhoods. San Jose has been 04:08:14.004 --> 04:08:17.324 preparing for PSPS events since May of 2019, 04:08:17.336 --> 04:08:20.891 convening an emergency task force and created a 04:08:20.903 --> 04:08:24.304 power vulnerability plan. After receiving the 04:08:24.316 --> 04:08:28.025 outage notification from PG&E last week, San Jose 04:08:28.037 --> 04:08:31.650 activated the City's Emergency Operations Center 04:08:31.662 --> 04:08:35.140 on Tuesday evening, and proceeded to implement 04:08:35.152 --> 04:08:38.549 its Power Vulnerability plan. the City of Son 04:08:38.561 --> 04:08:42.044 Jose coordinated with the county and with PG&E 04:08:42.056 --> 04:08:45.524 to respond to the outage and undertook several 04:08:45.536 --> 04:08:48.868 actions, such as contacting medical baseline 04:08:48.880 --> 04:08:52.502 customers and school districts. Deploying police 04:08:52.514 --> 04:08:55.778 Department and Department of Transportation 04:08:55.790 --> 04:08:59.330 staff to aid with traffic flow. And launching a 04:08:59.342 --> 04:09:02.821 special mobile app to crowd source information 04:09:02.833 --> 04:09:06.232 from San Jose residents. San Jose spent about 04:09:06.244 --> 04:09:09.951 half a million dollars in city staff overtime and 04:09:09.963 --> 04:09:13.803 costs for fueling the emergency generators required 04:09:13.815 --> 04:09:17.000 to maintain the city drinking water supply 04:09:17.012 --> 04:09:20.562 and other vital services. This figure is likely 04:09:20.574 --> 04:09:23.839 to be much higher as we unveil the actually 04:09:23.851 --> 04:09:27.461 impacts of the power outage and does not include 04:09:27.473 --> 04:09:30.948 the costs incurred by our residents to prepare 04:09:30.960 --> 04:09:34.651 for and respond to the outage. PSPS events cannot 04:09:34.663 --> 04:09:37.995 be used to protect PG&E from liability while 04:09:38.007 --> 04:09:41.546 transferring costs to local governments and the 04:09:41.558 --> 04:09:44.739 public. Also had there been an emergencies 04:09:44.751 --> 04:09:48.297 such as a fire or earthquake, all the resources 04:09:48.309 --> 04:09:51.792 deployed to protect it to protect citizens for 04:09:51.804 --> 04:09:55.046 the, against the PSPS event would have been 04:09:55.058 --> 04:09:58.608 already committed. The redirection of emergency 04:09:58.620 --> 04:10:02.164 respond resources compounds local public safety 04:10:02.176 --> 04:10:05.806 concerns. There were myriad operational problems 04:10:05.818 --> 04:10:09.211 as well, as it has been discussed today. Some 04:10:09.223 --> 04:10:12.776 areas where that were not in the projected area 04:10:12.788 --> 04:10:16.632 were impacted. San Jose did not receive information 04:10:16.644 --> 04:10:19.610 from PG&E. We received information from 04:10:19.622 --> 04:10:23.085 the crowdsharing app. Other areas were impact, 04:10:23.097 --> 04:10:26.720 were supposed to be impacted, but were not. That 04:10:26.732 --> 04:10:30.201 meant that San Jose had to deploy resources to 04:10:30.213 --> 04:10:33.694 those areas and those resources are scarce and 04:10:33.706 --> 04:10:37.173 this wasn't necessary. Lack of precision and a 04:10:37.185 --> 04:10:41.033 misinformation during a PSPS event is unacceptable. 04:10:41.045 --> 04:10:47.421 Medical baseline customers information was not shared with impacted series. Only with 04:10:47.433 --> 04:10:51.194 counties. The counties resources where overwhelmed 04:10:51.206 --> 04:10:54.608 at the time. Just one second, thank you, and, 04:10:54.620 --> 04:10:57.943 San Jose spend a lot of time trying to reach 04:10:57.955 --> 04:11:01.438 medical baseline customers. Unjustified delays 04:11:01.450 --> 04:11:04.917 in transferring critical PG&E Medical Baseline 04:11:04.929 --> 04:11:08.409 information to cities is unacceptable. We will 04:11:08.421 --> 04:11:11.969 present further comment with a report as filed, 04:11:11.981 --> 04:11:15.392 but thank you very much for this opportunity. 04:11:15.417 --> 04:11:18.372 Thank you very much. Eric 04:11:18.384 --> 04:11:21.545 Pain, and you will be followed by Jessica Tovar. 04:11:21.570 --> 04:11:25.529 Good evening, Commissioners, Madam 04:11:25.541 --> 04:11:29.512 Chair, and to the other Commissioners, thank you 04:11:29.524 --> 04:11:33.570 for calling this emergency meeting today. My name 04:11:33.582 --> 04:11:37.640 is Eric Pain, Executive Director with the Central 04:11:37.652 --> 04:11:41.938 Valley Urban Institute in Fresno, California. I will 04:11:41.950 --> 04:11:45.843 be speaking from a place of Kern County, today, 04:11:45.855 --> 04:11:50.392 as one of the impacted jurisdictions from the emergency 04:11:50.404 --> 04:11:54.140 response plan. Some of our concerns have been 04:11:54.152 --> 04:11:58.194 mentioned, specifically around greater investment 04:11:58.206 --> 04:12:02.421 opportunities for procurement in the Central Valley 04:12:02.433 --> 04:12:06.400 for the vegetation management issues that we are 04:12:06.412 --> 04:12:10.390 experiencing. And also, looking at taking a deep 04:12:10.402 --> 04:12:14.365 reflection around being more, creating a culture 04:12:14.377 --> 04:12:18.353 of diversity and inclusion within management and 04:12:18.365 --> 04:12:22.497 within the board. And I think those executives and 04:12:22.509 --> 04:12:26.734 the board members that were present today that were 04:12:26.746 --> 04:12:30.619 able to hear that and take it as a takeaway, as 04:12:30.631 --> 04:12:34.760 something that is actionable, that can be measured 04:12:34.772 --> 04:12:38.733 in the future. But also looking at the Emergency 04:12:38.745 --> 04:12:42.961 Response Impact Mitigation fund that could possibly 04:12:42.973 --> 04:12:47.092 include the purchase of generators for those local 04:12:47.104 --> 04:12:51.155 municipalities. And we also would concur with the 04:12:51.167 --> 04:12:55.050 Commission as looking further into some type of 04:12:55.062 --> 04:12:58.956 restitution for those ratepayers that have been 04:12:58.968 --> 04:13:02.924 impacted by the series of events that have taken 04:13:02.936 --> 04:13:06.985 place over the last month. We'd also encourage or 04:13:06.997 --> 04:13:11.446 offer, to the executive leadership, the prioritization 04:13:11.458 --> 04:13:15.189 of counties that are like Kern County for the 04:13:15.201 --> 04:13:19.484 expansion of those resource centers. Specifically in 04:13:19.496 --> 04:13:23.549 our rule communities to give them greater access. 04:13:23.561 --> 04:13:27.445 I’d like to thank the Commission for their time 04:13:27.457 --> 04:13:31.515 today and for offering public comment. Thank you. 04:13:31.540 --> 04:13:36.631 Thank you. Jessica? 04:13:36.656 --> 04:13:42.494 Jessica Tovar, Local Clean Energy Alliance. Also, I have 04:13:42.506 --> 04:13:48.355 an invisible illness. So I also depend on electricity to feel healthy and 04:13:48.367 --> 04:13:54.369 not be disabled. And one of the things I want to note is that I waited over 04:13:54.381 --> 04:14:00.079 four hours to make my comments, which I think is absolutely ridiculous. 04:14:00.091 --> 04:14:05.773 You know, last November, we came in here pretty much after the fires to 04:14:05.785 --> 04:14:11.796 pretty much say that enough was enough and that what we wanted to see was a 04:14:11.808 --> 04:14:17.655 public takeover of our electrical system. That we were done with PG&E and 04:14:17.667 --> 04:14:23.446 that we didn't want to see any more any more deaths as a result of their 04:14:23.458 --> 04:14:29.297 negligence. This last January, the CPUC unanimously voted to approve a $6 04:14:29.309 --> 04:14:35.160 billion loan to, for PG&E to move forward with its bankruptcy protection. 04:14:35.172 --> 04:14:41.255 And the excuse was to keep the lights on, and here we are, now, dealing with 04:14:41.267 --> 04:14:46.966 power shut offs. Again at the hands of PG&E. I feel like you're serious 04:14:46.978 --> 04:14:52.503 not taking this seriously and not getting to the root of the problem, 04:14:52.515 --> 04:14:58.132 because if you would, you would actually acknowledge that PG&E is only 04:14:58.144 --> 04:15:03.834 beholden to their shareholders, and that they don't care about how they 04:15:03.846 --> 04:15:09.864 affect people. Literally leaving us in the dark. One of the things that has 04:15:09.876 --> 04:15:16.026 been mentioned today is about microgrids and decentralized energy. Yes, those 04:15:16.038 --> 04:15:21.725 are solutions to the problem, but they should not be through PG&E. They 04:15:21.737 --> 04:15:27.656 should be owned and operated by the people so that it’s accountable to the 04:15:27.668 --> 04:15:33.519 people so that we don't leave our vulnerable communities in the dark when 04:15:33.531 --> 04:15:39.289 they need energy the most. We live in the communities where the dirtiest 04:15:39.301 --> 04:15:45.228 energy is processed. We live in the communities that struggle to make ends 04:15:45.240 --> 04:15:51.320 meet and have to make choices between buying groceries and paying our energy 04:15:51.332 --> 04:15:56.870 bills. This corporation has shown no mercy to any of us, to the point 04:15:56.882 --> 04:16:02.559 where, after murdering 85 people, we have to bear the brunt and pay for 04:16:02.571 --> 04:16:08.339 that and to continue having this discussion like, oh, what are you going 04:16:08.351 --> 04:16:14.350 to do, what's your plan, you know, for the next 10 years? That's not taking 04:16:14.362 --> 04:16:19.977 it seriously. There are people who have to rely on electricity just to 04:16:19.989 --> 04:16:26.144 breathe. Those are the lives that are at stake. And if you don't do something 04:16:26.156 --> 04:16:31.848 about it now, you're never gonna do it. We're gonna be coming back here 04:16:31.860 --> 04:16:37.466 over and over again. How many times do we have to say we need a public 04:16:37.478 --> 04:16:43.334 takeover of our electrical system so that it’s accountable to the people? 04:16:43.346 --> 04:16:49.137 Thank you, Ms Tovar. Next 04:16:49.149 --> 04:16:54.825 will be Walter Park, followed by Mindy Spatt. 04:16:54.837 --> 04:16:58.152 Thank you, Commissioners, for holding 04:16:58.164 --> 04:17:00.927 this meeting in timely. At about 345 today, 04:17:00.939 --> 04:17:04.009 your telecommunications provider said that there 04:17:04.021 --> 04:17:07.292 were about 200 people on your call-in line. I would 04:17:07.304 --> 04:17:10.623 guess that many of them are people with disabilities 04:17:10.635 --> 04:17:13.652 because of course, it's more difficult for many 04:17:13.664 --> 04:17:16.548 people disabilities to come here. Actually, I 04:17:16.560 --> 04:17:19.708 don't know if you're going to take testimony from 04:17:19.720 --> 04:17:22.661 that line. In any case, I want to let you know 04:17:22.673 --> 04:17:25.813 that there's a high interest in what you're doing 04:17:25.825 --> 04:17:29.212 today. I'm not so concerned about 95%, unfortunately, 04:17:29.224 --> 04:17:32.056 of what PG&E talked about today. In terms of 04:17:32.068 --> 04:17:35.388 earlier warning, narrower, more accurate maps and so 04:17:35.400 --> 04:17:38.670 on. What I'm concerned about and what the community 04:17:38.682 --> 04:17:41.568 is concerned about is continuous power, which 04:17:41.580 --> 04:17:44.604 is something that PG&E is not providing. And is 04:17:44.616 --> 04:17:47.555 now saying, well, 8, 10, 12 years, we'll do it 04:17:47.567 --> 04:17:50.959 everywhere, and we'll do it in a lot of places before 04:17:50.971 --> 04:17:54.168 then. During that time period of 10 years, we need 04:17:54.180 --> 04:17:57.200 local power generation, solar power generators, 04:17:57.212 --> 04:18:00.343 whatever. There are some people with disabilities 04:18:00.355 --> 04:18:03.561 who cannot survive without their electrical power, 04:18:03.573 --> 04:18:06.521 and PG&E sending out notice after notice after 04:18:06.533 --> 04:18:09.493 notice that has the word Safety written on the 04:18:09.505 --> 04:18:12.509 top doesn't help. Because they're not providing 04:18:12.521 --> 04:18:15.851 anything that will help people. As you probably read 04:18:15.863 --> 04:18:18.810 in the paper, one person died during this last 04:18:18.822 --> 04:18:21.969 emergency. This person-made emergency. Of chronic 04:18:21.981 --> 04:18:24.925 heart failure when his oxygen stopped. It only 04:18:24.937 --> 04:18:27.955 took 13 minutes for the first responders to get 04:18:27.967 --> 04:18:31.106 there, but that was too long. So that wasn't even 04:18:31.118 --> 04:18:34.269 the worst case. A friend of mine who lives in the 04:18:34.281 --> 04:18:37.343 Berkeley Hills, when her power went off, she has 04:18:37.355 --> 04:18:40.430 cancer. She has medications that have to be kept 04:18:40.442 --> 04:18:43.511 cool. She could move down the Hill and spend the 04:18:43.523 --> 04:18:46.792 night at a friend's house. She was in an urban area 04:18:46.804 --> 04:18:49.870 where she had that support in rural areas, we do 04:18:49.882 --> 04:18:53.023 not have that kind of support. We need continuous 04:18:53.035 --> 04:18:56.295 power. PG&E, wrote a letter to OES on September 27, 04:18:56.307 --> 04:18:59.391 saying that they do not have any plan to provide 04:18:59.403 --> 04:19:02.405 generation, local generators, that is household 04:19:02.417 --> 04:19:05.618 generators because of potential liabilities, their 04:19:05.630 --> 04:19:08.952 potential danger, danger problems with a gas-powered 04:19:08.964 --> 04:19:11.858 generator, for instance, if that were the way 04:19:11.870 --> 04:19:14.937 that was gone. And so I'm interested to hear the 04:19:14.949 --> 04:19:17.965 story that they did provide one for someone who 04:19:17.977 --> 04:19:20.924 needed it. I have to say that given the letter 04:19:20.936 --> 04:19:24.022 of September 27th, I don't think that's, I think 04:19:24.034 --> 04:19:27.223 that's the exception, not the rule. We need to see 04:19:27.235 --> 04:19:30.248 a full out company effort. When you asked about 04:19:30.260 --> 04:19:33.329 who was the person, who's the point person who's 04:19:33.341 --> 04:19:36.422 responsible here, you did not get an answer. You 04:19:36.434 --> 04:19:39.375 were told the buck stops here. Well, sure, the 04:19:39.387 --> 04:19:42.465 buck stops at the top. But if there's not a team 04:19:42.477 --> 04:19:45.550 leader who is in charge of this day to day whose 04:19:45.562 --> 04:19:48.646 primary job is coordinating all of this, I don't 04:19:48.658 --> 04:19:52.038 have a lot of hope for that. I would like to see PG&E 04:19:52.050 --> 04:19:55.190 have a real Disability Advisory Council Committee 04:19:55.202 --> 04:19:58.210 that they group with a task force. And frankly, 04:19:58.222 --> 04:20:01.242 I would like to have the CPUC have a disability 04:20:01.254 --> 04:20:04.134 advisory council that you talked to regularly 04:20:04.146 --> 04:20:07.414 because we have a lot of details to talk about that 04:20:07.426 --> 04:20:10.374 are vital to the way we live our lives. And we 04:20:10.386 --> 04:20:13.409 can't do it three minutes at a time. Thank you. 04:20:13.434 --> 04:20:18.239 Thank you, Mr Park. Mindy Spatt. 04:20:18.239 --> 04:20:22.066 Thank you, Commissioners. Hello again. I’m 04:20:22.078 --> 04:20:25.785 Mindy Spatt with TURN, the Utility Reform Network. It's 04:20:25.797 --> 04:20:29.365 sadly appropriate that the public is going last today 04:20:29.377 --> 04:20:33.090 because the public comes last with PG&E again and again 04:20:33.102 --> 04:20:36.799 and again. And that's been true since 1994 which is the 04:20:36.811 --> 04:20:40.521 first time they were found criminally negligent in tree 04:20:40.533 --> 04:20:44.104 trimming. So it's sort of stunning to hear the latest 04:20:44.116 --> 04:20:47.699 round of top brass talking about this like it's a new 04:20:47.711 --> 04:20:51.341 problem. It's an old problem. And if PG&E wants to get 04:20:51.353 --> 04:20:54.928 intimate with its customers, I have an idea how to do 04:20:54.940 --> 04:20:58.311 it. Pay their claims. That's how you can make your 04:20:58.323 --> 04:21:02.170 customers like you is pay their claims. How can you allow 04:21:02.182 --> 04:21:05.748 this company to put another two point five billion of 04:21:05.760 --> 04:21:09.338 damages onto the rest of the state? This is something 04:21:09.350 --> 04:21:12.989 they've done over and over again. They did it in their 04:21:13.001 --> 04:21:16.851 bankruptcy. They've done it with their wildfire expenses. 04:21:16.863 --> 04:21:20.422 Customers want this Commission to stop approving rate 04:21:20.434 --> 04:21:24.203 hikes and get this company under control. So I'm here to 04:21:24.215 --> 04:21:27.912 ask you, Commissioners, where's your authority here and 04:21:27.924 --> 04:21:31.369 what are you going to do about this? But the planed 04:21:31.381 --> 04:21:34.810 shutoffs were authorized by this Commission. Do you 04:21:34.822 --> 04:21:38.660 expect us customers to pay the costs of that program, the 04:21:38.672 --> 04:21:42.306 cost of prime time ads directing us to a Web site that 04:21:42.318 --> 04:21:46.097 doesn't work, the cost of a customer information service 04:21:46.109 --> 04:21:49.934 that our members are telling us was not reachable at all, 04:21:49.946 --> 04:21:53.518 period, over the phone? Not at all. So we think that, 04:21:53.530 --> 04:21:57.163 of course, shareholders should pay every dime for this 04:21:57.175 --> 04:22:00.952 debacle. Not only the damages the customers experienced, 04:22:00.964 --> 04:22:04.329 but also the costs of the program itself. And this 04:22:04.341 --> 04:22:08.313 Commission should send a much stronger message to PG&E that 04:22:08.325 --> 04:22:12.093 they need to start operating, not only safely, reliably, 04:22:12.105 --> 04:22:15.355 but competently. Because they're not. Thank you. 04:22:15.380 --> 04:22:18.718 Thank you, Mindy. Is 04:22:18.730 --> 04:22:22.406 there anyone else in the audience that would 04:22:22.418 --> 04:22:29.211 like to address on the Commission at this time? Anybody that wants to speak to the 04:22:29.223 --> 04:22:32.728 public comment? Okay, I see none. Is there 04:22:32.740 --> 04:22:36.420 any other comments from the Commissioners at 04:22:36.432 --> 04:22:40.106 this time? Okay, I want to thank you all for 04:22:40.118 --> 04:22:43.558 coming today. I appreciate very much your 04:22:43.570 --> 04:22:50.579 attendance and the time that you took away from your busy lives. I want in particular 04:22:50.591 --> 04:22:57.285 thank the PUC staff that helped us put this emergency meeting together. Elizaveta 04:22:57.297 --> 04:23:01.119 Malashenko, Ed Randolph, Saul Gomez and Rohama 04:23:01.131 --> 04:23:04.639 Mali, for all of their hard work in a very 04:23:04.651 --> 04:23:11.760 expedited manner. Again, thank you all very much for coming. This meeting is adjourned