WEBVTT
00:00:02.857 --> 00:00:06.040
(gavel hammering)
00:00:06.040 --> 00:00:08.800
Good morning,
this meeting of the
00:00:08.800 --> 00:00:11.150
Public Utility Commission
of Texas will come to order
00:00:11.150 --> 00:00:12.710
to consider matters that
have been duly posted
00:00:12.710 --> 00:00:16.480
with the secretary of state
of Texas for July 26th, 2021.
00:00:16.480 --> 00:00:19.250
For the record my name is
Peter lake and with me today are
00:00:19.250 --> 00:00:21.333
Will McAdams and Lori Cobos.
00:00:24.210 --> 00:00:29.210
This is another in our continuing
series of work sessions to
00:00:29.580 --> 00:00:32.810
learn about and discuss key topics
00:00:32.810 --> 00:00:35.720
related to the Commission and ERCOT.
00:00:35.720 --> 00:00:36.553
As a reminder,
00:00:36.553 --> 00:00:41.210
today's discussion is
about project number 52268.
00:00:41.210 --> 00:00:44.470
Of course we can't have
there are more people
00:00:44.470 --> 00:00:46.820
with good insights and
opinions on this project
00:00:46.820 --> 00:00:50.960
than we can fit into the
room or in a single day.
00:00:50.960 --> 00:00:55.960
So we'll always ask folks to
file comments or information
00:00:57.070 --> 00:00:59.330
on these particular
projects as we move through
00:00:59.330 --> 00:01:01.260
these work sessions,
00:01:01.260 --> 00:01:03.663
even if they don't have a
chance to be in the room.
00:01:04.920 --> 00:01:06.220
Let's move through our agenda.
00:01:06.220 --> 00:01:09.400
I don't have anything for item
one, two or three do you all?
00:01:09.400 --> 00:01:10.266
No sir.
00:01:10.266 --> 00:01:11.330
No.
00:01:11.330 --> 00:01:14.003
Takes us to item number four,
00:01:16.940 --> 00:01:20.070
on discussion and possible action
00:01:20.070 --> 00:01:23.170
on electric liability,
et cetera, et cetera.
00:01:23.170 --> 00:01:26.510
Our first topic is DSP
to RTO relationship
00:01:26.510 --> 00:01:30.510
and we've got Richard Ross with AEP,
00:01:30.510 --> 00:01:32.100
introduce yourself and take us through
00:01:32.100 --> 00:01:33.250
your presentation please.
00:01:33.250 --> 00:01:34.510
Yes, sir.
00:01:34.510 --> 00:01:36.010
I need to do anything to this.
00:01:39.687 --> 00:01:40.920
Okay.
00:01:40.920 --> 00:01:42.470
I'm Richard Ross with
00:01:42.470 --> 00:01:44.320
American Electric
Power service corporation.
00:01:44.320 --> 00:01:46.263
I'm the director of RTO policy.
00:01:47.445 --> 00:01:49.183
I'm here today to talk to you about,
00:01:51.724 --> 00:01:55.130
the RTO and TSO, DSO
communication exchange.
00:01:58.770 --> 00:02:02.720
I'm here, David Ball, my
manager of transmission operations
00:02:02.720 --> 00:02:05.220
would not be able to
be here today with me.
00:02:05.220 --> 00:02:07.570
So I'll do my best to answer
any questions that you have
00:02:07.570 --> 00:02:10.153
and take you through the
information we have for you.
00:02:12.620 --> 00:02:15.440
What I wanna do is give
you a highest level overview of
00:02:15.440 --> 00:02:19.100
the various roles and
responsibilities between ERCOT
00:02:19.100 --> 00:02:22.630
at my transmission,
operations and distribution folks,
00:02:22.630 --> 00:02:25.790
and give you some insight
in terms of the comparison
00:02:25.790 --> 00:02:27.010
to the Southwest Power Pool.
00:02:27.010 --> 00:02:28.100
To the extent you're interested,
00:02:28.100 --> 00:02:29.260
I'll touch on that very lightly.
00:02:29.260 --> 00:02:31.020
You can certainly ask
any questions you want
00:02:31.020 --> 00:02:33.080
and I'll try to respond to those
00:02:33.080 --> 00:02:35.110
and then some additional comparisons
00:02:35.110 --> 00:02:36.840
at the very end of my presentation.
00:02:36.840 --> 00:02:41.840
So next, the first element
that I wanna clarify for you
00:02:42.440 --> 00:02:43.790
is the balancing authority.
00:02:45.210 --> 00:02:50.210
The balancing authority is
that role that ERCOT serves.
00:02:50.530 --> 00:02:52.610
The ERCOT staff serves and similarly
00:02:52.610 --> 00:02:53.830
in the Southwest Power Pool.
00:02:53.830 --> 00:02:56.260
The Southwest Power Pool
serves as the balancing authority
00:02:56.260 --> 00:02:58.470
for that particular region.
00:02:58.470 --> 00:03:02.810
And under normal operations
we're focusing on the commitment
00:03:02.810 --> 00:03:05.620
of generation to match the
demand that we have on the system
00:03:05.620 --> 00:03:08.900
and there's an adequacy
of generation so that we are
00:03:08.900 --> 00:03:11.760
matching generation with demand.
00:03:11.760 --> 00:03:12.903
When we experience a situation
00:03:12.903 --> 00:03:14.450
like we experienced in February
00:03:14.450 --> 00:03:19.130
where we have a generation
deficiency that responsibility
00:03:19.130 --> 00:03:20.950
or that action reverses.
00:03:20.950 --> 00:03:24.330
So that we are doing everything
we can to match the load
00:03:24.330 --> 00:03:27.100
with the generation
that we have available
00:03:27.100 --> 00:03:30.100
and that is the balancing
authority in ERCOT responsibility.
00:03:31.188 --> 00:03:35.310
The second area that is
the reliability coordinator
00:03:36.320 --> 00:03:39.570
and the reliability
coordinator is that entity
00:03:39.570 --> 00:03:42.622
that is responsible for
overseeing the reliability
00:03:42.622 --> 00:03:46.053
and stability of the
overall bulk electric system.
00:03:46.970 --> 00:03:51.060
ERCOT also serves in
that role as the RC in Texas
00:03:51.060 --> 00:03:54.060
the Southwest Power Pool
serves in that role as the RC
00:03:54.060 --> 00:03:55.510
for the Southwest Power Pool.
00:03:56.360 --> 00:04:00.930
But they have available to
them all of the information
00:04:00.930 --> 00:04:02.770
from all transmission operators
00:04:02.770 --> 00:04:04.660
from the balancing authority functions
00:04:04.660 --> 00:04:09.020
from the generation operators
across the entire region
00:04:09.020 --> 00:04:11.060
and so they with the tools,
00:04:11.060 --> 00:04:13.470
the reliability tools that
they have available to them
00:04:13.470 --> 00:04:18.470
have the best insight available
to them to determine risks
00:04:18.920 --> 00:04:20.440
and actions that need to be taken
00:04:20.440 --> 00:04:22.900
from a reliability standpoint
00:04:22.900 --> 00:04:26.740
to maintain the security
of the bulk electric system.
00:04:26.740 --> 00:04:29.580
They have information that
I as a transmission owner
00:04:29.580 --> 00:04:31.210
is gonna be beyond my borders
00:04:31.210 --> 00:04:34.900
and may that I can't
have the visibility into
00:04:34.900 --> 00:04:37.080
and likewise the other
transmission operators
00:04:37.080 --> 00:04:38.760
and so they bring us all together
00:04:38.760 --> 00:04:41.340
although we work very tightly together
00:04:41.340 --> 00:04:42.403
in our interaction.
00:04:46.860 --> 00:04:48.713
Next the transmission operator,
00:04:50.670 --> 00:04:54.550
is the entity that's responsible
for that local transmission
00:04:54.550 --> 00:04:57.590
so I'm overseeing and
monitoring and responsible
00:04:57.590 --> 00:05:00.760
for the switching
activities associated with
00:05:00.760 --> 00:05:03.490
the AEP transmission facilities
00:05:03.490 --> 00:05:08.040
and in a deficiency
situation like we experience
00:05:08.040 --> 00:05:10.620
the operator is
receiving in the instruction
00:05:10.620 --> 00:05:14.340
from the reliability
coordinator to curtail load
00:05:14.340 --> 00:05:15.603
and how much to curtail.
00:05:16.790 --> 00:05:18.630
The allocations based on the percentage
00:05:18.630 --> 00:05:22.980
of the load at the Summer
peak during the February event
00:05:25.210 --> 00:05:29.380
AEP Texas Allocation was
8.7% of that responsibility
00:05:29.380 --> 00:05:32.270
and the reliability coordinator at ERCOT
00:05:32.270 --> 00:05:34.790
would communicate our
curtailment responsibility
00:05:34.790 --> 00:05:38.500
by telling us the number of
megawatts we need to curtail
00:05:38.500 --> 00:05:39.993
as a transmission operator.
00:05:41.520 --> 00:05:46.500
We then will relay then
that instruction down to
00:05:46.500 --> 00:05:51.500
the appropriate DDC centers
to effectuate that curtailment.
00:05:55.720 --> 00:05:57.890
When they communicate that to us
00:05:59.078 --> 00:06:01.710
it will come in via voice communication
00:06:01.710 --> 00:06:06.670
so that there is clarity on
exactly what we need to curtail
00:06:06.670 --> 00:06:08.920
and then we will turn either through
00:06:08.920 --> 00:06:13.100
SCADA if necessary from
a transmission standpoint
00:06:13.100 --> 00:06:15.230
to make that interruption
00:06:15.230 --> 00:06:17.870
but most likely we will turn around
00:06:17.870 --> 00:06:20.700
and give an operating order
to our distribution centers
00:06:20.700 --> 00:06:24.120
and then they implement
their load shedding plan
00:06:24.120 --> 00:06:26.160
where they will go through the plans
00:06:26.160 --> 00:06:29.200
that they have developed
shedding different blocks of load
00:06:29.200 --> 00:06:33.580
under ideal circumstances
going through a rotation
00:06:33.580 --> 00:06:36.750
we simply got into a
situation where we went further
00:06:36.750 --> 00:06:38.930
and rotation became very challenging
00:06:38.930 --> 00:06:40.900
but ideally they would then implement
00:06:40.900 --> 00:06:42.580
and begin the rotation activities
00:06:42.580 --> 00:06:44.730
that they have
rehearsed in their training.
00:06:45.850 --> 00:06:49.330
If the distribution center
is unable to comply
00:06:49.330 --> 00:06:53.550
unable to shed the necessary
load in a timely fashion
00:06:53.550 --> 00:06:56.250
from a transmission standpoint
we can also take action
00:06:56.250 --> 00:07:01.250
and would take action to make
sure things get off the system
00:07:01.800 --> 00:07:03.920
as quickly as necessary.
00:07:03.920 --> 00:07:07.240
And this step is virtually identical
00:07:07.240 --> 00:07:08.660
in the Southwest Power Pool
00:07:08.660 --> 00:07:11.470
where the Southeast Power Pool as the RC
00:07:11.470 --> 00:07:14.510
will communicate to my
transmission operations staff
00:07:14.510 --> 00:07:16.930
they will then likewise
relay that signal back
00:07:16.930 --> 00:07:21.600
to our distribution folks to
effectuate the curtailments.
00:07:21.600 --> 00:07:23.523
So very similar communications.
00:07:27.320 --> 00:07:32.320
The distribution provider
this feature role is where
00:07:32.780 --> 00:07:37.633
it takes on the activities
between the transmission system
00:07:39.320 --> 00:07:42.710
and the customer so all of
the distribution wires activities
00:07:43.820 --> 00:07:48.490
that are in place or
facilities that are in place
00:07:48.490 --> 00:07:51.233
between the transmission
system and the customer.
00:07:52.290 --> 00:07:54.860
They are the folks that
are in the best position
00:07:54.860 --> 00:07:57.130
to determine what load needs to be shed
00:07:57.130 --> 00:07:58.590
what the condition of the load is
00:07:58.590 --> 00:08:00.410
and work directly with
the customers to the
00:08:00.410 --> 00:08:04.820
extent necessary to
implement those curtailments
00:08:04.820 --> 00:08:07.050
and achieve the necessary curtailment.
00:08:07.050 --> 00:08:10.640
As I said earlier in the
event that they are unable to
00:08:10.640 --> 00:08:14.960
move quickly enough
transmission actions can be taken to
00:08:14.960 --> 00:08:17.960
at the transmission level to
interrupt distribution circuits
00:08:18.800 --> 00:08:21.113
or I'm sorry the
distribution substations.
00:08:23.280 --> 00:08:26.370
I would say that the actions
the distribution system
00:08:26.370 --> 00:08:31.370
can provide are far more
surgical than the transmission,
00:08:32.040 --> 00:08:34.240
transmission if it comes
to that is gonna end up
00:08:34.240 --> 00:08:35.833
taking out multiple circuits.
00:08:40.060 --> 00:08:45.060
Training all of these
activities fall under,
00:08:45.810 --> 00:08:49.310
well many of these activities
fall under the NERC criteria
00:08:49.310 --> 00:08:50.600
and training requirements
00:08:50.600 --> 00:08:53.670
and we go through
training each and every year
00:08:53.670 --> 00:08:55.283
to refresh these activities.
00:08:56.570 --> 00:08:59.730
Prior to someone a transmission
operator being placed
00:08:59.730 --> 00:09:03.020
in this role where they are
responsible for these functions
00:09:03.020 --> 00:09:07.180
they're gonna go through
training at E-training
00:09:07.180 --> 00:09:11.900
as well as simulation training
00:09:11.900 --> 00:09:14.030
and over and above that each year
00:09:14.030 --> 00:09:17.850
the operators are going
through training on both
00:09:17.850 --> 00:09:21.200
curtailment activities as
well as restoration drills.
00:09:21.200 --> 00:09:23.850
So we do drill on these these things
00:09:23.850 --> 00:09:25.500
so that they're
familiar with the actions
00:09:25.500 --> 00:09:26.550
they need to perform.
00:09:30.550 --> 00:09:33.433
Some positives and improvement areas.
00:09:35.340 --> 00:09:37.270
The pre-event planning activities before
00:09:37.270 --> 00:09:40.570
we got into the curtailments
was certainly good.
00:09:40.570 --> 00:09:44.420
The operating
instructions and restoration
00:09:44.420 --> 00:09:49.170
we executed in a timely manner
and avoided a system collapse
00:09:49.170 --> 00:09:51.706
but we could use we,
00:09:51.706 --> 00:09:55.500
we see some additional
equipment in the field
00:09:55.500 --> 00:09:57.810
for devices tied to the SCADA tools
00:09:57.810 --> 00:10:00.330
and more smart grid activities.
00:10:00.330 --> 00:10:03.000
There's also a need there may be between
00:10:03.000 --> 00:10:06.140
the Southwest Power Pool and
ERCOT we've been discussing
00:10:06.140 --> 00:10:08.960
within the working groups in
ERCOT some communication tools
00:10:08.960 --> 00:10:11.780
that SPP has that we may want
00:10:11.780 --> 00:10:15.090
to pursue implementing in ERCOT.
00:10:15.090 --> 00:10:16.470
They've been talking
about that for a little while
00:10:16.470 --> 00:10:19.430
but ERCOT is seeing that as a heightened
00:10:19.430 --> 00:10:20.533
area of improvement.
00:10:24.640 --> 00:10:27.990
ERCOT versus SPP now during this event
00:10:27.990 --> 00:10:32.720
we both experienced a capacity shortage
00:10:32.720 --> 00:10:35.790
so they were very much the
same the major difference was
00:10:35.790 --> 00:10:38.673
the extent the depth of
that curtailment situation.
00:10:39.650 --> 00:10:42.970
SPP had more flexibility in that we had
00:10:42.970 --> 00:10:46.700
SPP had available
imports from outside parties
00:10:46.700 --> 00:10:50.774
to the tune of 6000 megawatts
at times that curtailed
00:10:50.774 --> 00:10:53.780
as we got into further
into the emergency
00:10:53.780 --> 00:10:56.440
and as it lowered SPP
had to curtail service
00:10:56.440 --> 00:10:58.403
to interrupt customer service as well.
00:10:59.410 --> 00:11:03.077
But much more availability
of import capability
00:11:03.077 --> 00:11:07.580
and that compares to ERCOT's
roughly 12 to 1300 megawatts
00:11:07.580 --> 00:11:11.690
of import capability not
counting the blocking of resources
00:11:11.690 --> 00:11:13.023
or blocking of loads.
00:11:14.960 --> 00:11:19.020
As I said earlier ERCOT and
spp similarities is in both the
00:11:19.020 --> 00:11:22.060
reliability coordination and
balancing authority functions
00:11:23.180 --> 00:11:26.953
a small difference between
the two in the sense that the
00:11:27.790 --> 00:11:30.520
transmission operator
functions are shared
00:11:30.520 --> 00:11:32.720
between ERCOT and
the transmission operators
00:11:32.720 --> 00:11:35.830
and so there is some
delegation activity there
00:11:35.830 --> 00:11:39.820
whereas SPP is not
registered as a TOP at all.
00:11:39.820 --> 00:11:41.620
Not a major difference in this situation
00:11:41.620 --> 00:11:44.170
but it is a difference of these
00:11:45.299 --> 00:11:48.423
in the construction of
these responsibilities.
00:11:49.760 --> 00:11:52.883
The load shed activities
were virtually identical.
00:11:55.950 --> 00:12:00.030
SPP the allocation was 16.8%,
00:12:00.030 --> 00:12:02.100
I've indicated it's the highest
00:12:02.100 --> 00:12:04.070
it's actually the second highest
00:12:04.070 --> 00:12:06.550
when EnerGs companies
are taken into account
00:12:07.610 --> 00:12:10.510
and in ERCOT we're the third highest.
00:12:10.510 --> 00:12:14.610
Our peak load shed
was virtually four times
00:12:14.610 --> 00:12:17.150
in ERCOT what it was in SPP
00:12:17.150 --> 00:12:19.760
and so you get an idea of
the the scale of the difference
00:12:19.760 --> 00:12:23.110
from that figure of the differences
00:12:24.098 --> 00:12:26.040
in the scope of the curtailments.
00:12:28.110 --> 00:12:31.180
And with that that's all that
I have for you at this point
00:12:31.180 --> 00:12:32.380
are there any questions?
00:12:33.380 --> 00:12:34.630
I'm sure there will be.
00:12:35.650 --> 00:12:37.303
So yeah thanks Richard,
00:12:38.660 --> 00:12:42.730
question on the relationship
between ERCOT and SPP
00:12:42.730 --> 00:12:47.430
AEP's uniquely positioned
and then you manage a DC tie.
00:12:47.430 --> 00:12:48.530
Yes sir.
00:12:48.530 --> 00:12:51.080
Okay so let's
talk about DC ties
00:12:51.080 --> 00:12:56.080
and is there a means
that you could elaborate on
00:12:57.680 --> 00:13:01.300
for possibly ERCOT to consider
00:13:02.910 --> 00:13:06.430
especially in that last resort scenario
00:13:06.430 --> 00:13:11.430
where we have a obligation
for massive shedding of load
00:13:13.130 --> 00:13:17.430
if we have foundational
generator failure resource failure
00:13:17.430 --> 00:13:20.830
in the system again is there a way to
00:13:22.540 --> 00:13:27.130
on a transmission basis
further integrate ERCOT
00:13:27.130 --> 00:13:31.210
into other systems without necessarily
00:13:32.300 --> 00:13:35.700
adding to a commercial
application you see what I'm saying
00:13:35.700 --> 00:13:40.700
I mean augment possibly our
the security of the ERCOT grid
00:13:40.800 --> 00:13:45.700
outside of opening it up
to a larger DC footprint
00:13:45.700 --> 00:13:47.143
than we otherwise would,
00:13:48.526 --> 00:13:49.750
that may be a convoluted question
00:13:49.750 --> 00:13:51.140
I am nibbling around the edges
00:13:51.140 --> 00:13:53.183
of something very dangerous here so.
00:13:54.365 --> 00:13:57.583
And which puts me
also in dangerous territory.
00:13:57.583 --> 00:13:59.630
(members laughing)
00:13:59.630 --> 00:14:03.570
But I'm sure my attorney
will yell at me if I get out a lot.
00:14:03.570 --> 00:14:05.197
Mine can't reach me so.
00:14:05.197 --> 00:14:07.200
(members laughing)
00:14:07.200 --> 00:14:08.843
I think there are
certainly some things
00:14:08.843 --> 00:14:13.440
that we can investigate
around the DC ties that might
00:14:13.440 --> 00:14:18.210
in a extreme scenario if
for say we had gotten into
00:14:18.210 --> 00:14:22.240
a black start situation I'll
go even the most extreme
00:14:22.240 --> 00:14:25.680
where we could provide
additional assistance
00:14:25.680 --> 00:14:28.450
from the Southwest Power Pool into ERCOT
00:14:28.450 --> 00:14:30.890
without exposing I mean
there obviously would be
00:14:30.890 --> 00:14:33.590
some commercial activity settlements
00:14:33.590 --> 00:14:36.670
that would have to go on
as those things go happen
00:14:37.808 --> 00:14:41.540
but there's certainly ways to
provide additional assistance
00:14:41.540 --> 00:14:43.950
even beyond the DC ties
00:14:45.010 --> 00:14:47.103
in that kind of restoration situation.
00:14:48.250 --> 00:14:51.620
I can't magically make the ties bigger
00:14:51.620 --> 00:14:55.540
in the throes of the event
while it's still going on
00:14:55.540 --> 00:14:58.420
but we can do everything we
can to make them available,
00:14:58.420 --> 00:15:02.070
make power available from the
from the Southwest Power Pool
00:15:02.070 --> 00:15:05.033
and in that most extreme situation,
00:15:06.550 --> 00:15:08.540
provide assistance for restoration
00:15:08.540 --> 00:15:11.910
there are some things that
we've been discussing internally
00:15:11.910 --> 00:15:15.320
that we might consider and
might approach at some time later
00:15:15.320 --> 00:15:18.020
but we've got to be
mindful of the desire to
00:15:19.280 --> 00:15:21.610
make sure we take
all the steps necessary
00:15:21.610 --> 00:15:24.420
before we move forward
with anything like that.
00:15:24.420 --> 00:15:27.354
So I hope I'm not being too vague.
00:15:27.354 --> 00:15:30.030
No that's where I'm
headed I'm trying to establish
00:15:30.030 --> 00:15:31.800
for market participants that
00:15:32.660 --> 00:15:35.410
yes all options are on the
table but also maintenance
00:15:35.410 --> 00:15:36.790
of the integrity of ERCOT
00:15:36.790 --> 00:15:38.940
in terms of the commercial
aspects of ERCOT
00:15:40.060 --> 00:15:44.270
that we do, that we are self-contained
00:15:44.270 --> 00:15:45.540
we are still Islanded
00:15:45.540 --> 00:15:50.540
we still are captains of our
own destiny in that respect
00:15:50.600 --> 00:15:54.780
but that there are means
available to ensure reliability
00:15:55.710 --> 00:15:58.660
and possibly gain
assistance from other grids
00:15:58.660 --> 00:16:01.960
at the same time because
who knows what the future holds
00:16:01.960 --> 00:16:03.470
in terms of natural disasters
00:16:03.470 --> 00:16:06.190
or any type of recovery
efforts that may be warranted.
00:16:06.190 --> 00:16:09.440
Absolutely I mean
we've threaded that needle
00:16:09.440 --> 00:16:12.140
to some degree or to
a great degree already
00:16:12.140 --> 00:16:15.450
with the block load transfer functions
00:16:15.450 --> 00:16:17.110
we have in ERCOT today
00:16:17.110 --> 00:16:20.890
where you end up with a situation where
00:16:20.890 --> 00:16:23.530
load is either already
gone because it's out
00:16:23.530 --> 00:16:24.800
because of a contingency
00:16:24.800 --> 00:16:27.710
or we're in that emergency situation
00:16:27.710 --> 00:16:29.433
it's in the dark at that stage,
00:16:30.710 --> 00:16:32.600
having it served or having it
00:16:32.600 --> 00:16:35.070
us getting emergency assistance
00:16:35.070 --> 00:16:38.520
in a way that doesn't
integrate ERCOT into SPP
00:16:38.520 --> 00:16:40.460
doesn't hurt the
commercial system at all
00:16:40.460 --> 00:16:44.610
because it's either
lights out or light served
00:16:45.560 --> 00:16:47.670
in another way so.
00:16:47.670 --> 00:16:49.850
If I could add or ask,
00:16:49.850 --> 00:16:53.570
how many ties do we have
right now five, four or five?
00:16:53.570 --> 00:16:54.460
Four or five.
00:16:54.460 --> 00:16:57.272
Okay so it's about
1200 megawatts.
00:16:57.272 --> 00:16:58.105
Yes ma'am.
00:16:58.105 --> 00:17:00.450
Worth of megawatts that
we can move back and forth.
00:17:01.400 --> 00:17:05.370
To your knowledge are
the are all of these DC ties
00:17:05.370 --> 00:17:09.150
currently allowed for
commercial transactions
00:17:09.150 --> 00:17:11.011
right back and forth between okay so.
00:17:11.011 --> 00:17:12.969
Yes if understanding yes ma'am
00:17:12.969 --> 00:17:15.240
so certainly the ones AEP yes.
00:17:15.240 --> 00:17:17.420
Okay, so certainly one thing
00:17:17.420 --> 00:17:20.570
we don't want to lose
sight of the fact is that
00:17:20.570 --> 00:17:25.030
these DC ties while we do
need them for reliability at times
00:17:25.030 --> 00:17:29.570
and that's also dependent
on whether our neighboring
00:17:29.570 --> 00:17:32.770
ISO or TOs in Mexico are
not in emergency conditions
00:17:32.770 --> 00:17:34.490
because if they are
they will cut them off
00:17:34.490 --> 00:17:36.120
and we won't be able to use them.
00:17:36.120 --> 00:17:38.690
But the DC ties also provide a means
00:17:38.690 --> 00:17:41.520
for commercial transactions
that will provide generators
00:17:41.520 --> 00:17:44.890
an opportunity when we're
not in reliability conditions
00:17:44.890 --> 00:17:48.000
to access another market
00:17:48.921 --> 00:17:52.510
and so it's also from
an economic standpoint
00:17:54.597 --> 00:17:58.010
a good model to have but I guess
00:17:59.410 --> 00:18:04.410
certainly with an eye towards
preserving our jurisdiction.
00:18:05.170 --> 00:18:06.010
Yes.
00:18:06.010 --> 00:18:09.840
But I think what you're
alluding to is FERC
00:18:09.840 --> 00:18:12.550
we already have an
established process for DC ties
00:18:12.550 --> 00:18:15.610
with DOE waivers and FERC approval
00:18:15.610 --> 00:18:17.780
and although we've kind
of gone through a dance
00:18:17.780 --> 00:18:19.750
in the recent few years about
00:18:19.750 --> 00:18:21.800
kind of looking into
that a little bit deeper
00:18:21.800 --> 00:18:24.270
as a result of some discussions
00:18:24.270 --> 00:18:27.270
that may be at the Commission
like maybe two three years ago
00:18:27.270 --> 00:18:29.130
I think that model is still in place
00:18:29.130 --> 00:18:32.228
and something that if we
wanted to move forward on
00:18:32.228 --> 00:18:34.400
there's an established process
00:18:34.400 --> 00:18:36.880
that would not disturb
FERC jurisdiction.
00:18:36.880 --> 00:18:37.713
Certainly.
00:18:42.090 --> 00:18:45.610
You mentioned
that if the load shed
00:18:45.610 --> 00:18:47.567
doesn't happen quickly
enough at the distribution level
00:18:47.567 --> 00:18:49.290
the transmission level can step in
00:18:49.290 --> 00:18:52.897
I'll be on a less surgical base
00:18:52.897 --> 00:18:56.403
or using a broader brush if
you have a less surgical basis.
00:18:57.410 --> 00:19:01.022
What time frame does that happen?
00:19:01.022 --> 00:19:03.302
I mean we would see
that if we're not able to
00:19:03.302 --> 00:19:06.820
and Jeff you may want
to supplement if I get this,
00:19:06.820 --> 00:19:11.820
if I don't go quick accurately
but if we have 30 minutes
00:19:13.300 --> 00:19:14.490
to get the curtailment done
00:19:14.490 --> 00:19:16.210
and we see that that's not coming off
00:19:16.210 --> 00:19:20.370
we're gonna take that
action if we get to the point
00:19:20.370 --> 00:19:22.880
where we see the distribution centers
00:19:22.880 --> 00:19:25.450
are not gonna be able
to achieve the instruction
00:19:25.450 --> 00:19:28.140
in the time frame required
by ERCOT it's not gonna,
00:19:28.140 --> 00:19:30.073
we're not gonna wait to the last minute.
00:19:31.100 --> 00:19:33.230
Is 30 minutes of
standard time frame.
00:19:33.230 --> 00:19:36.220
I think that's what we've
been operating under yes sir.
00:19:36.220 --> 00:19:37.270
Okay so you'll get.
00:19:38.400 --> 00:19:40.480
We're gonna
achieve the directive.
00:19:40.480 --> 00:19:43.180
Right but you when you
get a directive for load shed
00:19:43.180 --> 00:19:46.730
you've got 30 minutes to
implement generally speaking.
00:19:46.730 --> 00:19:50.530
Okay, you mentioned in your slide
00:19:51.790 --> 00:19:54.170
about positives in
areas for improvements
00:19:54.170 --> 00:19:56.903
more field devices tied to
distribution SCADA tools.
00:19:58.430 --> 00:20:00.393
What does that look like in practice?
00:20:02.250 --> 00:20:04.910
Why don't you come on up
Jeff you can help me more with it
00:20:07.560 --> 00:20:09.440
and introduce yourself.
00:20:09.440 --> 00:20:11.730
Good morning I'm Jeff
Stracener with AEP Texas
00:20:11.730 --> 00:20:14.540
I'm vice president of the
distribution organization
00:20:14.540 --> 00:20:17.230
there so I'll try to help
out with that a little bit
00:20:17.230 --> 00:20:20.750
so one of the things we're looking at
00:20:20.750 --> 00:20:23.150
that hasn't come up yet
but we'll come up with a
00:20:23.150 --> 00:20:26.970
upcoming presenter is
the addition of natural gas
00:20:26.970 --> 00:20:30.470
critical infrastructure and so
how do you work around that
00:20:30.470 --> 00:20:32.790
and so that's one of the issues around
00:20:32.790 --> 00:20:37.460
more smart grid infrastructure
if you've got a natural gas
00:20:37.460 --> 00:20:40.170
customer that's on the middle of a line
00:20:40.170 --> 00:20:41.980
right now you can't open up that breaker
00:20:41.980 --> 00:20:43.280
and take that whole line out 'cause
00:20:43.280 --> 00:20:45.310
you'll take that one customer out
00:20:45.310 --> 00:20:48.860
but maybe you can put
a sectionalizing device
00:20:48.860 --> 00:20:50.830
just past that customer
00:20:50.830 --> 00:20:53.980
and operate it from another
system outside of the system
00:20:53.980 --> 00:20:57.490
we're using to operate our breakers
00:20:57.490 --> 00:21:00.290
and then that creates the issue
00:21:00.290 --> 00:21:03.250
okay I've got to keep track
of that load that I just dropped
00:21:03.250 --> 00:21:04.520
out of a second system
00:21:04.520 --> 00:21:09.520
and make sure I respond back
our TOP and to ERCOT correctly
00:21:09.960 --> 00:21:11.290
so that's one of the things,
00:21:11.290 --> 00:21:13.880
are primarily the things
that we're talking about there
00:21:13.880 --> 00:21:16.960
we do have a small number of substations
00:21:16.960 --> 00:21:21.660
that do not have SCADA
on them out of the 1500 or so
00:21:21.660 --> 00:21:24.250
circuits that we have we
have a little less than 200
00:21:24.250 --> 00:21:26.700
that do not have remote control to them
00:21:26.700 --> 00:21:30.000
they're in mainly in rural West Texas,
00:21:30.000 --> 00:21:32.720
not a lot of good communications
out there much less
00:21:32.720 --> 00:21:34.520
remote control of them
00:21:34.520 --> 00:21:39.520
and even though that's less
than 20% of our total circuits
00:21:40.010 --> 00:21:42.330
it's only about 6% of our total load
00:21:42.330 --> 00:21:44.200
that's controlled by that so
00:21:45.430 --> 00:21:48.750
there is certainly an
opportunity to extend that
00:21:48.750 --> 00:21:51.150
through those type of substations
00:21:51.150 --> 00:21:54.690
and get that added SCADA
out there on the distribution side
00:21:54.690 --> 00:21:58.550
but it is a little bit of a
diminishing return for that
00:21:58.550 --> 00:22:01.673
small incremental load that
you'd be able to add to the mix.
00:22:03.128 --> 00:22:07.680
And on that topic AEP by
virtue of your service territory
00:22:07.680 --> 00:22:08.943
let's talk oil field.
00:22:10.410 --> 00:22:12.990
It's a lot of load not a lot of people
00:22:15.350 --> 00:22:18.730
in terms of this
prioritization conversation
00:22:18.730 --> 00:22:19.780
that's gonna come up.
00:22:22.000 --> 00:22:27.000
It'll be important in
terms of knowing where
00:22:27.420 --> 00:22:30.660
critically designated
areas are for your system
00:22:31.604 --> 00:22:33.750
and then I guess future enhancements
00:22:33.750 --> 00:22:38.150
in terms of how you
can maintain the integrity
00:22:38.150 --> 00:22:43.150
of those areas while
focusing your load shed efforts
00:22:44.400 --> 00:22:47.790
in other areas meaning
we don't need to prioritize
00:22:47.790 --> 00:22:51.430
the entire field necessarily
but we will need to prioritize
00:22:51.430 --> 00:22:56.070
enough resource to keep ERCOT viable
00:22:56.070 --> 00:23:01.070
in terms of a management
condition during a scarcity event.
00:23:01.220 --> 00:23:06.220
So I guess what I'm laying
out there is that we need to
00:23:08.660 --> 00:23:10.820
keep that in mind in
terms of your position
00:23:10.820 --> 00:23:13.680
and the co-ops position
matter of fact how do you
00:23:13.680 --> 00:23:16.050
communicate with the co-ops
00:23:16.050 --> 00:23:18.560
in terms of the Eagle
Ford Shale for instance
00:23:19.970 --> 00:23:22.070
when managing through
these type of events
00:23:22.070 --> 00:23:24.240
how did you communicate
with them during Yuri
00:23:24.240 --> 00:23:26.690
I mean everybody basically
got their big tranches
00:23:27.822 --> 00:23:31.110
of the you know allowable
load that they had to shed
00:23:31.110 --> 00:23:32.883
but mechanically how did that work?
00:23:34.020 --> 00:23:35.710
Everybody just did it over 30 minutes.
00:23:35.710 --> 00:23:37.120
And I want you to take that.
00:23:37.120 --> 00:23:37.953
Yeah.
00:23:37.953 --> 00:23:40.413
So at least you
take that spirit.
00:23:41.264 --> 00:23:43.740
Yes so for the most part
00:23:44.610 --> 00:23:46.810
we did not work directly with the co-ops
00:23:46.810 --> 00:23:49.230
we only worked with the co-ops in cases
00:23:49.230 --> 00:23:50.879
where they have metering points
00:23:50.879 --> 00:23:53.570
tied to our distribution system.
00:23:53.570 --> 00:23:56.730
So if they're, normally
they work through
00:23:56.730 --> 00:23:58.230
their transmission provider
00:23:58.230 --> 00:24:00.300
whether it's south Texas electric co-op
00:24:00.300 --> 00:24:02.350
or Golden spread or whatever they,
00:24:02.350 --> 00:24:05.663
they get their load shared
direction from ERCOT
00:24:05.663 --> 00:24:07.490
and then communicate with those co-ops.
00:24:07.490 --> 00:24:11.320
So from an AEP Texas
perspective the only co-ops
00:24:11.320 --> 00:24:14.870
we dealt with during this were
ones that had a takeout point
00:24:14.870 --> 00:24:16.543
on our distribution system.
00:24:20.010 --> 00:24:23.930
I have a specific question
that kind of goes along with
00:24:23.930 --> 00:24:26.240
Mr. McAdams questions,
00:24:26.240 --> 00:24:30.130
how many natural gas
facilities do you currently have
00:24:30.130 --> 00:24:33.650
registered as critical loads
on your system right now?
00:24:33.650 --> 00:24:35.343
Today we have 71,
00:24:36.540 --> 00:24:38.913
in comparison we had
11 back in February.
00:24:40.260 --> 00:24:42.309
So that's 71 what
is that is that all
00:24:42.309 --> 00:24:43.901
the drilling location is at?
00:24:43.901 --> 00:24:47.068
Is at 171 we've
gone from 11 to 171.
00:24:48.849 --> 00:24:49.840
Right.
00:24:49.840 --> 00:24:52.138
Of those 171 do
you have a sense of
00:24:52.138 --> 00:24:55.650
what are drilling locations versus
00:24:55.650 --> 00:24:57.684
compressor station pump stations
00:24:57.684 --> 00:24:58.517
and what those-
No sir
00:24:58.517 --> 00:25:00.750
and that's where we
really need to fine-tune that
00:25:00.750 --> 00:25:04.760
and that's where we need
ERCOT, utilities, the Commission
00:25:04.760 --> 00:25:07.840
railroad Commission all
working together to really
00:25:07.840 --> 00:25:11.070
identify what what truly is critical
00:25:11.070 --> 00:25:13.370
versus some cathodic unit
00:25:13.370 --> 00:25:16.010
or something that might be
added to a list somewhere
00:25:16.010 --> 00:25:19.980
so and the other valuable
piece of information
00:25:19.980 --> 00:25:23.950
that's 171 customers
but it's on 85 to 90 circuits
00:25:25.090 --> 00:25:28.010
so it's not like they're
all on a handful of circuits
00:25:28.010 --> 00:25:30.440
I mean they're spread all
over so basically we got a
00:25:30.440 --> 00:25:33.760
two to one ratio of
customers per circuit
00:25:33.760 --> 00:25:35.300
if you look at it that way sir.
00:25:35.300 --> 00:25:39.510
So you're at 171
registered natural gas facilities
00:25:39.510 --> 00:25:41.490
right now is critical loads
00:25:41.490 --> 00:25:45.430
and I'm assuming that
list is growing over time.
00:25:45.430 --> 00:25:46.480
Yes ma'am.
Yeah.
00:25:47.605 --> 00:25:48.438
Okay.
00:25:49.950 --> 00:25:52.430
And if you've touched on,
00:25:52.430 --> 00:25:54.010
several points you've touched on
00:25:54.010 --> 00:25:57.290
more surgical load
shed whether it's at the
00:25:57.290 --> 00:26:01.400
natural gas facilities or more broadly
00:26:01.400 --> 00:26:05.820
isolating those circuits so
the critical resources can be
00:26:05.820 --> 00:26:09.810
kept online without while
still maintaining enough load
00:26:09.810 --> 00:26:14.810
to rotate for the the rest
of your customer base.
00:26:18.175 --> 00:26:21.190
If starting today hypothetically
the decision was made
00:26:21.190 --> 00:26:24.819
and all obstacles were removed
00:26:24.819 --> 00:26:27.730
to implementing a plan like that
00:26:27.730 --> 00:26:30.300
whether it's getting secondary circuits
00:26:30.300 --> 00:26:33.160
for the gas pipeline like you mentioned,
00:26:33.160 --> 00:26:35.360
how long it would it
take to implement that?
00:26:37.140 --> 00:26:40.170
I couldn't give you
a realistic answer
00:26:40.170 --> 00:26:42.210
I mean a lot of that's gonna depend on
00:26:42.210 --> 00:26:45.130
where those accounts
are along that circuit
00:26:45.130 --> 00:26:47.770
I mean if they're right
outside the substation
00:26:47.770 --> 00:26:51.290
and I can just put a switching
device right past them
00:26:51.290 --> 00:26:53.620
and drop that entire
load that's one thing
00:26:53.620 --> 00:26:57.230
if they're sitting down
there on the end of that line
00:26:57.230 --> 00:26:59.190
there's not much I can do to surgically
00:26:59.190 --> 00:27:02.570
remove load from that I'm
pretty much gonna have to protect
00:27:02.570 --> 00:27:05.990
that entire circuit for that
customer that's down there
00:27:05.990 --> 00:27:07.140
at the end of the line.
00:27:08.710 --> 00:27:12.340
We would need some
time again to pinpoint exactly
00:27:12.340 --> 00:27:15.800
where all these are and what
our options are now I mean
00:27:15.800 --> 00:27:19.340
the technology and we're
already doing something today
00:27:19.340 --> 00:27:20.410
with the smart grid
00:27:20.410 --> 00:27:23.310
and we have you know
interrupting devices
00:27:23.310 --> 00:27:25.220
other than breakers that we use today
00:27:25.220 --> 00:27:27.580
as a part of our distribution
automation schemes
00:27:27.580 --> 00:27:31.440
and stuff and so we're
already very familiar
00:27:31.440 --> 00:27:34.570
with that technology and stuff
and we've got that in-house
00:27:34.570 --> 00:27:37.680
so it's not a matter
of needing to develop
00:27:37.680 --> 00:27:40.750
a lot of technology or bring it in-house
00:27:40.750 --> 00:27:43.880
for us we're kind of there
but the bigger issue is
00:27:43.880 --> 00:27:45.470
pinpointing where they're at
00:27:45.470 --> 00:27:46.770
looking at what our options are
00:27:46.770 --> 00:27:50.400
and determining which is the
best option to move forward.
00:27:50.400 --> 00:27:54.177
Are there any
actions that the PUC
00:27:54.177 --> 00:27:57.830
and or ERCOT can
take to further move along
00:27:57.830 --> 00:27:59.930
smart grid infrastructure development
00:27:59.930 --> 00:28:03.163
to allow for more surgical
load shedding procedures?
00:28:05.060 --> 00:28:08.420
Well first of all
one of the actions
00:28:08.420 --> 00:28:11.497
we need your help with is
to make sure we're looking at
00:28:11.497 --> 00:28:15.610
the appropriate accounts
and don't have a mass list
00:28:15.610 --> 00:28:20.020
that's not pertinent or not
truly critical to this process
00:28:20.020 --> 00:28:22.320
and again I think that's a combination
00:28:22.320 --> 00:28:25.010
with the railroad Commission
and the oil and gas industry
00:28:25.010 --> 00:28:28.650
and the electric utility
industry and so forth.
00:28:28.650 --> 00:28:32.380
As far as advancing smart grid
00:28:34.480 --> 00:28:37.410
you guys took some action
back with AMI years ago
00:28:37.410 --> 00:28:41.340
that certainly advanced
that significantly
00:28:41.340 --> 00:28:45.670
with the opportunity there
maybe it's time to think about
00:28:45.670 --> 00:28:47.353
smart grid in that that relation.
00:28:48.470 --> 00:28:50.390
But conversely right now
00:28:50.390 --> 00:28:54.677
we do have the
opportunity to come in with
00:28:54.677 --> 00:28:56.908
and show the prudency
of the spin that we do have
00:28:56.908 --> 00:28:59.359
and make it a part of our rates.
00:28:59.359 --> 00:29:00.280
Right.
00:29:00.280 --> 00:29:02.830
But there's not
any specific like rule
00:29:02.830 --> 00:29:05.900
or ERCOT protocol
something we can work on
00:29:05.900 --> 00:29:09.020
to provide you with some
kind of regulatory certainty
00:29:09.020 --> 00:29:11.803
to move forward with those investments.
00:29:13.510 --> 00:29:15.030
Not to come to
the top of my mind
00:29:15.030 --> 00:29:17.550
but as the other utilities come
up they may have something.
00:29:17.550 --> 00:29:19.050
I think we'll touch
on some of those
00:29:19.050 --> 00:29:20.320
in the later presentations
00:29:20.320 --> 00:29:21.690
but we're certainly always,
00:29:21.690 --> 00:29:23.340
certainly looking at the situation
00:29:23.340 --> 00:29:24.590
and we will certainly
00:29:24.590 --> 00:29:29.590
AEP Texas will bring up the
whatever possible solutions
00:29:30.850 --> 00:29:33.000
or ways you can help
us remove those barriers
00:29:33.000 --> 00:29:36.110
certainly if it's an initiative
the Commission wants us
00:29:36.110 --> 00:29:38.640
to move forward and address
00:29:38.640 --> 00:29:42.230
we're gonna do what we
can to address those issues.
00:29:42.230 --> 00:29:44.530
Please do yes as you
come up with ideas on that
00:29:44.530 --> 00:29:48.970
please do circle back because
as you mentioned before
00:29:48.970 --> 00:29:51.160
we've already invested in smart meters
00:29:51.160 --> 00:29:53.290
the consumers have
paid for the smart meters
00:29:53.290 --> 00:29:58.170
and I think it's important
to capitalize on that existing
00:29:58.170 --> 00:30:03.170
technology where we can
to help us more effectively
00:30:03.410 --> 00:30:06.823
and equitably implement load
shed procedures in the future.
00:30:07.780 --> 00:30:08.613
Okay.
00:30:11.077 --> 00:30:12.210
Anything else?
00:30:12.210 --> 00:30:13.350
No sir.
00:30:13.350 --> 00:30:15.170
Any other question for this?
00:30:15.170 --> 00:30:16.183
I do not think.
00:30:17.160 --> 00:30:18.869
All right thank you gentlemen.
00:30:18.869 --> 00:30:19.869
Thank you.
00:30:20.930 --> 00:30:23.390
We will now move
on to our second topic
00:30:23.390 --> 00:30:25.460
regarding existing ERCOT load shedding
00:30:25.460 --> 00:30:27.830
process with Mr. Dan Woodfin.
00:30:43.361 --> 00:30:44.647
Good morning I'm Dan
Woodfin senior director
00:30:44.647 --> 00:30:46.583
of system operations ERCOT.
00:30:49.740 --> 00:30:51.050
Next slide.
00:30:51.050 --> 00:30:54.457
So I mean I think a
lot of this is gonna be
00:30:54.457 --> 00:30:55.690
the interesting thing about being
00:30:55.690 --> 00:30:57.630
sandwiched between ERCOT and AEP
00:30:57.630 --> 00:30:59.190
is a lot of what they're talking about
00:30:59.190 --> 00:31:02.080
in either presentation is
a little repetitive of what
00:31:02.080 --> 00:31:03.280
I'm gonna be talking about but there is
00:31:03.280 --> 00:31:06.543
some new information in here.
00:31:07.950 --> 00:31:10.040
The idea of course of load shed is that
00:31:10.040 --> 00:31:12.450
when we just have
exhausted all other possibilities
00:31:12.450 --> 00:31:16.560
and don't have enough resources
to serve the consumer demand
00:31:16.560 --> 00:31:20.870
we as Richard mentioned earlier
we have to lower that demand
00:31:20.870 --> 00:31:23.993
and the way we do that
is referred to as low shed.
00:31:25.570 --> 00:31:28.430
ERCOT's role in that is
determining how much load
00:31:28.430 --> 00:31:31.060
needs to come off the
system in order to balance
00:31:31.060 --> 00:31:33.410
with the amount of
generation that's available.
00:31:34.610 --> 00:31:36.840
The obligation on doing that
load shed as Richard mentioned
00:31:36.840 --> 00:31:38.713
is on the distribution providers,
00:31:39.780 --> 00:31:43.400
each distribution provider
is obligated to have a 24 by 7
00:31:43.400 --> 00:31:48.217
control room with which
that has control over breakers
00:31:48.217 --> 00:31:49.220
and those kind of things
00:31:49.220 --> 00:31:51.720
and typically that's a a
transmission operator
00:31:51.720 --> 00:31:55.250
that provides that and so in
the ERCOT operating guides
00:31:55.250 --> 00:31:58.510
the load shed percentages
are allocated out
00:31:58.510 --> 00:32:01.030
to those transmission operators
00:32:01.030 --> 00:32:03.670
rather than out to the
distribution providers.
00:32:03.670 --> 00:32:08.670
Next slide, this table is
in the operating guides
00:32:09.930 --> 00:32:13.900
it's based off of the
percentage of peak demand
00:32:13.900 --> 00:32:18.560
for the previous year for each
of the transmission operators
00:32:18.560 --> 00:32:20.663
that were reported at ERCOT.
00:32:21.610 --> 00:32:24.750
So we review that at least annually
00:32:24.750 --> 00:32:28.250
but also make changes
to it when there's a change
00:32:28.250 --> 00:32:31.150
like for example the city
of Lubbock has been added
00:32:31.150 --> 00:32:35.343
to this table recently and
the allocation reallocated.
00:32:37.250 --> 00:32:39.730
Each block of load shed
as discussed earlier has to
00:32:39.730 --> 00:32:43.220
it's required to be
shed within 30 minutes
00:32:44.901 --> 00:32:47.440
if the block size is
above 1000 megawatts
00:32:47.440 --> 00:32:49.870
they can actually in the current version
00:32:49.870 --> 00:32:53.170
of the operating guides
it may take longer for
00:32:53.170 --> 00:32:54.670
those to be implemented
00:32:55.570 --> 00:32:58.020
but as we saw in February for the most
00:32:58.020 --> 00:32:59.560
part those blocks can be shed much
00:32:59.560 --> 00:33:02.030
quicker than the 30 minute requirement
00:33:04.410 --> 00:33:08.370
and so something that
we did for Summer of 2021
00:33:08.370 --> 00:33:10.768
based on what we learned
from the February event
00:33:10.768 --> 00:33:13.200
was ask the transmission operators
00:33:13.200 --> 00:33:17.160
really how fast how much of
this load can you shed via SCADA
00:33:17.160 --> 00:33:19.780
rather than having to go
out and shed it in the field
00:33:19.780 --> 00:33:22.470
and how quickly can you do so
00:33:22.470 --> 00:33:25.180
and the numbers that are in this table
00:33:25.180 --> 00:33:28.390
and of course that will somewhat
depend on how much load
00:33:28.390 --> 00:33:32.320
is on a particular feeder
that they're turning off
00:33:32.320 --> 00:33:37.320
and so to try to allocate that
we looked at the overall load
00:33:38.350 --> 00:33:41.950
on the system and asked
them three different categories
00:33:41.950 --> 00:33:45.580
60 gigawatts on the system,
70 gigawatts and 80 gigawatts
00:33:45.580 --> 00:33:47.580
how much would you be able to shed
00:33:47.580 --> 00:33:52.580
and you can see the
numbers there that roughly
00:33:52.580 --> 00:33:57.130
23, 27, 31 gigawatts can be shed
00:33:57.130 --> 00:34:00.420
kind of isn't on some
of these critical circuits
00:34:00.420 --> 00:34:03.230
isn't transmission connected loads
00:34:03.230 --> 00:34:05.933
and is is controllable by SCADA.
00:34:07.020 --> 00:34:11.250
So that's of the 60
gigawatts 23 out of 60
00:34:11.250 --> 00:34:13.320
it could be shed that way
00:34:13.320 --> 00:34:18.320
and then most of it can
be shed within 15 minutes
00:34:19.300 --> 00:34:23.180
some may take a little longer
00:34:23.180 --> 00:34:26.530
and I think some of
that may be how the TSP
00:34:26.530 --> 00:34:28.410
answered this the transmission operators
00:34:28.410 --> 00:34:30.020
answered this question.
00:34:30.020 --> 00:34:32.460
Some were were saying
well we can get it done
00:34:32.460 --> 00:34:34.670
within 30 minutes because
that's the requirement
00:34:34.670 --> 00:34:36.660
they may actually be able to get it done
00:34:36.660 --> 00:34:40.130
in a shorter period of time
but it was the way they asked
00:34:40.130 --> 00:34:40.963
the answered the questionnaire
00:34:40.963 --> 00:34:43.050
it was what they were
willing to commit to
00:34:44.720 --> 00:34:47.890
and of course the avail
amount available for load shed
00:34:47.890 --> 00:34:50.770
depends on the
weather conditions if it's
00:34:50.770 --> 00:34:52.530
if a cool front has come through Dallas
00:34:52.530 --> 00:34:54.470
and not gone on down to the valley
00:34:54.470 --> 00:34:58.120
there may actually be more
load that's in the AEP area
00:34:58.120 --> 00:35:01.370
and the Houston area as
opposed to the ERCOT area
00:35:01.370 --> 00:35:06.360
and so it varies even within
a particular weather pattern
00:35:06.360 --> 00:35:08.010
how it's spread across the system
00:35:09.460 --> 00:35:14.400
and so that's really what
I wanted to provide to you
00:35:15.510 --> 00:35:17.220
but I'm happy to answer your question.
00:35:17.220 --> 00:35:20.630
Sure thank you can we
go back to the previous slide.
00:35:20.630 --> 00:35:24.380
When you said the
total of the 60 megawatts
00:35:24.380 --> 00:35:29.203
total load that can be
shed is 23, 27 out of 70,
00:35:29.203 --> 00:35:30.400
31 out of 80.
00:35:30.400 --> 00:35:35.400
Is it correct to say that those 23
00:35:36.700 --> 00:35:39.867
gigawatts are not critical load
00:35:39.867 --> 00:35:44.867
and are controlled by SCADA
and any other character's
00:35:46.420 --> 00:35:47.430
characterization of those.
00:35:47.430 --> 00:35:51.620
So under the kind of
the below the table there
00:35:51.620 --> 00:35:54.620
it's the ones that aren't
don't have under frequency
00:35:54.620 --> 00:35:57.190
load shed protection so
they're not part of our kind
00:35:57.190 --> 00:36:00.770
of safety net for if
we can't shed the load
00:36:00.770 --> 00:36:03.090
in a controlled way.
00:36:03.090 --> 00:36:05.650
There aren't on critical loads
00:36:05.650 --> 00:36:08.690
whatever those are defined to be by HTO
00:36:08.690 --> 00:36:11.210
and they aren't on network distribution
00:36:11.210 --> 00:36:13.910
so I think CenterPoint
has some slides about what
00:36:13.910 --> 00:36:16.340
network distribution is
but basically it's in the cities
00:36:16.340 --> 00:36:18.260
where you don't have radial distribution
00:36:18.260 --> 00:36:22.350
you've got it more networked
and then they aren't the
00:36:22.350 --> 00:36:25.096
transmission connected
more the industrial loads
00:36:25.096 --> 00:36:25.929
we're taking out that as well.
00:36:25.929 --> 00:36:28.660
Okay so broadly
speaking we're only
00:36:28.660 --> 00:36:31.397
about a third of the total.
00:36:36.220 --> 00:36:37.290
System wide.
00:36:37.290 --> 00:36:39.120
Yeah system-wide need for load
00:36:39.120 --> 00:36:43.370
only about a third of that
load is eligible for rapid
00:36:44.570 --> 00:36:46.943
load shed without manual intervention.
00:36:46.943 --> 00:36:50.330
Correct based on based
on the TO's estimates
00:36:50.330 --> 00:36:51.830
for this Summer.
00:36:51.830 --> 00:36:56.830
Okay do you have any sense
of how other ISOs fair in that
00:36:57.880 --> 00:37:01.310
what other third a half 10%.
00:37:01.310 --> 00:37:04.560
Yeah I know that this is
something that's come up
00:37:04.560 --> 00:37:07.890
on various calls with
other entities like ERCOT
00:37:07.890 --> 00:37:10.100
across the region is
something that they've
00:37:10.100 --> 00:37:14.570
when they saw kind of how
much load we had to shed
00:37:15.410 --> 00:37:20.060
at least the kind of
discussion around that was
00:37:20.060 --> 00:37:22.850
well we don't know what we
could do in that regard either it
00:37:22.850 --> 00:37:26.100
we may not be able to do
any more than that maybe less
00:37:26.100 --> 00:37:31.100
so I certainly think that
based on my memory
00:37:31.130 --> 00:37:32.950
and I wasn't in operations at the time
00:37:32.950 --> 00:37:36.510
but in 2011 there was
much less than that
00:37:36.510 --> 00:37:39.050
that could have been shed
that could be shed by SCADA
00:37:39.050 --> 00:37:42.667
so the TO's have made
some improvements since 2011
00:37:42.667 --> 00:37:44.573
and how much can be done via SCADA.
00:37:45.630 --> 00:37:46.493
Okay thank you.
00:37:47.640 --> 00:37:49.320
I wanna follow back up on
00:37:49.320 --> 00:37:53.020
so you confirmed that about
a third would be eligible for.
00:37:53.020 --> 00:37:55.740
Yeah bet you're asking
me to do math on the-
00:37:55.740 --> 00:37:58.863
I think the chairman said
the third I count on his math.
00:37:59.908 --> 00:38:01.240
(members laughing)
00:38:01.240 --> 00:38:02.740
I think I can rely on his math
00:38:03.860 --> 00:38:08.380
so about a third is eligible
for load shed this Summer
00:38:08.380 --> 00:38:09.213
and that is that-
00:38:09.213 --> 00:38:10.870
That's actually is available.
00:38:10.870 --> 00:38:12.053
Available.
Yeah.
00:38:13.083 --> 00:38:16.570
And that includes taking
into account all the natural gas
00:38:16.570 --> 00:38:19.300
facilities that have been
registered as critical loads
00:38:19.300 --> 00:38:20.270
that you're aware of.
00:38:20.270 --> 00:38:23.180
Yeah so based on
the discussion while ago
00:38:23.180 --> 00:38:26.630
that that's been going up quite a bit.
00:38:26.630 --> 00:38:31.630
This survey was sent about
a month and a half or so ago
00:38:32.000 --> 00:38:34.500
so it wouldn't include any increases
00:38:34.500 --> 00:38:37.670
that have happened since
then so it was based off
00:38:37.670 --> 00:38:39.170
of what they knew at the time.
00:38:41.540 --> 00:38:46.540
Okay thank you and I have
like one I guess a question
00:38:47.440 --> 00:38:49.950
or a request for an explanation,
00:38:49.950 --> 00:38:51.930
the under frequency load protection
00:38:51.930 --> 00:38:56.690
can you sort of explain
that in just kind of
00:38:56.690 --> 00:38:58.620
simplistic matter what is that exactly?
00:38:58.620 --> 00:39:00.030
We've heard a lot, we heard a lot about
00:39:00.030 --> 00:39:02.550
under frequency load protection during
00:39:02.550 --> 00:39:04.430
the legislative
hearings this past spring
00:39:04.430 --> 00:39:07.660
and I'd just like to learn
just a little bit more about it.
00:39:07.660 --> 00:39:11.500
Yeah so if that,
the idea is that
00:39:13.500 --> 00:39:15.350
if the balance between generation
00:39:15.350 --> 00:39:18.650
and load gets out of whack
00:39:18.650 --> 00:39:22.828
where there's not enough
generation to serve the load
00:39:22.828 --> 00:39:27.080
and that happens in a
kind of a slower manner
00:39:27.080 --> 00:39:29.820
because of generators
tripping off or load growth
00:39:29.820 --> 00:39:33.550
then we can manually
implement this kind of load shed
00:39:34.488 --> 00:39:37.060
to protect the system and
make sure that the frequency
00:39:37.060 --> 00:39:41.123
doesn't get so far off that
it causes bigger problems.
00:39:42.450 --> 00:39:44.070
The idea of the under
frequency load shed
00:39:44.070 --> 00:39:45.350
is to provide a safety net
00:39:45.350 --> 00:39:49.800
so that if a a unit trips
or a bunch of units trip
00:39:49.800 --> 00:39:52.640
and the frequency drops very low
00:39:52.640 --> 00:39:57.640
then the their relays on
some of the distribution circuits
00:39:57.820 --> 00:40:00.830
are the transmissions
distribution circuits out there
00:40:00.830 --> 00:40:04.340
that are set to certain
frequency levels so
00:40:04.340 --> 00:40:09.340
59.3, 58.9 and 58.5
and so if the frequency
00:40:12.180 --> 00:40:13.930
were to drop that much
00:40:13.930 --> 00:40:17.630
then it automatically sheds
load rather than us ordering
00:40:17.630 --> 00:40:19.990
the load to be shed in order
to bring the system back
00:40:19.990 --> 00:40:23.010
into balance and recover the frequency
00:40:23.010 --> 00:40:26.840
and that there's 5% of
the system that's set at that
00:40:26.840 --> 00:40:29.910
higher level the 59.3 and 10%
00:40:29.910 --> 00:40:31.910
at each of the the other levels
00:40:31.910 --> 00:40:36.910
and the utilities are
required to maintain that
00:40:37.560 --> 00:40:41.320
kind of safety net in
place so there's at least
00:40:41.320 --> 00:40:46.260
that 5, 10, 10% of the
load on the system that is
00:40:46.260 --> 00:40:49.380
can automatically be
shed to provide like I say
00:40:49.380 --> 00:40:50.213
that safety net.
00:40:51.370 --> 00:40:52.203
Thank you.
00:40:56.170 --> 00:40:58.283
All right thank you
Dan appreciate it.
00:41:02.700 --> 00:41:06.133
Next we'll have call up Oncor.
00:41:14.930 --> 00:41:18.823
Oh I'm sorry yes Oncor,
CenterPoint and TNMP.
00:41:30.720 --> 00:41:33.369
If we weren't before
we are now thank you.
00:41:33.369 --> 00:41:34.269
That works well.
00:41:43.553 --> 00:41:46.160
Good morning
Commissioners chairman
00:41:46.160 --> 00:41:48.620
my name is Liz Jones
and I'm the vice president
00:41:48.620 --> 00:41:50.553
of regulatory affairs for Oncor.
00:41:51.774 --> 00:41:54.120
Good morning Colin Martin
with Oncor electric delivery
00:41:54.120 --> 00:41:57.070
senior director of
transmission grid operations.
00:41:57.070 --> 00:41:59.030
Good morning Eric
Easton vice president
00:41:59.030 --> 00:42:01.330
of real-time operations
at CenterPoint Energy.
00:42:02.679 --> 00:42:04.690
Good morning I'm Keith
Nix I'm vice president
00:42:04.690 --> 00:42:06.653
of engineering Tech services for TNMP.
00:42:07.740 --> 00:42:10.100
Stacy Whitehurst vice
president regulatory affairs
00:42:10.100 --> 00:42:12.440
for Texas New mexico Power company.
00:42:12.440 --> 00:42:13.990
Thank you all for being here.
00:42:15.150 --> 00:42:18.530
If it works for y'all just
we'll start off going through
00:42:18.530 --> 00:42:21.080
I know what are several presentations
00:42:21.080 --> 00:42:23.520
and if you don't mind I'm guessing
00:42:23.520 --> 00:42:25.070
we'll ask some questions along the way
00:42:25.070 --> 00:42:30.070
it would be may not be
productive to wait till the end
00:42:31.210 --> 00:42:32.610
so if you don't mind some interruptions
00:42:32.610 --> 00:42:34.150
we'll appreciate you humoring questions
00:42:34.150 --> 00:42:36.810
as you go through the presentations.
00:42:36.810 --> 00:42:38.523
I'll turn it over to Oncor.
00:42:39.479 --> 00:42:42.680
I appreciate the
interruptions you might have.
00:42:42.680 --> 00:42:44.873
I'm gonna skip this first slide
00:42:44.873 --> 00:42:46.310
since Dan did such a good job of giving
00:42:46.310 --> 00:42:47.810
the overview there
00:42:47.810 --> 00:42:49.850
and start with the
discussion of priorities
00:42:49.850 --> 00:42:51.640
during a load shed event.
00:42:51.640 --> 00:42:54.400
So during any what you call a normal day
00:42:54.400 --> 00:42:56.262
there's a lot of operational priorities
00:42:56.262 --> 00:42:58.726
that we manage through
from a utility standpoint
00:42:58.726 --> 00:43:00.160
ERCOT standpoint in our control room
00:43:00.160 --> 00:43:02.550
to keep the system up
and running in a reliable
00:43:02.550 --> 00:43:03.940
and secure manner.
00:43:03.940 --> 00:43:06.200
When you get into a
short supply situation
00:43:06.200 --> 00:43:07.700
there's some additional
things that are they're always
00:43:07.700 --> 00:43:09.550
in the back of your mind
and things that we're prepared
00:43:09.550 --> 00:43:11.340
for and ready to act
on but they really come
00:43:11.340 --> 00:43:13.170
to the forefront of
what we're working on
00:43:13.170 --> 00:43:15.170
during that day and we have to focus on.
00:43:16.011 --> 00:43:18.880
And the number one is
preventing a system blackout.
00:43:18.880 --> 00:43:21.180
Protecting the system
is absolutely number one
00:43:21.180 --> 00:43:22.843
to avoid that blackout and having to go
00:43:22.843 --> 00:43:26.030
through the process
of picking up the pieces
00:43:26.030 --> 00:43:28.400
and the way that we protect
the system from that blackout
00:43:28.400 --> 00:43:31.650
is what Dan was walking through
00:43:31.650 --> 00:43:34.436
instead of the normal
practice of manually
00:43:34.436 --> 00:43:36.770
matching generation
to the amount of load
00:43:36.770 --> 00:43:39.067
as load just varies
normally in coming up with
00:43:39.067 --> 00:43:40.980
the economic solution,
00:43:40.980 --> 00:43:43.920
we then have to manually
control the amount of load
00:43:43.920 --> 00:43:46.390
to match which generation is available.
00:43:46.390 --> 00:43:51.390
And those manual actions it
requires immediate accurate
00:43:53.600 --> 00:43:55.390
and coordinated action between all
00:43:55.390 --> 00:43:57.560
transmission operators
and utilities across the state
00:43:57.560 --> 00:44:00.003
to accomplish those
actions and do that quickly.
00:44:01.020 --> 00:44:03.610
Those actions have to be straightforward
00:44:03.610 --> 00:44:05.250
have to be pre-planned
00:44:05.250 --> 00:44:07.280
and you have to be well
trained to execute those quickly
00:44:07.280 --> 00:44:08.680
and get the desired results.
00:44:10.110 --> 00:44:14.110
Number two with the
system in a secure state
00:44:15.540 --> 00:44:18.450
we're obviously in a bad
situation when we're shedding load
00:44:18.450 --> 00:44:20.600
customers are being
significantly impacted.
00:44:22.320 --> 00:44:25.829
It's critical for us to be
aware of where we have
00:44:25.829 --> 00:44:27.670
customers I'm gonna use the term exempt
00:44:27.670 --> 00:44:28.783
and I'm gonna slide a bit later
00:44:28.783 --> 00:44:30.140
a little bit later in the presentation
00:44:30.140 --> 00:44:33.730
we'll give some clarity between exempt
00:44:33.730 --> 00:44:37.361
and perhaps critical but
knowing where those exempt
00:44:37.361 --> 00:44:39.280
customers are at
00:44:39.280 --> 00:44:41.890
and keeping those
exempt customers online
00:44:43.020 --> 00:44:46.550
that are critical to the public
health community welfare
00:44:46.550 --> 00:44:48.154
and integrity electric system
00:44:48.154 --> 00:44:48.987
when you know where those are at
00:44:48.987 --> 00:44:50.030
and we need to keep them online
00:44:50.030 --> 00:44:51.870
during an event like this.
00:44:51.870 --> 00:44:53.703
Now it's important to
recognize that even for those
00:44:53.703 --> 00:44:57.120
type of customers we can't
guarantee continuity of service
00:44:58.080 --> 00:45:00.610
but we do elevate those
from a low shed standpoint
00:45:00.610 --> 00:45:02.760
exempt them from
those low shift rotations.
00:45:03.900 --> 00:45:07.550
And then number three and
this this one has come into
00:45:07.550 --> 00:45:10.800
quite a bit of focus given
the unprecedented depth
00:45:10.800 --> 00:45:13.830
and duration of load shed
that we had in February
00:45:13.830 --> 00:45:18.150
but doing everything
that we can to equitably
00:45:18.150 --> 00:45:21.430
and effectively rotate
what capacity is left
00:45:21.430 --> 00:45:23.680
on the system to minimize
impact to customers
00:45:24.700 --> 00:45:26.553
and going through
these slides I'll touch on
00:45:26.553 --> 00:45:28.623
a little bit more detail
on each of these topics.
00:45:32.320 --> 00:45:37.320
So key thing here load
shed is a pre-planned event
00:45:38.870 --> 00:45:41.310
it's not something that
we're coming up with
00:45:41.310 --> 00:45:42.980
and figuring out how
we're gonna handle this
00:45:42.980 --> 00:45:45.430
by the seat of our pants when
we get the call from archive
00:45:46.402 --> 00:45:48.202
and I like to think of it.
00:45:48.202 --> 00:45:50.952
(members laughs)
00:45:52.308 --> 00:45:55.140
Now stating the obvious
but I like think about it
00:45:55.140 --> 00:45:58.030
in two pieces I mean you
have the you have the plan
00:45:58.030 --> 00:46:00.043
and then you have the
execution of the plan.
00:46:01.120 --> 00:46:03.300
In each entity everybody
up here on the table
00:46:03.300 --> 00:46:06.860
all the entities on the
table that Dan showed as far
00:46:06.860 --> 00:46:07.870
as how the load should have split up
00:46:07.870 --> 00:46:09.240
everybody's gonna have
a documented plan on how
00:46:09.240 --> 00:46:10.540
they're gonna handle this.
00:46:11.800 --> 00:46:15.340
Oncor plan is a 300 plus page document
00:46:15.340 --> 00:46:18.540
it covers the procedures for load shed,
00:46:18.540 --> 00:46:22.500
our philosophy, our
priorities and it covers
00:46:22.500 --> 00:46:24.080
how we're gonna handle
that all the way down
00:46:24.080 --> 00:46:25.960
to the distribution circuit level
00:46:25.960 --> 00:46:28.110
and what type of exempt customers exist
00:46:28.110 --> 00:46:29.410
on each of those circuits.
00:46:30.700 --> 00:46:32.880
We review and update
that plan twice a year
00:46:32.880 --> 00:46:35.900
to capture any changes
in customers or repeaters
00:46:35.900 --> 00:46:37.740
or other system changes
that need to be just need to be
00:46:37.740 --> 00:46:38.823
updated in that plan.
00:46:41.430 --> 00:46:44.490
Dan mentioned the the
load share breakdown
00:46:44.490 --> 00:46:46.240
Oncor percentage is 36.16% of ERCOT
00:46:49.210 --> 00:46:51.430
our load shed plan
will take that percent
00:46:51.430 --> 00:46:53.970
and we'll actually break that
out into six different regions
00:46:53.970 --> 00:46:58.970
across our system to nail
down exactly how that load shed
00:46:59.850 --> 00:47:00.890
directive is gonna be spread
00:47:00.890 --> 00:47:02.470
across our system geographically
00:47:02.470 --> 00:47:05.420
so that we have that plan in
place and ready to execute it.
00:47:09.480 --> 00:47:12.150
All of the load on our
system will really fall
00:47:12.150 --> 00:47:14.360
into four buckets
00:47:14.360 --> 00:47:17.333
and there was previously some discussion
00:47:17.333 --> 00:47:18.493
on each of these items.
00:47:19.850 --> 00:47:23.610
Under frequency load
shed that's our safety net
00:47:23.610 --> 00:47:26.710
that's automatic action
that's taken by relays
00:47:26.710 --> 00:47:27.720
out at the substation
00:47:27.720 --> 00:47:29.720
there's no human interaction whatsoever.
00:47:30.960 --> 00:47:35.080
Each entity is required
to have a minimum level
00:47:35.080 --> 00:47:40.080
of at least 25% of their load
subscribe to UFLS at any time.
00:47:40.270 --> 00:47:43.320
Now at that minimum level
it means that's in any type
00:47:43.320 --> 00:47:44.950
of situation whether it's the
00:47:44.950 --> 00:47:46.240
highest level of the Summer or Winter
00:47:46.240 --> 00:47:48.450
or shoulder month in in March or April
00:47:48.450 --> 00:47:50.120
where loading might be lower.
00:47:50.120 --> 00:47:53.520
So a little bit later in
the discussion here
00:47:53.520 --> 00:47:56.560
we'll see how that
number does vary a bit
00:47:56.560 --> 00:47:58.410
but the 25 is the floor.
00:47:58.410 --> 00:47:59.743
So that the headroom in
there might be something
00:47:59.743 --> 00:48:02.570
that we can talk about using
as a potential mechanism
00:48:02.570 --> 00:48:05.463
to alleviate some of
the rotational concerns.
00:48:07.650 --> 00:48:10.720
The exempt customers
that's the public health,
00:48:10.720 --> 00:48:13.480
community welfare integrity of grid
00:48:13.480 --> 00:48:15.780
those are those customers
that need to stay online
00:48:15.780 --> 00:48:17.280
to keep things up and running.
00:48:18.540 --> 00:48:21.300
Transmission connected we do not include
00:48:21.300 --> 00:48:24.460
transmission connected
customers in our load shed plans
00:48:25.910 --> 00:48:29.290
based on the impacts to the grid
00:48:29.290 --> 00:48:31.440
of potentially shedding those customers
00:48:31.440 --> 00:48:33.580
I mean they're connected
directly to the grid
00:48:33.580 --> 00:48:37.090
and that can cause disruptions
to the transmission system
00:48:37.090 --> 00:48:40.360
when the system's already in
a somewhat of a fragile state
00:48:40.360 --> 00:48:42.540
and we'll talk about
that here a little bit more
00:48:42.540 --> 00:48:43.490
two slides from now
00:48:44.730 --> 00:48:47.830
and then everything
else that's left on the table
00:48:47.830 --> 00:48:50.070
falls into the manual load shed bucket
00:48:50.070 --> 00:48:52.580
and from an Oncor standpoint that number
00:48:52.580 --> 00:48:54.590
hovers around 40% plus or minus
00:48:54.590 --> 00:48:56.190
depending on loading conditions.
00:48:59.620 --> 00:49:03.850
Standard just 40%
of total load is in the
00:49:03.850 --> 00:49:05.752
eligible for the manual load shed.
00:49:05.752 --> 00:49:07.214
That's what's left after
00:49:07.214 --> 00:49:09.170
excluding under frequency load shed
00:49:09.170 --> 00:49:10.500
exempt and transmission connected.
00:49:10.500 --> 00:49:11.383
Okay great.
00:49:13.160 --> 00:49:16.200
How many natural gas
facilities do you currently have
00:49:16.200 --> 00:49:17.900
registered as critical load today?
00:49:18.760 --> 00:49:22.840
Today we have seven well
as of early July we have 795
00:49:23.770 --> 00:49:28.110
registered before the
Winter event we had 35
00:49:28.110 --> 00:49:30.060
and during the Winter event we didn't
00:49:30.060 --> 00:49:31.773
shed a single one of those 35.
00:49:32.890 --> 00:49:34.490
as we progressed through the week
00:49:34.490 --> 00:49:38.440
of February 15th
through various outreach
00:49:38.440 --> 00:49:40.530
and starting to add
back production fields
00:49:40.530 --> 00:49:43.690
and midstream compression
and the whole gas supply chain
00:49:43.690 --> 00:49:48.690
that number grew from
135 to 187 during that week
00:49:49.720 --> 00:49:53.110
and then with the revision of the forum
00:49:53.110 --> 00:49:56.020
and the outreach with PC and
railroad Commission and Oncor
00:49:56.020 --> 00:49:58.870
and internally as well that
number number's grown to 795.
00:50:00.160 --> 00:50:05.160
So given the state
of the law today
00:50:06.200 --> 00:50:09.060
and your procedures
and ERCOT's procedures
00:50:10.100 --> 00:50:12.430
say a Yuri level event happens
00:50:14.300 --> 00:50:15.420
with the increased
00:50:15.420 --> 00:50:18.440
registration of critical
infrastructure now
00:50:18.440 --> 00:50:20.590
I assume a lot of that is concentrated
00:50:20.590 --> 00:50:25.483
in certain parts of Texas
your western territory probably.
00:50:26.330 --> 00:50:28.550
Mostly but not entirely.
00:50:28.550 --> 00:50:32.020
Okay so and
you're dividing your
00:50:32.020 --> 00:50:36.340
load shed percentages up six ways?
00:50:36.340 --> 00:50:38.490
Across different regions.
00:50:38.490 --> 00:50:42.950
So how do we keep the
residents of West Texas
00:50:42.950 --> 00:50:44.690
from freezing to death
00:50:44.690 --> 00:50:49.690
in light of a heavy proportion
of non-curtailable power
00:50:49.720 --> 00:50:51.910
to certain areas?
00:50:51.910 --> 00:50:55.670
So I think that you all have
up to now made an assumption
00:50:55.670 --> 00:50:59.130
that natural gas
critical is non-curtailable
00:50:59.130 --> 00:51:03.840
and depending on the
depth and time dimension
00:51:03.840 --> 00:51:07.900
of rolling outages that may not be
00:51:07.900 --> 00:51:09.363
the right assumption to make.
00:51:11.890 --> 00:51:16.890
So obviously the PUC staff
and the railroad Commission staff
00:51:16.960 --> 00:51:20.642
are engaged on the joint
rulemakings that are required
00:51:20.642 --> 00:51:25.110
and we expect to have a
lot more sort of shake out
00:51:25.110 --> 00:51:27.720
from that conversation because up to now
00:51:29.150 --> 00:51:30.730
the electric companies
and the gas companies
00:51:30.730 --> 00:51:34.070
haven't communicated as well
as they should have obviously
00:51:34.070 --> 00:51:39.070
but it's important to note
that there are five kinds
00:51:39.410 --> 00:51:42.370
at least of of critical.
00:51:42.370 --> 00:51:45.320
So there's critical load natural gas,
00:51:45.320 --> 00:51:48.940
critical load industrial,
critical load public safety,
00:51:48.940 --> 00:51:51.840
critical care for individuals
00:51:51.840 --> 00:51:56.840
and new categories that
involve dialysis centers
00:51:57.613 --> 00:52:00.670
and homes for older adults.
00:52:00.670 --> 00:52:05.160
So if we were to
honor all of the criticality
00:52:05.160 --> 00:52:07.920
across those five categories
00:52:07.920 --> 00:52:10.180
we would not have a feeder we could shed
00:52:11.570 --> 00:52:14.340
given the other limitations
that you see up there.
00:52:14.340 --> 00:52:15.950
So essentially you
would not have a what?
00:52:15.950 --> 00:52:17.810
We would not have for,
00:52:17.810 --> 00:52:20.980
we would have virtually no
feeders that we could shed
00:52:20.980 --> 00:52:24.970
because every feeder we have virtually
00:52:24.970 --> 00:52:27.960
has one of those kinds of customers
00:52:27.960 --> 00:52:31.410
and the natural gas guys
are not only out in the Permian
00:52:31.410 --> 00:52:33.460
although they're a bunch of them
00:52:33.460 --> 00:52:36.130
those pipelines run all
the way across the state
00:52:36.130 --> 00:52:39.480
compressor stations,
midstream processing facilities,
00:52:39.480 --> 00:52:41.240
gas storage facilities.
00:52:41.240 --> 00:52:44.307
So we're talking about
a huge quantity for Oncor
00:52:44.307 --> 00:52:48.840
and I think for the other
utilities that is not sustainable
00:52:48.840 --> 00:52:53.153
unless we have a very
shallow and very brief load shed.
00:52:54.210 --> 00:52:57.700
It is our hope and it is a hope
that we express repeatedly
00:52:57.700 --> 00:52:59.280
during the legislative session
00:53:00.920 --> 00:53:03.980
and it is a hope that is
manifested in the current version
00:53:03.980 --> 00:53:07.440
of the critical load form
for natural gas customers
00:53:07.440 --> 00:53:10.570
that there can be a triage of sorts
00:53:10.570 --> 00:53:14.280
and so if we can't
keep every gas well on
00:53:14.280 --> 00:53:17.220
for every oil and gas well on,
00:53:17.220 --> 00:53:21.230
what provides the most production
00:53:21.230 --> 00:53:23.080
to support the system
00:53:23.080 --> 00:53:26.090
and how can we figure out what that is.
00:53:26.090 --> 00:53:30.330
Similarly if we can't
keep all the pipelines on
00:53:30.330 --> 00:53:32.500
what are the pipelines that are actually
00:53:32.500 --> 00:53:36.510
feeding the gas plants
and can we triage those
00:53:36.510 --> 00:53:39.130
and so Collin's got a lot
more to talk to you about
00:53:39.130 --> 00:53:40.540
on critical load
00:53:40.540 --> 00:53:43.830
but I'm concerned that
there's an assumption
00:53:43.830 --> 00:53:47.980
in much of the discussion
that has taken place up to now
00:53:47.980 --> 00:53:50.300
that somehow we can
take care of the gas guys
00:53:50.300 --> 00:53:53.020
and still do everything
else we have to do
00:53:53.020 --> 00:53:55.763
and it's not that easy.
00:53:56.690 --> 00:53:58.091
So Liz,
00:53:58.091 --> 00:53:59.720
(clears throat)
00:53:59.720 --> 00:54:04.350
very good points and very
concerning points actually
00:54:04.350 --> 00:54:09.350
and SP3 has the grid mapping system
00:54:11.490 --> 00:54:16.060
and that's a report that's
be due by January 1st 2022
00:54:16.060 --> 00:54:18.880
which would hopefully assist us
00:54:18.880 --> 00:54:23.180
in more precisely
identifying which critic
00:54:23.180 --> 00:54:25.930
which natural gas
facilities are actually critical
00:54:25.930 --> 00:54:30.100
to the electric gas, to
the electric generation
00:54:30.100 --> 00:54:31.600
and first like I guess process
00:54:32.710 --> 00:54:35.960
but in the meantime we're
here and the report's not due
00:54:35.960 --> 00:54:40.610
till January 1st 2022 so
during this this window
00:54:40.610 --> 00:54:43.280
through the Summer up until January
00:54:44.460 --> 00:54:47.930
we have this potential
challenge if we were to have
00:54:47.930 --> 00:54:50.900
a extreme event
00:54:50.900 --> 00:54:53.730
that required a significant
amount of load shed
00:54:53.730 --> 00:54:57.250
is there anything that
I mean it sounds like
00:54:57.250 --> 00:55:00.570
you've the company
has worked on the form
00:55:00.570 --> 00:55:03.570
to try to triage is there
anything within that form
00:55:03.570 --> 00:55:07.080
that you provide for
registration that could
00:55:07.080 --> 00:55:11.360
further maybe triage the
amount of natural gas facilities
00:55:11.360 --> 00:55:12.360
that are signing up.
00:55:13.230 --> 00:55:14.830
Well there's an
important element here
00:55:14.830 --> 00:55:16.500
which is for the TDUS
00:55:16.500 --> 00:55:19.140
although not for the
municipalities and co-ops
00:55:20.370 --> 00:55:24.810
we don't have identities
particularly associated
00:55:24.810 --> 00:55:25.860
with our customers
00:55:25.860 --> 00:55:28.970
so one of the pieces
that they do in this form
00:55:28.970 --> 00:55:32.410
is tell us what their
meter number or easy ID
00:55:32.410 --> 00:55:36.850
their essentially account number is,
00:55:36.850 --> 00:55:40.100
they're also asked to
identify what specific facility
00:55:40.100 --> 00:55:45.100
and if they know how that
relates to gas-fired generation
00:55:46.920 --> 00:55:49.410
not everybody fills out
that report completely
00:55:49.410 --> 00:55:52.410
if they haven't filled if
they've left no breadcrumbs
00:55:52.410 --> 00:55:55.980
we'll call and ask and and
ask for more information.
00:55:55.980 --> 00:55:58.630
So with the railroad Commission's help
00:55:58.630 --> 00:56:01.210
because this was actually
suggested by one of them
00:56:03.710 --> 00:56:07.080
we have the opportunity
to have more visibility
00:56:07.080 --> 00:56:07.913
what's a big field?
00:56:07.913 --> 00:56:08.746
What's a small field?
00:56:08.746 --> 00:56:09.579
What's a big well?
00:56:09.579 --> 00:56:10.810
What's small well?
00:56:10.810 --> 00:56:14.520
We don't necessarily have
that for everyone because
00:56:14.520 --> 00:56:18.460
there's simply no compulsion
for them to complete the form
00:56:18.460 --> 00:56:23.460
with that kind of detail and
as we move forward in general
00:56:27.360 --> 00:56:29.890
load shed that occurs
during the Summer months
00:56:29.890 --> 00:56:33.040
or the risk of load shed occurring
during the Summer months
00:56:33.040 --> 00:56:38.040
tends to be of a relatively
short duration of an afternoon
00:56:38.320 --> 00:56:41.210
and it tends to be significantly less
00:56:41.210 --> 00:56:43.171
than we saw in February
00:56:43.171 --> 00:56:44.030
and that was by far the most
00:56:44.030 --> 00:56:46.690
severe load shed in living memory
00:56:47.570 --> 00:56:52.570
and so for the Summer if
we played the odds right
00:56:53.540 --> 00:56:57.650
and we factored in generally
where these facilities are
00:56:57.650 --> 00:57:00.100
and generally what we
think is gonna happen
00:57:00.100 --> 00:57:01.750
the risk is not immediate
00:57:02.660 --> 00:57:06.670
but Collin on his second slide said
00:57:06.670 --> 00:57:09.170
the first thing we have
to do is prevent blackouts
00:57:10.290 --> 00:57:15.183
and we will do what we have
to to prevent a grid failure.
00:57:17.430 --> 00:57:19.740
Have along the lines of
the natural gas supply chain
00:57:19.740 --> 00:57:21.500
are you all aware this may be a question
00:57:21.500 --> 00:57:24.490
for a different audience
are you all aware of anybody
00:57:24.490 --> 00:57:27.890
on the generation side
who's taking the initiative
00:57:27.890 --> 00:57:30.040
to trace their natural gas supply chain
00:57:31.070 --> 00:57:35.040
just as an operational risk
management mechanism or effort?
00:57:37.390 --> 00:57:40.160
I think ERCOT actually
asked last Summer
00:57:40.160 --> 00:57:43.720
for them to do some work to
at least identify their sources
00:57:43.720 --> 00:57:47.410
the pipelines and to ask
the pipelines to identify
00:57:47.410 --> 00:57:48.920
if they were taking maintenance outages
00:57:48.920 --> 00:57:50.450
during the Summer.
00:57:50.450 --> 00:57:52.680
I don't believe there's
any way that either
00:57:52.680 --> 00:57:56.080
the wires company or
the generators can compel
00:57:58.730 --> 00:58:02.363
supply information behind the pipeline.
00:58:03.760 --> 00:58:05.523
Sure okay thank you.
00:58:07.200 --> 00:58:09.610
One thing I might add
on to what Liz shared
00:58:09.610 --> 00:58:11.673
on the gas supply chain,
00:58:12.650 --> 00:58:15.230
as those numbers grow and
as we get a better visibility of
00:58:15.230 --> 00:58:16.840
what those exact facilities are
00:58:16.840 --> 00:58:18.720
and where they fit in the supply chain
00:58:18.720 --> 00:58:21.913
I know there's a project
that'll address this,
00:58:22.820 --> 00:58:25.590
I think there's an opportunity to tier
00:58:25.590 --> 00:58:28.440
and really prioritize
some of that because
00:58:28.440 --> 00:58:30.700
if we're gonna have a
Summer afternoon load shed
00:58:30.700 --> 00:58:32.950
that lasts two or three
hours are you really worried
00:58:32.950 --> 00:58:36.170
about your production
field probably not.
00:58:36.170 --> 00:58:41.170
Yeah so what when you went
from 35 to 750 critical I think
00:58:41.470 --> 00:58:43.300
you've said it before
if everybody's critical
00:58:43.300 --> 00:58:48.300
nobody's critical well is
there a minimum threshold
00:58:48.500 --> 00:58:52.290
facility must clear before
00:58:52.290 --> 00:58:57.290
or I guess is there a hurdle
or threshold the natural gas
00:58:57.790 --> 00:59:01.310
facility must clear before
you put them on that list
00:59:02.540 --> 00:59:06.490
or and if so what what is it
00:59:06.490 --> 00:59:08.823
and does anyone get turned away?
00:59:10.310 --> 00:59:12.310
There is not a
threshold at this point
00:59:12.310 --> 00:59:14.440
but that's something that
that needs to be discussed.
00:59:14.440 --> 00:59:17.010
To the triage
all right thank you.
00:59:18.019 --> 00:59:19.510
Is that something you feel
00:59:19.510 --> 00:59:21.330
as we go through our SP3 implementation
00:59:21.330 --> 00:59:22.860
on the critical mapping system
00:59:22.860 --> 00:59:25.170
obviously that's gonna
help us sort of kind of
00:59:25.170 --> 00:59:28.190
really specifically identify
what's which facilities
00:59:28.190 --> 00:59:29.710
which natural gas
facilities are critical
00:59:29.710 --> 00:59:31.500
for electric generation
00:59:31.500 --> 00:59:34.840
but as we look to I guess
craft our roles surrounding it
00:59:35.970 --> 00:59:38.150
that's something certainly to consider
00:59:38.150 --> 00:59:41.423
to help you triage on
your registration form.
00:59:42.258 --> 00:59:43.091
I agree.
00:59:43.091 --> 00:59:44.040
Okay.
00:59:44.040 --> 00:59:49.020
And and on that okay
so say we get to a point
00:59:49.020 --> 00:59:54.020
to where we can start
refining that definition of critical
00:59:54.100 --> 00:59:56.350
and we can start prioritizing
00:59:56.350 --> 01:00:01.350
what and again the law is
somewhat broad in terms of
01:00:02.370 --> 01:00:04.730
contemplation by the legislature
01:00:04.730 --> 01:00:08.030
and even in legislative intent,
01:00:08.030 --> 01:00:12.850
what type of regulatory
certainty do you need from us
01:00:13.760 --> 01:00:16.780
and the railroad Commission
to give you comfort
01:00:16.780 --> 01:00:21.460
in terms of your ability to
manage that plan moving forward
01:00:21.460 --> 01:00:23.680
is a memorandum of understanding
01:00:23.680 --> 01:00:27.121
MOU between PUC and railroads sufficient
01:00:27.121 --> 01:00:31.393
or what do we need to look for there.
01:00:34.060 --> 01:00:38.500
What we have hoped
for for quite some time is
01:00:38.500 --> 01:00:41.280
to actually have some mirrored rules
01:00:41.280 --> 01:00:44.920
so that the PUC who's
directing the generators
01:00:44.920 --> 01:00:47.920
and the wires companies
and the railroad Commission
01:00:47.920 --> 01:00:51.780
who's directing the
gas supply chain owners
01:00:54.260 --> 01:00:56.510
mapping is the most
direct way of doing it
01:00:56.510 --> 01:01:00.400
but also thinking about
what the hierarchy is
01:01:00.400 --> 01:01:03.580
so for instance the railroad
Commission is gonna revise its
01:01:03.580 --> 01:01:08.580
1973 priorities order on human needs
01:01:09.660 --> 01:01:14.350
and on down the chain
and it would be helpful for us
01:01:14.350 --> 01:01:17.050
frankly for you all to
think some more about
01:01:18.720 --> 01:01:21.620
what priorities the electric
companies should have
01:01:21.620 --> 01:01:26.050
again not taking anything
away from the severity
01:01:26.050 --> 01:01:29.470
of the lack of electricity
was to everyone
01:01:29.470 --> 01:01:30.770
in wherever they were
01:01:32.640 --> 01:01:37.640
but if the more you all
have a vision of triage for us
01:01:38.270 --> 01:01:40.770
the clearer it will be
01:01:40.770 --> 01:01:43.130
when we get into a situation like this.
01:01:47.351 --> 01:01:49.184
All right thank you.
01:01:51.610 --> 01:01:54.690
So I think we covered the
plan side of this now gonna the
01:01:54.690 --> 01:01:56.470
execution side of it
01:01:56.470 --> 01:01:58.960
and Dan and Richard
covered the communication.
01:01:58.960 --> 01:02:01.140
The communication coming from ERCOT
01:02:01.140 --> 01:02:02.510
to the transmission operator
01:02:02.510 --> 01:02:05.350
then down to the DSP
to actually shed that load
01:02:05.350 --> 01:02:07.200
some entities that will happen within
01:02:07.200 --> 01:02:09.090
the transmission distribution
part it will happen within
01:02:09.090 --> 01:02:13.300
one location for larger
entities for Oncor for example
01:02:13.300 --> 01:02:15.930
that communication will come
to my transmission control room
01:02:15.930 --> 01:02:17.710
and then we will take that
and we will break that out
01:02:17.710 --> 01:02:20.900
to our two separate halves
of our distribution system
01:02:20.900 --> 01:02:22.840
and we've got two
distribution operation centers
01:02:22.840 --> 01:02:24.140
control rooms where they'll take that
01:02:24.140 --> 01:02:26.563
and they'll execute that
for their half of the system.
01:02:28.160 --> 01:02:32.740
When they execute that we're
using real-time control systems
01:02:32.740 --> 01:02:36.570
so SCADA Supervisory
Control and Data Acquisition
01:02:36.570 --> 01:02:39.840
that's having direct control
of the assets out in the field
01:02:39.840 --> 01:02:41.890
on a real-time basis
a very secure system
01:02:42.980 --> 01:02:45.770
and having that is
critical to be able to have
01:02:46.710 --> 01:02:49.210
that quick and indefinite response
01:02:49.210 --> 01:02:50.960
to be able to maintain reliability.
01:02:52.700 --> 01:02:57.170
As far as tools we have tools
that can allow us to do this
01:02:57.170 --> 01:02:59.440
more or less automatically
to where we can plug in
01:02:59.440 --> 01:03:01.790
and what's the amount of
load shed that we need to have
01:03:01.790 --> 01:03:03.310
for this particular region
01:03:03.310 --> 01:03:05.250
and that tool will take
that and shed the load
01:03:05.250 --> 01:03:07.400
and do the rotation based on
01:03:07.400 --> 01:03:09.253
predetermined timing and whatnot.
01:03:10.140 --> 01:03:12.420
And we also train annually every year
01:03:12.420 --> 01:03:15.020
and do simulations on
how to do that manually
01:03:15.020 --> 01:03:17.200
with just paper and
running down through the list
01:03:17.200 --> 01:03:19.230
and handling and doing the math
01:03:19.230 --> 01:03:20.380
and rotating that load.
01:03:22.140 --> 01:03:26.380
SCADA versus manual
control and manual means
01:03:26.380 --> 01:03:28.610
person getting into a truck
driving to the substation
01:03:28.610 --> 01:03:32.610
and operating a facility
there's obviously major benefits
01:03:32.610 --> 01:03:35.180
of having that that remote capability
01:03:35.180 --> 01:03:38.290
I mean especially if you get
into a situation like February
01:03:38.290 --> 01:03:41.250
where you've got ice
everywhere and road conditions
01:03:41.250 --> 01:03:43.990
and things like that
having that remote control
01:03:43.990 --> 01:03:47.970
gives you the ability to
respond quickly and safely
01:03:47.970 --> 01:03:49.800
and not be delayed by people
01:03:49.800 --> 01:03:52.400
being dispatched to go
do these types of activities.
01:03:55.180 --> 01:04:00.180
Load rotation our target is
to in a normal load shed event
01:04:01.390 --> 01:04:02.563
if there ever is one,
01:04:03.410 --> 01:04:07.640
our target is to rotate load
within 15 to 30 minute time
01:04:07.640 --> 01:04:09.810
increments so nobody
would be off for more than
01:04:09.810 --> 01:04:12.630
that 30 minute time
frame that's our objective.
01:04:12.630 --> 01:04:15.530
Obviously during this
last February event
01:04:15.530 --> 01:04:19.120
there was very limited in
supply as far as that supply
01:04:19.120 --> 01:04:20.650
and how far you had to stretch it
01:04:20.650 --> 01:04:21.710
from a demand standpoint
01:04:21.710 --> 01:04:24.480
so that time got
stretched out significantly
01:04:25.890 --> 01:04:27.600
and then the training I
already touched on this
01:04:27.600 --> 01:04:29.940
but this is something
that that's trained on
01:04:29.940 --> 01:04:31.720
and drilled and simulated annually
01:04:33.370 --> 01:04:35.870
we have to be good at load shed
01:04:35.870 --> 01:04:37.320
to avoid a black start event.
01:04:44.210 --> 01:04:48.260
So the difference
between critical and exempt
01:04:48.260 --> 01:04:49.897
and we've already had a
little bit of exchange here
01:04:49.897 --> 01:04:53.140
but you know the four
types defined in PUC rules
01:04:53.140 --> 01:04:54.760
are listed up here
01:04:54.760 --> 01:04:58.550
and those those categories
get a higher restoration priority
01:04:59.470 --> 01:05:03.640
in a storm event or outages though
01:05:03.640 --> 01:05:05.710
to the extent there's some
sort of planned maintenance
01:05:05.710 --> 01:05:07.900
that would require them to be
disconnected from the system
01:05:07.900 --> 01:05:09.990
they'll get advanced notifications
01:05:09.990 --> 01:05:11.900
and they'll also have
certain protections
01:05:11.900 --> 01:05:13.450
against disconnect for non-pay.
01:05:14.870 --> 01:05:18.930
These customers in these
categories are not automatically
01:05:18.930 --> 01:05:20.103
on our exempt list.
01:05:21.710 --> 01:05:24.730
I think Liz mentioned the
pervasiveness of these customers
01:05:24.730 --> 01:05:26.530
I mean they're it's very
diverse they're spread out
01:05:26.530 --> 01:05:27.950
across the system
01:05:27.950 --> 01:05:31.910
and in fact I pulled
the numbers over 90%
01:05:31.910 --> 01:05:34.420
of our distribution
circuits have some amount
01:05:34.420 --> 01:05:37.680
of these customers
on them so very diverse
01:05:39.200 --> 01:05:40.763
so to be able to have a,
01:05:41.900 --> 01:05:42.733
to be able to manage a load shed event
01:05:42.733 --> 01:05:44.363
then we have to narrow that scope
01:05:45.430 --> 01:05:47.900
and we narrow that
scope to the customers
01:05:47.900 --> 01:05:50.030
that are listed on the
bottom of the screen here
01:05:50.030 --> 01:05:52.360
for the ones that are
critical to public health,
01:05:52.360 --> 01:05:54.603
community welfare,
integrity of the grid.
01:06:00.850 --> 01:06:02.340
Anything else to add
on I was gonna talk about
01:06:02.340 --> 01:06:04.800
some of the gas stuff here
I think we've covered that.
01:06:04.800 --> 01:06:08.040
Distributed generation
major exporter,
01:06:08.040 --> 01:06:10.220
can you drill down what
we're talking about there?
01:06:10.220 --> 01:06:13.440
Yeah so these are
distributed generation
01:06:13.440 --> 01:06:16.080
resources Oncor currently has
01:06:16.080 --> 01:06:18.463
two major distributed
generation resources
01:06:18.463 --> 01:06:21.190
that actually participate in
the ancillary service market
01:06:21.190 --> 01:06:23.143
and so they are excluded from load shed.
01:06:24.950 --> 01:06:29.950
And in order to participate
as a distributed generation
01:06:30.190 --> 01:06:32.960
resource in the ancillary service market
01:06:34.990 --> 01:06:38.720
we and ERCOT have
required those DG facilities
01:06:38.720 --> 01:06:40.600
to be on dedicated feeders
01:06:40.600 --> 01:06:44.293
and to not be on feeders
with other customers.
01:06:45.720 --> 01:06:49.210
So there's distributed
generation across multiple feeders
01:06:49.210 --> 01:06:52.630
in our system it's only
those ancillary service
01:06:52.630 --> 01:06:57.503
provision DG installations
that have this protection.
01:06:59.700 --> 01:07:02.620
So as we see more of
that which is a good thing
01:07:02.620 --> 01:07:06.960
it sounds like I think for the
purposes of grid resiliency
01:07:06.960 --> 01:07:09.350
that helps and they're
all in their own feeder
01:07:09.350 --> 01:07:12.670
so in terms of their
portion of the allocation
01:07:12.670 --> 01:07:15.410
they're really not impacting
us on the allocation side
01:07:15.410 --> 01:07:17.530
because their own dedicated feeder.
01:07:17.530 --> 01:07:18.363
That's correct.
01:07:18.363 --> 01:07:19.350
Okay.
01:07:19.350 --> 01:07:21.390
So we're not just to be clear
01:07:21.390 --> 01:07:23.700
as we have more DG on the system
01:07:23.700 --> 01:07:27.130
and DG that may be
participating in ancillary services
01:07:27.130 --> 01:07:29.220
or cup market rules open up
01:07:29.220 --> 01:07:31.870
to allow that kind of participation,
01:07:31.870 --> 01:07:35.220
how does that impact
the amount of circuits
01:07:35.220 --> 01:07:38.250
we can rotate out
during a load shed event
01:07:38.250 --> 01:07:41.339
'cause we have a
long list already of folks
01:07:41.339 --> 01:07:42.860
we got to protect.
01:07:42.860 --> 01:07:44.442
That's a good question
01:07:44.442 --> 01:07:47.157
so for the distributed
generation resources
01:07:47.157 --> 01:07:49.410
that I'm speaking about
it's a relatively narrow
01:07:49.410 --> 01:07:51.230
scope so it's the DGR
01:07:51.230 --> 01:07:55.440
the resources that are
registered as a DGR with ERCOT
01:07:55.440 --> 01:07:58.350
and they're providing
those ancillary services
01:07:58.350 --> 01:08:01.160
and our company philosophy is to
01:08:02.400 --> 01:08:03.900
anytime we have one of them hooking up
01:08:03.900 --> 01:08:06.500
we're gonna connect
them to a separate feeder
01:08:06.500 --> 01:08:08.700
that's connected
directly to the substation.
01:08:10.380 --> 01:08:15.250
There are a recent change
to the archive protocols
01:08:15.250 --> 01:08:20.130
I believe it was last year
that basically requires that
01:08:20.130 --> 01:08:23.170
any type of resource
or distribution resources
01:08:23.170 --> 01:08:26.940
providing ancillary
services has to be excluded
01:08:26.940 --> 01:08:29.221
from under frequency load shed
01:08:29.221 --> 01:08:32.600
and from under voltage load shed.
01:08:32.600 --> 01:08:34.390
So that they have to be
excluded from those buckets
01:08:34.390 --> 01:08:36.890
and then we obviously
we're not if it's a resource
01:08:36.890 --> 01:08:39.590
we're not gonna shed them
during a load shed event
01:08:40.700 --> 01:08:42.210
so we require them to
be on a separate feed
01:08:42.210 --> 01:08:43.560
or not to dilute that pool.
01:08:46.410 --> 01:08:48.590
The other kinds of
distributed generation
01:08:48.590 --> 01:08:50.743
say associated with a grocery store.
01:08:53.030 --> 01:08:55.770
If that feeder is shed
that grocery store
01:08:55.770 --> 01:08:59.650
can continue to operate that
distributed generation on site
01:09:00.490 --> 01:09:02.580
but the fact that there is distributed
01:09:02.580 --> 01:09:05.090
generation along that feeder
01:09:05.090 --> 01:09:07.563
doesn't change that feeder's priority.
01:09:12.440 --> 01:09:13.273
You want me try again?
01:09:13.273 --> 01:09:14.188
A little bit more.
01:09:14.188 --> 01:09:18.260
Okay, so there is
distributed generation
01:09:18.260 --> 01:09:19.620
all across our system
01:09:19.620 --> 01:09:21.810
and it's integrated with customers
01:09:21.810 --> 01:09:23.610
sometimes it's adjacent to a customer
01:09:23.610 --> 01:09:26.290
sometimes it's just an
attractive place to put
01:09:26.290 --> 01:09:27.921
a DG solar farm
01:09:27.921 --> 01:09:32.260
all the ones that are like
that that produce energy
01:09:32.260 --> 01:09:33.550
either for a customer
01:09:33.550 --> 01:09:36.320
or just to put on the
system generally during
01:09:36.320 --> 01:09:37.820
potentially high price periods
01:09:39.660 --> 01:09:44.560
that sails along just fine
unless there is a load shed event
01:09:44.560 --> 01:09:48.610
if there is a load shed
event the fact that a feeder
01:09:48.610 --> 01:09:52.840
has distributed generation
on it will not keep us
01:09:52.840 --> 01:09:54.757
from shedding that feeder.
01:09:56.240 --> 01:09:59.700
Now having said that if
we have shed a feeder
01:09:59.700 --> 01:10:01.950
that has distributed generation on it
01:10:01.950 --> 01:10:04.720
and it is co-located with a customer
01:10:04.720 --> 01:10:09.720
that customer can use that
DG as a source of backup power
01:10:09.890 --> 01:10:13.970
so they receive a clear
benefit in that event
01:10:13.970 --> 01:10:18.450
but the system as a whole
is not going to be able to keep
01:10:18.450 --> 01:10:22.510
all of the distributed
generation on the grid
01:10:22.510 --> 01:10:24.113
for grid consumption.
01:10:27.010 --> 01:10:31.020
But the DG that's AS
will not get rotated out.
01:10:31.020 --> 01:10:36.020
Exactly and frankly we would
never want to rotate them out
01:10:36.090 --> 01:10:39.630
because they have no load
on it so they can't decrease
01:10:39.630 --> 01:10:42.850
the load side of the equation
that we're talking about.
01:10:42.850 --> 01:10:45.770
Okay so it's not
going to result in further
01:10:46.950 --> 01:10:49.850
limiting the amount of
customers that can be wrote
01:10:49.850 --> 01:10:54.500
or the amount of I guess
limiting the load shed.
01:10:54.500 --> 01:10:59.500
Right so let's say there are
20 of these in 2022 or 2023
01:11:00.020 --> 01:11:02.250
we would have on our books it would show
01:11:02.250 --> 01:11:04.200
that we have 20 more feeders
01:11:04.200 --> 01:11:07.430
and we couldn't shed
those 20 more feeders
01:11:07.430 --> 01:11:11.430
but not shutting those feeders
does not materially change
01:11:11.430 --> 01:11:15.420
our ability to manage a load shed event.
01:11:15.420 --> 01:11:17.210
It's only a net positive.
01:11:17.210 --> 01:11:18.043
Yes.
01:11:18.043 --> 01:11:20.120
In terms of the Oncor
systems accounting.
01:11:20.120 --> 01:11:21.770
Yes.
01:11:21.770 --> 01:11:24.420
Thank you for that
clarification it's very helpful.
01:11:26.240 --> 01:11:27.073
Next slide.
01:11:28.900 --> 01:11:32.760
So this slide shows
our our February trend
01:11:32.760 --> 01:11:35.360
of transmission connected loads.
01:11:35.360 --> 01:11:37.410
So each little vertical line
01:11:37.410 --> 01:11:39.570
that's a different day in February
01:11:39.570 --> 01:11:42.293
and this slide tells a
pretty interesting story.
01:11:44.035 --> 01:11:47.600
Oncor we do not include
transmission connected load
01:11:47.600 --> 01:11:48.780
in our load shed plans
01:11:49.810 --> 01:11:52.330
and two main reasons there is due to the
01:11:52.330 --> 01:11:55.440
highly interconnected nature
of the transmission system
01:11:55.440 --> 01:11:59.540
so disconnecting
certain transmission loads
01:11:59.540 --> 01:12:02.600
can impact the topology
of your transmission system
01:12:02.600 --> 01:12:06.010
which then can cause
additional constraints
01:12:06.010 --> 01:12:08.410
from an overall grid standpoint.
01:12:08.410 --> 01:12:11.760
So going and putting
your when the grid's already
01:12:13.776 --> 01:12:16.120
at a fragile state going
01:12:16.120 --> 01:12:19.890
and putting that that grid in
a number of different spots
01:12:19.890 --> 01:12:22.740
into a abnormal state
is not a good practice
01:12:23.640 --> 01:12:26.360
and then a number of
these very large customers
01:12:26.360 --> 01:12:29.220
they carry significant
environmental risks as well
01:12:29.220 --> 01:12:31.490
if you disrupt them and just turn them
01:12:31.490 --> 01:12:32.863
from 100 down to zero.
01:12:34.540 --> 01:12:39.540
This chart it shows a
significant voluntary reduction
01:12:40.150 --> 01:12:42.513
both ahead of and
during the load shed event.
01:12:43.720 --> 01:12:46.210
So you can see the the three days
01:12:46.210 --> 01:12:47.930
leading up to the blue box there.
01:12:47.930 --> 01:12:49.950
So the blue box is a load shed event
01:12:50.950 --> 01:12:53.423
there's a significant
downtick in the load.
01:12:54.940 --> 01:12:59.330
Now whether that was a
result of calls for conservation
01:12:59.330 --> 01:13:00.970
from from ERCOT, from Oncor,
01:13:00.970 --> 01:13:02.960
from outreach directly to customers
01:13:02.960 --> 01:13:06.000
or how much of this is
due to price responsiveness
01:13:06.000 --> 01:13:10.110
or really a combination
of both of those two things
01:13:10.110 --> 01:13:13.380
it shows that our
transmission customers have
01:13:13.380 --> 01:13:14.940
they significantly responded
01:13:14.940 --> 01:13:17.823
and really shouldn't be
subjected to mandatory load shed.
01:13:20.477 --> 01:13:22.850
The reduction before the load shed
01:13:24.090 --> 01:13:29.030
they reduced by 48% from
net level on the days leading up
01:13:29.030 --> 01:13:31.670
to the event and then
actually during the event
01:13:31.670 --> 01:13:34.240
from a couple days ahead
to the middle of the event
01:13:34.240 --> 01:13:36.163
there was a 60 reduction.
01:13:37.770 --> 01:13:42.670
So doing a little bit of
math and ERCOT hit
01:13:42.670 --> 01:13:46.350
a new Winter peak the
Sunday before load shed
01:13:46.350 --> 01:13:49.530
it was just south of 70,000
megawatts notionally
01:13:50.430 --> 01:13:53.690
and the deepest that we got
from a load shed standpoint
01:13:53.690 --> 01:13:57.350
was on Monday afternoon
and that was 20,000 megawatts.
01:13:57.350 --> 01:14:01.540
So if you 20,000 out
of 70,000 that's 29%
01:14:01.540 --> 01:14:03.650
if you were to spread
load shed peanut butter
01:14:03.650 --> 01:14:06.750
across every load on the ERCOT system.
01:14:08.220 --> 01:14:10.870
The transmission customers
covered 48% of that
01:14:10.870 --> 01:14:12.600
before the load shed event started
01:14:12.600 --> 01:14:14.773
and got down to 60% during the event.
01:14:16.200 --> 01:14:19.820
So to me this shows that
though those transmission
01:14:19.820 --> 01:14:21.760
customers carried a
significant amount of water
01:14:21.760 --> 01:14:24.020
and they actually
ultimately reduced the impact
01:14:24.020 --> 01:14:27.300
to other customer
classes by dipping deeper
01:14:27.300 --> 01:14:29.700
than that 29% that was
spread across the system.
01:14:35.400 --> 01:14:36.560
It is our intention.
01:14:36.560 --> 01:14:38.940
You fear in curtailing them
01:14:38.940 --> 01:14:41.410
or this is a physical constraint
01:14:41.410 --> 01:14:43.240
that you cannot turn them off
01:14:43.240 --> 01:14:46.340
because they carry
such internal infrastructure
01:14:46.340 --> 01:14:50.893
that by nature of that setup
they cannot be turned off.
01:14:52.450 --> 01:14:56.130
So either because of
their location on the system
01:14:56.130 --> 01:14:58.970
and their integration into
the transmission system
01:15:01.112 --> 01:15:06.112
and or because the facility
itself has environmental hazards
01:15:08.450 --> 01:15:10.550
associated with it I
mean you all remember
01:15:12.070 --> 01:15:13.770
there was a plant that lost power.
01:15:15.200 --> 01:15:19.920
That we are very concerned
with just cutting them off
01:15:19.920 --> 01:15:24.600
we don't think that that
is a safe step to take
01:15:24.600 --> 01:15:28.300
we are continuing conversations
with those customers
01:15:28.300 --> 01:15:33.070
to try to figure out on a
more predictable basis
01:15:33.070 --> 01:15:35.230
what they could be capable of
01:15:35.230 --> 01:15:36.590
and there's probably room to have
01:15:36.590 --> 01:15:40.030
some of those conversations
at ERCOT as well
01:15:40.030 --> 01:15:44.253
but it's very dependent
on what that business is.
01:15:45.200 --> 01:15:48.150
So the the where
my question goes is
01:15:48.150 --> 01:15:51.510
some transmission level customers
01:15:52.640 --> 01:15:57.640
do not have inside the fence
co-located generation capacity
01:15:59.700 --> 01:16:02.500
and so their business
model is predicated upon
01:16:02.500 --> 01:16:04.680
being an off taker from the Texas grid
01:16:06.320 --> 01:16:10.850
but during a event like February
01:16:10.850 --> 01:16:15.200
or even like you don't
need an event like February
01:16:15.200 --> 01:16:19.150
I mean in a cold event and
we're looking at these thresholds
01:16:19.150 --> 01:16:22.040
of as you're ratcheting down load shed
01:16:22.040 --> 01:16:26.370
deeper and deeper into
the I mean we're shedding
01:16:26.370 --> 01:16:28.533
residential consumers
all over the place.
01:16:30.250 --> 01:16:32.770
What is that that bright line
01:16:32.770 --> 01:16:35.143
when we look everybody's off?
01:16:37.720 --> 01:16:41.523
Microchips or not, so what's that line?
01:16:42.490 --> 01:16:44.780
We don't have a
line yet across ERCOT
01:16:46.360 --> 01:16:50.840
we could try to draw one
I guess our first goal was
01:16:50.840 --> 01:16:54.000
to try to recognize the individuality
01:16:54.000 --> 01:16:56.040
of those business operations.
01:16:56.040 --> 01:16:58.570
I will tell you during February
01:16:58.570 --> 01:17:00.340
there were industrial customers
01:17:01.350 --> 01:17:03.540
that to the extent they had gas
01:17:03.540 --> 01:17:05.410
continued to run their cogen
01:17:05.410 --> 01:17:08.970
and dialed their behind the
fence operations way down
01:17:10.400 --> 01:17:13.070
their off takers as you called them
01:17:13.070 --> 01:17:15.320
that had a wide range of outcomes from
01:17:15.320 --> 01:17:19.070
their customary load
to significantly less
01:17:19.070 --> 01:17:22.370
and I know of at least one customer that
01:17:22.370 --> 01:17:24.500
couldn't get gas for its cogen
01:17:24.500 --> 01:17:27.620
but continued to take at full capacity
01:17:27.620 --> 01:17:29.650
without regard for the system.
01:17:29.650 --> 01:17:34.070
So I mean there's always a
bad guy out here somewhere
01:17:34.070 --> 01:17:38.180
but there was a wide range
of intermediate responses
01:17:38.180 --> 01:17:40.743
that we felt were very constructive.
01:17:50.930 --> 01:17:53.280
So moving forward
one of the key questions
01:17:54.290 --> 01:17:56.170
is how do we improve rotations?
01:17:56.170 --> 01:17:57.940
How do we reduce the customer impact
01:17:57.940 --> 01:17:59.670
in a situation like this?
01:17:59.670 --> 01:18:03.580
And it really boils down to
you need a bigger pool of load
01:18:03.580 --> 01:18:05.420
to be able to rotate and
there's different ways
01:18:05.420 --> 01:18:07.670
that you can accomplish that.
01:18:07.670 --> 01:18:09.520
So I got a couple items
on the on the slide here
01:18:09.520 --> 01:18:11.290
that I'd like to walk through with you
01:18:11.290 --> 01:18:14.560
and I've listed them in
what I see from my mind
01:18:14.560 --> 01:18:18.840
is as rough order from a
cost or benefit standpoint
01:18:18.840 --> 01:18:23.083
as opposed to just the
flat you know physical cost
01:18:23.083 --> 01:18:25.880
and the cost in terms
of risk to the system
01:18:25.880 --> 01:18:28.080
as far as getting the desired outcome
01:18:29.560 --> 01:18:34.160
so number one this one
anywhere that an entity doesn't have
01:18:34.160 --> 01:18:37.150
remote control SCADA
capability at a substation
01:18:37.150 --> 01:18:40.960
it makes sense to add
that avoid relying on
01:18:40.960 --> 01:18:43.400
dispatching personnel
out to the substation
01:18:43.400 --> 01:18:46.023
to do the switching that's number one.
01:18:48.010 --> 01:18:51.770
Number two and number
three are are tied to
01:18:53.077 --> 01:18:55.443
the bucket of under
frequency load shed load.
01:18:56.830 --> 01:19:00.790
So earlier Dan mentioned
I mentioned as well
01:19:00.790 --> 01:19:04.010
that floor for under
frequency load shed is 25%
01:19:04.010 --> 01:19:05.163
of your connected load.
01:19:06.060 --> 01:19:09.580
Now given that that's a
floor that floor is measured
01:19:09.580 --> 01:19:12.670
at the time it's typically a situation
01:19:12.670 --> 01:19:15.100
where the system is in a shoulder month
01:19:15.100 --> 01:19:17.050
and system loads are relatively low
01:19:17.050 --> 01:19:18.990
so you've got higher commercial
01:19:18.990 --> 01:19:21.736
or commercial and transmission connected
01:19:21.736 --> 01:19:25.210
and lower residential type load.
01:19:25.210 --> 01:19:29.040
So as you get to situations
where you're at high load events
01:19:29.040 --> 01:19:32.470
that UFLS magnitude increases
01:19:32.470 --> 01:19:33.377
it doesn't stay at 25%
01:19:33.377 --> 01:19:36.470
and actually cycles day to day as well
01:19:36.470 --> 01:19:40.240
but it can get up into
the range of the 30 to 35
01:19:40.240 --> 01:19:42.270
even getting close to 40%
01:19:42.270 --> 01:19:44.470
and every entity will be
different on how their load
01:19:44.470 --> 01:19:45.773
is spread out.
01:19:47.469 --> 01:19:49.500
But there are some things that we can do
01:19:49.500 --> 01:19:54.470
during a load shed event
to dynamically adjust
01:19:54.470 --> 01:19:56.260
the amount of load that we have
01:19:56.260 --> 01:20:00.340
dedicated to that safety net
under frequency load shed.
01:20:00.340 --> 01:20:03.060
We can as we get the
load shed we can start
01:20:03.060 --> 01:20:05.260
moving some of that load
or start actually rotating
01:20:05.260 --> 01:20:08.830
some of that under frequency
load shed capable load
01:20:08.830 --> 01:20:12.133
to address the limited
pool of resources.
01:20:13.092 --> 01:20:16.710
So using up that that margin
to the extent you're above 25%
01:20:16.710 --> 01:20:17.850
that's something we can look at
01:20:17.850 --> 01:20:18.990
and there's actually some discussion
01:20:18.990 --> 01:20:22.686
going on in the the ERCOT
stakeholder community
01:20:22.686 --> 01:20:25.210
on what type of
changes or clarifications
01:20:25.210 --> 01:20:27.240
to the workout operating
guys might be required to
01:20:27.240 --> 01:20:28.440
effectuate some of that.
01:20:30.420 --> 01:20:35.153
Number three is similar but for Oncor
01:20:36.150 --> 01:20:38.580
our under frequency load shed feeders
01:20:38.580 --> 01:20:43.020
that we use to meet that
threshold that's a static list
01:20:43.020 --> 01:20:45.520
it's not something that we can remotely
01:20:45.520 --> 01:20:47.453
enable or disable that functionality.
01:20:49.140 --> 01:20:53.600
If we were to add devices to the station
01:20:54.580 --> 01:20:57.960
and each of those feeders
to be able to turn on or off
01:20:57.960 --> 01:20:59.940
that load shed capability
01:20:59.940 --> 01:21:02.970
and also add that capability
to feeders that are on
01:21:02.970 --> 01:21:05.080
our manual load shed list
01:21:05.080 --> 01:21:09.358
that could facilitate
potentially having a dynamic
01:21:09.358 --> 01:21:12.360
UFLS bucket if you will.
01:21:12.360 --> 01:21:15.680
So that this is not static
but we're actually rotating
01:21:15.680 --> 01:21:19.780
that UFLS protection around to customers
01:21:19.780 --> 01:21:21.890
that are in the manual load shed list.
01:21:21.890 --> 01:21:24.620
So that bucket gets
it's substantially bigger
01:21:24.620 --> 01:21:26.440
you've got a bigger group
that you're working with
01:21:26.440 --> 01:21:29.510
as you're spreading that
that generation constraint
01:21:29.510 --> 01:21:30.483
around the loads.
01:21:34.400 --> 01:21:36.890
Now that as we go
down the list those things
01:21:36.890 --> 01:21:39.650
do get more complicated
from a control standpoint
01:21:40.960 --> 01:21:42.350
and from a load shed standpoint
01:21:42.350 --> 01:21:44.690
that's more place that
we're having to spend
01:21:44.690 --> 01:21:47.090
more systems that you're
depending on to keep track
01:21:47.090 --> 01:21:49.451
and keep those things running so
01:21:49.451 --> 01:21:52.420
we're increasing your risk
as we move down this list.
01:21:52.420 --> 01:21:55.660
Number four AEP mentioned this one a bit
01:21:55.660 --> 01:21:58.573
it's further segmentation
of the distribution system.
01:21:59.920 --> 01:22:03.240
Identifying where you have
some of those exempt loads
01:22:03.240 --> 01:22:06.940
the hospitals natural gas
facility or whatever it might be
01:22:08.160 --> 01:22:13.160
and surgically going in and
adding additional automation
01:22:14.442 --> 01:22:18.210
or segmentation facilities
that could be integrated
01:22:18.210 --> 01:22:20.083
into the load shed plans.
01:22:21.060 --> 01:22:25.150
Now that from a risk standpoint that it
01:22:25.150 --> 01:22:27.330
one thing it does is it blurs the lines
01:22:27.330 --> 01:22:29.793
between control
systems this is something
01:22:29.793 --> 01:22:31.220
that Jeff mentioned earlier
01:22:31.220 --> 01:22:34.040
we have our real-time
transmission management system
01:22:34.040 --> 01:22:38.010
that we use to control feeder
breakers in the substation
01:22:38.010 --> 01:22:39.620
things that are outside of that fence
01:22:39.620 --> 01:22:41.960
that are on down the feeder
01:22:41.960 --> 01:22:43.610
on the other side of that hospital
01:22:43.610 --> 01:22:45.583
that's a different
type of control system.
01:22:46.670 --> 01:22:48.045
So there's things that you get into
01:22:48.045 --> 01:22:51.057
from a cyber security
standpoint from the controls,
01:22:51.057 --> 01:22:52.410
how do you manage all that
01:22:52.410 --> 01:22:53.830
and how do you make
it all meshed together
01:22:53.830 --> 01:22:55.360
when we're looking at load shed
01:22:55.360 --> 01:22:57.290
those are the the risks
and the complications
01:22:57.290 --> 01:22:58.590
that have to be addressed.
01:22:59.800 --> 01:23:01.970
And then on from an advanced metering
01:23:01.970 --> 01:23:03.710
infrastructure standpoint
I'm gonna hold off on that
01:23:03.710 --> 01:23:06.050
one I've got a slide on
the back to talk about it
01:23:06.050 --> 01:23:10.290
but just the general
concept here is that
01:23:10.290 --> 01:23:13.010
making the pool bigger reduces the
01:23:13.010 --> 01:23:14.640
it spreads the pain more equally
01:23:15.620 --> 01:23:18.640
but in doing that we have to
make sure that what we're doing
01:23:18.640 --> 01:23:19.980
doesn't diminish reliability
01:23:19.980 --> 01:23:21.810
and doesn't diminish the the speed
01:23:21.810 --> 01:23:24.843
at which we can execute these actions.
01:23:27.530 --> 01:23:28.480
Good deal thanks.
01:23:31.180 --> 01:23:34.990
All right so from an
AMI load shed standpoint.
01:23:34.990 --> 01:23:36.760
I've talked about our load shed systems
01:23:36.760 --> 01:23:39.268
as being real-time systems.
01:23:39.268 --> 01:23:40.807
(clears throat)
01:23:40.807 --> 01:23:43.280
They're highly reliable highly secure
01:23:44.497 --> 01:23:47.120
and controlled within a box.
01:23:47.120 --> 01:23:51.040
AMI is I would call it more
of a near real-time system
01:23:51.040 --> 01:23:55.350
and its primary purpose is to
measure energy consumption
01:23:55.350 --> 01:23:59.190
provide meter reads and operate remote
01:23:59.190 --> 01:24:01.693
disconnect or reconnect
for certain premises.
01:24:03.100 --> 01:24:06.160
We take that data (clears
throat) and integrate that
01:24:06.160 --> 01:24:07.870
into our outage management system
01:24:07.870 --> 01:24:09.930
to give our operators additional
information on the system
01:24:09.930 --> 01:24:12.630
and make better operational
decisions and restoration.
01:24:14.090 --> 01:24:17.173
So some considerations
associated with AMI,
01:24:19.070 --> 01:24:24.070
number one not all meters
have the capability to
01:24:24.840 --> 01:24:27.483
remotely disconnect
or reconnect a customer.
01:24:28.860 --> 01:24:32.010
It's limited right now to
single-phase premises
01:24:32.010 --> 01:24:33.530
it's primarily residential
01:24:33.530 --> 01:24:36.983
and some small very
small commercial locations.
01:24:37.840 --> 01:24:42.410
Now while that covers
about 90% of our meters
01:24:42.410 --> 01:24:43.243
that we have on our system
01:24:43.243 --> 01:24:47.290
we have 3.8 million meters
better than 90% of them
01:24:47.290 --> 01:24:49.283
have this remote disconnect capability.
01:24:50.960 --> 01:24:53.510
The limitation is that only
covers 40% of your load
01:24:55.060 --> 01:24:58.750
the the other 10% of
the meters represent your
01:24:59.600 --> 01:25:01.940
that's your large that's
your commercial industrial
01:25:01.940 --> 01:25:04.270
as transmission connected
that that's bigger stuff
01:25:04.270 --> 01:25:06.420
and that represents
60% of the actual load.
01:25:07.910 --> 01:25:10.950
So for encore that's 270,000 premises
01:25:12.320 --> 01:25:16.050
where to actually use
a metering system to
01:25:16.990 --> 01:25:21.483
premise by premise with
pinpoint accuracy rotate load shed,
01:25:23.040 --> 01:25:25.030
those locations you have
to you'd have to install insert
01:25:25.030 --> 01:25:28.310
some sort of interrupting
device at each of those locations
01:25:29.220 --> 01:25:32.383
and that's not a it's not a small task.
01:25:33.560 --> 01:25:35.100
The meters that are
used for small residential
01:25:35.100 --> 01:25:37.020
that you have on your house
01:25:37.020 --> 01:25:38.857
they're meant for for small loads
01:25:38.857 --> 01:25:43.020
if you get to a large
commercial or industrial plant
01:25:43.020 --> 01:25:45.200
that's much more substantial
electrical equipment
01:25:45.200 --> 01:25:47.190
so having those devices
to be able to interrupt
01:25:47.190 --> 01:25:48.610
be able to remotely control that
01:25:48.610 --> 01:25:51.500
be able to integrate
that with the AMI system
01:25:51.500 --> 01:25:52.750
that's a substantial task
01:25:52.750 --> 01:25:55.093
and it's 270,000 locations.
01:25:58.620 --> 01:26:00.820
The speed of executing load shed
01:26:00.820 --> 01:26:02.733
again is of critical importance.
01:26:04.990 --> 01:26:07.030
Each entity's meteor infrastructure
01:26:07.030 --> 01:26:08.500
would be will be different
01:26:09.340 --> 01:26:12.050
from an Oncor standpoint a comparison
01:26:12.050 --> 01:26:13.500
that I would make is that
01:26:13.500 --> 01:26:15.850
using our transmission management system
01:26:15.850 --> 01:26:17.480
or our real-time SCADA system
01:26:18.560 --> 01:26:22.040
we could interrupt say
10 distribution feeders
01:26:22.040 --> 01:26:24.890
that might serve 15,000 customers
01:26:24.890 --> 01:26:26.410
get confirmation of the amount of load
01:26:26.410 --> 01:26:29.370
that it was shed and the
new status within 10 seconds
01:26:30.340 --> 01:26:35.340
that same action to send the
command on the AMI system
01:26:35.460 --> 01:26:37.623
might take 30 minutes
for 15,000 customers.
01:26:39.060 --> 01:26:43.229
So the size of the pipe
the latency of the pipe
01:26:43.229 --> 01:26:45.460
it's not built as a
real-time control system
01:26:45.460 --> 01:26:47.090
it's built as a metering system
01:26:47.090 --> 01:26:49.180
and that's a big, getting
that pipe big enough
01:26:49.180 --> 01:26:52.030
and reliable enough is a
big something significant
01:26:52.030 --> 01:26:55.263
to be required to translate
that into a real-time control.
01:26:57.890 --> 01:27:00.387
Similarly on the the network resiliency
01:27:00.387 --> 01:27:02.970
and the control system resiliency
01:27:02.970 --> 01:27:05.980
again these are
architected for meter reading
01:27:05.980 --> 01:27:07.750
they're not architected to have
01:27:09.120 --> 01:27:11.910
the high levels of redundancy
01:27:11.910 --> 01:27:13.630
and reliability that's required
01:27:13.630 --> 01:27:15.880
for a real-time control system.
01:27:15.880 --> 01:27:18.910
So in the communications networks,
01:27:18.910 --> 01:27:21.610
in the actual control
system so it has to be built to
01:27:21.610 --> 01:27:25.290
effectuate these changes
that's a significant move
01:27:25.290 --> 01:27:27.170
from where it's at
today to an architecture
01:27:27.170 --> 01:27:28.580
that would be able to accommodate those
01:27:28.580 --> 01:27:29.930
those millions of commands.
01:27:32.760 --> 01:27:35.720
And then the last items or two items.
01:27:35.720 --> 01:27:38.170
If we were able to
get to the point where
01:27:39.250 --> 01:27:41.930
we could reliably shed load
01:27:41.930 --> 01:27:44.250
so we get we get the
instruction work out to shed
01:27:44.250 --> 01:27:46.400
x number of megawatts
and we can shed that.
01:27:47.863 --> 01:27:49.613
The February event highlighted that
01:27:51.119 --> 01:27:52.960
at one time we might have
had 1 million customers out
01:27:52.960 --> 01:27:54.513
for Oncor more than a million.
01:27:55.570 --> 01:27:57.420
If we want to effectively rotate that
01:27:58.500 --> 01:28:01.520
that's a million customers
that you're rotating
01:28:01.520 --> 01:28:03.350
on a regular basis.
01:28:03.350 --> 01:28:05.320
So the pipe which gets bigger and bigger
01:28:05.320 --> 01:28:06.810
and bigger as you think okay load shed
01:28:06.810 --> 01:28:09.310
is one thing but effective rotation
01:28:09.310 --> 01:28:10.660
is potentially another item
01:28:12.417 --> 01:28:15.900
and then the last item
of things that would
01:28:15.900 --> 01:28:19.095
have to be overcome is I've struggled
01:28:19.095 --> 01:28:24.090
with how we would potentially
test a system like that
01:28:24.090 --> 01:28:27.840
to ensure that we would
have a high level of confidence
01:28:27.840 --> 01:28:29.833
that we get the desired result.
01:28:34.060 --> 01:28:36.390
You're talking millions
of meters out there
01:28:36.390 --> 01:28:37.277
and complex control systems
01:28:37.277 --> 01:28:40.200
and communication there's
always something unknown
01:28:40.200 --> 01:28:41.810
that might happen and you
need to do thorough testing
01:28:41.810 --> 01:28:44.210
to make sure that that
it's gonna work correctly
01:28:44.210 --> 01:28:47.550
and that's a challenge that
would have to work through
01:28:47.550 --> 01:28:50.970
and then the last item
just thinking through
01:28:50.970 --> 01:28:52.660
in our real-time control system
01:28:54.090 --> 01:28:57.530
there's you'll have a sporadic
communication issue here
01:28:57.530 --> 01:28:59.160
or some device might not respond exactly
01:28:59.160 --> 01:29:00.490
how you think it would respond
01:29:00.490 --> 01:29:03.530
so if you assume you
had a 99% success rate
01:29:03.530 --> 01:29:05.706
with our real-time control system.
01:29:05.706 --> 01:29:07.440
We're having to do something manually
01:29:07.440 --> 01:29:09.440
to address that last 1% that means
01:29:09.440 --> 01:29:11.720
rolling truck out the field
to address that breaker
01:29:11.720 --> 01:29:13.810
address those customers
whatever it might be
01:29:13.810 --> 01:29:15.610
so if that's 1% on a feeder basis
01:29:15.610 --> 01:29:18.070
that's I'm sending out
a dozen or two trucks
01:29:18.070 --> 01:29:20.300
to different locations on the system.
01:29:20.300 --> 01:29:25.300
If we have that same 1% miss
rate from an AMI standpoint,
01:29:26.467 --> 01:29:29.320
1% of 3.8 million meters
is 38,000 customers
01:29:29.320 --> 01:29:30.480
or truck rolls that we're looking at
01:29:30.480 --> 01:29:32.293
having to roll out in address.
01:29:33.780 --> 01:29:36.570
So all that being said the
purpose of this live was just to
01:29:36.570 --> 01:29:38.560
provide some perspective
on some of the substantial
01:29:38.560 --> 01:29:41.110
infrastructure and architectural
changes that are required
01:29:41.110 --> 01:29:43.240
to make AMI work in that manner.
01:29:43.240 --> 01:29:45.451
So Murphy's law still applies.
01:29:45.451 --> 01:29:47.080
It always applies.
01:29:47.080 --> 01:29:48.350
All right thanks.
01:29:48.350 --> 01:29:49.240
I have one question
01:29:49.240 --> 01:29:52.863
before we move on to the next panelist.
01:29:55.040 --> 01:29:57.820
First of all it sounds very
complex and expensive
01:29:57.820 --> 01:30:01.990
what the AMI involvement in load shed
01:30:01.990 --> 01:30:04.473
but I think it's something
we need to continue
01:30:04.473 --> 01:30:07.100
to maybe look at to see if
there's ways in the future
01:30:07.100 --> 01:30:09.110
that we can kind of make that.
01:30:09.110 --> 01:30:11.110
Make that work and it might be driven by
01:30:12.070 --> 01:30:15.060
the pure size also and and
the unique characteristics
01:30:15.060 --> 01:30:16.883
of your system too, right?
01:30:18.241 --> 01:30:19.840
What I wanted to touch base with you on
01:30:19.840 --> 01:30:21.680
specifically with your company Collin
01:30:21.680 --> 01:30:24.360
is Oncor's use of voltage reduction
01:30:25.200 --> 01:30:29.330
as a tool to reduce load at
the distribution feeder level.
01:30:29.330 --> 01:30:30.900
Can you talk?
01:30:30.900 --> 01:30:33.897
Can you give us a description
of how that tool is used
01:30:33.897 --> 01:30:36.449
and how it works and when it's used.
01:30:36.449 --> 01:30:38.820
Sure that's a good question so
01:30:38.820 --> 01:30:43.320
voltage reduction is a tool that is used
01:30:43.320 --> 01:30:45.050
it's currently in EEA2.
01:30:45.050 --> 01:30:47.535
So when ERCOT reaches the EEA II level
01:30:47.535 --> 01:30:51.310
they'll request TSPs to implement
voltage reduction measures
01:30:53.140 --> 01:30:55.110
there was actually a voltage reduction
01:30:55.110 --> 01:30:58.160
task force with ERCOT that
concluded their work back
01:30:58.160 --> 01:31:03.160
in 2015 I'll get you some
of their findings there but
01:31:04.720 --> 01:31:06.710
the premise of voltage reduction is the
01:31:06.710 --> 01:31:09.350
power is the product of
the voltage and current
01:31:09.350 --> 01:31:13.070
so if you can while
maintaining the appropriate pan
01:31:13.070 --> 01:31:15.490
with the voltage if you can
squeeze that voltage down
01:31:15.490 --> 01:31:16.750
you can reduce the amount of power being
01:31:16.750 --> 01:31:18.550
consumed on the distribution system.
01:31:19.886 --> 01:31:24.183
The task force found
that a demand response
01:31:24.183 --> 01:31:26.490
that could be expected in
what we've actually experienced
01:31:26.490 --> 01:31:29.810
on the Oncor system
could be between one to 2%
01:31:29.810 --> 01:31:34.810
of overall demand based on
the number of stations that have
01:31:36.730 --> 01:31:39.780
the capability to regulate voltage.
01:31:39.780 --> 01:31:41.240
Not all not all transformers
01:31:41.240 --> 01:31:43.070
have the capability to change taps
01:31:43.070 --> 01:31:44.820
and control voltage in this manner.
01:31:46.800 --> 01:31:51.800
At Oncor we have at about
one-third of our eligible
01:31:52.570 --> 01:31:54.320
stations where we have that capability
01:31:54.320 --> 01:31:56.530
we have this remote control set up where
01:31:56.530 --> 01:31:58.310
at the push of a button when ERCOT calls
01:31:58.310 --> 01:32:01.110
for EEA2 voltage
reduction we implement that
01:32:01.960 --> 01:32:05.490
and in previous events we've seen
01:32:07.020 --> 01:32:10.520
upwards of 100 to 120
megawatts of demand
01:32:10.520 --> 01:32:12.370
or not demand response would
01:32:12.370 --> 01:32:14.510
demand reduction as a result of
01:32:14.510 --> 01:32:15.960
voltage reduction activities.
01:32:17.050 --> 01:32:19.260
So that's the kind of
the easy button side of it
01:32:19.260 --> 01:32:23.270
and as we add stations rebuild stations
01:32:23.270 --> 01:32:24.870
that's something that we've integrated
01:32:24.870 --> 01:32:27.880
into our standard design
that capability to do that
01:32:30.200 --> 01:32:31.970
for the other two-thirds of our system
01:32:31.970 --> 01:32:33.630
when we do get that call from ERCOT
01:32:33.630 --> 01:32:35.730
we hit that button and then we also call
01:32:35.730 --> 01:32:37.550
all of our regional operations folks
01:32:37.550 --> 01:32:39.430
and they go out and they start actually
01:32:39.430 --> 01:32:41.880
manually changing those
voltages out in the field
01:32:43.090 --> 01:32:46.750
obviously much slower but
it still gives you some benefit.
01:32:48.379 --> 01:32:53.379
And so this tool is
used during the time
01:32:53.410 --> 01:32:55.070
that ERCOT is an emergency procedure
01:32:55.070 --> 01:32:57.890
so it's not a tool to avoid
emergency procedures
01:32:57.890 --> 01:33:01.137
it's a tool that when you're in
emergency procedures EEA2
01:33:02.260 --> 01:33:06.580
that it would help I
guess lower the amount of
01:33:06.580 --> 01:33:09.100
load that's being reduced it's a lesser.
01:33:09.100 --> 01:33:12.370
So for an IOU the
only time that we use it
01:33:12.370 --> 01:33:17.250
is in emergency and when
it's ordered by ERCOT in EA2.
01:33:17.250 --> 01:33:20.150
Has it, have the
stakeholders has ERCOT
01:33:20.150 --> 01:33:22.900
or the stakeholders
and or the stakeholders
01:33:22.900 --> 01:33:26.800
evaluated whether that
tool could be used earlier
01:33:26.800 --> 01:33:29.747
in the emergency procedures
process like maybe EA1.
01:33:32.160 --> 01:33:33.960
I'm not sure that's
been discussed recently
01:33:33.960 --> 01:33:35.495
but I do think that is something
01:33:35.495 --> 01:33:39.790
that's worth talking about
particularly given that it
01:33:40.940 --> 01:33:43.980
for the vast majority of those
type of benefits it requires
01:33:45.450 --> 01:33:47.510
folks to roll trucks and go
out and make those changes
01:33:47.510 --> 01:33:50.210
so there is a significant
time lag associated with it.
01:33:52.330 --> 01:33:53.663
I think you described
there's like specific equipment
01:33:53.663 --> 01:33:56.180
you can add into the
design of the stations
01:33:57.840 --> 01:33:58.937
and that's something Oncor
01:33:58.937 --> 01:34:01.690
and it's on its own
has decided to look at
01:34:01.690 --> 01:34:03.840
and I think that's an interesting tool
01:34:03.840 --> 01:34:05.850
and I'd be interested in
learning as we move on to
01:34:05.850 --> 01:34:07.050
the other panelists.
01:34:07.050 --> 01:34:09.510
If that is a tool that the
other companies are using
01:34:09.510 --> 01:34:13.810
and if they're not why
not and what would it take
01:34:13.810 --> 01:34:17.140
to allow for this transmission,
01:34:17.140 --> 01:34:20.740
I'm sorry voltage
reduction told to be used
01:34:20.740 --> 01:34:24.660
in the other TDU service
territories so that we can
01:34:25.870 --> 01:34:29.560
potentially garner the benefits
of getting back megawatts
01:34:29.560 --> 01:34:31.720
during load shed procedures.
01:34:31.720 --> 01:34:34.157
So thank you, appreciate it.
01:34:37.056 --> 01:34:38.700
All right thank you Oncor.
01:34:38.700 --> 01:34:41.053
Next up I think we've got CenterPoint.
01:34:41.053 --> 01:34:42.893
Yes thank you very much.
01:34:43.870 --> 01:34:48.070
So significant portion
of what Collin covered
01:34:48.070 --> 01:34:50.040
is true also for CenterPoint
01:34:50.040 --> 01:34:52.653
I think it probably is
for other TSPs as well.
01:34:53.538 --> 01:34:56.900
So I'm gonna highlight
just a few of the other points
01:34:56.900 --> 01:35:00.373
related to starting with
the industrial customers.
01:35:01.340 --> 01:35:03.610
So in terms of the industrial customers
01:35:03.610 --> 01:35:05.340
obviously that's gonna the percentage
01:35:05.340 --> 01:35:07.500
of the load that is industrial customer
01:35:07.500 --> 01:35:09.363
will vary for each utility.
01:35:10.290 --> 01:35:14.550
However that load
reduction or that load amount
01:35:14.550 --> 01:35:17.110
is considered in the allocation of load
01:35:17.110 --> 01:35:20.193
when we start to
calculate obligations that
01:35:20.193 --> 01:35:23.400
were on the table that
Dan showed us earlier
01:35:23.400 --> 01:35:27.790
and so those industrial
customers load is concentrated
01:35:27.790 --> 01:35:30.740
into one footprint but
when they do reduce load
01:35:30.740 --> 01:35:33.940
it benefits obviously ERCOT wide.
01:35:33.940 --> 01:35:36.860
CenterPoint saw similar behavior
01:35:36.860 --> 01:35:38.330
from our industrial customers
01:35:38.330 --> 01:35:42.690
during the February event
reductions of 60 plus percent
01:35:42.690 --> 01:35:44.240
in the industrial load
01:35:44.240 --> 01:35:48.280
and so we also would
not advocate for the utilities
01:35:48.280 --> 01:35:50.530
to be shedding that
load for the same reasons
01:35:50.530 --> 01:35:53.250
there's the health and
safety of the public,
01:35:53.250 --> 01:35:55.216
the operations of those facilities
01:35:55.216 --> 01:35:57.070
and so we think that right now
01:35:57.070 --> 01:36:00.530
that process worked in
terms of reducing the load
01:36:00.530 --> 01:36:02.863
and providing a benefit
to ERCOT as a whole.
01:36:04.060 --> 01:36:07.830
But however the the
the load differential
01:36:07.830 --> 01:36:10.270
as those loads do reduce.
01:36:10.270 --> 01:36:13.880
It reduces the amount of
load in each utility's footprint
01:36:13.880 --> 01:36:17.480
and but the allocation
from the shed obligation
01:36:17.480 --> 01:36:21.860
stays constant so that
allocation for the load shed
01:36:21.860 --> 01:36:24.290
obligation is a Summer number
01:36:24.290 --> 01:36:26.820
and it's a one-time value.
01:36:26.820 --> 01:36:29.260
As the industrial load
changes in the footprint
01:36:29.260 --> 01:36:32.050
that could be as a
percentage due to the season
01:36:32.050 --> 01:36:35.180
so during the Winter the
industrial load may be a higher
01:36:35.180 --> 01:36:37.020
percentage of the total load
01:36:37.020 --> 01:36:40.290
versus the Summer as you
have more air conditioning load
01:36:40.290 --> 01:36:43.980
that differential if you
are into a load shed event
01:36:43.980 --> 01:36:46.450
is then spread to the
residential customers
01:36:46.450 --> 01:36:50.380
and so today there's no
way to really account for that
01:36:50.380 --> 01:36:53.390
change in the industrial
load whether it's seasonal
01:36:53.390 --> 01:36:56.650
or based on the specifics of the event
01:36:56.650 --> 01:37:00.040
and then also there's no way to account
01:37:00.040 --> 01:37:02.660
for the fact that now the
reduced load in the footprint
01:37:02.660 --> 01:37:05.910
is being shed at the residential level
01:37:05.910 --> 01:37:08.870
and so that's something that puts a
01:37:08.870 --> 01:37:11.440
depending on the
allocation of industrial load,
01:37:11.440 --> 01:37:14.360
puts additional load shed requirements
01:37:14.360 --> 01:37:16.650
on the remaining residential load
01:37:16.650 --> 01:37:20.450
to still maintain an arrest
system frequency decay.
01:37:20.450 --> 01:37:23.010
So that's just one of the things
that we wanted to highlight
01:37:23.010 --> 01:37:26.810
in terms of how the
changing of the industrial load
01:37:26.810 --> 01:37:29.330
allocation during an
event or prior to an event
01:37:29.330 --> 01:37:32.023
impacts each utility differently.
01:37:34.770 --> 01:37:36.750
So here on the on the next slide
01:37:36.750 --> 01:37:39.684
it's somewhat of a
related topic in terms of
01:37:39.684 --> 01:37:43.300
how the allocations can
change either seasonally
01:37:43.300 --> 01:37:46.070
or during an event so
what this graph on the right
01:37:46.070 --> 01:37:50.930
at the top is depicting
is based on ERCOT
01:37:50.930 --> 01:37:53.310
weather zone data so we pulled some data
01:37:53.310 --> 01:37:55.250
from the ERCOT website
01:37:55.250 --> 01:37:57.140
which doesn't give us the resolution of
01:37:57.140 --> 01:37:59.340
each individual utility,
01:37:59.340 --> 01:38:01.230
however we can see the different weather
01:38:01.230 --> 01:38:03.610
zones that are listed there
on the bottom so you can see
01:38:03.610 --> 01:38:06.983
Coast and East and Central and so forth.
01:38:08.400 --> 01:38:13.340
So the allocations as you can
see from the plot are changing
01:38:13.340 --> 01:38:16.800
throughout the entire year
but as we just discussed
01:38:16.800 --> 01:38:20.590
the number that we are
obligated to shed is a fixed amount
01:38:20.590 --> 01:38:22.020
based on the Summer.
01:38:22.020 --> 01:38:25.100
So there's been some
discussion on this topic
01:38:25.100 --> 01:38:27.800
however we feel like there
needs to be more study
01:38:27.800 --> 01:38:31.100
to determine what is
the actual bandwidth
01:38:31.100 --> 01:38:33.870
that we are experiencing
in terms of load
01:38:33.870 --> 01:38:37.430
throughout the year or
throughout a particular season
01:38:37.430 --> 01:38:39.290
'cause you can at several points here
01:38:39.290 --> 01:38:41.930
you can see the Winter event is depicted
01:38:41.930 --> 01:38:45.880
where you see these spikes
in kind of that first quarter
01:38:45.880 --> 01:38:49.650
from the left you can see
where there was differences
01:38:49.650 --> 01:38:52.430
in the way that
allocations were changing
01:38:52.430 --> 01:38:55.080
but then also as we
moved later in the year
01:38:55.080 --> 01:38:57.830
the plots are also
showing that same behavior
01:38:57.830 --> 01:39:01.060
just at a much lower scale.
01:39:01.060 --> 01:39:05.940
So the regional allocations
can also impact the ability
01:39:05.940 --> 01:39:08.320
to shed load and to rotate load.
01:39:08.320 --> 01:39:13.320
So as you have more allocation
than you have available load
01:39:13.910 --> 01:39:17.000
it becomes more and more
difficult to rotate the load
01:39:17.000 --> 01:39:19.244
because you're shedding
a larger percentage
01:39:19.244 --> 01:39:21.620
of your remaining share.
01:39:21.620 --> 01:39:24.410
An extreme example of
this would be a hurricane
01:39:24.410 --> 01:39:26.380
scenario during hurricane Ike
01:39:27.240 --> 01:39:29.310
the CenterPoint footprint
we were roughly 5%
01:39:29.310 --> 01:39:32.990
of the ERCOT total system load just
01:39:32.990 --> 01:39:35.620
because we had so many feeder lockouts.
01:39:35.620 --> 01:39:39.090
So one of our concerns
there is that if ERCOT called,
01:39:39.090 --> 01:39:41.710
if for some reason we
had to do a load shed
01:39:41.710 --> 01:39:43.950
during such an extreme event
01:39:43.950 --> 01:39:46.450
the expectation would
be for CenterPoint to shed
01:39:46.450 --> 01:39:48.330
25% of our load
01:39:48.330 --> 01:39:51.200
but if we were already
only 5% of the ERCOT load
01:39:51.200 --> 01:39:55.500
it may not be effective in
arresting a frequency decay
01:39:55.500 --> 01:39:57.980
which then could continue to have to
01:39:57.980 --> 01:39:59.300
shed either additional load
01:39:59.300 --> 01:40:01.860
or if we don't shed the load fast enough
01:40:01.860 --> 01:40:05.130
it could pose a greater
risk to system stability
01:40:05.130 --> 01:40:08.670
and so then in that case
we'd be on the fly trying to
01:40:08.670 --> 01:40:12.680
determine how to
reproportion those allocations
01:40:14.110 --> 01:40:16.310
or the work needs to
be done to determine
01:40:16.310 --> 01:40:19.890
how to do that in advance
so again another area
01:40:19.890 --> 01:40:22.810
where we would like to
see some study conducted
01:40:22.810 --> 01:40:25.070
to understand in these extreme events
01:40:25.070 --> 01:40:28.040
or as the seasons
change are there things
01:40:28.040 --> 01:40:30.018
that we should be doing differently
01:40:30.018 --> 01:40:33.080
in the way that we're
allocating the load
01:40:33.080 --> 01:40:35.960
and then also to Collins
point around the maximum
01:40:35.960 --> 01:40:38.190
we have a minimum
number in terms of the 5,
01:40:38.190 --> 01:40:41.790
10 and 10 or the 25% that
we need to have available
01:40:41.790 --> 01:40:43.240
for under frequency.
01:40:43.240 --> 01:40:47.120
But as these values
change also those allocations
01:40:47.120 --> 01:40:49.380
of under frequency are changing as well
01:40:49.380 --> 01:40:51.730
talk about that a little
bit on the next slide.
01:40:53.750 --> 01:40:57.750
So on this slide you can you
can see some of the main groups
01:40:57.750 --> 01:41:00.490
in this top right chart
01:41:00.490 --> 01:41:03.080
where your exempt feeders
are basically staying the same
01:41:03.080 --> 01:41:05.793
they're static number
and they're maintained.
01:41:06.640 --> 01:41:09.060
The manual load which
is the load that we would
01:41:09.060 --> 01:41:12.040
initially start to shed
is obviously decreasing
01:41:12.040 --> 01:41:14.510
because we're reducing
that amount of load.
01:41:14.510 --> 01:41:18.890
The industrial load is
also decreasing as we saw
01:41:18.890 --> 01:41:21.570
from the chart that Collin provided
01:41:21.570 --> 01:41:23.770
but in total what that means is that
01:41:23.770 --> 01:41:26.600
the amount that's left in
the under frequency relaying
01:41:26.600 --> 01:41:30.940
is increasing because you're
shedding the rest of the load
01:41:30.940 --> 01:41:34.880
and as that does it leads
to this bottom graph where
01:41:36.303 --> 01:41:39.440
the red section of
this chart really depicts
01:41:39.440 --> 01:41:41.120
the efforts that were taking place
01:41:41.120 --> 01:41:43.330
at all the control centers
in the ERCOT footprint
01:41:43.330 --> 01:41:46.750
we were all manually
shedding load either
01:41:46.750 --> 01:41:49.100
by entering it into a load program
01:41:49.100 --> 01:41:52.000
or doing it through more manual means
01:41:52.000 --> 01:41:54.510
to produce that
recovery of the frequency
01:41:54.510 --> 01:41:56.710
that you see in the
red portion of the plot.
01:41:57.650 --> 01:42:01.330
One of the concerns is
that if this under frequency
01:42:01.330 --> 01:42:05.930
value gets too high and then
we shed a tremendous amount
01:42:05.930 --> 01:42:09.630
of load all at once relative
to the total amount of load
01:42:09.630 --> 01:42:13.570
it could potentially result
in power system instability
01:42:13.570 --> 01:42:16.200
so the frequency would
go too high in that case
01:42:16.200 --> 01:42:18.350
and if it went too high then the units
01:42:18.350 --> 01:42:20.730
the generators that we were
concerned about staying on
01:42:20.730 --> 01:42:22.830
could then trip offline
01:42:22.830 --> 01:42:26.350
and if enough of that
happens in rapid succession
01:42:26.350 --> 01:42:27.570
then that instability
01:42:27.570 --> 01:42:30.800
could again lead to a
system-wide blackout.
01:42:30.800 --> 01:42:34.390
So one of the things that we
believe needs to be studied
01:42:34.390 --> 01:42:38.810
is how should we proportion
that under frequency load
01:42:38.810 --> 01:42:42.610
for such a long duration
event as Oncor mentioned
01:42:42.610 --> 01:42:43.780
our typical Summer event
01:42:43.780 --> 01:42:45.740
or the Summer event
we experienced in 2011
01:42:45.740 --> 01:42:48.270
was seven and a half hours long
01:42:48.270 --> 01:42:52.000
whereas this was 70 and a half hours
01:42:52.000 --> 01:42:55.040
and so with those extremely
long duration events
01:42:56.070 --> 01:43:00.170
the ability to continue to
maintain proper under frequency
01:43:00.170 --> 01:43:03.900
relay allocation could
become a critical piece
01:43:03.900 --> 01:43:06.930
of sustaining grid stability
01:43:06.930 --> 01:43:10.040
and so that's something that
ERCOT we need their support
01:43:10.040 --> 01:43:12.340
in understanding and doing the studies
01:43:12.340 --> 01:43:14.530
as to should we not only have a minimum
01:43:14.530 --> 01:43:16.510
but should we also have a maximum
01:43:16.510 --> 01:43:18.347
amount of under frequency
01:43:18.347 --> 01:43:23.347
which also if we start to
implement those types of processes
01:43:23.612 --> 01:43:26.300
will give us additional
load that we can rotate
01:43:26.300 --> 01:43:29.470
because today we don't
have clear direction on
01:43:29.470 --> 01:43:31.270
whether we should or should not rotate
01:43:31.270 --> 01:43:32.550
that under frequency load.
01:43:32.550 --> 01:43:36.720
But again that's sets a
maximum of the tranches
01:43:36.720 --> 01:43:39.490
that you are ordered to
shed at any given time right?
01:43:39.490 --> 01:43:42.290
So basically for your
operational purposes
01:43:42.290 --> 01:43:44.540
you want a more incremental approach
01:43:44.540 --> 01:43:47.540
even if it's in a short like a
machine gun bam bam bam
01:43:48.960 --> 01:43:52.530
sequence but you don't want big bulk
01:43:52.530 --> 01:43:55.115
orders coming down on
you because especially
01:43:55.115 --> 01:43:59.850
you've got so much
that cannot be turned off
01:43:59.850 --> 01:44:01.140
it's transmission level.
01:44:01.140 --> 01:44:02.750
That's correct.
01:44:02.750 --> 01:44:04.700
So question on
the transmission level
01:44:06.280 --> 01:44:10.540
again we're learning
and I think the problem
01:44:10.540 --> 01:44:12.580
in the near term may be more acute
01:44:12.580 --> 01:44:14.980
because we now have
this critical infrastructure
01:44:16.200 --> 01:44:19.803
equation that we've got to
get right for your purposes.
01:44:23.250 --> 01:44:26.690
what's the the status of
discussion or has it been discussed
01:44:28.260 --> 01:44:29.800
you're different from West Texas
01:44:29.800 --> 01:44:31.090
you're different from North Texas
01:44:31.090 --> 01:44:33.310
you have a huge industrial footprint
01:44:33.310 --> 01:44:35.470
along the Houston Ship channel
01:44:35.470 --> 01:44:37.380
you've got a lot of
critical load right there
01:44:37.380 --> 01:44:40.657
already transmission level
which you cannot cut off
01:44:40.657 --> 01:44:44.620
but we're seeing that they
voluntarily turn themselves off
01:44:44.620 --> 01:44:46.100
they reduce load,
01:44:46.100 --> 01:44:48.360
so is there any proportionality between
01:44:48.360 --> 01:44:52.270
again there's this is
kind of a Dan thing too
01:44:52.270 --> 01:44:57.270
but your customers are
voluntarily going into an event
01:44:57.830 --> 01:44:59.730
shedding load or they're
turning themselves off
01:44:59.730 --> 01:45:02.190
they're reducing right load
01:45:02.190 --> 01:45:07.190
and but you're still asked to
shed however many megawatts
01:45:07.400 --> 01:45:10.180
because that's your allocation
on the ERCOT system.
01:45:10.180 --> 01:45:11.462
Correct.
01:45:11.462 --> 01:45:14.041
Is there any discussion
on proportional
01:45:14.041 --> 01:45:19.041
as your load reduces
not having that allocation
01:45:19.460 --> 01:45:22.900
or pegging that allocation to
the voluntary reduction load
01:45:22.900 --> 01:45:24.340
is there any conversation around that?
01:45:24.340 --> 01:45:26.750
There is and that's
what we're looking forward
01:45:26.750 --> 01:45:30.050
to studying with ERCOT is understanding
01:45:30.050 --> 01:45:33.440
what is the mechanism in
which we could accomplish that?
01:45:33.440 --> 01:45:35.620
And so the there's two
things that happened
01:45:35.620 --> 01:45:38.610
during the Winter storm
you had the industrial load
01:45:38.610 --> 01:45:41.780
that was reducing
but then there was also
01:45:41.780 --> 01:45:44.810
and you see it in the in
the weather zone data
01:45:44.810 --> 01:45:47.430
a temperature gradient also
that we were experiencing.
01:45:47.430 --> 01:45:50.920
So on the coast the
megawatts per customer
01:45:50.920 --> 01:45:54.920
was at a slightly
different rate than maybe
01:45:54.920 --> 01:45:58.890
extreme cold in the North
more northern parts of the state.
01:45:58.890 --> 01:46:03.890
So we need a way in our
opinion to normalize that load shed
01:46:05.620 --> 01:46:07.500
kind of like what you're saying
01:46:07.500 --> 01:46:10.340
but then also there will be
times where maybe there's
01:46:10.340 --> 01:46:12.890
extreme heat in the Houston area
01:46:12.890 --> 01:46:15.410
and so the gradient
has swung the other way
01:46:15.410 --> 01:46:18.300
and that's what we see
in the preliminary data
01:46:18.300 --> 01:46:23.300
is that there it is not
a unidirectional shift
01:46:23.720 --> 01:46:26.490
it varies based on the weather
01:46:26.490 --> 01:46:29.490
and whatever events are taking place
01:46:29.490 --> 01:46:32.880
and so to account
for the variation first
01:46:32.880 --> 01:46:35.093
to understand how large is the variation
01:46:35.093 --> 01:46:39.870
and can we what is
the most simplistic way
01:46:39.870 --> 01:46:41.490
to make it equitable.
01:46:41.490 --> 01:46:44.540
But then once we understand
what the variation is
01:46:44.540 --> 01:46:47.500
I think then we can
design something that will
01:46:47.500 --> 01:46:51.800
allow us to shed load in
the most efficient manner.
01:46:51.800 --> 01:46:54.040
Because the other thing
that we have to touch on
01:46:54.040 --> 01:46:56.340
from a technical standpoint
is the more efficient
01:46:56.340 --> 01:46:59.737
the load shed the faster we
get the load off of the system
01:46:59.737 --> 01:47:02.943
and the quicker we can
arrest the frequency decay.
01:47:03.910 --> 01:47:07.270
So if you're having to
shed I make a number up
01:47:07.270 --> 01:47:10.550
20% more customers to get
the same number of megawatts
01:47:10.550 --> 01:47:13.320
because it's in a less low dense area
01:47:13.320 --> 01:47:16.570
it's gonna take longer to
get that load off the system
01:47:16.570 --> 01:47:18.720
and one thing that we
learned from the Winter storm
01:47:18.720 --> 01:47:20.110
is speed is of the essence
01:47:20.110 --> 01:47:24.660
and I think that was why
ERCOT sent that RFQ out
01:47:24.660 --> 01:47:27.810
and we try to provide the information
01:47:27.810 --> 01:47:30.280
as to how quickly we
can reduce that load
01:47:30.280 --> 01:47:32.160
because we do need to be doing it
01:47:32.160 --> 01:47:34.243
in the most efficient manners possible.
01:47:36.990 --> 01:47:40.833
How many natural gas
facilities do you have?
01:47:42.250 --> 01:47:44.480
Natural gas facilities
do you have registered
01:47:44.480 --> 01:47:46.283
as critical load.
01:47:46.283 --> 01:47:50.766
We have 18 so we don't have
near the challenges of others.
01:47:50.766 --> 01:47:54.530
During the Winter storm
we did have two that called in
01:47:54.530 --> 01:47:58.400
that were not previously registered
01:47:58.400 --> 01:48:02.580
but we don't have near the
challenges of West Texas.
01:48:02.580 --> 01:48:04.357
So your natural
gas related facilities
01:48:04.357 --> 01:48:06.223
are more downstream assets.
01:48:07.110 --> 01:48:08.990
Yeah that we assume
so obviously we don't
01:48:08.990 --> 01:48:10.310
have that level of detail.
01:48:10.310 --> 01:48:12.570
So we have been participating in the
01:48:12.570 --> 01:48:14.690
gas electric working group through ERCOT
01:48:14.690 --> 01:48:17.270
where we are able to
coordinate with some of the folks
01:48:17.270 --> 01:48:22.270
in our footprint and then
naturally after the Winter storm
01:48:22.380 --> 01:48:27.190
we had six additional
folks that contacted us
01:48:27.190 --> 01:48:28.920
through the process.
01:48:28.920 --> 01:48:31.190
But we don't have a lot of insight into
01:48:31.190 --> 01:48:33.160
what their facilities are providing.
01:48:33.160 --> 01:48:35.230
Okay but you before
the storm you it sounds like
01:48:35.230 --> 01:48:36.320
you had 10.
01:48:36.320 --> 01:48:37.200
Yes.
01:48:37.200 --> 01:48:39.010
Natural gas
facilities registered
01:48:39.010 --> 01:48:40.710
as critical infrastructure
now you've got 18.
01:48:40.710 --> 01:48:41.543
Correct.
01:48:41.543 --> 01:48:43.590
So even though it's not the
numbers of the West Texas.
01:48:43.590 --> 01:48:47.450
That's ratio yes it's
still right that's a yes.
01:48:47.450 --> 01:48:49.732
80% increase in registration.
01:48:49.732 --> 01:48:50.565
Correct.
01:48:50.565 --> 01:48:52.660
But I wonder how
how big is that load
01:48:52.660 --> 01:48:55.900
were those eight that came
on are they really big loads.
01:48:55.900 --> 01:48:58.513
I don't have the
specifics yeah.
01:48:59.510 --> 01:49:00.710
So that's interesting.
01:49:02.210 --> 01:49:06.620
Such a stark significant
difference between Oncor
01:49:06.620 --> 01:49:08.940
service territory that
obviously covers the oil patch
01:49:08.940 --> 01:49:11.690
and Permian Basin and elsewhere
01:49:11.690 --> 01:49:16.270
and I guess Delaware as well and versus
01:49:16.270 --> 01:49:19.230
CenterPoint service territory
that's heavily industrial
01:49:19.230 --> 01:49:22.050
so your challenges are more with the
01:49:22.050 --> 01:49:24.570
I guess the challenges in load shed
01:49:24.570 --> 01:49:29.570
are more focused on the
industrial loads that are exempt
01:49:32.190 --> 01:49:34.453
from load shed procedures.
01:49:35.930 --> 01:49:39.363
Yes lets me say that really
is our biggest challenge.
01:49:41.140 --> 01:49:43.050
So I should have
added one thing earlier
01:49:43.050 --> 01:49:45.770
and that is there's been
some discussion about
01:49:45.770 --> 01:49:49.660
how do you manage the
critical loads in the Eagle Ford
01:49:49.660 --> 01:49:53.000
the way that the current
process this natural gas
01:49:53.000 --> 01:49:57.847
critical form is structured
it has to be turned into
01:49:58.940 --> 01:50:03.780
the wires company that
serves whatever that thing is
01:50:03.780 --> 01:50:06.040
it's a compressor station it might be
01:50:06.040 --> 01:50:10.350
San Bernard electric co-op or
if it's a midstream processing
01:50:10.350 --> 01:50:14.320
it might be TNMP but that's how
01:50:14.320 --> 01:50:16.063
we try to avoid duplication.
01:50:19.231 --> 01:50:22.850
Yeah and it's a fair
point the load size
01:50:22.850 --> 01:50:27.850
on CenterPoint area is
probably large natural gas assets
01:50:31.550 --> 01:50:36.010
with big loads but once you
get past the midstream point
01:50:36.010 --> 01:50:40.240
they're less relevant to
the generation supply chain.
01:50:40.240 --> 01:50:42.420
So another element of balance.
01:50:44.720 --> 01:50:49.030
And if I could ask
does CenterPoint have
01:50:49.030 --> 01:50:51.790
a voltage reduction tool at this time.
01:50:51.790 --> 01:50:53.630
So we don't have a
tool we have a plan.
01:50:53.630 --> 01:50:58.530
So we implement CVR on a manual basis
01:50:59.880 --> 01:51:03.710
the days where conservation
voltage reduction are
01:51:03.710 --> 01:51:07.080
most likely to be called on are usually
01:51:07.080 --> 01:51:09.280
gonna be days where
we can see that event
01:51:09.280 --> 01:51:11.093
it's a slow progressing event.
01:51:12.320 --> 01:51:16.350
It's not like the under frequency
relay event that happens
01:51:16.350 --> 01:51:18.170
out of the blue sky.
01:51:18.170 --> 01:51:20.810
So on those days
what we will typically do
01:51:20.810 --> 01:51:23.670
is we will dispatch our
crews to the substations
01:51:23.670 --> 01:51:27.240
so they're pre-positioned
in the case that
01:51:27.240 --> 01:51:30.780
we need to reduce the voltage
on the distribution system
01:51:31.730 --> 01:51:34.650
but this is also another
difference that's gonna occur
01:51:34.650 --> 01:51:36.950
from system to system
and so I think that's probably
01:51:36.950 --> 01:51:40.560
gonna be a reoccurring
theme is that it depends
01:51:40.560 --> 01:51:41.883
based on the system.
01:51:42.980 --> 01:51:46.380
It largely depends on the
load characteristics of the
01:51:46.380 --> 01:51:50.090
customers that are connected
to your feeders as to how well
01:51:50.090 --> 01:51:52.180
voltage reduction is gonna work
01:51:53.030 --> 01:51:58.030
and mainly that's because
as you reduce the voltage
01:51:58.090 --> 01:52:00.870
the work that needs to
be done is still the same.
01:52:00.870 --> 01:52:05.300
So in terms of air conditioning
what we found on studies
01:52:05.300 --> 01:52:07.539
we performed some studies on our system
01:52:07.539 --> 01:52:12.497
and so we would get an
initial reduction in demand,
01:52:14.070 --> 01:52:17.090
however because of the loss of diversity
01:52:17.090 --> 01:52:21.040
so the diversity is how many AC units
01:52:21.040 --> 01:52:23.740
are running simultaneously,
01:52:23.740 --> 01:52:27.310
so as you as you reduce the the voltage
01:52:27.310 --> 01:52:31.740
it typically the air
conditioner then runs longer
01:52:31.740 --> 01:52:34.220
and so where you may
have five on at a time
01:52:34.220 --> 01:52:37.560
out of 100 that number
continually increases
01:52:37.560 --> 01:52:40.980
as the units run longer and
they start to overlap each other
01:52:40.980 --> 01:52:44.110
so after about 35 to 40
minutes we would actually see
01:52:44.110 --> 01:52:49.040
the load start to increase
again to the levels that it was
01:52:49.040 --> 01:52:51.730
prior to when we did
the voltage reduction.
01:52:51.730 --> 01:52:56.620
So the voltage reduction
effect is not sustained
01:52:56.620 --> 01:52:58.940
depending on the type of load
01:52:58.940 --> 01:53:02.240
but if you have resistive
heating where it's more
01:53:03.530 --> 01:53:08.160
constant power then you
can get a more sustained effect
01:53:08.160 --> 01:53:10.320
so it depends on the time of year,
01:53:10.320 --> 01:53:13.990
it depends on the type of load
01:53:13.990 --> 01:53:16.890
and so for those reasons
we haven't implemented
01:53:16.890 --> 01:53:21.050
a automated process of
doing voltage reduction
01:53:21.050 --> 01:53:24.962
but we do have predetermined
feeders that we study each year
01:53:24.962 --> 01:53:27.660
and our distribution
planning our engineering folks
01:53:27.660 --> 01:53:30.857
will study those feeders tell
us where we can pre-position
01:53:30.857 --> 01:53:33.050
our substation resources
01:53:33.050 --> 01:53:35.593
where they will be most
effective on our system.
01:53:37.540 --> 01:53:41.250
So the voltage
reduction practices
01:53:41.250 --> 01:53:43.090
that you're currently conducting
01:53:43.090 --> 01:53:46.442
are just sort of voluntary actions
01:53:46.442 --> 01:53:47.350
that you take they're not
01:53:47.350 --> 01:53:49.840
baked into the emergency
procedures process.
01:53:49.840 --> 01:53:53.150
No similar to Oncor it
would be during the EA2.
01:53:53.150 --> 01:53:54.333
Okay thank you.
Yeah.
01:53:57.400 --> 01:53:59.353
All right thank you CenterPoint
01:53:59.353 --> 01:54:00.733
next up is TNMP.
01:54:01.700 --> 01:54:03.450
Thank you chairman
Commissioners.
01:54:05.380 --> 01:54:07.290
Oncor and CenterPoint provided
01:54:07.290 --> 01:54:09.660
some really great
information this morning.
01:54:09.660 --> 01:54:11.700
Keith and I would like
to drill down a little bit
01:54:11.700 --> 01:54:13.500
to discuss how load shed it affect
01:54:13.500 --> 01:54:17.270
a small electric utility TNMP.
01:54:17.270 --> 01:54:20.650
TNMP does not serve
large cities like Houston
01:54:20.650 --> 01:54:24.460
Fort Worth or Dallas what we do serve is
01:54:24.460 --> 01:54:28.123
suburbs of some of those
areas and rural towns in Texas.
01:54:30.200 --> 01:54:32.870
But we do serve some very important load
01:54:32.870 --> 01:54:35.540
specifically along with Oncor and AEP
01:54:35.540 --> 01:54:39.620
we do serve natural gas and
petroleum out in West Texas
01:54:39.620 --> 01:54:43.460
and like CenterPoint we serve refineries
01:54:43.460 --> 01:54:46.163
and petrochemicals
in the Texas city area.
01:54:47.370 --> 01:54:50.320
What I show, what we show here is the
01:54:50.320 --> 01:54:53.430
TNMP's 4CP at ERCOT times
01:54:53.430 --> 01:54:55.530
and obviously you should as you can see
01:54:55.530 --> 01:54:57.290
that ranges anywhere from about a little
01:54:57.290 --> 01:55:00.060
over 1800 megawatts to 2000 megawatts
01:55:00.060 --> 01:55:03.440
with an average of
roughly 1900 megawatts.
01:55:03.440 --> 01:55:08.000
Embedded in this 1900
megawatts is 550 megawatts
01:55:08.000 --> 01:55:10.060
of transmission load
01:55:10.060 --> 01:55:13.370
and is what we've heard today already is
01:55:13.370 --> 01:55:16.540
that 550 megawatts of transmission load
01:55:16.540 --> 01:55:19.903
is not something we consider
in the load shed event.
01:55:22.210 --> 01:55:25.290
But once again that 550 megawatts
01:55:25.290 --> 01:55:29.953
is included when we get
our load shed amount ratio.
01:55:32.880 --> 01:55:34.860
As I show on this slide as well our we
01:55:34.860 --> 01:55:38.200
actually had a peak
demand on February 14th of
01:55:38.200 --> 01:55:43.200
at roughly 6:30 p.m of a
little over 1700 megawatts.
01:55:45.300 --> 01:55:49.660
On February 15th
around right after midnight
01:55:49.660 --> 01:55:53.723
that had dropped down to 1647 megawatts.
01:55:54.560 --> 01:55:58.000
We could see that some of
the transmission customers were
01:55:58.000 --> 01:55:59.810
curtailing either on their own
01:55:59.810 --> 01:56:03.160
or participating in the
emergency response at ERCOT
01:56:04.620 --> 01:56:06.430
but what this shows is that
01:56:07.570 --> 01:56:10.730
on the beginning of the
morning of February 15th
01:56:10.730 --> 01:56:14.380
our load was already down 13%
01:56:14.380 --> 01:56:16.617
of what was calculated
for our load ratio shed
01:56:16.617 --> 01:56:20.363
that we were gonna have
to start load shedding.
01:56:25.320 --> 01:56:29.950
I'm gonna let Keith address
some of the specific challenges
01:56:29.950 --> 01:56:32.503
that he saw and from
his operations group.
01:56:35.270 --> 01:56:38.040
Good morning one of the
things one of the benefits I guess
01:56:38.040 --> 01:56:40.070
is going after my colleagues
is that I can point straight
01:56:40.070 --> 01:56:42.570
to him and say pretty much
what they said happened but
01:56:42.570 --> 01:56:45.200
in a sense I'd like to
cover it a little bit about
01:56:45.200 --> 01:56:47.590
what our load service
territory challenges are
01:56:47.590 --> 01:56:49.680
is that in availability of SCADA
01:56:49.680 --> 01:56:51.800
in all of our substations
as you can see by the
01:56:51.800 --> 01:56:55.040
the numerous little pockets
and smaller areas that we serve
01:56:55.040 --> 01:56:58.370
is very dependent upon
communications infrastructure.
01:56:58.370 --> 01:57:00.930
In my opinion from my experience
01:57:00.930 --> 01:57:02.820
we do a pretty decent
job of this already
01:57:02.820 --> 01:57:06.530
we only have about 11% of our
feeders that are not on SCADA
01:57:06.530 --> 01:57:09.330
however the downside
of that is that going out
01:57:09.330 --> 01:57:12.120
and putting them is that as
the gentleman from AEP said
01:57:12.120 --> 01:57:15.210
is that putting it out there's
very limited load available
01:57:15.210 --> 01:57:17.410
even in these rural areas to hit that.
01:57:17.410 --> 01:57:21.730
So impact emergency and
response service participants
01:57:21.730 --> 01:57:24.530
is that during the event
as Stacy said we saw
01:57:24.530 --> 01:57:26.750
loads dropping on the
transmission system.
01:57:26.750 --> 01:57:29.480
Some of those customers
were participating in ERS
01:57:29.480 --> 01:57:31.520
some of the other transmission customers
01:57:31.520 --> 01:57:33.190
they may have been
curtailing on their own
01:57:33.190 --> 01:57:34.400
from the voluntary
01:57:34.400 --> 01:57:37.270
they may have been
experiencing conditions on their own
01:57:37.270 --> 01:57:39.760
equipment that necessitated that.
01:57:39.760 --> 01:57:43.140
I know at least one case we
had a large facility that had
01:57:43.140 --> 01:57:46.610
Cogen right next door that
was typically a large exporter
01:57:46.610 --> 01:57:49.030
onto the system and
suddenly that flipped
01:57:49.030 --> 01:57:51.630
and was actually
taking off of the system
01:57:51.630 --> 01:57:53.130
so I think Liz covered that earlier is
01:57:53.130 --> 01:57:55.610
that we saw that in there as well.
01:57:55.610 --> 01:57:58.560
The under frequency load
shed we've discussed pretty
01:57:58.560 --> 01:58:01.790
intensively around that we have to set
01:58:01.790 --> 01:58:04.380
that certain block away
that's that external to anything
01:58:04.380 --> 01:58:07.330
that we put in a manual
load shed program
01:58:07.330 --> 01:58:10.380
so there's a large block
of the load that we had
01:58:10.380 --> 01:58:11.980
that was not available for rotation
01:58:11.980 --> 01:58:14.700
and what this meant is that
what you heard earlier is that
01:58:14.700 --> 01:58:17.780
very early on in the
event because of our size
01:58:17.780 --> 01:58:20.810
and the scale of the
event we had implemented
01:58:20.810 --> 01:58:22.920
our automatic load shedding program
01:58:22.920 --> 01:58:24.690
and pretty much hit the maximum to where
01:58:24.690 --> 01:58:26.630
no rotation was happening.
01:58:26.630 --> 01:58:30.230
So for those of you who
have been around a long time
01:58:30.230 --> 01:58:32.547
you probably understand
when Y2K was out there
01:58:32.547 --> 01:58:34.810
and all of the things
that happened with Y2K
01:58:34.810 --> 01:58:37.290
and all the bad things
we were told happening
01:58:37.290 --> 01:58:39.530
I kind of characterized
this event as Y2K
01:58:39.530 --> 01:58:41.350
with a social media kicker
01:58:41.350 --> 01:58:44.060
because as things
happened in various areas
01:58:44.060 --> 01:58:45.800
as we started rotating outages
01:58:45.800 --> 01:58:48.830
and then as we started
not having rotating outages
01:58:48.830 --> 01:58:50.560
the communications got out there that
01:58:50.560 --> 01:58:53.120
hey things are happening
lights aren't coming back on
01:58:53.120 --> 01:58:54.530
what's going on.
01:58:54.530 --> 01:58:55.700
We were very privy to that
01:58:55.700 --> 01:58:57.410
and we started trying
to get very inventive
01:58:57.410 --> 01:59:00.420
on what can we do
to implement rotations.
01:59:00.420 --> 01:59:02.887
We talked a little bit
about actually going
01:59:02.887 --> 01:59:04.770
and switching out
under frequency feeders
01:59:04.770 --> 01:59:06.340
by changing relay settings
01:59:06.340 --> 01:59:09.420
and making a feeder that
wasn't available for rotation
01:59:09.420 --> 01:59:11.330
because it was on
an under frequency list
01:59:11.330 --> 01:59:14.240
available for rotation in the meantime
01:59:14.240 --> 01:59:16.490
going and enabling a
feeder that was rotated
01:59:16.490 --> 01:59:18.340
and making that part of
our under frequency block
01:59:18.340 --> 01:59:19.880
so we could keep that hole.
01:59:19.880 --> 01:59:21.530
So that was a learning experience for me
01:59:21.530 --> 01:59:23.480
to say well maybe we should be putting
01:59:23.480 --> 01:59:26.050
under frequency remote
capability into our substation
01:59:26.050 --> 01:59:27.680
so we can switch that on the fly
01:59:27.680 --> 01:59:30.190
and as Collin mentioned
that's a big coordination problem
01:59:30.190 --> 01:59:32.080
because your under frequency requirement
01:59:32.080 --> 01:59:33.470
is constantly changing.
01:59:33.470 --> 01:59:36.180
So that's something
that we need to study
01:59:36.180 --> 01:59:38.835
as far as the number of gas customers
01:59:38.835 --> 01:59:40.350
that we had in our system as you can see
01:59:40.350 --> 01:59:42.840
we serve a big portion
of the Permian as well
01:59:42.840 --> 01:59:45.470
before the event we had
about two customers registered
01:59:45.470 --> 01:59:50.100
we ended up just
recently we're at about 177
01:59:50.100 --> 01:59:53.490
so we saw an exponential
increase in that as well.
01:59:53.490 --> 01:59:55.990
So I think the challenge
with gas customers
01:59:55.990 --> 01:59:59.070
as everyone knows is
that assigning criticality
01:59:59.070 --> 02:00:01.040
is probably gonna be
one of the biggest things
02:00:01.040 --> 02:00:02.850
that I think we can get help for
02:00:02.850 --> 02:00:05.670
is that I've traditionally been in
02:00:05.670 --> 02:00:08.490
historically I've had some
experience in gas contracts
02:00:08.490 --> 02:00:11.180
and when we're dealing
at least in TNMP's case
02:00:11.180 --> 02:00:13.500
we're getting notifications
from the operators on site
02:00:13.500 --> 02:00:15.960
that hey my facility is critical
02:00:15.960 --> 02:00:18.970
but in reality when you're
putting in a gas contract
02:00:18.970 --> 02:00:20.940
you're not going and
saying individual whales
02:00:20.940 --> 02:00:23.130
are putting into the whole entire pipe
02:00:23.130 --> 02:00:25.120
and this well is
critical this was critical
02:00:25.120 --> 02:00:27.630
it's usually a package
of a volume of gas.
02:00:27.630 --> 02:00:30.480
So we're trying to get
explanations from the operators
02:00:30.480 --> 02:00:32.780
a little bit more we're
trying to dive down
02:00:32.780 --> 02:00:34.310
into it a little bit
more and saying well
02:00:34.310 --> 02:00:35.430
tell me how this is critical
02:00:35.430 --> 02:00:37.040
do you have a contract for it
02:00:37.040 --> 02:00:38.770
where is it going ex cetera.
02:00:38.770 --> 02:00:41.160
The experience that I've
had is that I've reviewed
02:00:41.160 --> 02:00:43.590
some of the easy IDs that have come in
02:00:43.590 --> 02:00:45.550
and just from you know being nosy
02:00:45.550 --> 02:00:47.050
and Google earthing on my look
02:00:47.050 --> 02:00:49.330
and I say wow well that
doesn't look very critical to me
02:00:49.330 --> 02:00:51.310
because it looks like
a series of trailers.
02:00:51.310 --> 02:00:54.480
So you go well that's
your are you telling me that
02:00:54.480 --> 02:00:57.090
the place where you're
keeping your workers is critical
02:00:57.090 --> 02:00:59.660
to your outfit yes or
no so that's kind of
02:00:59.660 --> 02:01:00.590
that's a little different
02:01:00.590 --> 02:01:03.160
it's different in the semantics I guess.
02:01:03.160 --> 02:01:04.033
So that's one of the things
02:01:04.033 --> 02:01:05.913
that we're really working through.
02:01:07.340 --> 02:01:10.450
With that as we're
kind of a hybrid between
02:01:10.450 --> 02:01:13.760
CenterPoint and Oncor
service territory albeit
02:01:13.760 --> 02:01:15.460
on a smaller scale is that
02:01:15.460 --> 02:01:18.330
we have a large impact of
commercial customers down
02:01:18.330 --> 02:01:20.420
in the Texas city area,
02:01:20.420 --> 02:01:23.740
our experience during
that was is that as they were
02:01:23.740 --> 02:01:26.560
either reducing load
or not reducing load
02:01:26.560 --> 02:01:28.320
but their suppliers were reducing load
02:01:28.320 --> 02:01:31.210
which caused their
plants to start reducing
02:01:31.210 --> 02:01:32.470
we were getting phone calls
02:01:32.470 --> 02:01:33.610
are you reducing these guys
02:01:33.610 --> 02:01:35.640
are you curtailing them when in fact
02:01:35.640 --> 02:01:38.213
there was no director from TNMP to do.
02:01:38.213 --> 02:01:41.330
So it's a very dynamic
situation on the flip side
02:01:41.330 --> 02:01:44.310
in West Texas you know we were still
02:01:44.310 --> 02:01:47.070
seeing a lot of the
gas facilities that were
02:01:47.070 --> 02:01:49.260
trying to stay up but either couldn't
02:01:49.260 --> 02:01:52.430
we were not necessarily
rotating a large volume of them
02:01:52.430 --> 02:01:54.780
but we were a smaller footprint so
02:01:55.810 --> 02:01:57.250
that's kind of our experience with that
02:01:57.250 --> 02:02:00.003
and with that I'll take
any questions or Stacey.
02:02:01.600 --> 02:02:04.380
How many natural gas
facilities do you currently
02:02:04.380 --> 02:02:05.830
have registered as critical load.
02:02:05.830 --> 02:02:08.378
177, it was two
prior to the event.
02:02:08.378 --> 02:02:10.730
And they were
transmission rates.
02:02:10.730 --> 02:02:12.940
Yeah the two that we
had were transmission.
02:02:12.940 --> 02:02:15.080
So they wouldn't have
been rotated anyway.
02:02:15.080 --> 02:02:16.490
Right.
02:02:16.490 --> 02:02:18.680
Their transmission
level customers?
02:02:18.680 --> 02:02:19.513
Right.
02:02:19.513 --> 02:02:23.020
Got you, the any
sense of same question
02:02:23.020 --> 02:02:27.040
are there any sense of what
type of natural gas facility
02:02:27.040 --> 02:02:29.760
is now on that list of 171.
02:02:29.760 --> 02:02:32.900
It varies we have
large compressor stations
02:02:32.900 --> 02:02:35.160
we've had individual well customers
02:02:35.160 --> 02:02:38.120
this is off the easy ID
level what I'm talking about.
02:02:38.120 --> 02:02:39.730
We've seen individual facilities,
02:02:39.730 --> 02:02:40.950
we've seen individual fields
02:02:40.950 --> 02:02:44.420
all the way up to large
compression those kinds of things,
02:02:44.420 --> 02:02:46.687
it's all over the all of them the gamut.
02:02:46.687 --> 02:02:48.270
Okay interesting.
02:02:51.090 --> 02:02:54.920
Do you utilize
voltage reduction.
02:02:54.920 --> 02:02:57.220
Yeah much the
same as CenterPoint is
02:02:57.220 --> 02:03:00.010
that it's more of a
manual situation for us
02:03:00.010 --> 02:03:05.010
we don't have, our transmission
stops at about 138KV
02:03:05.450 --> 02:03:08.980
so we will dispatch it's
primarily in the Gulf Coast
02:03:08.980 --> 02:03:11.470
that we have distribution
load that's available
02:03:11.470 --> 02:03:14.070
for voltage reduction that's
done under EA2 as well.
02:03:17.900 --> 02:03:19.850
Is there any and I
guess maybe this is
02:03:19.850 --> 02:03:22.180
just general question
across the board it sounds like
02:03:22.180 --> 02:03:23.920
depending on your service territory
02:03:23.920 --> 02:03:28.590
the unique characteristics
on of your service territories
02:03:28.590 --> 02:03:32.630
voltage reduction means
different things for each company
02:03:32.630 --> 02:03:36.530
is there anything that we
as a PUC and or ERCOT
02:03:36.530 --> 02:03:39.873
can do to drive more of that,
02:03:41.460 --> 02:03:44.142
more use of voltage reduction
02:03:44.142 --> 02:03:48.440
and to drive that investment
or incent those actions.
02:03:50.050 --> 02:03:53.810
In the TNMP case we're
participating in the studies
02:03:53.810 --> 02:03:55.230
and we would be incented just by
02:03:55.230 --> 02:03:57.430
what the results of the
study say for the benefit
02:03:57.430 --> 02:03:58.610
of the system.
02:03:58.610 --> 02:04:01.580
So we're relatively small players
02:04:01.580 --> 02:04:05.750
so our loads you know the one
to 2% would not necessarily be
02:04:05.750 --> 02:04:08.120
a large significant benefit but we would
02:04:08.120 --> 02:04:09.720
definitely participate as we go.
02:04:11.200 --> 02:04:14.950
It's just as you sort of look
across the broad spectrum
02:04:14.950 --> 02:04:19.950
of all the TDUs in the
ERCOT region that potentially
02:04:21.250 --> 02:04:24.900
there could be additional
benefits that we can gain
02:04:24.900 --> 02:04:29.900
through voltage reduction
by either moving it up
02:04:30.500 --> 02:04:32.150
in the emergency procedure process
02:04:32.150 --> 02:04:34.050
so that maybe we don't get to you know
02:04:36.670 --> 02:04:39.340
help mitigate the risk of gonna EA2
02:04:39.340 --> 02:04:44.210
and also to reduce
the amount of load shed
02:04:44.210 --> 02:04:47.980
if it stays in EA I guess
well I guess EA3 is load shed
02:04:47.980 --> 02:04:51.500
but I guess there there seems to be like
02:04:51.500 --> 02:04:53.790
more benefits we can
garner from this tool
02:04:53.790 --> 02:04:55.150
so that's what I'm kind of just trying
02:04:55.150 --> 02:04:56.543
to evaluate right now.
02:04:59.900 --> 02:05:03.150
I think for CenterPoint we
probably see more advantages
02:05:03.150 --> 02:05:05.030
in the load management space
02:05:05.030 --> 02:05:07.708
than the voltage
reduction space so we were
02:05:07.708 --> 02:05:09.590
very encouraged by some of the recent
02:05:09.590 --> 02:05:11.330
changes to allow us to do more
02:05:11.330 --> 02:05:13.350
in that load management area
02:05:13.350 --> 02:05:16.410
because the net effect
and the long-term effect
02:05:16.410 --> 02:05:19.350
of the load management
is more significant
02:05:19.350 --> 02:05:21.850
than the voltage reduction piece
02:05:21.850 --> 02:05:24.030
and so I would say if
we were gonna focus
02:05:24.030 --> 02:05:26.570
we would probably focus
more of our attention to
02:05:27.460 --> 02:05:30.810
how expediently we can get
the load management programs
02:05:30.810 --> 02:05:32.460
up and going because I think they're
02:05:32.460 --> 02:05:34.223
gonna be a bigger impact.
02:05:35.910 --> 02:05:37.450
That's a really good point Eric
02:05:37.450 --> 02:05:41.820
and it's not clear from
Senate Bill 3 whether
02:05:42.690 --> 02:05:44.620
the additional load management programs
02:05:44.620 --> 02:05:48.830
are intended to be a part of
our energy efficiency portfolio
02:05:48.830 --> 02:05:50.520
or separate from
02:05:50.520 --> 02:05:55.520
and on the one hand it
doesn't specifically call out
02:05:55.690 --> 02:05:58.720
a Commission rulemaking on this issue
02:05:58.720 --> 02:06:02.920
on the other hand at
least some initial clarity
02:06:02.920 --> 02:06:06.200
particularly around interim
adoption of the programs
02:06:06.200 --> 02:06:07.553
would be really beneficial.
02:06:08.460 --> 02:06:09.330
I agree.
02:06:09.330 --> 02:06:11.470
Within the load
management universe
02:06:11.470 --> 02:06:14.440
what are the top two or
three things that you'd say
02:06:14.440 --> 02:06:16.963
we need to be focused
on or implementing.
02:06:19.500 --> 02:06:22.750
Well historically there's
been some tension
02:06:22.750 --> 02:06:27.550
on having the energy efficiency
load management programs
02:06:27.550 --> 02:06:30.800
relative to some of the ERCOT
load management programs
02:06:30.800 --> 02:06:33.970
like ERS one of the things that was done
02:06:33.970 --> 02:06:37.990
after 2011 to try to
reconcile that is that
02:06:37.990 --> 02:06:42.990
all of the TDU load management
programs are called by ERCOT
02:06:43.330 --> 02:06:46.780
so we will implement
at ERCOT's instruction
02:06:48.370 --> 02:06:52.490
another piece is it's
something as basic as
02:06:52.490 --> 02:06:55.550
the way the math is set
up around energy efficiency
02:06:55.550 --> 02:06:58.310
and demonstrating
energy efficiency savings
02:06:58.310 --> 02:07:01.140
the off-peak load management programs
02:07:01.140 --> 02:07:02.840
which is what we're talking about now
02:07:02.840 --> 02:07:05.010
outside of the four Summer months
02:07:06.050 --> 02:07:08.920
it's not clear how that plugs into our
02:07:08.920 --> 02:07:12.520
overall performance under our goals
02:07:12.520 --> 02:07:16.907
and so they're I mean
these sound like details
02:07:16.907 --> 02:07:20.330
and there is no program
the Commission oversees
02:07:20.330 --> 02:07:22.930
that is more detailed
than energy efficiency
02:07:22.930 --> 02:07:26.400
but they're important and
it makes a difference in
02:07:26.400 --> 02:07:28.113
how we go about implementation.
02:07:29.860 --> 02:07:32.370
Yeah I think that the
load management programs
02:07:32.370 --> 02:07:34.540
are gonna have similar
effects as the other things
02:07:34.540 --> 02:07:37.300
we described in terms
of load ratio share.
02:07:37.300 --> 02:07:40.210
So as you have certain footprints
02:07:40.210 --> 02:07:42.530
that are more successful in implementing
02:07:42.530 --> 02:07:44.480
load management programs
02:07:44.480 --> 02:07:46.000
I think there needs to be consideration
02:07:46.000 --> 02:07:49.290
in how that changes
their load shed obligation
02:07:49.290 --> 02:07:51.650
such that it is equitable
02:07:51.650 --> 02:07:53.500
and it bakes in these other factors
02:07:53.500 --> 02:07:58.500
that we know change in
throughout the event as it evolves.
02:08:02.670 --> 02:08:04.760
Gotcha thank, you good?
02:08:04.760 --> 02:08:06.173
I'm good thank you.
02:08:06.173 --> 02:08:08.520
Just a question on that because
02:08:08.520 --> 02:08:11.050
I don't know Dan if you
want to hop in on this
02:08:11.050 --> 02:08:12.810
or stay masked over there
02:08:12.810 --> 02:08:15.120
'cause I can't see
your facial expression
02:08:15.120 --> 02:08:19.530
but what's the downside for ERCOT
02:08:19.530 --> 02:08:21.210
is what we're talking about in terms of
02:08:21.210 --> 02:08:23.880
adjusting real time
that load ratio share
02:08:23.880 --> 02:08:28.880
in proportion to transmission
level voluntary curtailment
02:08:28.897 --> 02:08:32.180
is that too complicated
to do instantaneously
02:08:32.180 --> 02:08:35.260
at a moment's notice
to keep the lights on or
02:08:35.260 --> 02:08:37.970
I mean it seems like that would be
02:08:37.970 --> 02:08:39.720
in the history of the state of Texas
02:08:39.720 --> 02:08:41.410
and managing our grid
that would have been
02:08:41.410 --> 02:08:42.800
considered before now
02:08:43.650 --> 02:08:46.240
especially we are a
heavy industrial state
02:08:46.240 --> 02:08:49.560
I mean that's our claim to
fame we're becoming more so.
02:08:49.560 --> 02:08:54.560
So operationally what's the downside?
02:08:54.676 --> 02:08:56.160
So I'm gonna spring
to ERCOT's defense
02:08:56.160 --> 02:08:57.810
before they speak for themselves.
02:09:00.810 --> 02:09:04.270
Load shed events have
historically been so rare
02:09:04.270 --> 02:09:08.130
that the kind of rough
justice that we employ
02:09:08.130 --> 02:09:10.590
under the existing protocols.
02:09:10.590 --> 02:09:12.810
That's a good way to put it.
02:09:12.810 --> 02:09:15.470
Was sufficient I think
what we've learned is
02:09:15.470 --> 02:09:19.923
it's not always and
I'll give you my chair.
02:09:26.150 --> 02:09:28.750
Yeah I think that
Liz is probably right
02:09:28.750 --> 02:09:31.370
there hasn't been
enough of these that we've
02:09:31.370 --> 02:09:33.070
explored some of the things especially
02:09:33.070 --> 02:09:37.000
that Eric was talking
about but I think Oncor
02:09:37.000 --> 02:09:39.870
had a bullet point on their
slide that is very accurate
02:09:39.870 --> 02:09:43.690
which is when we do need to shed load
02:09:43.690 --> 02:09:45.547
it has to be done very quickly
02:09:45.547 --> 02:09:50.547
and so anything that
adds to the confusion
02:09:50.620 --> 02:09:54.040
or the complexity of
it is got to be balanced
02:09:54.040 --> 02:09:58.920
with that ability to shed
quickly and so in the past
02:09:58.920 --> 02:10:00.880
because these happen so infrequently
02:10:00.880 --> 02:10:05.000
there hasn't been a lot of
maybe effort put into identifying
02:10:05.000 --> 02:10:08.480
the amount of allocation
due to transmission
02:10:08.480 --> 02:10:09.590
and those kind of things.
02:10:09.590 --> 02:10:13.210
If we can do those things
in advance such that they
02:10:13.210 --> 02:10:15.670
don't cause confusion and complexity
02:10:15.670 --> 02:10:18.692
of getting the load shed
when we actually need it
02:10:18.692 --> 02:10:19.970
in order to preserve the system
02:10:19.970 --> 02:10:23.253
then I think we're all for
working with them to do that.
02:10:28.178 --> 02:10:29.720
Okay thank you.
02:10:29.720 --> 02:10:32.020
All right thank you
panelists appreciate it.
02:10:33.780 --> 02:10:37.320
I think that gets us to our fourth topic
02:10:37.320 --> 02:10:42.130
but given the time of day
02:10:42.130 --> 02:10:44.170
do y'all wanna recess for lunch now?
02:10:44.170 --> 02:10:45.250
Your call sir.
02:10:45.250 --> 02:10:47.688
It's your call I'm
good either way.
02:10:47.688 --> 02:10:49.410
I think you wanted
more guidance I think
02:10:49.410 --> 02:10:50.243
you wanted to vote on that.
02:10:50.243 --> 02:10:52.603
Yeah everybody wants guidance.
02:10:53.710 --> 02:10:55.140
Sure you want to take.
02:10:55.140 --> 02:10:56.740
Yeah let's go take 45 minutes,
02:10:57.899 --> 02:11:00.400
all right we'll recess for lunch now
02:11:01.640 --> 02:11:05.283
be back at say 12:40.
02:11:19.080 --> 02:11:22.140
Meeting of the Public Utility
Commission of Texas is now
02:11:23.130 --> 02:11:26.020
back in session for the final portion
02:11:26.020 --> 02:11:30.000
of our work session today,
02:11:30.000 --> 02:11:32.650
fourth topic covering Rio
Grande Valley transmission.
02:11:33.650 --> 02:11:37.327
We'll hear from a panel
including ERCOT, AEP
02:11:39.189 --> 02:11:41.483
and Sharyland utilities.
02:11:42.988 --> 02:11:45.080
Thank you gentlemen for being here.
02:11:45.080 --> 02:11:47.720
Start with you Mr. Lasher.
02:11:47.720 --> 02:11:48.553
Sure.
02:11:48.553 --> 02:11:49.386
Take it away.
02:11:49.386 --> 02:11:51.330
Thank you for the
record Warren Lasher
02:11:51.330 --> 02:11:53.803
with the Electric
Reliability Council of Texas.
02:11:54.980 --> 02:11:57.960
Good afternoon Commissioners
it's a pleasure to be here.
02:11:57.960 --> 02:12:00.550
I've got a couple slides
I brought some slides
02:12:00.550 --> 02:12:03.150
kind of looking at transmission
planning in general.
02:12:04.140 --> 02:12:05.612
I thought we could go through those
02:12:05.612 --> 02:12:09.310
and then Wayman here I
think has some much more
02:12:09.310 --> 02:12:12.430
detailed slides to probe down into the
02:12:12.430 --> 02:12:13.900
Lower Rio Grande Valley Area.
02:12:13.900 --> 02:12:15.410
So I think I'll turn it over to him
02:12:15.410 --> 02:12:19.310
when I've kind of got
through my general slides
02:12:19.310 --> 02:12:23.590
and then we can Wayman
and Michael can speak
02:12:23.590 --> 02:12:26.340
and then if possible I'd
like to kind of come back
02:12:26.340 --> 02:12:29.220
to my last slide at the end of that
02:12:29.220 --> 02:12:31.540
kind of to round out the
conversation about the
02:12:31.540 --> 02:12:34.243
Lower Rio Grande Valley
Area if that's acceptable.
02:12:35.520 --> 02:12:40.060
So just background here the
transmission system in ERCOT
02:12:40.060 --> 02:12:41.360
I've got a map of it here.
02:12:42.730 --> 02:12:45.500
Basically what the transmission
system does is it moves
02:12:45.500 --> 02:12:49.480
just a massive amount
of power from 700 plus
02:12:49.480 --> 02:12:53.742
generating units to every
consumer in the ERCOT region
02:12:53.742 --> 02:12:58.520
which covers about
75% of the state of Texas
02:12:58.520 --> 02:13:00.250
and so just if you think
02:13:00.250 --> 02:13:02.000
about the massive
amount of energy that is
02:13:02.000 --> 02:13:05.270
moving around the grid at any given time
02:13:05.270 --> 02:13:09.670
and it's imperative on
ERCOT to operate this system
02:13:09.670 --> 02:13:11.650
within the limits of the system.
02:13:11.650 --> 02:13:15.990
So every single last element
of of the transmission system
02:13:15.990 --> 02:13:19.940
has some maximum
amount of power that can flow
02:13:19.940 --> 02:13:23.083
through that device without
that device being damaged.
02:13:24.290 --> 02:13:28.200
As over time as people move to the state
02:13:28.200 --> 02:13:33.200
as new businesses get started
the customer demand in regions
02:13:33.430 --> 02:13:36.870
can increase and as a result of that
02:13:36.870 --> 02:13:40.290
we can run into situations
where we come to the point where
02:13:40.290 --> 02:13:42.800
we're starting to get close to exceeding
02:13:42.800 --> 02:13:46.030
the capacity of some of
the transmission in that area.
02:13:46.030 --> 02:13:49.230
So there can be a need
to increase the capacity
02:13:49.230 --> 02:13:52.520
of the transmission system
because of population growth,
02:13:52.520 --> 02:13:54.540
economic growth throughout the state
02:13:54.540 --> 02:13:57.550
at the same time we
have new power plants
02:13:57.550 --> 02:14:00.840
that are being built on a daily basis
02:14:00.840 --> 02:14:04.080
and we have some of our
older less efficient plants
02:14:04.080 --> 02:14:05.850
very older plants that get retired
02:14:05.850 --> 02:14:09.660
and so kind of where the power
comes from changes over time
02:14:09.660 --> 02:14:12.810
and again that changes
the need for transmission
02:14:12.810 --> 02:14:15.520
so in essence we have to move the power
02:14:15.520 --> 02:14:18.670
from different locations to all of this
02:14:18.670 --> 02:14:19.950
growing customer demand.
02:14:19.950 --> 02:14:22.790
So those are kind of the
two drivers that we have
02:14:22.790 --> 02:14:26.800
that really force us to
do transmission planning
02:14:26.800 --> 02:14:31.170
to predict in advance
where new transmission
02:14:31.170 --> 02:14:32.560
is going to be needed
02:14:32.560 --> 02:14:35.880
and to make sure that
that transmission is in place
02:14:36.830 --> 02:14:38.490
in advance of need
02:14:38.490 --> 02:14:42.220
and so ERCOT works directly
with the transmission companies
02:14:42.220 --> 02:14:44.390
the transmission service providers
02:14:44.390 --> 02:14:47.000
we also work with a
stakeholder committee called the
02:14:47.000 --> 02:14:51.960
Regional Planning Group
in order to study the needs
02:14:51.960 --> 02:14:52.793
on the system
02:14:52.793 --> 02:14:56.720
and to evaluate specific
projects to meet those needs
02:14:56.720 --> 02:15:01.720
so that's kind of the overview
of transmission planning.
02:15:02.450 --> 02:15:05.850
So next slide, so kind of
the way I broke it out before
02:15:05.850 --> 02:15:08.680
we've got customer demand
growing in some regions
02:15:08.680 --> 02:15:12.010
and we've got generation
that is being built
02:15:12.010 --> 02:15:15.880
that kind of leads us to two
different types of projects
02:15:15.880 --> 02:15:17.920
that we have on the system
02:15:17.920 --> 02:15:21.720
we call them reliability
projects and economic projects.
02:15:21.720 --> 02:15:24.540
Reliability projects are
projects that are needed
02:15:24.540 --> 02:15:28.580
in order to reliably serve customers
02:15:28.580 --> 02:15:32.260
and there are a set of North American
02:15:32.260 --> 02:15:36.100
Electric Reliability Corporation
standards NERC standards.
02:15:36.100 --> 02:15:39.290
There's also a set of
additional standards
02:15:39.290 --> 02:15:42.990
associated with
what level of reliability
02:15:42.990 --> 02:15:46.820
is required for customers
that are in the ERCOT protocols
02:15:46.820 --> 02:15:49.150
and the ERCOT planning guides.
02:15:49.150 --> 02:15:54.150
Once a project is determined
to be needed once our analysis
02:15:54.518 --> 02:15:56.870
working with the
transmission service providers
02:15:56.870 --> 02:16:01.870
once our analysis shows
that a project is needed
02:16:02.120 --> 02:16:05.530
to meet these reliability criteria
02:16:05.530 --> 02:16:09.250
we judge any project to allow us to meet
02:16:09.250 --> 02:16:11.760
that reliability criteria
based on the effectiveness
02:16:11.760 --> 02:16:14.830
of the project and
the cost of the project
02:16:14.830 --> 02:16:19.830
but we don't not do the project
because it's too expensive
02:16:20.070 --> 02:16:23.820
meaning we look we
compare projects based on cost
02:16:23.820 --> 02:16:27.090
but we don't say yes
or no based on cost.
02:16:27.090 --> 02:16:31.970
So from a reliability
perspective cost is a comparison
02:16:31.970 --> 02:16:33.250
but it's not something that
02:16:33.250 --> 02:16:34.900
we would say yes or no on a project
02:16:34.900 --> 02:16:36.120
does that make sense?
02:16:36.120 --> 02:16:39.807
Yeah it's a factor in
prioritization not determination of
02:16:39.807 --> 02:16:40.960
course you're not built.
02:16:40.960 --> 02:16:44.150
Right so we actually we do
a determination of need first
02:16:44.150 --> 02:16:45.820
and once there's a determination of need
02:16:45.820 --> 02:16:47.800
and we say yeah there's a need
02:16:47.800 --> 02:16:49.710
we're going to build a project
02:16:49.710 --> 02:16:51.510
it's just a matter of which project.
02:16:53.230 --> 02:16:55.670
Economic projects on the other hand
02:16:55.670 --> 02:17:00.670
are primarily designed to
allow more efficient generation
02:17:01.750 --> 02:17:04.150
to have greater access to the market
02:17:04.150 --> 02:17:08.210
and for this there really
is a cost-benefit analysis
02:17:08.210 --> 02:17:13.210
we look at the current economic criteria
02:17:13.270 --> 02:17:15.490
that is actually in substantive rule
02:17:16.370 --> 02:17:21.020
and we evaluate the
savings in the overall cost
02:17:21.020 --> 02:17:24.690
to operate the system the
variable cost, the fuel cost
02:17:24.690 --> 02:17:28.000
to operate the system
and compare those costs
02:17:28.000 --> 02:17:30.550
to the annual carrying cost
02:17:30.550 --> 02:17:32.880
of the transmission asset itself.
02:17:32.880 --> 02:17:37.880
Now obviously that rule in
25 101 has been modified by
02:17:41.200 --> 02:17:45.060
Senate Bill 1281 and I believe
Michael is gonna hit on that
02:17:45.060 --> 02:17:45.970
in his topic
02:17:45.970 --> 02:17:49.510
so we can kind of leave
that topic of conversation
02:17:49.510 --> 02:17:53.490
for when he has his
slides, if that's okay?
02:17:53.490 --> 02:17:54.323
Sure.
02:17:54.323 --> 02:17:59.080
Okay so it's important
to note that both of these
02:17:59.080 --> 02:18:02.210
situations kind of reliability
projects, economic projects
02:18:02.210 --> 02:18:03.680
they're both driven off the fact that
02:18:03.680 --> 02:18:05.730
there's insufficient transmission
02:18:05.730 --> 02:18:09.330
but because of the fact
that we have alternatives
02:18:09.330 --> 02:18:13.910
in real time operation
for redispatching the fleet
02:18:13.910 --> 02:18:18.130
to control congestion
for economic projects
02:18:18.130 --> 02:18:20.110
we don't have to do those projects
02:18:20.110 --> 02:18:21.870
and we only do those
projects if they meet
02:18:21.870 --> 02:18:23.930
specific economic criteria.
02:18:23.930 --> 02:18:25.360
Does that make sense?
02:18:25.360 --> 02:18:27.253
Okay, next slide.
02:18:30.150 --> 02:18:32.070
It's important to note that the process
02:18:32.070 --> 02:18:34.890
of building transmission
takes a long time,
02:18:34.890 --> 02:18:36.340
it takes about six years
02:18:36.340 --> 02:18:37.790
it can take more than six years
02:18:37.790 --> 02:18:38.930
we're gonna start talking about that
02:18:38.930 --> 02:18:40.860
with the Lower Rio Grande Valley area
02:18:40.860 --> 02:18:41.880
it's one of the areas
02:18:41.880 --> 02:18:43.990
where it can actually
take longer than six years
02:18:43.990 --> 02:18:47.490
from the point at which there's analysis
02:18:49.590 --> 02:18:51.630
that indicates that
there could be a need
02:18:51.630 --> 02:18:54.300
to the point at which we're
actually closing a breaker
02:18:54.300 --> 02:18:56.973
and we've got new circuits in place.
02:18:58.120 --> 02:19:03.120
This kind of runs through
the whole set of activities
02:19:04.150 --> 02:19:06.484
you've got the kind
of the initial proposal
02:19:06.484 --> 02:19:09.450
ERCOT has an independent project review
02:19:09.450 --> 02:19:11.590
it's important to note that
takes about six months
02:19:11.590 --> 02:19:15.010
out of this six year period
engineering and routing
02:19:15.010 --> 02:19:19.040
and then you've got the
the typically a one-year
02:19:19.040 --> 02:19:23.150
hearing here for a CCN analysis
02:19:23.150 --> 02:19:25.700
and then the actual
construction of the project
02:19:25.700 --> 02:19:30.450
and we have a our typical
planning horizon is six years
02:19:30.450 --> 02:19:33.550
because of this requirement
that it takes about six years
02:19:33.550 --> 02:19:34.923
to bring a project online.
02:19:35.950 --> 02:19:36.823
Okay, next slide.
02:19:37.910 --> 02:19:40.190
So just kind of running
around the system here
02:19:40.190 --> 02:19:44.710
we've got across the system
we've got a set of different
02:19:45.570 --> 02:19:47.560
challenges right now
02:19:47.560 --> 02:19:50.450
and they some are
reliability, some are economic,
02:19:50.450 --> 02:19:51.670
some are a little bit of both
02:19:51.670 --> 02:19:53.780
if you look all the way over
on the left the Delaware basin
02:19:53.780 --> 02:19:56.610
we've got growing customer
demand associated with oil
02:19:56.610 --> 02:20:00.470
and gas so keeping up
with that is a challenge
02:20:00.470 --> 02:20:04.200
I'll talk a little bit more
about that at the very very end
02:20:04.200 --> 02:20:08.740
on my last slide but just
the idea that we can have
02:20:09.629 --> 02:20:14.507
10, 15, 50, 100 megawatts
just pop up in different areas
02:20:14.507 --> 02:20:17.350
both because of oil extraction
02:20:17.350 --> 02:20:19.763
but then also midstream
processing ex cetera.
02:20:20.940 --> 02:20:22.900
Keeping up with that is difficult
02:20:22.900 --> 02:20:25.580
their planning horizon
is about 18 months
02:20:25.580 --> 02:20:27.700
for the most part of
building new facilities
02:20:27.700 --> 02:20:29.530
and again our transmission
planning horizon
02:20:29.530 --> 02:20:30.430
is around six years.
02:20:30.430 --> 02:20:32.453
So that's one of the key issues there.
02:20:33.350 --> 02:20:37.160
Swinging over to Dallas we've
got growing customer demand
02:20:37.160 --> 02:20:40.520
many parts of Dallas are
growing at a very fast pace
02:20:40.520 --> 02:20:43.990
at the same time Dallas
kind of stands in the way of
02:20:43.990 --> 02:20:45.700
all of that wind generation
02:20:45.700 --> 02:20:47.720
that brand new wind
generation out in west Texas
02:20:47.720 --> 02:20:49.030
and all the way up in the panhandle
02:20:49.030 --> 02:20:51.420
trying to move across the system
02:20:51.420 --> 02:20:53.390
and get customers some of that power
02:20:53.390 --> 02:20:55.490
wants to go all the way down to Houston.
02:20:55.490 --> 02:20:59.330
So kind of Dallas is
almost a waste station
02:20:59.330 --> 02:21:02.253
for some of that energy
that's flowing onto the system.
02:21:03.130 --> 02:21:05.573
Houston growing customer demand.
02:21:09.070 --> 02:21:10.700
I don't need to really
say much more about
02:21:10.700 --> 02:21:13.560
that obviously a need
for reliability projects
02:21:13.560 --> 02:21:16.590
over time the last project
came online in 2018
02:21:16.590 --> 02:21:21.590
I believe and so that's a
large customer demand center.
02:21:24.570 --> 02:21:26.680
The valley we'll be talking
more about the valley
02:21:26.680 --> 02:21:29.960
interesting part about
the valley is that it is both
02:21:29.960 --> 02:21:33.120
a export constrained
when the wind is blowing
02:21:33.120 --> 02:21:37.520
at a fast clip that power
moving out of the region
02:21:37.520 --> 02:21:40.070
and it's also import
constrained when the wind is low
02:21:40.070 --> 02:21:42.490
because of the growing
customer demand down there
02:21:42.490 --> 02:21:44.940
so it's both an import
and an export constraint
02:21:44.940 --> 02:21:46.730
and then you've got kind
of in the center of the system
02:21:46.730 --> 02:21:48.880
you've got that West Texas export
02:21:48.880 --> 02:21:53.310
that's kind of a limitation
on moving power
02:21:53.310 --> 02:21:56.550
from the West where
we've got a lot of wind
02:21:56.550 --> 02:21:58.470
and a growing amount of solar
02:21:58.470 --> 02:22:00.653
to customers on the
East side of the system
02:22:00.653 --> 02:22:02.880
it's just it's basically
we have right now
02:22:02.880 --> 02:22:05.490
an interface which
cuts the system in two
02:22:06.420 --> 02:22:11.420
and limits power
flow from left to right.
02:22:11.620 --> 02:22:13.910
So these are just some of the challenges
02:22:13.910 --> 02:22:15.659
that we're facing right now
02:22:15.659 --> 02:22:18.670
and you can kind of see how
they're split up by reliability
02:22:18.670 --> 02:22:21.653
and economics, any questions about that?
02:22:23.880 --> 02:22:27.940
So Warren and and I'll
ask this of both yourself
02:22:27.940 --> 02:22:32.930
and AEP's analyst but
why is the valley different?
02:22:32.930 --> 02:22:35.050
Why does it take longer?
02:22:35.050 --> 02:22:39.220
Well Wayman has
quite a few slides on that
02:22:39.220 --> 02:22:41.269
about why does it take longer
02:22:41.269 --> 02:22:43.270
I'll leave that for Wayman yeah,
02:22:43.270 --> 02:22:44.170
why does it take longer.
02:22:44.170 --> 02:22:48.577
Okay, so ERCOT has
no official view on why
02:22:48.577 --> 02:22:51.823
the the process is
taking longer for RGV.
02:22:55.700 --> 02:22:57.860
I mean I would
just say there are
02:22:57.860 --> 02:23:02.360
it's just much more
difficult to bring a CCN case
02:23:02.360 --> 02:23:05.316
because of property
ownership and issues like that.
02:23:05.316 --> 02:23:07.730
Okay it's the property
ownership side of the equation.
02:23:07.730 --> 02:23:08.990
I mean that's part of it
02:23:08.990 --> 02:23:12.150
but I would imagine there
are other issues as well.
02:23:12.150 --> 02:23:14.070
Okay I'll wait then.
02:23:14.070 --> 02:23:16.220
So Warren that's
interesting because
02:23:16.220 --> 02:23:18.160
in the last several years
02:23:18.160 --> 02:23:21.910
within the last 10 years
ERCOT has approved
02:23:21.910 --> 02:23:25.330
and PUC has issued out CCNs for
02:23:25.330 --> 02:23:27.600
significant amount of
transmission into the valley
02:23:27.600 --> 02:23:32.480
the cross valley import
transmission lines
02:23:32.480 --> 02:23:34.720
and but yet we still continue to have
02:23:34.720 --> 02:23:36.453
issues down there why?
02:23:38.500 --> 02:23:41.140
For I would argue
for two reasons
02:23:41.140 --> 02:23:46.140
first of all because we
have I started off my whole
02:23:47.020 --> 02:23:49.960
slide deck saying we've
got specific standards
02:23:49.960 --> 02:23:52.210
the North American Electric
Reliability Corporation
02:23:52.210 --> 02:23:55.470
Standards and the protocols
the ERCOT protocols ex cetera
02:23:55.470 --> 02:23:58.470
and to some extent I said that
02:23:58.470 --> 02:24:01.150
they allow us to find a need
02:24:01.150 --> 02:24:05.090
and to find a project to meet
that need regardless of cost
02:24:05.090 --> 02:24:09.010
so that sounds like it's
expansive but at the same time
02:24:09.010 --> 02:24:13.980
to some extent those
protocols and criteria limit us
02:24:13.980 --> 02:24:17.090
because if we see
something that doesn't meet
02:24:17.090 --> 02:24:19.520
one of those specific criteria
02:24:19.520 --> 02:24:21.560
it's much harder for us to point at that
02:24:21.560 --> 02:24:24.193
and say this is something
that we need to address.
02:24:25.270 --> 02:24:28.210
Because those protocols
are the things that
02:24:28.210 --> 02:24:31.530
allow us to define
what a reliability need
02:24:31.530 --> 02:24:33.200
on the transmission system is
02:24:33.200 --> 02:24:36.100
and to some extent
the valley I apologize
02:24:36.100 --> 02:24:38.690
to some extent the
valley is a situation where
02:24:38.690 --> 02:24:41.290
it is so distant from the system
02:24:41.290 --> 02:24:43.680
and there are so few options there
02:24:43.680 --> 02:24:46.930
there just are not that
many generation units
02:24:46.930 --> 02:24:49.040
to provide for some of that reliability
02:24:49.040 --> 02:24:50.380
services that we need
02:24:50.380 --> 02:24:54.400
that I think the valley
requires a little bit of a
02:24:54.400 --> 02:24:59.150
more expansive reliability
set of considerations.
02:24:59.150 --> 02:25:00.010
Now interestingly
02:25:00.010 --> 02:25:02.440
and this is what I'll
get to at the very end
02:25:02.440 --> 02:25:03.690
it's not that different
02:25:03.690 --> 02:25:05.750
from what we found
in the Delaware Basin,
02:25:05.750 --> 02:25:07.040
dealing with the Delaware basin
02:25:07.040 --> 02:25:08.250
and trying to keep up with that
02:25:08.250 --> 02:25:10.840
and so I think we may
have learned something there
02:25:10.840 --> 02:25:12.810
which we'll talk about when we get done.
02:25:12.810 --> 02:25:14.510
The other thing I wanted to say is
02:25:16.110 --> 02:25:19.670
two things that I think
have driven some of
02:25:19.670 --> 02:25:23.040
the issues down in
the valley the first is,
02:25:23.040 --> 02:25:27.250
we've been surprised by
some of the load growth there
02:25:27.250 --> 02:25:30.730
my recollection is that
when the February 2011
02:25:30.730 --> 02:25:34.830
event happened the
actual customer demand
02:25:34.830 --> 02:25:36.980
that occurred in February 2011
02:25:37.911 --> 02:25:39.350
Wayman's gonna correct me here because
02:25:39.350 --> 02:25:40.840
I may be wrong about this but that's
02:25:40.840 --> 02:25:43.390
okay the actual customer demand was
02:25:43.390 --> 02:25:45.790
greater than what we
had in our planning models.
02:25:47.570 --> 02:25:48.810
Yeah for sure.
02:25:48.810 --> 02:25:50.232
Oh there you go okay well.
02:25:50.232 --> 02:25:51.065
Yeah doubt.
02:25:51.065 --> 02:25:52.970
Okay and the second
thing is not long after
02:25:52.970 --> 02:25:56.990
that Frontera decided that
they wanted to retire from
02:25:56.990 --> 02:26:00.310
ERCOT and moved to
Mexico so that was a completely
02:26:00.310 --> 02:26:03.190
unexpected event we lost
one of our combined cycle
02:26:03.190 --> 02:26:07.240
facilities down in the valley
which again significantly
02:26:07.240 --> 02:26:08.820
limited some of the reliability issues
02:26:08.820 --> 02:26:11.573
so there have been other issues as well.
02:26:13.530 --> 02:26:15.800
Okay yeah that's interesting
02:26:17.160 --> 02:26:22.110
I guess it's irrespective
of those large 345KV
02:26:23.000 --> 02:26:26.110
transmission projects that
were built into the valley
02:26:26.110 --> 02:26:29.170
load growth continues
to increase down there
02:26:29.170 --> 02:26:33.000
that requires more
generation to be brought in
02:26:33.000 --> 02:26:34.920
or more transmission to be built
02:26:36.400 --> 02:26:38.870
and a lot of the
generation resources down,
02:26:38.870 --> 02:26:41.660
the primary generation
resources down in the valley
02:26:41.660 --> 02:26:45.650
are it sounds like Gulf
Coast wind or wind.
02:26:45.650 --> 02:26:50.600
There is wind, gas
and solar in the queue.
02:26:50.600 --> 02:26:52.813
But maybe like
one or two gas plants
02:26:52.813 --> 02:26:54.110
I think I saw one.
02:26:54.110 --> 02:26:57.500
There's more than two
there's two combined cycles
02:26:58.840 --> 02:27:03.840
South Texas electric co-op
has a set of peaking units
02:27:03.990 --> 02:27:07.105
Brownsville I believe
has some generation
02:27:07.105 --> 02:27:08.823
along the coast as well.
02:27:09.980 --> 02:27:11.610
We also have DC tie.
02:27:11.610 --> 02:27:12.900
They've got a coal
plant down there
02:27:12.900 --> 02:27:14.575
Brownsville don't they?
02:27:14.575 --> 02:27:16.670
A coal plant I don't believe
there's a coal plant down
02:27:16.670 --> 02:27:20.520
I think there's an old gas
plan, older gas plant yeah.
02:27:20.520 --> 02:27:25.420
So I do apologize but he's
got some really good slides
02:27:25.420 --> 02:27:28.350
so let me turn it over
to Wayman at this point
02:27:28.350 --> 02:27:30.450
and he can go through some of his slides
02:27:30.450 --> 02:27:32.250
and then we can come back to my
02:27:32.250 --> 02:27:35.990
yeah keep going a few more,
one more there you go okay
02:27:35.990 --> 02:27:38.920
and then we can come
back to my last slide one.
02:27:38.920 --> 02:27:40.280
Yep thank you Warren.
02:27:40.280 --> 02:27:41.210
Please.
02:27:41.210 --> 02:27:44.370
Good afternoon Commissioners
I'm truly appreciative
02:27:44.370 --> 02:27:46.170
of the opportunity to be here
02:27:46.170 --> 02:27:48.370
and talk to you about
the Rio Grande Valley.
02:27:49.410 --> 02:27:52.010
I can tell you that that I first started
02:27:52.010 --> 02:27:56.610
working on issues in the
valley in the mid to late 90s
02:27:56.610 --> 02:27:59.870
so that says a couple of
things one I'm no spring chicken
02:27:59.870 --> 02:28:03.930
and two what is it that's
unique about the valley
02:28:03.930 --> 02:28:08.750
that it's still a focus as we
sit here today 25 years later
02:28:08.750 --> 02:28:12.490
so I really wanna
and I think I'll address
02:28:12.490 --> 02:28:15.670
some of the specific questions
that have been asked already
02:28:15.670 --> 02:28:20.280
but and I'll be honest I had
the question not too long ago
02:28:20.280 --> 02:28:23.030
someone asked me how come
every time something bad happens
02:28:23.030 --> 02:28:24.690
it always happens in the valley?
02:28:24.690 --> 02:28:28.190
What is it about the valley
that makes it susceptible
02:28:28.190 --> 02:28:31.300
and so it made me
really start to think about it
02:28:31.300 --> 02:28:33.150
and so I've got a
whole list of things here
02:28:33.150 --> 02:28:34.820
and I have to apologize
02:28:34.820 --> 02:28:37.730
by my very nature I get down
into the weeds very quickly
02:28:37.730 --> 02:28:39.120
and I realize it's after lunch
02:28:39.120 --> 02:28:40.440
and I don't want to put you to sleep
02:28:40.440 --> 02:28:43.450
so if you wanna pull me up
out of the weeds at any time
02:28:43.450 --> 02:28:46.200
please feel free to do that but,
02:28:46.200 --> 02:28:51.010
I wanted to start just a little
bit here with the topology
02:28:51.010 --> 02:28:54.380
of the electrical network
relative to the load
02:28:54.380 --> 02:28:57.744
in the valley and I've
shown here in the circle
02:28:57.744 --> 02:29:01.680
kind of the load pocket
where the largest concentration
02:29:01.680 --> 02:29:02.610
of the load is
02:29:03.530 --> 02:29:05.550
and when I talk about the valley
02:29:05.550 --> 02:29:07.710
I'll refer to the Lower
Rio Grande Valley
02:29:07.710 --> 02:29:09.170
which I'm showing here.
02:29:09.170 --> 02:29:11.700
The Rio Grande Valley
which typically would be
02:29:11.700 --> 02:29:14.640
further North up to include Laredo
02:29:14.640 --> 02:29:17.240
and then when I talk about South Texas
02:29:17.240 --> 02:29:20.070
that's all the way up
encompassing the Corpus area
02:29:20.070 --> 02:29:22.210
at least that's my nomenclature
02:29:22.210 --> 02:29:24.660
but what I've kind of zeroed in here on
02:29:24.660 --> 02:29:26.090
is the Lower Rio Grande Valley
02:29:26.090 --> 02:29:28.080
where the bulk of that load is
02:29:28.080 --> 02:29:30.930
and I wanna draw your
attention to the blue line
02:29:30.930 --> 02:29:32.540
that's a little bit hard to see
02:29:33.400 --> 02:29:37.420
but you can see the the
the blue lines two on the East
02:29:37.420 --> 02:29:39.710
side of the valley one on the West.
02:29:39.710 --> 02:29:43.080
So those are 345KV transmission lines
02:29:44.030 --> 02:29:47.640
one originating from Lobo on the West
02:29:47.640 --> 02:29:50.050
the other two are from Long Hill
02:29:50.050 --> 02:29:52.650
which is just south of Corpus Christi.
02:29:52.650 --> 02:29:57.650
So in terms of the
ability to import power
02:29:57.740 --> 02:30:01.920
from the West of ERCOT into
the Lower Rio Grande Valley
02:30:03.100 --> 02:30:07.290
that's the bulk of the
capability is right there
02:30:07.290 --> 02:30:09.900
in those three transmission lines
02:30:09.900 --> 02:30:12.650
and that's it there are also three 138s
02:30:12.650 --> 02:30:14.370
that that can carry some
02:30:14.370 --> 02:30:16.100
but the bulk of the import is there on
02:30:16.100 --> 02:30:18.043
those three transmission lines.
02:30:19.060 --> 02:30:21.570
So that was that was
kind of the first thing
02:30:21.570 --> 02:30:23.620
and if we go to the next slide
02:30:23.620 --> 02:30:27.880
I tried to put this in in kind
of a bubble format here
02:30:27.880 --> 02:30:30.250
sort of illustrating
what I just showed you
02:30:30.250 --> 02:30:32.100
on the previous slide,
02:30:32.100 --> 02:30:34.090
you can see the Lower Rio Grande Valley
02:30:34.090 --> 02:30:36.740
there at the bottom
we've got about 3900,
02:30:36.740 --> 02:30:39.653
approximately 3900 megawatts generation.
02:30:40.780 --> 02:30:44.013
As was pointed out there's
about 1500 megawatts of that
02:30:44.013 --> 02:30:47.360
that is conventional gas fire generation
02:30:47.360 --> 02:30:51.620
but that's really
concentrated in two plants
02:30:51.620 --> 02:30:55.870
those two plants are
1150 or so of that 1500
02:30:57.150 --> 02:30:59.300
and the bulk of that generation is wind
02:30:59.300 --> 02:31:03.030
there's about 2000 megawatts
of wind generation down there
02:31:03.030 --> 02:31:06.640
and then I'm showing a load
depending on which forecast
02:31:06.640 --> 02:31:10.060
and which probabilistic
range you wanna look at
02:31:10.060 --> 02:31:13.640
about 2800 kind of ballpark
02:31:13.640 --> 02:31:15.640
and then I show there the valley import
02:31:15.640 --> 02:31:20.640
that's this was actually
on a real-time basis
02:31:20.880 --> 02:31:24.370
from an operations
perspective minute to minute
02:31:24.370 --> 02:31:27.080
how much can we import into the valley
02:31:27.080 --> 02:31:32.080
over the last year it
ranged from 700 to 3500
02:31:32.480 --> 02:31:34.970
and one of the things I
want to call your attention to
02:31:34.970 --> 02:31:37.720
is the volatility of that number
02:31:38.800 --> 02:31:42.370
it varies greatly depending on
02:31:42.370 --> 02:31:44.820
what outages are out there on the system
02:31:44.820 --> 02:31:48.080
it also varies depending
on what generation is on
02:31:48.080 --> 02:31:51.040
within the valley in that 3900
02:31:51.040 --> 02:31:52.990
which of those units are on
02:31:52.990 --> 02:31:55.420
where are they dispatched
at because as I said
02:31:55.420 --> 02:31:57.430
a lot of that is wind generation,
02:31:57.430 --> 02:32:00.130
when their output
drops to a certain level
02:32:00.130 --> 02:32:02.860
they no longer have
to supply reactive power
02:32:02.860 --> 02:32:04.730
to help support the voltage
02:32:04.730 --> 02:32:06.910
and the voltage is
really the limiting factor
02:32:06.910 --> 02:32:11.500
in the valley so and I'm
gonna talk about the load
02:32:11.500 --> 02:32:12.670
in more detail here too
02:32:12.670 --> 02:32:14.680
but I just wanted to kind of set this up
02:32:14.680 --> 02:32:17.050
to give you a flavor of
02:32:17.050 --> 02:32:20.550
how much that valley
import capability can vary
02:32:20.550 --> 02:32:22.670
and then also the fact that the majority
02:32:22.670 --> 02:32:26.740
of that generation
about half of it is wind.
02:32:26.740 --> 02:32:31.740
Yeah so the for the 2800
megawatts of load in the valley
02:32:33.320 --> 02:32:36.190
peak presumably if
the wind's not blowing
02:32:36.190 --> 02:32:40.643
only say 60% of it of
that load is dispatchable.
02:32:42.030 --> 02:32:45.760
Well of the 4000
megawatts of generation
02:32:45.760 --> 02:32:49.190
about 1500 is directly
dispatchable out of 4000.
02:32:49.190 --> 02:32:53.030
Right so the 1500 out
of the 28 you need 2800.
02:32:53.030 --> 02:32:53.863
Yes.
02:32:53.863 --> 02:32:55.460
If the wind's not
blowing you only got 1500.
02:32:55.460 --> 02:32:56.300
Correct.
02:32:56.300 --> 02:32:57.322
Okay.
02:32:57.322 --> 02:32:59.344
Yep that's correct
and so obviously
02:32:59.344 --> 02:33:02.741
you've got X amount of
load Y amount of generation
02:33:02.741 --> 02:33:03.783
whatever the delta is
02:33:03.783 --> 02:33:06.490
has got to come in
over those import lines
02:33:06.490 --> 02:33:07.720
and there are only three of them
02:33:07.720 --> 02:33:11.113
and it can vary drastically.
02:33:14.200 --> 02:33:19.200
So let me ask you this
in order to support that
02:33:19.670 --> 02:33:22.860
sounds like Rio Grande
Valley is a pretty good test case
02:33:22.860 --> 02:33:26.683
for variability in terms
of resources available.
02:33:28.180 --> 02:33:32.360
What kind of costs are
associated on a regional basis
02:33:32.360 --> 02:33:35.113
with normalizing that for your system?
02:33:36.550 --> 02:33:40.120
What more on this for
you what is ERCOT doing
02:33:40.120 --> 02:33:42.860
to sort of normalize that to maintain
02:33:43.850 --> 02:33:47.210
like constant supply of
power at any given time
02:33:47.210 --> 02:33:50.503
in the Rio Grande Valley,
what do you have to do?
02:33:52.500 --> 02:33:56.220
Well short term
we can ensure that
02:33:56.220 --> 02:33:58.190
the conventional units are available.
02:33:58.190 --> 02:33:59.560
So you wreck them.
02:33:59.560 --> 02:34:03.580
Theoretically they're
also there's a possibility
02:34:03.580 --> 02:34:06.380
that they're on forced
outage unavailable
02:34:07.260 --> 02:34:09.420
or they may be scheduled for maintenance
02:34:09.420 --> 02:34:11.453
during off-peak months.
02:34:12.590 --> 02:34:17.310
There are from a long-term perspective
02:34:18.590 --> 02:34:20.320
there could be market design issues
02:34:20.320 --> 02:34:23.940
that y'all may be
looking at to incentivize
02:34:27.089 --> 02:34:29.880
dispatchable generation
in specific locations.
02:34:29.880 --> 02:34:34.880
Okay and then you probably also
02:34:35.670 --> 02:34:39.770
do you regionally kind of
apply ancillary services there
02:34:39.770 --> 02:34:40.993
as well to?
02:34:41.930 --> 02:34:43.970
Ancillary services are
purchased on a system-wide basis.
02:34:43.970 --> 02:34:48.320
On system-wide basis right okay
02:34:48.320 --> 02:34:50.680
but do they help you normal
02:34:50.680 --> 02:34:53.430
because again the valley
is sort of self-contained
02:34:53.430 --> 02:34:54.960
at this point it's almost Islanded
02:34:54.960 --> 02:34:56.080
to a certain degree, right?
02:34:56.080 --> 02:34:59.970
Because of the import restrictions
02:34:59.970 --> 02:35:02.480
that you would experience.
02:35:02.480 --> 02:35:07.289
Yeah I mean I would just
it's a constrained area yeah.
02:35:07.289 --> 02:35:10.660
Yeah okay so please go ahead.
02:35:10.660 --> 02:35:13.370
I would also, I
apologize, I would also note
02:35:13.370 --> 02:35:15.300
if everything's in service
02:35:15.300 --> 02:35:17.260
we don't have any problem at all.
02:35:17.260 --> 02:35:20.270
I mean import capability
of 3500 megawatts
02:35:20.270 --> 02:35:22.560
and generation of 3900 megawatts
02:35:22.560 --> 02:35:24.910
to serve 2800 megawatts of load,
02:35:24.910 --> 02:35:26.150
that's not the problem,
02:35:26.150 --> 02:35:29.000
the problem is one of the
transmission circuits off
02:35:29.000 --> 02:35:32.350
because of some issue one
of the combined cycles is off
02:35:32.350 --> 02:35:34.429
because of some issue ex cetera
02:35:34.429 --> 02:35:38.280
and that's when you get down
into these operational issues
02:35:38.280 --> 02:35:42.230
that always seem to be
a little bit more extreme
02:35:42.230 --> 02:35:44.610
than what we see in the planning cases
02:35:44.610 --> 02:35:46.620
'cause the planning cases
start with everything there
02:35:46.620 --> 02:35:48.400
and say well what if you lost one thing
02:35:48.400 --> 02:35:50.670
I would also say because of the distance
02:35:50.670 --> 02:35:53.160
that the valley is from
the rest of the system
02:35:53.160 --> 02:35:57.940
there's kind of a stair step
of declining system capability
02:35:57.940 --> 02:36:00.560
for the loss of either
a transmission line
02:36:00.560 --> 02:36:04.240
or a generation unit and
those stair steps to my view
02:36:04.240 --> 02:36:07.910
are bigger in the valley
because of the distance away
02:36:07.910 --> 02:36:08.970
from the system
02:36:08.970 --> 02:36:11.880
and the small number
of units that are there
02:36:11.880 --> 02:36:14.510
if you lose one unit in the Houston area
02:36:14.510 --> 02:36:17.840
the system doesn't really
feel that reliability impact.
02:36:17.840 --> 02:36:20.530
You lose one unit in the
Rio Grande Valley area
02:36:20.530 --> 02:36:23.503
and it has a significant impact
on load serving capability.
02:36:23.503 --> 02:36:26.120
And what's the age
of those existing units?
02:36:26.120 --> 02:36:28.407
I believe they're well
the two that I'm thinking of
02:36:28.407 --> 02:36:31.850
are combined cycles
Magic valley and Hidalgo
02:36:31.850 --> 02:36:35.313
they're probably 10, 15
years old I'm not exactly sure.
02:36:35.313 --> 02:36:36.970
Yeah I was gonna
say 20 but yeah.
02:36:36.970 --> 02:36:39.680
20 years old okay so that
would be an older vintage
02:36:39.680 --> 02:36:41.576
for a combined cycle unit.
02:36:41.576 --> 02:36:42.409
Okay.
02:36:45.020 --> 02:36:46.720
Okay let me go
to the next slide
02:36:48.123 --> 02:36:50.630
and I really wanted to
to focus in here a little bit
02:36:50.630 --> 02:36:52.030
on the load this first graph
02:36:52.030 --> 02:36:56.550
and this valley specific load forecast
02:36:56.550 --> 02:37:01.043
is a couple of years old but
illustrates the point very well
02:37:01.043 --> 02:37:03.200
you see the black line
02:37:03.200 --> 02:37:06.900
that's the weather
normalized load forecast
02:37:06.900 --> 02:37:08.990
and then the little band of colors
02:37:10.140 --> 02:37:15.140
shows the 50, 50, 70, 30, 90,
10 and 99, one load forecast
02:37:18.520 --> 02:37:21.170
and what that means for example
02:37:21.170 --> 02:37:24.963
the 50, 50 load
forecast says that there's
02:37:24.963 --> 02:37:27.480
a 50 chance that the
load could be higher
02:37:27.480 --> 02:37:30.020
there's a 50 percent
chance it could be lower
02:37:30.020 --> 02:37:31.890
and as you go up in probability
02:37:31.890 --> 02:37:34.590
obviously you're getting
higher loads with less
02:37:34.590 --> 02:37:38.300
of a probability that the
load would exceed that level
02:37:38.300 --> 02:37:40.750
but you can see there in the Summer
02:37:40.750 --> 02:37:43.540
yeah there's a spread not too severe
02:37:44.500 --> 02:37:45.530
but there is a bandwidth
02:37:45.530 --> 02:37:49.360
when that makes sense around
those different probabilities
02:37:49.360 --> 02:37:50.990
and then you can see the green line
02:37:50.990 --> 02:37:53.570
as it's tracking
relative to the forecast
02:37:53.570 --> 02:37:55.900
the green line is the actuals
02:37:55.900 --> 02:37:58.710
pretty good, pretty good
the actual load followed
02:37:58.710 --> 02:38:01.351
the load forecast pretty well.
02:38:01.351 --> 02:38:04.070
Now I want to contrast that
as we go to the next slide
02:38:04.070 --> 02:38:08.600
this is the same graph but
relative to the Winter peak
02:38:08.600 --> 02:38:12.160
in the valley and the first
thing I wanna point out
02:38:12.160 --> 02:38:15.610
you see the green line
is the actual peak load
02:38:15.610 --> 02:38:20.430
relative to the weather
normalized forecast that existed
02:38:20.430 --> 02:38:23.110
the black line, it's all over the map,
02:38:23.110 --> 02:38:26.050
it is highly volatile
02:38:26.050 --> 02:38:29.310
and you see that as well when
you look at the colored lines
02:38:29.310 --> 02:38:31.610
on the right hand side if I
had a pointer I'd be pointing
02:38:31.610 --> 02:38:36.610
but the colored lines show
that same 50, 50 to 99, one
02:38:38.280 --> 02:38:41.050
load forecast look at the spread.
02:38:41.050 --> 02:38:44.850
The load in the valley
particularly in the Winter time
02:38:44.850 --> 02:38:49.240
is highly volatile and
a lot of that is because
02:38:49.240 --> 02:38:53.240
of the penetration of
resistive type heating
02:38:53.240 --> 02:38:55.840
and when the temperature
falls to a certain level
02:38:55.840 --> 02:38:58.440
in the valley everybody
turns their resistive heat
02:38:58.440 --> 02:39:01.180
on which is highly
inefficient to begin with
02:39:01.180 --> 02:39:04.100
and it causes the load to spike
02:39:04.100 --> 02:39:07.210
this is really unique about the valley
02:39:07.210 --> 02:39:10.870
and so we're sitting here
talking about a situation
02:39:10.870 --> 02:39:15.250
where you have intermittent
generation is predominant
02:39:15.250 --> 02:39:17.120
it's variable right?
02:39:17.120 --> 02:39:19.450
You have an import capability
02:39:19.450 --> 02:39:23.670
that as we saw is variable
because it's dependent on
02:39:23.670 --> 02:39:26.960
outages it's dependent on
what generation is available
02:39:26.960 --> 02:39:30.120
and oh by the way
the load's also volatile.
02:39:30.120 --> 02:39:33.380
So it's the confluence of those
02:39:33.380 --> 02:39:36.157
facts that gives rise to
some of the challenges
02:39:36.157 --> 02:39:38.597
and the difficulties in the valley.
02:39:44.471 --> 02:39:47.820
And here I'm providing
a little more detail
02:39:47.820 --> 02:39:50.340
about the installed generation capacity
02:39:50.340 --> 02:39:51.990
we've kind of talked about that
02:39:52.840 --> 02:39:56.110
but as we can see here there's
about 2000 megawatts of wind,
02:39:56.110 --> 02:39:59.710
1500 megawatts of
conventional generation
02:39:59.710 --> 02:40:03.200
and as I said the bulk
of that conventional
02:40:03.200 --> 02:40:06.903
is in two combined cycle gas plants
02:40:06.903 --> 02:40:10.980
and they happen to be
interconnected to the same location.
02:40:10.980 --> 02:40:15.980
So let that soak them in it
but basically the bulk of that
02:40:16.100 --> 02:40:18.040
conventional was on the West side
02:40:18.040 --> 02:40:20.610
interconnected into the same location
02:40:20.610 --> 02:40:23.290
and that's the bulk of the
conventional generation
02:40:23.290 --> 02:40:26.563
which can give give rise
to some issues as well.
02:40:29.240 --> 02:40:33.320
Next slide this is showing
planned generation
02:40:33.320 --> 02:40:35.530
again you can see of the plan generation
02:40:35.530 --> 02:40:39.960
there's no conventional on
there it's all wind and solar
02:40:39.960 --> 02:40:43.190
I think Sharylands
looking at some batteries
02:40:43.190 --> 02:40:45.740
around the railroad location
02:40:46.740 --> 02:40:49.830
but primarily wind in
terms of plan generation.
02:40:49.830 --> 02:40:52.270
Let me ask you
something on Frontera.
02:40:52.270 --> 02:40:54.360
So is Frontera still operating I mean
02:40:54.360 --> 02:40:55.670
it's selling into Mexico right?
02:40:55.670 --> 02:40:56.797
Correct.
02:40:56.797 --> 02:40:59.500
Switchable as part
of that DOE agreement
02:40:59.500 --> 02:41:01.630
I know I'm gonna freak
some Frontera guys out
02:41:01.630 --> 02:41:04.650
but because of reliability we have
02:41:04.650 --> 02:41:07.333
the ability to call that back correct.
02:41:08.800 --> 02:41:09.720
Yap.
Don't they have their own
02:41:09.720 --> 02:41:10.930
private transmission line
02:41:10.930 --> 02:41:12.870
that they built to go
straight into Mexico?
02:41:12.870 --> 02:41:15.500
They do yeah and they
get a capacity payment, right?
02:41:15.500 --> 02:41:16.333
Yep.
02:41:17.630 --> 02:41:19.830
That kind of sounds
like a legal question.
02:41:20.730 --> 02:41:21.563
Okay.
02:41:22.770 --> 02:41:25.150
Yeah I do recall what
you're talking about
02:41:25.150 --> 02:41:26.760
I think it may have been linked to
02:41:26.760 --> 02:41:28.563
when they made that switch.
02:41:29.820 --> 02:41:32.390
I don't know I'm certainly not a lawyer
02:41:32.390 --> 02:41:34.410
someone questioned
I'm a very good engineer.
02:41:34.410 --> 02:41:36.060
But that was part of
the DOE agreement.
02:41:36.060 --> 02:41:37.450
Oh come on we like.
02:41:39.350 --> 02:41:40.770
But I don't know
once they switch
02:41:40.770 --> 02:41:45.350
I don't know what leverage
we had to pull them back
02:41:45.350 --> 02:41:46.870
at that point I think it had to do
02:41:46.870 --> 02:41:48.270
before they made that switch
02:41:49.560 --> 02:41:52.673
yeah next slide.
02:41:56.050 --> 02:41:59.510
This is that real import
limit I was talking about the
02:41:59.510 --> 02:42:02.043
700 to the 3500.
02:42:02.975 --> 02:42:04.725
This is over the course of the year
02:42:06.010 --> 02:42:10.280
but it just and again
this is kind of hard to see
02:42:10.280 --> 02:42:12.250
unfortunately I'm not very
good at making slides either
02:42:12.250 --> 02:42:15.440
I use crayons and so when
somebody puts these together
02:42:15.440 --> 02:42:17.870
sometimes they don't look too good but
02:42:17.870 --> 02:42:20.850
from a load of 700 up to about 3500
02:42:20.850 --> 02:42:24.960
but it varies greatly and as I
said it's highly dependent on
02:42:24.960 --> 02:42:28.560
what generation is online
as well which is also varying
02:42:28.560 --> 02:42:32.330
so you have varying
output of the of the units
02:42:32.330 --> 02:42:35.430
which affects the load
serving capability in the valley
02:42:35.430 --> 02:42:38.450
but then that's exacerbated
because it also impacts
02:42:38.450 --> 02:42:40.363
the import capability as well.
02:42:42.970 --> 02:42:45.920
Next slide so some of the challenges
02:42:45.920 --> 02:42:50.340
and honestly in my mind if
you look at any single one
02:42:50.340 --> 02:42:54.190
of the bullets here on
the next couple of slides
02:42:54.190 --> 02:42:56.670
and you look at it you
go yeah that's not unique
02:42:56.670 --> 02:42:58.690
there are other areas on the system
02:42:58.690 --> 02:42:59.770
where we could find that
02:42:59.770 --> 02:43:03.720
and I think that's true I
think the thing in my mind
02:43:03.720 --> 02:43:06.670
that makes the valley
unique is it has all of them
02:43:06.670 --> 02:43:10.640
and so you've got everything
there combined together
02:43:10.640 --> 02:43:12.630
and then based on
what we just talked about
02:43:12.630 --> 02:43:17.340
the variability of the import
the load and the generation
02:43:17.340 --> 02:43:19.890
that makes it a very challenging area.
02:43:19.890 --> 02:43:20.970
So I just wanted to list
02:43:20.970 --> 02:43:23.560
some of the challenging issues
02:43:23.560 --> 02:43:26.750
one as Warren mentioned
and we talked about here
02:43:26.750 --> 02:43:30.020
it is a load pocket at
times it's reliant upon
02:43:30.020 --> 02:43:33.080
those imports in order
to maintain reliability
02:43:33.080 --> 02:43:34.850
during high load periods.
02:43:34.850 --> 02:43:37.740
It's also a generation pocket
02:43:37.740 --> 02:43:40.380
and I know Sharyland's
got some more comments
02:43:40.380 --> 02:43:43.690
relative to that but there
are export issues there
02:43:43.690 --> 02:43:45.450
when the wind is blowing
02:43:45.450 --> 02:43:49.247
and the load is at a lower level
02:43:49.247 --> 02:43:52.340
we hit constraints there
trying to get the generation
02:43:52.340 --> 02:43:53.860
out of the valley.
02:43:53.860 --> 02:43:56.780
So it's both it is a
higher low growth area
02:43:56.780 --> 02:43:58.400
I know historically
02:43:58.400 --> 02:44:01.510
we saw periods in the
valley that were 10, 11%
02:44:01.510 --> 02:44:05.560
native load growth
it's not that much now
02:44:05.560 --> 02:44:09.180
but there's still a
lot of interest in large
02:44:09.180 --> 02:44:13.400
from large spot load additions
industrial type facilities,
02:44:13.400 --> 02:44:15.240
we get requests all the time for folks
02:44:15.240 --> 02:44:16.710
wanting to locate down there
02:44:16.710 --> 02:44:19.450
there's some strategic areas there
02:44:19.450 --> 02:44:23.160
as well as the coastal
bend area for AEP Texas
02:44:23.160 --> 02:44:28.160
some really high value
locations and these load requests
02:44:29.200 --> 02:44:32.240
some of them are a gigawatt
well you start talking about
02:44:32.240 --> 02:44:34.520
adding a gigawatt a load at a time
02:44:36.060 --> 02:44:39.130
that's a pretty big shock to the system
02:44:39.130 --> 02:44:41.800
and we see I mean I have
multiple of those requests
02:44:41.800 --> 02:44:44.153
outstanding right
now in different areas.
02:44:45.440 --> 02:44:49.270
Obviously it's coastal
environment which has an impact on
02:44:49.270 --> 02:44:53.910
facility condition as well as
the potential for hurricanes
02:44:53.910 --> 02:44:56.640
obviously that impact the area
02:44:56.640 --> 02:44:59.410
there's a high penetration
of inverter-based resources
02:44:59.410 --> 02:45:01.940
which really there I'm
talking primarily in the valley
02:45:01.940 --> 02:45:02.850
about the wind
02:45:04.170 --> 02:45:08.160
and I won't talking about
getting down in the weeds
02:45:08.160 --> 02:45:09.480
I'm getting down in the weeds here
02:45:09.480 --> 02:45:13.684
but I'll just say that that
there are some characteristics
02:45:13.684 --> 02:45:16.601
of the operation of those wind
02:45:16.601 --> 02:45:20.370
or just inverter based
resources in general
02:45:20.370 --> 02:45:21.970
that when coupled with the fact
02:45:21.970 --> 02:45:24.230
that we have series capacitors installed
02:45:24.230 --> 02:45:27.170
on some of those 345
KV transmission lines
02:45:27.170 --> 02:45:32.170
creates problems issues
because the two interact
02:45:32.560 --> 02:45:33.433
so that's-
02:45:34.601 --> 02:45:35.930
Frequency issues.
02:45:35.930 --> 02:45:40.930
Yep so not
necessarily singly unique
02:45:42.030 --> 02:45:44.480
about the valley but again
another one of those things
02:45:44.480 --> 02:45:46.723
that layers on complexity in the valley.
02:45:48.340 --> 02:45:50.220
I have a question
to follow that
02:45:50.220 --> 02:45:52.490
and I'm about to take
you further into the weeds
02:45:52.490 --> 02:45:54.530
and you can probably can imagine
02:45:54.530 --> 02:45:56.920
and I'm gonna blame
Warren for that because
02:45:56.920 --> 02:45:59.180
I even learned about these
concepts because of him
02:45:59.180 --> 02:46:00.656
during my time at Ricotta.
02:46:00.656 --> 02:46:02.540
Absolutely.
02:46:02.540 --> 02:46:05.550
You mentioned there's a
voltage issue that's causing
02:46:05.550 --> 02:46:07.420
this issue into the valley
02:46:07.420 --> 02:46:11.660
and you mentioned reactive equipment
02:46:11.660 --> 02:46:13.880
and now you've
mentioned series capacitors
02:46:13.880 --> 02:46:17.880
can you sort of tie all
that together and okay.
02:46:17.880 --> 02:46:22.880
I will try so series
capacitors effectively reduce
02:46:26.878 --> 02:46:30.240
a component of the impedance
of the transmission line
02:46:30.240 --> 02:46:33.130
and so you can take a transmission line
02:46:34.120 --> 02:46:37.480
and the amount of flow across the line
02:46:37.480 --> 02:46:40.638
is impacted by the impedance of the line
02:46:40.638 --> 02:46:43.980
how much is the line pushing
back against power flowing
02:46:43.980 --> 02:46:46.800
you put a serious
capacitor install it on the line
02:46:46.800 --> 02:46:49.800
it effectively shortens
that transmission line
02:46:49.800 --> 02:46:52.210
it improves its load carrying capability
02:46:52.210 --> 02:46:54.110
improves its voltage performance
02:46:54.110 --> 02:46:57.990
and so that's really the purpose
of those series capacitors
02:46:57.990 --> 02:47:01.420
they were put there to help
improve that import capability
02:47:01.420 --> 02:47:02.710
that we talked about
02:47:02.710 --> 02:47:04.930
and be able to serve
more load in the valley well
02:47:04.930 --> 02:47:07.040
then subsequent to that,
02:47:07.040 --> 02:47:10.500
we had the explosion of wind
wanting to connect down there
02:47:10.500 --> 02:47:13.390
and oh it just so happens
that the equipment
02:47:13.390 --> 02:47:15.150
on the wind turbines can interact
02:47:15.150 --> 02:47:18.540
with those series capacitors
so that can create an issue
02:47:19.770 --> 02:47:23.450
from a voltage standpoint
as far as that being the limit
02:47:23.450 --> 02:47:27.290
what I mean is if you look at the sum
02:47:27.290 --> 02:47:30.620
of the thermal capability
of those transmission lines
02:47:30.620 --> 02:47:33.860
it's much greater than
the ability to import
02:47:33.860 --> 02:47:37.060
power over the lines
and so what happens
02:47:37.060 --> 02:47:39.930
and if I had a whiteboard I'd
probably draw a picture but
02:47:40.830 --> 02:47:44.930
as you import more power into the valley
02:47:44.930 --> 02:47:49.930
those reactive losses increase
voltage will start to degrade
02:47:49.970 --> 02:47:52.640
you reach a point where the voltage,
02:47:52.640 --> 02:47:55.920
when the voltage degrades
the reactive devices
02:47:55.920 --> 02:47:58.070
produce less reactive power
02:47:58.070 --> 02:48:01.390
which then causes the
voltage to degrade even further
02:48:01.390 --> 02:48:02.970
and you reach a point where you simply
02:48:02.970 --> 02:48:05.410
can't recover from that
there's just not enough
02:48:05.410 --> 02:48:07.960
reactive capability
at that point in time
02:48:07.960 --> 02:48:12.170
to be able to recover and
bring the system back up
02:48:12.170 --> 02:48:15.120
and so that's really
the limit for the valley
02:48:15.120 --> 02:48:19.040
at this point in time is
the voltage capability
02:48:19.040 --> 02:48:21.322
and interestingly enough what we found
02:48:21.322 --> 02:48:25.160
out about the valley is that you can add
02:48:25.160 --> 02:48:27.830
dynamic reactive
capability which we've done
02:48:27.830 --> 02:48:29.590
we've added some Statcoms there
02:48:29.590 --> 02:48:34.370
that can continuously
adjust reactive power
02:48:34.370 --> 02:48:36.440
in real time to help offset that
02:48:36.440 --> 02:48:38.910
but there's a limit to
how much you can add
02:48:38.910 --> 02:48:41.330
and we're about there we've added
02:48:42.170 --> 02:48:43.930
dynamic reactive capability
02:48:43.930 --> 02:48:45.820
we've added it in the valley
02:48:45.820 --> 02:48:48.470
and what happens you
reach a certain point where that
02:48:49.340 --> 02:48:53.680
voltage limitation becomes
a transient stability limitation
02:48:53.680 --> 02:48:57.710
where the valley actually
starts to separate angularly
02:48:57.710 --> 02:49:00.410
from the rest of ERCOT
and we're about there
02:49:00.410 --> 02:49:01.640
from a reactive standpoint.
02:49:01.640 --> 02:49:04.710
What is that
penetration percentage
02:49:06.118 --> 02:49:07.870
I guess when you say we're there.
02:49:07.870 --> 02:49:10.770
Yeah so it we don't
think about it that way
02:49:10.770 --> 02:49:15.770
we think about it more
in terms of what you'll see
02:49:15.940 --> 02:49:19.190
in operations is there's
as you get more and more
02:49:19.190 --> 02:49:22.100
flow on the line there's
a kind of a degrading of
02:49:22.100 --> 02:49:23.840
the voltage conditions
02:49:23.840 --> 02:49:26.930
and what happens is
normally it kind of goes like this
02:49:26.930 --> 02:49:29.370
and so you can have
as a rough rule of thumb
02:49:29.370 --> 02:49:31.660
when you get to a certain voltage level
02:49:31.660 --> 02:49:33.730
you're getting close to that
02:49:33.730 --> 02:49:36.730
as you get more and more of this
02:49:36.730 --> 02:49:40.410
dynamic reactive equipment
you can hold the voltage up
02:49:40.410 --> 02:49:42.100
but then what tends to happen is that
02:49:42.100 --> 02:49:44.850
the cliff gets actually
steeper and steeper
02:49:44.850 --> 02:49:47.420
and so once you get to that point
02:49:47.420 --> 02:49:49.740
from an operational context it becomes
02:49:49.740 --> 02:49:51.790
almost uncontrollable
because you can't tell
02:49:51.790 --> 02:49:54.430
how close you are to the
edge of that edge of that cliff.
02:49:54.430 --> 02:49:56.210
So you don't want to go over?
02:49:56.210 --> 02:49:59.240
You certainly don't want
to go over the cliff yes.
02:49:59.240 --> 02:50:02.100
In terms of the
current trajectory
02:50:02.100 --> 02:50:05.850
and kind of have how you've
seen that phenomenon evolve
02:50:05.850 --> 02:50:07.310
over the last few years
02:50:09.110 --> 02:50:13.940
what that sounds like a
major regional stability problem
02:50:13.940 --> 02:50:15.440
that we are seeing evolve.
02:50:15.440 --> 02:50:17.720
The voltage and the frequency.
02:50:17.720 --> 02:50:18.553
Combined.
02:50:18.553 --> 02:50:19.490
Yeah.
02:50:19.490 --> 02:50:22.623
Because they're
interlinked to a degree, right?
02:50:24.860 --> 02:50:27.690
I'm not sure finish your.
02:50:27.690 --> 02:50:32.310
Okay so and there
are a couple things that
02:50:32.310 --> 02:50:36.020
we can do to solve that
we need more stable forms
02:50:36.020 --> 02:50:39.660
of generation in key
places around the state
02:50:39.660 --> 02:50:40.873
would that be accurate?
02:50:42.700 --> 02:50:43.810
It would support the valley
02:50:43.810 --> 02:50:46.840
if we had more synchronous generation.
02:50:46.840 --> 02:50:50.220
Or we need more
transmission is that accurate?
02:50:50.220 --> 02:50:52.913
Transmission is one
of the levers that yeah.
02:50:52.913 --> 02:50:54.000
That we can pull.
02:50:54.000 --> 02:50:55.093
We currently have
access to yeah.
02:50:55.093 --> 02:50:57.900
You got to realize I'm
a transmission guy so.
02:50:57.900 --> 02:50:58.733
Sure I get it.
02:50:58.733 --> 02:51:00.390
When all you've got is a hammer
02:51:00.390 --> 02:51:01.700
the whole world looks like a nail
02:51:01.700 --> 02:51:03.710
but we need more transmission in there.
02:51:03.710 --> 02:51:04.860
I've heard that.
02:51:04.860 --> 02:51:07.540
So my question is geared toward
02:51:08.421 --> 02:51:11.670
what is our timeline
as regulators as people
02:51:11.670 --> 02:51:16.670
ERCOT especially to
try to solve the reliability
02:51:17.060 --> 02:51:18.293
forecast reliability issues
02:51:18.293 --> 02:51:19.720
that the valley will face
02:51:21.420 --> 02:51:22.760
and what are you seeing right now
02:51:22.760 --> 02:51:27.410
are we gonna have
major reliability issues
02:51:27.410 --> 02:51:29.790
within the next year the next two years?
02:51:29.790 --> 02:51:31.970
We're seeing it already now but in terms
02:51:33.017 --> 02:51:35.123
of sustained reliability events?
02:51:36.150 --> 02:51:39.463
Yeah I'll start maybe
with your last question.
02:51:40.536 --> 02:51:43.450
I think the last RPG filing that we made
02:51:43.450 --> 02:51:46.950
we were showing about
200 megawatts of headroom
02:51:46.950 --> 02:51:49.760
and again this is a planning study
02:51:49.760 --> 02:51:53.960
based on averages
deterministic planning criteria
02:51:53.960 --> 02:51:56.180
which as we talked
about the world down there
02:51:56.180 --> 02:51:57.970
is highly probabilistic
02:51:59.010 --> 02:52:01.210
but we had about 200
megawatts of headroom
02:52:01.210 --> 02:52:05.180
I think the latest ERCOT
study that had increased
02:52:05.180 --> 02:52:08.033
where I think the load serving
capability now is about 3300
02:52:08.033 --> 02:52:10.450
is what we were seeing
in a planning study
02:52:11.780 --> 02:52:14.920
so there's you know
three to 500 megawatts
02:52:14.920 --> 02:52:16.967
I would say of headroom
but the question is
02:52:16.967 --> 02:52:19.550
are we gonna have a
problem well going back to that
02:52:19.550 --> 02:52:21.670
load forecast it depends
02:52:21.670 --> 02:52:23.580
because the load is highly volatile
02:52:23.580 --> 02:52:25.960
could we have a problem
down there we could
02:52:25.960 --> 02:52:28.850
if we have a cold weather event
02:52:28.850 --> 02:52:31.040
that causes the Winter peak to spike
02:52:31.040 --> 02:52:33.140
we could absolutely have problems
02:52:33.140 --> 02:52:35.240
if it doesn't then we'll
probably be okay.
02:52:36.569 --> 02:52:38.570
And to some extent
to add on to that,
02:52:38.570 --> 02:52:40.680
to some extent you're asking
02:52:40.680 --> 02:52:42.160
how are we gonna roll the dice
02:52:42.160 --> 02:52:45.820
because if you look
at everything in service
02:52:45.820 --> 02:52:47.070
no we're not gonna have a problem
02:52:47.070 --> 02:52:50.240
but will we have a hot
day or a very cold day
02:52:50.240 --> 02:52:52.290
when one of the generation units is out
02:52:52.290 --> 02:52:55.370
and maybe one of the
transmission line trips
02:52:55.370 --> 02:52:58.800
if that were to occur we
would likely have some sort
02:52:58.800 --> 02:53:01.460
of an operational issue in the valley.
02:53:01.460 --> 02:53:03.330
Well no I'm looking
at it takes six years
02:53:03.330 --> 02:53:06.200
to build a transmission line
according to your timeline
02:53:06.200 --> 02:53:08.610
and eight years in the valley apparently
02:53:08.610 --> 02:53:10.670
for some reason or another
02:53:10.670 --> 02:53:14.550
and then we have no
forecasted base load generation
02:53:14.550 --> 02:53:17.630
in the queue really to any real degree
02:53:17.630 --> 02:53:18.840
and so I'm wondering
02:53:18.840 --> 02:53:20.740
when are we gonna
start to see real problems
02:53:20.740 --> 02:53:22.270
in the Rio Grande Valley
02:53:22.270 --> 02:53:23.830
which happens to be a very economically
02:53:23.830 --> 02:53:25.893
dynamic part of Texas.
02:53:28.270 --> 02:53:31.630
I mean operationally
we see issues in the valley
02:53:31.630 --> 02:53:32.750
about once a year.
02:53:32.750 --> 02:53:36.540
I mean last week the tropical
storm came through last fall
02:53:36.540 --> 02:53:41.100
and that led to some load
issues down in the valley
02:53:41.100 --> 02:53:43.270
so from an operational perspective
02:53:43.270 --> 02:53:46.010
we continue to see operational
events down in the valley
02:53:46.010 --> 02:53:51.010
the February 2011 event
load shed on the system
02:53:51.750 --> 02:53:53.100
lasted around four hours
02:53:53.100 --> 02:53:55.580
load shed in the valley lasted two days,
02:53:55.580 --> 02:53:56.413
two and a half days
02:53:56.413 --> 02:53:59.040
I can't remember exactly
what but just because
02:53:59.040 --> 02:54:02.860
of all of this resistive heat down there
02:54:02.860 --> 02:54:04.690
and the extended cold conditions
02:54:04.690 --> 02:54:07.730
so I mean I think we get to
the end of this conversation
02:54:07.730 --> 02:54:11.453
I think the time for building
transmission is now.
02:54:12.960 --> 02:54:17.960
Will that prevent an operational
event in the meantime.
02:54:18.150 --> 02:54:19.250
I'd have to say no.
02:54:19.250 --> 02:54:20.083
Right.
02:54:22.860 --> 02:54:25.048
And how do we
shorten that six years?
02:54:25.048 --> 02:54:26.850
I don't now.
02:54:26.850 --> 02:54:28.650
One way to do
it is well I guess
02:54:28.650 --> 02:54:30.020
there's two types of projects right
02:54:30.020 --> 02:54:32.140
there's reliability and economic
02:54:32.140 --> 02:54:35.280
and given the unique circumstance that
02:54:36.710 --> 02:54:38.760
the Rio Grande Valley
is under right now,
02:54:39.830 --> 02:54:43.930
perhaps reliability projects
would be a more efficient
02:54:43.930 --> 02:54:46.240
manner of building
transmission into the area
02:54:46.240 --> 02:54:48.230
versus economic especially because
02:54:48.230 --> 02:54:51.180
we still need to
implement the Senate Bill
02:54:52.060 --> 02:54:53.250
for the economic criteria
02:54:53.250 --> 02:54:56.300
so when you have a
situation like this that has
02:54:56.300 --> 02:54:59.740
presents a reliability issue
I think reliability projects
02:54:59.740 --> 02:55:01.150
are a little bit faster.
02:55:01.150 --> 02:55:01.983
Correct.
02:55:01.983 --> 02:55:03.150
And about how much faster can
02:55:03.150 --> 02:55:05.760
you kind of give us a timeline?
02:55:05.760 --> 02:55:09.850
I mean it's a little faster
for us to do the analysis.
02:55:09.850 --> 02:55:13.170
I would also say that for
certain reliability projects
02:55:13.170 --> 02:55:14.283
and this would be something
02:55:14.283 --> 02:55:17.580
that we would want to
consult with the Commissioners
02:55:17.580 --> 02:55:21.460
and with staff we can
designate it as critical
02:55:21.460 --> 02:55:25.870
to reliability unfortunately
that reduces your time
02:55:25.870 --> 02:55:30.270
to review that project from 12
months down to six months so
02:55:30.270 --> 02:55:33.880
we would not take that
critical designation lightly
02:55:36.989 --> 02:55:38.680
then it kind of falls
back into the hands
02:55:38.680 --> 02:55:41.063
of the various transmission
service providers
02:55:41.063 --> 02:55:42.770
and admittedly we also have
02:55:42.770 --> 02:55:46.450
a right writer first refusal requirement
02:55:46.450 --> 02:55:51.120
so when we designate
what that optimal project is
02:55:51.120 --> 02:55:52.600
the end points would determine
02:55:52.600 --> 02:55:55.580
the the actual transmission
service providers
02:55:55.580 --> 02:55:58.880
that would be involved in
the in the construction process.
02:55:58.880 --> 02:55:59.990
What would you reduce
02:55:59.990 --> 02:56:01.817
from 12 months to six
months specifically sorry?
02:56:01.817 --> 02:56:06.000
The the CCN analysis if
we designate it as critical
02:56:06.000 --> 02:56:09.860
when the transmission
service provider brings it to you
02:56:09.860 --> 02:56:11.170
I think under your rules
02:56:11.170 --> 02:56:14.380
and again I'm not an
attorney so I don't know if
02:56:14.380 --> 02:56:17.580
the exact stipulation but
the timeline is reduced
02:56:17.580 --> 02:56:19.913
from 12 months to six months.
02:56:20.800 --> 02:56:24.870
Yeah and just because that
processes the existing process
02:56:24.870 --> 02:56:26.550
doesn't mean we need to adhere to it
02:56:26.550 --> 02:56:28.173
we can change that as well.
02:56:29.060 --> 02:56:33.040
That may require
some real changes
02:56:33.040 --> 02:56:35.663
role or protocol changes
to shorten the timeline.
02:56:36.962 --> 02:56:39.183
There's a one avenue right we have it.
02:56:40.120 --> 02:56:41.599
We can do that.
02:56:41.599 --> 02:56:42.432
Yes sir.
02:56:42.432 --> 02:56:44.260
And while we're on the
on the subject of timeline
02:56:44.260 --> 02:56:47.720
if I could and you're
probably aware of this
02:56:47.720 --> 02:56:51.280
but I talked about some
of those large load requests
02:56:51.280 --> 02:56:54.150
that we have that's true in the valley
02:56:54.150 --> 02:56:56.710
it's also true in the Coastal bend
02:56:56.710 --> 02:56:59.980
area around Corpus
Christi, port of Corpus Christi,
02:56:59.980 --> 02:57:04.980
Port of victoria very
strategic high value,
02:57:05.680 --> 02:57:09.700
high interest location, we
have a lot of interest from
02:57:09.700 --> 02:57:14.370
very large load customers
who come to us and say
02:57:14.370 --> 02:57:18.320
what would it take primarily
how long would it take
02:57:18.320 --> 02:57:20.190
for you to be able to service well
02:57:21.310 --> 02:57:24.380
we very recently signed
two load customers
02:57:24.380 --> 02:57:25.890
about a gigawatt a load
02:57:27.950 --> 02:57:32.360
and made the filing got endorsement
02:57:32.360 --> 02:57:35.410
to move forward with those upgrades
02:57:35.410 --> 02:57:37.810
we had about 25 megawatts of headroom
02:57:37.810 --> 02:57:40.240
over and above once
those upgrades were in place
02:57:40.240 --> 02:57:42.210
we have about 25 megawatts of headroom
02:57:42.210 --> 02:57:45.920
well there's eight other
people waiting in line
02:57:45.920 --> 02:57:49.020
we've done everything we can to ring
02:57:49.020 --> 02:57:52.670
what capacity we can out of the system
02:57:52.670 --> 02:57:54.760
back to that timeline if it takes,
02:57:54.760 --> 02:57:57.760
if I have to build major infrastructure
02:57:57.760 --> 02:58:00.460
in order to accommodate that request
02:58:00.460 --> 02:58:02.760
five or six years they
want to be connected
02:58:02.760 --> 02:58:04.870
in 18 to 24 months
02:58:04.870 --> 02:58:07.700
and so some of these customers are like
02:58:07.700 --> 02:58:09.570
sorry I'm gonna go to Louisiana
02:58:09.570 --> 02:58:12.410
or somewhere because I
can get hooked up a lot quicker
02:58:12.410 --> 02:58:14.370
it's really an issue so I don't know
02:58:16.550 --> 02:58:19.600
what we can do I you know it seems to me
02:58:19.600 --> 02:58:23.640
and again you guys poke me if I'm
02:58:23.640 --> 02:58:26.390
if I get in trouble here
but would it make sense
02:58:26.390 --> 02:58:28.880
in some of these locations
02:58:28.880 --> 02:58:30.960
let's look what infrastructure
02:58:30.960 --> 02:58:34.650
would we need to put in
place where we would have
02:58:34.650 --> 02:58:38.340
an extra gigawatt of capacity
in some of these strategic
02:58:38.340 --> 02:58:42.780
high-value areas prior to
having somebody say go
02:58:42.780 --> 02:58:46.180
and sign on the dotted line
but having some excess capacity
02:58:46.180 --> 02:58:49.670
in the areas because we're
gonna lose some business
02:58:49.670 --> 02:58:52.120
because of that and it
just takes a long time to.
02:58:52.960 --> 02:58:54.100
When you say capacity
02:58:54.100 --> 02:58:55.900
are you talking about
transmission capacity?
02:58:55.900 --> 02:58:56.790
I am.
02:58:56.790 --> 02:59:01.423
Okay so aside from
345, 138 and 69 KV lines
02:59:02.350 --> 02:59:04.120
what other solution do we have?
02:59:04.120 --> 02:59:08.150
No that's it but it
just takes five six years
02:59:08.150 --> 02:59:12.160
if we have to build
a 50 mile 345 KV line
02:59:12.160 --> 02:59:13.847
to provide enough capacity
02:59:13.847 --> 02:59:16.000
by the time we we do the study
02:59:16.000 --> 02:59:18.310
we submit it you know six months to get
02:59:18.310 --> 02:59:20.565
ERCOT endorsement through RPG
02:59:20.565 --> 02:59:22.070
we've got eight months to a year
02:59:22.070 --> 02:59:24.210
to do environmental analysis,
02:59:24.210 --> 02:59:26.690
routing analysis to prepare the CCN
02:59:27.540 --> 02:59:30.030
six months to a year
to get the CCN approval
02:59:30.030 --> 02:59:32.590
depending on whether
it's critical or not
02:59:32.590 --> 02:59:36.760
and then move forward to
actually acquire the right-of-way
02:59:36.760 --> 02:59:40.560
and build a facility that
whole timeline is lengthy
02:59:40.560 --> 02:59:44.160
and a lot of these guys
like I said 18, 24 months
02:59:44.160 --> 02:59:45.914
they want to be up and going.
02:59:45.914 --> 02:59:48.990
So to the
chairman's point earlier
02:59:48.990 --> 02:59:51.660
we obviously are in the
position to modify rules
02:59:51.660 --> 02:59:53.480
and aircraft protocols and criteria
02:59:53.480 --> 02:59:57.000
and that could definitely have short
02:59:57.000 --> 02:59:59.330
could potentially shorten the window
02:59:59.330 --> 03:00:02.330
but from a transmission
an electric utility
03:00:02.330 --> 03:00:04.810
transmission planning,
building perspective
03:00:05.670 --> 03:00:08.700
how much flexibility do
you really have to shorten
03:00:08.700 --> 03:00:11.420
the build out of the 345KV line I mean
03:00:11.420 --> 03:00:13.760
how long does it take
you once you get a CCN
03:00:13.760 --> 03:00:15.640
how long does it
take you to build a line.
03:00:15.640 --> 03:00:20.020
Depending on what it is but
we can put a 345 load serving
03:00:20.020 --> 03:00:23.000
station in probably 18 months
03:00:23.000 --> 03:00:27.283
and then depending on
the line 24 to 36 months.
03:00:28.670 --> 03:00:30.970
So still about if
I'm counting right.
03:00:30.970 --> 03:00:32.200
We're getting close though
03:00:32.200 --> 03:00:33.640
we're getting close.
03:00:33.640 --> 03:00:34.473
Two and a half years.
03:00:34.473 --> 03:00:36.880
Depending on the line if it's
shorter we can do it quicker
03:00:36.880 --> 03:00:38.253
I think West Texas.
03:00:39.570 --> 03:00:41.017
I'm over here I'm right.
03:00:41.017 --> 03:00:42.291
(members laughing)
03:00:42.291 --> 03:00:45.610
Yeah okay actual
actual construction time
03:00:45.610 --> 03:00:47.443
on far West what were.
03:00:49.060 --> 03:00:53.230
So I can't recall
but it was 18 months.
03:00:53.230 --> 03:00:54.110
18 months.
03:00:54.110 --> 03:00:55.750
It was superhuman.
03:00:55.750 --> 03:00:56.583
Yeah.
03:00:56.583 --> 03:00:59.450
I was gonna say Warren I
don't want to steal his thunder
03:00:59.450 --> 03:01:02.970
'cause he has his last act
is about the Permian basin
03:01:02.970 --> 03:01:07.970
but the TSPs that own most
of the infrastructure out there
03:01:10.020 --> 03:01:13.120
and therefore have most
of the obligation to build
03:01:13.120 --> 03:01:17.030
have been chasing our our
tales on this for several years
03:01:17.030 --> 03:01:20.700
and over the last 24
months I guess it's been
03:01:20.700 --> 03:01:24.150
'cause COVID was sort of a pause
03:01:25.610 --> 03:01:27.930
we developed a number
of strategies that we thought
03:01:27.930 --> 03:01:31.310
could meaningfully
shorten the time between
03:01:32.250 --> 03:01:35.240
what transmission do we
need and transmission is built
03:01:35.240 --> 03:01:40.240
and energized those
range from what criteria
03:01:40.760 --> 03:01:44.090
could ERCOT use to determine need
03:01:45.140 --> 03:01:48.250
and does 'cause traditionally
ERCOT either thinks
03:01:48.250 --> 03:01:51.720
there's organic growth or
thinks there's a contract sign
03:01:51.720 --> 03:01:55.080
and in the valley as in the Permian
03:01:55.080 --> 03:01:58.060
they can go to market in 12 to 18 months
03:01:58.060 --> 03:02:01.240
and we're still trying to figure out how
03:02:01.240 --> 03:02:02.390
we're gonna serve them.
03:02:03.610 --> 03:02:07.410
There are parallel
studies that can be done
03:02:07.410 --> 03:02:10.740
by the utility and by
ERCOT at the same time
03:02:10.740 --> 03:02:15.000
so that rather than sequentially
studying those projects
03:02:15.000 --> 03:02:16.933
we're doing it in tandem.
03:02:18.130 --> 03:02:21.480
There is the six-month
urgency designation
03:02:22.460 --> 03:02:24.840
and there is a fair
amount of flexibility
03:02:24.840 --> 03:02:27.210
frankly already in place
at the Commission in terms
03:02:27.210 --> 03:02:30.140
of how you all want
to process those CCNs
03:02:30.140 --> 03:02:34.360
and so we've been holding
off on sharing all this with you
03:02:34.360 --> 03:02:36.539
because you have a lot on your plate
03:02:36.539 --> 03:02:40.610
but there are some very
concrete opportunities here
03:02:40.610 --> 03:02:41.443
to go faster.
03:02:41.443 --> 03:02:44.050
Please don't be shy
feel free to share those
03:02:46.445 --> 03:02:47.945
as soon as you're comfortable.
03:02:50.330 --> 03:02:52.560
Yeah and Warren
just one last question
03:02:52.560 --> 03:02:54.020
about the ERCOT processes
03:02:54.020 --> 03:02:59.020
so RPG I mean I'm just
thinking back to Houston import.
03:02:59.050 --> 03:02:59.883
Sure.
03:02:59.883 --> 03:03:01.270
It was heavily litigated
03:03:01.270 --> 03:03:03.850
and obviously there was some need there
03:03:03.850 --> 03:03:06.520
Houston was growing
leaps and bounds still is
03:03:06.520 --> 03:03:10.040
and of course that that
was heavily fought over
03:03:10.040 --> 03:03:12.570
within RPG was it not I mean it was RPG
03:03:12.570 --> 03:03:14.020
was here at the Commission
it was everywhere
03:03:14.020 --> 03:03:15.360
was it the legislature.
03:03:15.360 --> 03:03:17.490
We heard a lot of noise at RPG
03:03:17.490 --> 03:03:19.560
but RPG is not a voting body.
03:03:19.560 --> 03:03:21.250
Okay but it
doesn't slow it down
03:03:21.250 --> 03:03:22.220
or anything like that.
03:03:22.220 --> 03:03:23.430
It doesn't necessarily
slow it down
03:03:23.430 --> 03:03:26.040
except to the point where
someone raises something
03:03:26.040 --> 03:03:28.310
we look at and go yeah
that's a really good point
03:03:28.310 --> 03:03:29.320
and then we might have to go back
03:03:29.320 --> 03:03:31.420
and I think that did
happen with with Houston
03:03:31.420 --> 03:03:34.010
where there were a couple
that's why they were raised
03:03:34.010 --> 03:03:37.210
we went back and studied it
a lot of the litigation was here
03:03:37.210 --> 03:03:41.040
where we actually had two different
03:03:41.040 --> 03:03:42.900
contested cases associated with that.
03:03:42.900 --> 03:03:44.000
That's correct okay.
03:03:46.320 --> 03:03:48.200
I think I saw a
rabbit across the road
03:03:48.200 --> 03:03:52.950
and got us off a little bit but
I wanted to kind of continue
03:03:52.950 --> 03:03:55.180
here some of the
challenges in South Texas
03:03:55.180 --> 03:03:57.890
we can go to the next slide.
03:03:57.890 --> 03:04:00.520
Multiple generic
transmission constraints
03:04:01.640 --> 03:04:04.150
which we could probably
talk for a while about
03:04:04.150 --> 03:04:06.820
what those are but
essentially back to that
03:04:06.820 --> 03:04:10.620
voltage stability issue
it's a stability issue
03:04:10.620 --> 03:04:13.250
that cannot be directly
observed in real time
03:04:13.250 --> 03:04:14.700
by the operators
03:04:14.700 --> 03:04:17.840
and so you have a group
of transmission elements
03:04:17.840 --> 03:04:19.400
that are defined
03:04:19.400 --> 03:04:23.440
and that grouping of transmission
elements is then used to
03:04:23.440 --> 03:04:27.070
adjust or limit flows between
two geographic regions
03:04:27.070 --> 03:04:30.650
you calculate those
limits kind of offline
03:04:30.650 --> 03:04:35.050
and then convert those back
into an equivalent megawatt flow
03:04:35.050 --> 03:04:36.810
that the operators can actually see
03:04:36.810 --> 03:04:39.090
and manage the system with so
03:04:39.090 --> 03:04:43.430
out of I think 16 GTC's
in ERCOT seven of them
03:04:43.430 --> 03:04:45.260
are in the Rio Grande Valley
03:04:45.260 --> 03:04:49.440
so that's again another thing
03:04:49.440 --> 03:04:51.640
that makes the valley really complex
03:04:51.640 --> 03:04:54.770
and difficult to manage
some of those GTCs
03:04:54.770 --> 03:04:57.400
have now started to
overlap so you have a GTC
03:04:57.400 --> 03:05:01.140
within another GTC nested
03:05:02.180 --> 03:05:05.040
and the solution for the GTCs
03:05:05.040 --> 03:05:08.520
the GTCs are considered
economic constraints
03:05:08.520 --> 03:05:12.430
because you do have
the ability to mitigate it
03:05:12.430 --> 03:05:15.480
through redispatch you just
turn the generation down right?
03:05:15.480 --> 03:05:19.070
And so you reduce the
generation you reduce the flow
03:05:19.070 --> 03:05:23.830
therefore it's considered an
economic constraint (coughs)
03:05:23.830 --> 03:05:26.420
excuse me and so you
have conditional exit plans
03:05:26.420 --> 03:05:28.070
associated with those GTCs
03:05:28.070 --> 03:05:31.266
but I've got a bullet
later I think I said
03:05:31.266 --> 03:05:34.140
4% of the load in the valley
03:05:34.140 --> 03:05:37.280
and 40 of the ERCOT load in the valley
03:05:37.280 --> 03:05:39.300
and 44% of the GTC's.
03:05:39.300 --> 03:05:42.840
It's a very complex area.
03:05:42.840 --> 03:05:45.020
Talked about difficulties and delays
03:05:45.020 --> 03:05:46.700
associated with permitting inciting
03:05:46.700 --> 03:05:48.680
new transmission infrastructure
03:05:48.680 --> 03:05:52.070
and so I've listed some
of the issues we've had
03:05:52.070 --> 03:05:54.490
we had a project here
that was just put in service
03:05:54.490 --> 03:05:58.050
this Spring and so I
talked to the gentleman
03:05:59.186 --> 03:06:01.680
who was working on that project like man
03:06:01.680 --> 03:06:02.863
why it takes so long?
03:06:03.720 --> 03:06:05.740
What is it and so I've listed here
03:06:07.083 --> 03:06:10.080
some of the issues one is
that some of the areas are just
03:06:10.080 --> 03:06:14.320
very highly congested
it's just difficult to find
03:06:14.320 --> 03:06:16.290
a transmission route that's available
03:06:16.290 --> 03:06:18.560
through some of those areas.
03:06:18.560 --> 03:06:21.710
Numerous Commissions and
agencies that you have to work with
03:06:21.710 --> 03:06:26.260
which I've listed here
as well as the county
03:06:26.260 --> 03:06:28.110
and city government's irrigation,
03:06:28.110 --> 03:06:30.640
water canals, pipelines, wells
03:06:31.691 --> 03:06:34.170
there are other infrastructure
improvements down there
03:06:34.170 --> 03:06:38.890
to meet the growing load that
already planned like highways
03:06:38.890 --> 03:06:41.580
that they've already got
those those routes planned
03:06:41.580 --> 03:06:43.130
and so it makes it difficult then
03:06:43.130 --> 03:06:45.143
to try to cite new transmission.
03:06:46.700 --> 03:06:49.910
The other thing and this
isn't in and of itself unique
03:06:49.910 --> 03:06:53.110
to the valley but there is
some aging infrastructure
03:06:53.110 --> 03:06:55.480
particularly some of the facts devices
03:06:55.480 --> 03:06:57.420
some of those dynamic reactive devices
03:06:57.420 --> 03:06:58.810
that we talked about.
03:06:58.810 --> 03:07:00.520
Those are nearing the end of their lives
03:07:00.520 --> 03:07:01.980
on the AEP Texas system
03:07:01.980 --> 03:07:03.740
and so we're gonna have
to make some decisions
03:07:03.740 --> 03:07:06.183
really quickly about
what do we do with those.
03:07:08.030 --> 03:07:11.240
So a lot of challenges
03:07:11.240 --> 03:07:13.600
some of my takeaways from all that
03:07:15.060 --> 03:07:17.280
and I've been beaten on this but
03:07:18.340 --> 03:07:21.560
obviously the majority
of the generation is
03:07:21.560 --> 03:07:25.535
intermittent subject to
environmental conditions
03:07:25.535 --> 03:07:28.900
the conventional generation
is really comprised primarily
03:07:28.900 --> 03:07:32.540
of two large combined
cycle plants import
03:07:32.540 --> 03:07:34.562
capability can vary significantly
03:07:34.562 --> 03:07:38.370
and that import capability is
dependent upon the resource
03:07:38.370 --> 03:07:41.660
reactive capability what's online
03:07:41.660 --> 03:07:44.120
and able to be dispatched in the valley.
03:07:44.120 --> 03:07:45.890
Valley load is highly volatile
03:07:45.890 --> 03:07:47.820
particularly in the Winter time
03:07:48.920 --> 03:07:50.700
and then just in general when you go
03:07:50.700 --> 03:07:52.970
back to that very first slide
03:07:52.970 --> 03:07:56.600
with limited connectivity
with the rest of ERCOT
03:07:56.600 --> 03:07:58.810
the margin for error
is just less down there
03:07:58.810 --> 03:08:02.760
and you think about you
lose one combined cycle plant
03:08:02.760 --> 03:08:03.593
down in the valley
03:08:03.593 --> 03:08:04.763
and that's what a third of the load,
03:08:04.763 --> 03:08:08.740
fourth of the load I mean
it's a significant impact
03:08:08.740 --> 03:08:12.650
and we just don't have enough
ties back to the rest of ERCOT
03:08:14.200 --> 03:08:16.700
to give us the kind of
margin that we really need.
03:08:18.520 --> 03:08:23.520
Next slide, yeah last major 345 KV path
03:08:23.870 --> 03:08:26.900
and that's the one over on
the west side of the valley
03:08:26.900 --> 03:08:29.860
that was placed in service in 2015
03:08:29.860 --> 03:08:34.700
at the same time we
reconducted the two 345s
03:08:34.700 --> 03:08:36.720
on the East side of the valley
03:08:36.720 --> 03:08:39.690
and we actually had to do that
03:08:39.690 --> 03:08:41.130
while they were energized
03:08:41.130 --> 03:08:42.770
and the reason for that is we just
03:08:42.770 --> 03:08:44.910
didn't have enough redundancy
03:08:44.910 --> 03:08:48.290
in the valley to to get the clearances
03:08:48.290 --> 03:08:51.080
to be able to reconductor those lines
03:08:51.080 --> 03:08:52.430
we had to do it energized which
03:08:52.430 --> 03:08:56.932
obviously adds to cost and
safety concerns and so forth
03:08:56.932 --> 03:08:59.570
and even those upgrades
were really triggered by
03:09:00.754 --> 03:09:03.110
a load shed event that we had after
03:09:05.456 --> 03:09:07.440
a Winter temperature event.
03:09:07.440 --> 03:09:10.190
Takes a long time in
some areas to construct
03:09:10.190 --> 03:09:11.570
a new transmission
03:09:12.650 --> 03:09:14.600
Warren talked about
the six year time frame
03:09:14.600 --> 03:09:17.750
it can be longer than that
depending on where you're trying
03:09:17.750 --> 03:09:20.150
to route the new the
new transmission line
03:09:20.150 --> 03:09:23.040
I talked about the
head room in the valley
03:09:23.040 --> 03:09:27.943
and then as I said 4% of the
of the load 44% of the GTC's.
03:09:31.240 --> 03:09:35.770
Recommendations take a
more proactive approach it
03:09:35.770 --> 03:09:39.847
seemed like in my 25 years of working
03:09:42.670 --> 03:09:45.450
in transmission planning and
in particular working on issues
03:09:45.450 --> 03:09:46.480
in the valley it just seems like
03:09:46.480 --> 03:09:48.980
we're always trying to catch up
03:09:48.980 --> 03:09:52.210
it's just never have we ever
03:09:52.210 --> 03:09:53.690
I certainly haven't felt like
03:09:53.690 --> 03:09:55.810
we've ever we've caught
up we've gotten ahead
03:09:55.810 --> 03:09:56.760
we're ahead of the problem
03:09:56.760 --> 03:09:57.760
we're always trying to catch
03:09:57.760 --> 03:09:59.310
it seems like we're chasing it.
03:10:00.230 --> 03:10:02.170
Part of that I think has to do with the
03:10:02.170 --> 03:10:04.630
fact we talked about the time frame
03:10:05.650 --> 03:10:07.090
some of these lines that you have to
03:10:07.090 --> 03:10:09.030
build are really long over 100 miles
03:10:09.030 --> 03:10:10.830
and it takes a long time to get through
03:10:10.830 --> 03:10:14.020
that process and
build that infrastructure.
03:10:14.020 --> 03:10:18.070
We're studying and planning
the system based on models
03:10:18.070 --> 03:10:19.890
that are typically about six years out
03:10:19.890 --> 03:10:21.560
when it takes maybe longer than that
03:10:21.560 --> 03:10:24.540
to build the infrastructure.
03:10:24.540 --> 03:10:27.900
So I really think we
need to be more proactive
03:10:27.900 --> 03:10:31.270
we need to think
about off into the future
03:10:31.270 --> 03:10:33.100
the serious caps that are there they're
03:10:33.100 --> 03:10:34.820
gonna reach the end of their life
03:10:34.820 --> 03:10:36.330
eventually we're gonna have to retire
03:10:36.330 --> 03:10:39.180
those as well as the
conventional generation
03:10:39.180 --> 03:10:42.390
and so we really need a good long-term
03:10:42.390 --> 03:10:43.840
plan for the valley
03:10:43.840 --> 03:10:47.430
that has shorter term actionable steps
03:10:47.430 --> 03:10:50.390
that we can take to get
us to that ultimate state
03:10:50.390 --> 03:10:51.795
because there are some big changes
03:10:51.795 --> 03:10:54.853
that will be coming in the
next 10, 15 years down there.
03:10:55.980 --> 03:10:59.060
I think we can also look at the studies
03:10:59.060 --> 03:11:00.970
that we are performing
03:11:00.970 --> 03:11:02.730
look at some of those input assumptions
03:11:02.730 --> 03:11:06.080
I know warren has some
ideas around that as well
03:11:06.080 --> 03:11:08.200
and really what I'm
talking about there is
03:11:08.200 --> 03:11:11.670
what load scenarios are we
using when we plan the valley?
03:11:11.670 --> 03:11:13.690
what are we assuming for output
03:11:13.690 --> 03:11:15.440
from those intermittent resources
03:11:15.440 --> 03:11:17.750
and is that really appropriate?
03:11:17.750 --> 03:11:19.670
What outages do we consider whenever
03:11:19.670 --> 03:11:21.960
we're planning the
system for the valley?
03:11:21.960 --> 03:11:25.630
And I continue to say I think
03:11:25.630 --> 03:11:28.180
from a transmission planning perspective
03:11:28.180 --> 03:11:30.008
when they're operating the system,
03:11:30.008 --> 03:11:33.630
they're always operating
the system looking to see
03:11:33.630 --> 03:11:36.490
what's gonna happen when
the next contingency occurs
03:11:36.490 --> 03:11:39.090
when I lose the next transmission line?
03:11:39.090 --> 03:11:41.850
I want to adjust the system
03:11:41.850 --> 03:11:44.610
so that I have
everything all my voltages
03:11:44.610 --> 03:11:47.880
and thermal loadings on the
lines are within their ratings
03:11:47.880 --> 03:11:50.180
after I have the next contingency
03:11:50.180 --> 03:11:52.300
we don't plan the system that way
03:11:52.300 --> 03:11:55.760
we plan the system
on a deterministic basis
03:11:55.760 --> 03:11:58.360
we don't look at N minus one minus one
03:11:58.360 --> 03:12:01.670
which is really after
you lose the next facility
03:12:01.670 --> 03:12:05.810
are you sure that on
that a subsequent loss
03:12:05.810 --> 03:12:07.880
of a transmission line
that we're gonna be within
03:12:07.880 --> 03:12:09.850
all of the criteria we
don't plan that way
03:12:09.850 --> 03:12:12.920
and I think we should and then again
03:12:14.135 --> 03:12:18.480
the proliferation of the
GTC's at some point
03:12:18.480 --> 03:12:21.050
I continue to say those GTC's at some
03:12:21.050 --> 03:12:23.370
point are gonna
become reliability issues
03:12:24.601 --> 03:12:28.000
and that's something I think
we need to sort of wrestle with
03:12:28.000 --> 03:12:29.900
and then ultimately as I said we need
03:12:29.900 --> 03:12:33.223
more transmission to the
valley short and simple so.
03:12:35.230 --> 03:12:36.860
I said a lot I drug you into the weeds
03:12:36.860 --> 03:12:39.450
I told you I would I apologize for that.
03:12:39.450 --> 03:12:40.990
Lori might have
pushed you a little bit.
03:12:40.990 --> 03:12:42.060
Yeah I'm sorry.
03:12:42.060 --> 03:12:44.073
No it's good.
I was just going back to.
03:12:44.073 --> 03:12:49.073
I did include some of
that 25 years of history
03:12:49.280 --> 03:12:52.690
I included at the end
of my slide presentation
03:12:52.690 --> 03:12:55.350
I'm not gonna go through that I promise
03:12:55.350 --> 03:12:57.670
but it's there it's kind of
interesting to look through
03:12:57.670 --> 03:12:59.220
so thank you.
03:12:59.220 --> 03:13:01.800
Thank you and yeah
I was kind of take a trip
03:13:01.800 --> 03:13:04.854
back in memory lane with
ERCOT transmission planning.
03:13:04.854 --> 03:13:08.300
That's good so those
are important elements.
03:13:08.300 --> 03:13:13.300
Real quick question GTC's
discussion of trap generation
03:13:14.170 --> 03:13:16.240
during legislative hearings,
03:13:16.240 --> 03:13:18.700
what kind of generation was that wind
03:13:18.700 --> 03:13:21.840
was it both wind and
gas that was trapped
03:13:21.840 --> 03:13:25.330
during the Winter
storm due to the GTC's?
03:13:25.330 --> 03:13:30.320
Yeah so not sure
quite how to put it
03:13:30.320 --> 03:13:33.940
but I mean to me that
those export constraints
03:13:33.940 --> 03:13:36.280
a megawatt is a megawatt is a megawatt
03:13:36.280 --> 03:13:38.500
in terms of the resource type
03:13:38.500 --> 03:13:40.800
so I don't know that
we really distinguish
03:13:40.800 --> 03:13:44.610
the way you typically
would reduce the generation
03:13:44.610 --> 03:13:48.080
in order to get the the flow back to
03:13:48.080 --> 03:13:51.390
or below that limit is you
adjust the generation down
03:13:51.390 --> 03:13:52.990
that provides the most benefit.
03:13:52.990 --> 03:13:56.930
So you look at which unit
will reduce the flow the most
03:13:56.930 --> 03:14:00.320
and that's what you back
down regardless of what type it is
03:14:01.890 --> 03:14:04.710
so hopefully I answered your question.
03:14:04.710 --> 03:14:06.810
Yeah I guess I was
just kind of curious
03:14:06.810 --> 03:14:09.860
I mean just we heard
some discussion about that
03:14:09.860 --> 03:14:12.790
and I was just interested
in knowing a little bit more.
03:14:12.790 --> 03:14:14.133
Yeah maybe if I can add,
03:14:15.470 --> 03:14:18.040
my understanding of the
analysis coming out of the valley
03:14:18.040 --> 03:14:20.650
is that there was some
limited amount of generation
03:14:20.650 --> 03:14:22.850
that was trapped
but it was fairly limited
03:14:22.850 --> 03:14:27.160
in the hundreds of megawatts
over a short period of time
03:14:27.160 --> 03:14:31.400
and my understanding is
that it was wind that was being
03:14:31.400 --> 03:14:35.013
constrained at that time.
03:14:36.620 --> 03:14:38.993
Okay thank you.
03:14:40.400 --> 03:14:42.003
All right Sharyland.
03:14:43.160 --> 03:14:45.210
Good afternoon Michael
Queen on behalf of
03:14:45.210 --> 03:14:47.220
Sharyland utilities thank
you for the opportunity
03:14:47.220 --> 03:14:48.320
to speak the workshop.
03:14:49.340 --> 03:14:52.698
So I recognize most folks
don't immediately throw their
03:14:52.698 --> 03:14:53.531
(clears throat)
03:14:53.531 --> 03:14:55.410
assets up on the screen that's different
03:14:55.410 --> 03:14:57.480
than where everybody else has been but
03:14:57.480 --> 03:15:00.150
when we start talking about
the lower Rio Grande Valley
03:15:00.150 --> 03:15:03.810
that's where we are
Hidalgo Cameron county
03:15:03.810 --> 03:15:07.140
that's exactly the area that we serve
03:15:07.140 --> 03:15:09.750
and so Sharyland is a
transmission owner operator
03:15:09.750 --> 03:15:12.503
in that space, next slide please.
03:15:13.360 --> 03:15:16.960
So I won't be labor or try
and recap all the facts that
03:15:16.960 --> 03:15:18.163
we just went through.
03:15:20.350 --> 03:15:23.630
The quickest summary
is it's a distant part
03:15:23.630 --> 03:15:26.850
from the main ERCOT
there's lots of GTC's
03:15:26.850 --> 03:15:31.100
in fact over half almost
half of the GTCs in ERCOT
03:15:31.990 --> 03:15:35.223
are required to keep
reliability down there.
03:15:36.660 --> 03:15:39.350
We agree and appreciate
ERCOT's acknowledgement
03:15:39.350 --> 03:15:41.530
in their 60-point plan
that we have to have more
03:15:41.530 --> 03:15:44.410
transmission but I'll
give you two invocations
03:15:44.410 --> 03:15:47.470
from my perspective
that a rebalancing point
03:15:47.470 --> 03:15:49.720
in the planning process is necessary
03:15:49.720 --> 03:15:51.370
and in the 10 years
03:15:51.370 --> 03:15:55.070
and certainly Wayman's
been struggling with this longer
03:15:55.070 --> 03:15:58.040
than some but in that 10-year
03:15:58.040 --> 03:16:02.450
past 10 year period there's
only been a handful of projects
03:16:02.450 --> 03:16:04.373
that either passed
the reliability criteria
03:16:04.373 --> 03:16:08.860
or the economic and so that's
where he said a rebalancing
03:16:08.860 --> 03:16:09.910
needs to happen there
03:16:10.970 --> 03:16:15.970
but an operational challenge
that we see and face every day
03:16:17.510 --> 03:16:21.540
we had a construction
project it's ongoing still
03:16:21.540 --> 03:16:23.940
but we had to have a
transmission line out
03:16:23.940 --> 03:16:26.650
and the return to service period
03:16:26.650 --> 03:16:29.560
for that transmission line was so short
03:16:29.560 --> 03:16:33.000
we brought in a fair
amount of Capex cost
03:16:33.000 --> 03:16:36.730
directly related to having to
have that transmission line
03:16:36.730 --> 03:16:39.490
that's out of service
and being reconductured
03:16:39.490 --> 03:16:41.360
back in service so quickly
03:16:41.360 --> 03:16:44.480
and so the only place
I've seen that obligation
03:16:44.480 --> 03:16:45.630
is West Texas
03:16:45.630 --> 03:16:50.000
and our return to service
window is just really tight
03:16:50.000 --> 03:16:53.650
and so that's an operational
challenge that we face
03:16:53.650 --> 03:16:56.800
day in and day out, next slide.
03:16:56.800 --> 03:16:59.000
Went over reliability economic test
03:16:59.000 --> 03:17:02.260
just a couple thoughts on that process
03:17:02.260 --> 03:17:06.210
the essence of the economic
test is to me pretty simple
03:17:06.210 --> 03:17:09.860
from standpoint of what's
the cost of new transmission
03:17:09.860 --> 03:17:13.370
compared to what's
the higher cost of having
03:17:13.370 --> 03:17:17.920
more costly generation serve
that load due to constraint
03:17:17.920 --> 03:17:20.860
and that's the essence
of the economic test.
03:17:20.860 --> 03:17:25.860
That economic test can
address inter-valley congestion
03:17:26.970 --> 03:17:31.120
but it also can in fact
address the export issue
03:17:31.120 --> 03:17:32.650
that we were just talking about.
03:17:32.650 --> 03:17:34.850
I've heard different
numbers bandied about
03:17:36.010 --> 03:17:39.350
since February as to
was it 4000 megawatts
03:17:39.350 --> 03:17:42.670
was it several hundred
megawatts of trap generation
03:17:42.670 --> 03:17:44.990
I don't have a number to
bring to the Commission today
03:17:44.990 --> 03:17:47.170
but what I what we are advocating is
03:17:47.170 --> 03:17:50.820
let's evaluate whether we
can economically deliver
03:17:50.820 --> 03:17:51.920
that to the load
03:17:52.800 --> 03:17:55.433
that I guess that
that's our ultimate ask.
03:17:59.120 --> 03:18:01.540
Senate Bill 1281 we acknowledge
03:18:01.540 --> 03:18:03.890
and respect the
Commission has a rule making
03:18:03.890 --> 03:18:06.020
implementation plan that concludes
03:18:06.020 --> 03:18:08.740
approximately June of 2022 followed
03:18:08.740 --> 03:18:12.690
on by ERCOT's implementation
through the protocol revisions
03:18:12.690 --> 03:18:16.940
and that stakeholder process
however we understand ERCOT
03:18:16.940 --> 03:18:20.340
is not going to be reviewing
any economic projects
03:18:21.200 --> 03:18:25.090
that are brought forward
during this 18 to 24 month plan
03:18:25.090 --> 03:18:28.220
and if we only have
two criteria or two tests
03:18:31.610 --> 03:18:33.710
we're struggling to see
why we would potentially
03:18:33.710 --> 03:18:37.070
want to pull one of those
down in this interim period
03:18:37.070 --> 03:18:41.030
when I think the Commission
in the last 30 minutes has said
03:18:41.030 --> 03:18:44.190
sooner or later is
our bias to addressing
03:18:45.040 --> 03:18:46.430
the Lower Rio Grande Valley
03:18:46.430 --> 03:18:51.430
and so we're gonna suggest
actually a parallel path
03:18:54.310 --> 03:18:56.439
type scenario
where (clears throat)
03:18:56.439 --> 03:19:01.270
we certainly let SB 1281
go through its normal process
03:19:01.270 --> 03:19:03.940
but we're advocating that the Commission
03:19:03.940 --> 03:19:06.470
gives ERCOT the authorization it needs
03:19:06.470 --> 03:19:08.420
to continue with what we think
03:19:08.420 --> 03:19:10.420
is a very straightforward process
03:19:10.420 --> 03:19:12.940
to evaluate economic
projects in the interim
03:19:14.070 --> 03:19:17.073
so next slide.
03:19:18.160 --> 03:19:21.130
So we're asking that we keep both tools
03:19:21.130 --> 03:19:23.070
on the table at this point where we do
03:19:23.070 --> 03:19:26.020
in fact evaluate reliability projects
03:19:26.020 --> 03:19:29.350
but we also evaluate economic projects.
03:19:29.350 --> 03:19:32.790
We do in fact have economic
projects in cue right now
03:19:32.790 --> 03:19:34.340
that we'd like to bring forward
03:19:35.620 --> 03:19:38.320
and have at least reviewed
during this interim process
03:19:39.200 --> 03:19:42.100
we believe ERCOT is well
equipped both technically
03:19:42.100 --> 03:19:47.100
and experientially to work this process
03:19:47.450 --> 03:19:50.180
we think the intended
language is clear enough
03:19:50.180 --> 03:19:52.560
that on a case-by-case basis
03:19:52.560 --> 03:19:55.720
and I think ERCOT would agree that
03:19:55.720 --> 03:19:59.100
there's not a tremendous
number of economic projects
03:19:59.100 --> 03:20:00.400
that get brought forward
03:20:00.400 --> 03:20:03.330
so we're not thinking this is
a tremendous burden on them
03:20:03.330 --> 03:20:06.530
in this 18 to 24 month period.
03:20:06.530 --> 03:20:09.140
Additionally we look forward
to working with ERCOT
03:20:09.140 --> 03:20:12.620
and broaden that
reliability test to include
03:20:12.620 --> 03:20:14.940
different scenarios
alternative criteria,
03:20:14.940 --> 03:20:17.270
cost savings and time to market
03:20:17.270 --> 03:20:21.100
and so I'm sorry I don't
remember who asked the question
03:20:21.100 --> 03:20:23.567
of how do we solve
this sooner first later
03:20:23.567 --> 03:20:25.510
and how much time do we have
03:20:25.510 --> 03:20:26.610
and I'll give you two examples
03:20:26.610 --> 03:20:29.460
of how we solve it sooner or later.
03:20:29.460 --> 03:20:32.260
I'm not suggesting these are the epitome
03:20:32.260 --> 03:20:37.260
and the one bullet to
solve the whole scenario
03:20:38.780 --> 03:20:43.700
but we have facilities down
there that are 345 transmission
03:20:43.700 --> 03:20:45.740
that are double circuit capable.
03:20:45.740 --> 03:20:47.140
The right-of-way is in place,
03:20:47.140 --> 03:20:49.570
the transmission structures are in place
03:20:49.570 --> 03:20:51.500
but the other circuit's not home
03:20:51.500 --> 03:20:55.230
so if you want to try and
truly shorten transmission build
03:20:55.230 --> 03:20:58.220
utilize the assets we've
got down there today.
03:20:58.220 --> 03:21:02.107
Same thing Commissioner
McAdams asked earlier
03:21:02.107 --> 03:21:06.350
and very delicately about HVDC.
03:21:06.350 --> 03:21:09.510
The HVDC facility down
there that we own and operate
03:21:09.510 --> 03:21:13.200
is capable of 300 megawatts
that's its maximum capability
03:21:13.200 --> 03:21:16.260
that's what it was originally built for
03:21:16.260 --> 03:21:19.170
the conductor that goes
to Mexico the five miles
03:21:20.875 --> 03:21:23.430
its capability is 300 megawatts.
03:21:23.430 --> 03:21:26.360
What isn't being said is the
other side of that structure
03:21:26.360 --> 03:21:30.400
is not being utilized there's
a complete another path
03:21:30.400 --> 03:21:34.640
so to expand the HVDC
if that's the appetite
03:21:34.640 --> 03:21:37.340
of the Commission
that's again a shorter path
03:21:37.340 --> 03:21:40.563
we see to try and address
some of these valley issues.
03:21:42.850 --> 03:21:45.985
The DC Ties 300
megawatts right now of total
03:21:45.985 --> 03:21:49.450
transmission capacity how
much more can you expand?
03:21:49.450 --> 03:21:52.920
So I haven't done
an analysis say hey in
03:21:52.920 --> 03:21:55.890
that footprint we can
bring another 100, 150
03:21:55.890 --> 03:21:59.500
I'm suggesting let's if we have appetite
03:21:59.500 --> 03:22:04.050
for additional HVDC
let's truly gear up and say
03:22:04.050 --> 03:22:05.900
if the other side of
that transmission tower
03:22:05.900 --> 03:22:09.460
is available and we have
three acres to that side
03:22:09.460 --> 03:22:11.590
let's work with the
vendor community and say
03:22:11.590 --> 03:22:15.030
what can we put in that that footprint
03:22:15.030 --> 03:22:18.173
to get us additional import
and or export capability.
03:22:22.980 --> 03:22:26.030
we do not have immediate
expansion capability
03:22:26.030 --> 03:22:28.010
beyond 300 in the footprint
03:22:28.010 --> 03:22:30.800
in the equipment that's in place today
03:22:30.800 --> 03:22:32.963
maybe a more direct
answer to it for you.
03:22:35.258 --> 03:22:38.530
All right thank you sir.
03:22:38.530 --> 03:22:40.010
Warren you're gonna bring us home.
03:22:40.010 --> 03:22:41.690
I have one more slide
if you could go back.
03:22:41.690 --> 03:22:43.400
Well actually go back to the GTC slide
03:22:43.400 --> 03:22:44.690
I just wanted to kind of show those
03:22:44.690 --> 03:22:48.350
I had one point to make
about the GTC to add
03:22:48.350 --> 03:22:51.130
what no go down one more there you go
03:22:51.130 --> 03:22:54.860
stop right there okay so
getting back to Commissioner
03:22:54.860 --> 03:22:57.150
McAdams I think raised the issue of
03:22:58.490 --> 03:23:00.093
exporting on the GTC's.
03:23:01.400 --> 03:23:03.420
Circling back to your comment before
03:23:03.420 --> 03:23:06.090
about dispatchable generation
03:23:06.090 --> 03:23:09.380
recall that whenever the GTCs
03:23:09.380 --> 03:23:11.400
these Generic Transmission Constraints
03:23:11.400 --> 03:23:14.180
are limiting export from the region
03:23:14.180 --> 03:23:17.890
that means that the wind
generation down there is very high.
03:23:17.890 --> 03:23:21.120
If the wind generation is
high and the ERCOT operators
03:23:21.120 --> 03:23:23.610
and these security
constrained economic dispatch
03:23:23.610 --> 03:23:26.500
have to ramp those units down
03:23:26.500 --> 03:23:30.315
in order to maintain the
reliability of the system
03:23:30.315 --> 03:23:33.550
that means that the
power prices in the valley
03:23:33.550 --> 03:23:37.780
now are being set by
these curtailed wind assets
03:23:37.780 --> 03:23:41.590
and so that becomes
an economic disincentive
03:23:41.590 --> 03:23:44.220
for new dispatchable generation
03:23:44.220 --> 03:23:45.590
to move into that area
03:23:45.590 --> 03:23:48.440
so the in a way the Generic
Transmission Constraints
03:23:48.440 --> 03:23:50.510
are limiting the development
03:23:50.510 --> 03:23:53.020
of dispatchable generation there
03:23:53.020 --> 03:23:55.310
as well as wind generation.
03:23:55.310 --> 03:23:58.457
No 'cause it's captive
intermittent generation
03:23:58.457 --> 03:24:00.340
that's just bottled up there
03:24:01.184 --> 03:24:06.184
that is suppressing well
it's providing a ceiling
03:24:06.320 --> 03:24:08.685
on economic dispatch correct so-
03:24:08.685 --> 03:24:10.280
When the wind's blowing.
03:24:10.280 --> 03:24:11.720
When the wind's blowing.
03:24:11.720 --> 03:24:14.661
Well we go the opposite
way as well, right?
03:24:14.661 --> 03:24:15.494
Right?
03:24:15.494 --> 03:24:16.327
Because if you.
03:24:16.327 --> 03:24:17.180
That's his point.
03:24:17.180 --> 03:24:19.570
Yeah and then when the
wind stops blowing then we have
03:24:19.570 --> 03:24:21.490
the import constraint down
into the right development.
03:24:21.490 --> 03:24:23.770
Into the opposite
presumably the opposite
03:24:23.770 --> 03:24:25.800
effect on prices the LMP.
03:24:25.800 --> 03:24:27.140
Theoretically yes yeah yeah
03:24:27.140 --> 03:24:28.984
so then the price is being set by
03:24:28.984 --> 03:24:32.090
the generation assets that
are there the gas assets
03:24:32.090 --> 03:24:34.550
and then obviously if
there's a reliability issue
03:24:34.550 --> 03:24:37.010
beyond that then you
would get some sort of
03:24:37.010 --> 03:24:40.150
scarcity pricing in there.
03:24:40.150 --> 03:24:43.200
So if you go to the next
slide this is my last slide.
03:24:43.200 --> 03:24:45.850
So we talked briefly
about the Permian basin
03:24:45.850 --> 03:24:50.050
and Liz gave kind of
a brief statement about
03:24:50.050 --> 03:24:52.313
some of the lessons
that we've learned there.
03:24:53.730 --> 03:24:57.150
Two of the actual planning
considerations that we changed
03:24:57.150 --> 03:25:00.480
specific to the Permian Basin.
03:25:00.480 --> 03:25:02.920
The first there's a gas plant out there
03:25:02.920 --> 03:25:05.070
that has four different units
03:25:05.070 --> 03:25:10.070
and we look at the loss of
one generation unit at a time
03:25:10.800 --> 03:25:12.080
from a planning perspective
03:25:12.080 --> 03:25:15.500
so we call it G minus
one the loss of one unit
03:25:15.500 --> 03:25:19.254
unfortunately there are certain
environmental considerations
03:25:19.254 --> 03:25:22.560
that theoretically can affect all four
03:25:22.560 --> 03:25:24.980
of those combustion turbines
03:25:24.980 --> 03:25:28.200
and as a result of that
from a planning perspective
03:25:28.200 --> 03:25:31.300
we decided in the Permian
Basin that we would take
03:25:31.300 --> 03:25:35.390
all four of those units out
as a single contingency
03:25:35.390 --> 03:25:39.320
so we started doing that late last year.
03:25:39.320 --> 03:25:41.550
Another thing that happens
in the Permian Basin
03:25:41.550 --> 03:25:45.350
is you have basically
24/7 oil and gas demand
03:25:45.350 --> 03:25:48.510
you have a significant
amount of solar capacity.
03:25:48.510 --> 03:25:51.660
So we started planning
with the understanding
03:25:51.660 --> 03:25:53.510
that we needed to serve this load
03:25:53.510 --> 03:25:54.940
when the solar wasn't available.
03:25:54.940 --> 03:25:58.470
So we made specific planning assumptions
03:25:58.470 --> 03:26:00.960
associated with variable generation
03:26:00.960 --> 03:26:02.030
for the Permian Basin
03:26:02.030 --> 03:26:04.290
and we've been using
that for about the last year
03:26:04.290 --> 03:26:07.100
or so in the Permian basin
03:26:07.100 --> 03:26:09.570
I think it's appropriate
for us to use similar
03:26:09.570 --> 03:26:12.000
criteria for the valley specifically
03:26:13.480 --> 03:26:17.410
the two combined cycle units
that sit very close together.
03:26:17.410 --> 03:26:19.070
We were tracking earlier this year
03:26:19.070 --> 03:26:22.200
growing drought
conditions down in the valley
03:26:22.200 --> 03:26:25.750
theoretically now we've
gotten rain down there recently
03:26:25.750 --> 03:26:28.740
so the drought
conditions have alleviated
03:26:28.740 --> 03:26:32.150
but we were concerned that
in the not too distant future
03:26:32.150 --> 03:26:35.080
there could have been a combined impact
03:26:35.080 --> 03:26:38.300
on both of those plants
from a drought consideration
03:26:38.300 --> 03:26:40.440
also they are right next to each other
03:26:40.440 --> 03:26:42.670
now I don't have a way today
03:26:42.670 --> 03:26:46.410
I wish I did but I do not have
a way today to understand
03:26:46.410 --> 03:26:49.760
what the contingencies
on the gas system are
03:26:49.760 --> 03:26:51.950
that could affect both of those plants
03:26:51.950 --> 03:26:55.410
but it is likely that there
is some infrastructure
03:26:55.410 --> 03:26:57.230
that serves both of those plants
03:26:57.230 --> 03:26:59.400
from a compression perspective
03:26:59.400 --> 03:27:01.140
and again I don't have any way of
03:27:01.140 --> 03:27:03.990
defining that right
now again I wish I did
03:27:05.040 --> 03:27:08.030
but I think it's reasonable because of
03:27:08.030 --> 03:27:10.410
the potential for drought in the area
03:27:10.410 --> 03:27:13.450
and from a gas delivery perspective
03:27:13.450 --> 03:27:15.490
I think it's reasonable to consider
03:27:15.490 --> 03:27:20.170
the two combined cycles
as a single contingency
03:27:20.170 --> 03:27:22.560
as opposed to a double contingency
03:27:22.560 --> 03:27:23.920
the way we look at it today
03:27:24.830 --> 03:27:27.260
I think that would put us
from a planning perspective
03:27:27.260 --> 03:27:29.833
closer to some of the
operational conditions
03:27:29.833 --> 03:27:31.240
that they see.
03:27:31.240 --> 03:27:35.020
In addition we talked about
solar in the Permian basin
03:27:35.950 --> 03:27:40.560
there's a significant amount
of wind in the valley area
03:27:40.560 --> 03:27:43.660
and Wayman touched on this before
03:27:43.660 --> 03:27:45.890
we when we do our planning studies
03:27:45.890 --> 03:27:48.030
we are fairly conservative
on what the output
03:27:48.030 --> 03:27:50.800
of those units are we typically
would ramp those units down
03:27:50.800 --> 03:27:55.250
to about 10% but there's a
cut-off there at 10% below 10%
03:27:55.250 --> 03:27:57.680
they do not have to
provide reactive support
03:27:57.680 --> 03:28:00.520
and some of the units
cannot provide reactive support
03:28:00.520 --> 03:28:03.170
which means that they no longer support
03:28:03.170 --> 03:28:05.000
the voltage in the valley
03:28:05.000 --> 03:28:06.920
that makes a significant difference
03:28:06.920 --> 03:28:10.800
in the planning results that
we see and so going forward
03:28:10.800 --> 03:28:12.287
our study is now looking at the
03:28:12.287 --> 03:28:15.010
potential for the wind to be below 10%
03:28:15.010 --> 03:28:16.990
and not providing reactive support
03:28:16.990 --> 03:28:21.150
either of those two by
themselves put us in a position
03:28:21.150 --> 03:28:22.620
where we're ready to endorse
03:28:22.620 --> 03:28:25.630
a new reliability project
down into the valley.
03:28:25.630 --> 03:28:29.710
In addition Senate Bill 1281
also has consideration for
03:28:29.710 --> 03:28:31.450
extreme weather conditions
03:28:31.450 --> 03:28:35.100
Wayman talked about the two 345KV lines
03:28:35.100 --> 03:28:38.710
that come out of Corpus
they are fairly close together
03:28:38.710 --> 03:28:41.250
in their Northern extreme
03:28:41.250 --> 03:28:43.450
a hurricane or tropical
storm coming through
03:28:43.450 --> 03:28:47.070
could have an impact
on both of those circuits
03:28:47.070 --> 03:28:50.040
which would make it
very difficult if it were
03:28:50.040 --> 03:28:52.580
high demand in the
valley for us to be able to
03:28:52.580 --> 03:28:54.140
reliably serve those demands
03:28:54.140 --> 03:28:57.030
so I think Senate Bill
1281 specifically directs us
03:28:57.030 --> 03:29:00.220
to make recommendations
exactly like this
03:29:00.220 --> 03:29:03.680
so we're in a position where
we are gonna be working
03:29:03.680 --> 03:29:06.660
with the transmission owners to finalize
03:29:06.660 --> 03:29:08.820
an endorsement of a
new reliability project
03:29:08.820 --> 03:29:10.410
down into the valley.
03:29:10.410 --> 03:29:13.653
Now admittedly that's
a six-year timeline.
03:29:15.760 --> 03:29:19.130
Just to maybe
tag on just a little bit
03:29:19.130 --> 03:29:22.220
and I know we're
focused on the valley here
03:29:22.220 --> 03:29:23.897
but I made the comment earlier
03:29:23.897 --> 03:29:26.243
and in particular when
you look at the GTC's
03:29:26.243 --> 03:29:30.375
it's kind of like a drop
of water on a paper towel
03:29:30.375 --> 03:29:33.300
it starts to move outward
03:29:33.300 --> 03:29:36.210
and some of those constraints
have moved further out
03:29:36.210 --> 03:29:39.700
further North and now
encompassing a larger area
03:29:39.700 --> 03:29:44.220
in South Texas I mentioned
the Coastal bend area
03:29:44.220 --> 03:29:45.490
there around Corpus
03:29:45.490 --> 03:29:48.640
I don't wanna completely leave that
03:29:48.640 --> 03:29:49.830
out of the discussion as well
03:29:49.830 --> 03:29:51.580
when we talk about some of these
03:29:51.580 --> 03:29:54.810
changes because that area
has gotten larger and larger.
03:29:54.810 --> 03:29:57.910
I was gonna ask yes
maybe after the fact
03:29:57.910 --> 03:30:00.550
but so Corpus is
experiencing ramifications
03:30:00.550 --> 03:30:03.913
from these Lower Rio
Grande Valley events.
03:30:04.910 --> 03:30:07.270
Well the the GTCs in particular
03:30:07.270 --> 03:30:10.030
when we look at the impact of those GTCs
03:30:10.030 --> 03:30:12.670
and potential upgrades to mitigate those
03:30:12.670 --> 03:30:15.710
we're now looking at
potentially making connections
03:30:15.710 --> 03:30:18.090
transmission connections
North of Corpus Christi
03:30:18.090 --> 03:30:20.120
in order to fix some of those.
03:30:20.120 --> 03:30:22.180
And that plays
into your scenarios
03:30:22.180 --> 03:30:23.050
that you're looking at right now?
03:30:23.050 --> 03:30:25.050
Yeah I think our
recommended project
03:30:25.050 --> 03:30:27.580
is going take into account the GTC's
03:30:27.580 --> 03:30:32.253
and alleviating the the
extent of those issues.
03:30:33.210 --> 03:30:34.820
Your recommended
project is that
03:30:34.820 --> 03:30:36.647
an existing project
that you're reviewing
03:30:36.647 --> 03:30:39.000
in the RPG process right now?
03:30:39.000 --> 03:30:42.670
Well we have had
several both AEP
03:30:42.670 --> 03:30:44.700
and the South Texas electric co-op
03:30:44.700 --> 03:30:47.500
have brought to us specific proposals
03:30:47.500 --> 03:30:50.290
now admittedly these
were originally designed
03:30:50.290 --> 03:30:52.520
to serve some of these
large industrial customers
03:30:52.520 --> 03:30:53.960
down in the Valley
03:30:53.960 --> 03:30:55.570
but we have been looking at this with
03:30:55.570 --> 03:30:57.110
the transmission service providers
03:30:57.110 --> 03:30:58.740
for about the last two years
03:30:58.740 --> 03:31:00.510
looking at different alternatives.
03:31:00.510 --> 03:31:03.930
In addition ERCOT is required to produce
03:31:03.930 --> 03:31:06.760
Generic Transmission
Constraint exit strategies
03:31:06.760 --> 03:31:09.450
and so we have those studies also done
03:31:09.450 --> 03:31:10.870
or we have another study that's
03:31:10.870 --> 03:31:13.910
about to be completed
that will inform that as well
03:31:13.910 --> 03:31:16.180
and we just like Raymond said we just
03:31:16.180 --> 03:31:19.090
had reliability analysis
in the Corpus area
03:31:19.090 --> 03:31:22.650
so that'll be a part of
that recommendation.
03:31:22.650 --> 03:31:26.540
Mr. Quinn you mentioned
utilizing existing transmission
03:31:26.540 --> 03:31:28.240
infrastructure are you talking about
03:31:28.240 --> 03:31:31.517
infrastructure that
that goes into the valley
03:31:31.517 --> 03:31:34.770
or is in the valley that maybe
is double circuit capable
03:31:34.770 --> 03:31:36.730
but it only has one line right now?
03:31:36.730 --> 03:31:40.750
Correct there's a 345 line that
03:31:40.750 --> 03:31:43.000
starts at the Palmetto Sharyland station
03:31:43.000 --> 03:31:44.820
and goes on up through Stewart road
03:31:44.820 --> 03:31:46.720
and into North Edinburgh.
03:31:46.720 --> 03:31:48.620
It's approximately 100
mile transmission line
03:31:48.620 --> 03:31:50.120
that's double circuit capable
03:31:50.120 --> 03:31:52.923
that has one circuit on it presently.
03:31:56.600 --> 03:32:00.103
Yeah we actually
AEP Texas actually AEP
03:32:01.540 --> 03:32:03.060
the line on the West side of the valley
03:32:03.060 --> 03:32:04.610
that I showed you the two on the East
03:32:04.610 --> 03:32:07.070
one on the West the one on
the West was originally built
03:32:07.070 --> 03:32:09.500
it's double circuit capable
single circuit strong
03:32:09.500 --> 03:32:12.940
now we've strung a lot of
the open position hooking up
03:32:12.940 --> 03:32:16.440
wind farms honestly
but it's still not a complete
03:32:16.440 --> 03:32:18.960
contiguous path you
have to be a little bit careful
03:32:18.960 --> 03:32:22.730
because typically in a
planning environment
03:32:22.730 --> 03:32:25.330
you would consider
loss of that double circuit
03:32:25.330 --> 03:32:28.420
as one contingency because
it's on the same towers
03:32:28.420 --> 03:32:29.710
so you just have to keep that in mind
03:32:29.710 --> 03:32:33.390
it's not something you
have to take into account.
03:32:33.390 --> 03:32:37.523
It is without a doubt it
is a risk reward scenario
03:32:37.523 --> 03:32:40.800
but we're trying to I think that
03:32:40.800 --> 03:32:43.400
the ask was is there ways to do
03:32:43.400 --> 03:32:45.400
this in a more expedited fashion.
03:32:45.400 --> 03:32:46.233
Absolutely.
03:32:46.233 --> 03:32:48.850
That's what I suggested
it's not a silver bullet
03:32:48.850 --> 03:32:52.040
to solve everything but utilizing
03:32:52.040 --> 03:32:55.020
or capitalizing on part of
the infrastructure we have
03:32:55.020 --> 03:32:57.960
immediately available
is a potential solution.
03:32:57.960 --> 03:33:01.450
That seems like a
solution, a near-term solution
03:33:01.450 --> 03:33:03.460
maybe not a like
you said a silver bullet
03:33:03.460 --> 03:33:06.780
but an incremental near-term solution
03:33:06.780 --> 03:33:10.380
I mean you have CCN that
was approved by the PUC
03:33:10.380 --> 03:33:12.410
that allows you to
build that infrastructure
03:33:12.410 --> 03:33:14.520
as double circuit capable.
03:33:14.520 --> 03:33:19.120
So is there a reason why
you would make a decision
03:33:19.120 --> 03:33:21.230
not to add that additional line
03:33:21.230 --> 03:33:23.600
or is it just what,
03:33:23.600 --> 03:33:26.500
how do you I guess make a
decision to only put one line
03:33:26.500 --> 03:33:28.633
and then later put in the other line.
03:33:30.580 --> 03:33:32.800
I'm not a planner
but it's my impression
03:33:33.640 --> 03:33:36.070
that basically there
are certain criteria
03:33:36.070 --> 03:33:38.490
and Warren talked about this earlier
03:33:39.790 --> 03:33:44.460
in the valley there's
certain criteria in planning
03:33:45.900 --> 03:33:47.150
for all of ERCOT
03:33:47.150 --> 03:33:50.940
and it's a you either are above the line
03:33:50.940 --> 03:33:52.040
or you're below the line
03:33:52.040 --> 03:33:53.700
and it doesn't matter if
you're just below the line
03:33:53.700 --> 03:33:55.000
or way below the line
03:33:55.000 --> 03:33:57.830
if the project isn't you
know either economical
03:33:57.830 --> 03:34:00.370
or based upon today's planning criteria
03:34:00.370 --> 03:34:02.490
doesn't meet the reliability needs
03:34:02.490 --> 03:34:03.800
it doesn't get built
03:34:03.800 --> 03:34:07.440
and so that's why I think
that the notion of expanding
03:34:07.440 --> 03:34:12.250
the reliability criteria for
the Lower Rio Grande Valley
03:34:12.250 --> 03:34:15.220
is important step
in the right direction.
03:34:15.220 --> 03:34:16.900
Can you shed a little bit
more light on that Warren
03:34:16.900 --> 03:34:20.550
because when you and when ERCOT endorses
03:34:20.550 --> 03:34:21.720
a transmission project
03:34:21.720 --> 03:34:25.893
and the utility comes over
to the PUC to get a CCN,
03:34:27.854 --> 03:34:31.630
the CCN that's provided
is for a certain project
03:34:31.630 --> 03:34:33.960
and it's double circuit capable
03:34:33.960 --> 03:34:36.010
if you've already labeled
it a reliability project
03:34:36.010 --> 03:34:37.840
or an economic project I mean
03:34:37.840 --> 03:34:41.500
is there an like you have
to review that additional line
03:34:41.500 --> 03:34:44.780
that's being added under
reliability or economic criteria?
03:34:44.780 --> 03:34:46.480
Yeah I think
you're falling into
03:34:47.471 --> 03:34:50.030
the most cost effective
project to solve the need
03:34:50.030 --> 03:34:52.800
so if we see a need
03:34:52.800 --> 03:34:56.410
and we determine that
a single 345KV circuit
03:34:56.410 --> 03:34:58.590
will serve that need
03:34:58.590 --> 03:35:00.850
it's lower cost to the consumers
03:35:00.850 --> 03:35:03.300
for that project to get built.
03:35:03.300 --> 03:35:08.300
So we have a significant
focus on trying to
03:35:08.790 --> 03:35:10.590
minimize the cost of the system
03:35:10.590 --> 03:35:12.600
while maintaining reliability
03:35:12.600 --> 03:35:15.350
and I think you run
into that situation here
03:35:15.350 --> 03:35:17.670
and unfortunately
I've gotten a little bit
03:35:17.670 --> 03:35:21.300
older and orner if that's a word
03:35:21.300 --> 03:35:26.300
and I find that situations
where we build a single circuit
03:35:26.760 --> 03:35:29.690
and then when we start talking about
03:35:29.690 --> 03:35:31.780
putting a second circuit onto that
03:35:31.780 --> 03:35:34.320
double circuit capable tower we realize
03:35:34.320 --> 03:35:36.240
that the maintenance window to take the
03:35:36.240 --> 03:35:38.020
circuit out of service to put that
03:35:38.020 --> 03:35:39.890
second circuit is so short
03:35:39.890 --> 03:35:42.680
that it becomes
increasingly difficult to do that
03:35:42.680 --> 03:35:44.580
and that's Raymond talked about the
03:35:44.580 --> 03:35:46.180
maintenance window having to work on
03:35:46.180 --> 03:35:48.653
those other two circuits hot energized.
03:35:49.890 --> 03:35:51.640
I've gotten to the point now
03:35:51.640 --> 03:35:54.060
where it almost feels reasonable
03:35:54.060 --> 03:35:55.870
if we're going to build a circuit
03:35:55.870 --> 03:35:57.810
let's just go ahead
and build both circuits
03:35:57.810 --> 03:36:00.870
and not put ourselves
in a position where
03:36:00.870 --> 03:36:03.430
two years later, three
years later we realize hey
03:36:03.430 --> 03:36:04.840
we'd like to have that second circuit
03:36:04.840 --> 03:36:07.370
but from a maintenance perspective
03:36:07.370 --> 03:36:09.850
just getting it in is
gonna be difficult.
03:36:09.850 --> 03:36:14.160
And whenever a
transmission project is built
03:36:14.160 --> 03:36:16.580
to be double circuit capable,
03:36:16.580 --> 03:36:21.580
is there I'm just wondering
if it's you get a CCN
03:36:23.273 --> 03:36:25.330
you get recovery and at the rates
03:36:25.330 --> 03:36:27.880
and you've already paid for
something that's double circuit
03:36:27.880 --> 03:36:30.570
capable but you're not
using it it's like buying
03:36:31.410 --> 03:36:33.110
I don't know how to compare it to,
03:36:35.210 --> 03:36:37.310
an iPhone that has a lot of capacity
03:36:37.310 --> 03:36:38.970
but you're only using half of it
03:36:38.970 --> 03:36:41.900
but you've already
paid for the entire phone.
03:36:41.900 --> 03:36:44.220
Well I've got opinions
but let me let Liz go first.
03:36:44.220 --> 03:36:46.340
So there are two
things I mean one is
03:36:48.030 --> 03:36:50.640
we arguably have been
pennywise and pound foolish
03:36:51.860 --> 03:36:55.300
and not adding that second
circuit on the one hand
03:36:55.300 --> 03:36:57.820
adding it later is
incrementally less expensive
03:36:57.820 --> 03:37:00.300
than having to build a second line
03:37:00.300 --> 03:37:02.080
on the other hand
there's this historical
03:37:02.080 --> 03:37:05.120
predisposition to
against pulling the circuit
03:37:05.120 --> 03:37:07.730
until the need is absolutely clear.
03:37:07.730 --> 03:37:10.540
I will tell you in far West
03:37:10.540 --> 03:37:13.210
we actually certificated a project
03:37:13.210 --> 03:37:16.290
and ERCOT had authorized
it to be single circuit
03:37:16.290 --> 03:37:18.770
but double circuit capable
03:37:18.770 --> 03:37:22.830
and we brought the second
CCN for the second circuit
03:37:22.830 --> 03:37:26.260
before we had even
finished building the line
03:37:26.260 --> 03:37:28.290
because the need was so great.
03:37:28.290 --> 03:37:32.050
Now the last piece is the
Commission's own rules
03:37:32.050 --> 03:37:37.050
provide that subject to the
cost tiers of the RPG process
03:37:39.450 --> 03:37:44.450
that a TSP can go in and
put the second circuit in
03:37:44.550 --> 03:37:49.303
without another CCN
proceeding if it is 138 or 69 KV.
03:37:50.850 --> 03:37:54.700
If it is 345 KV we have to come back for
03:37:54.700 --> 03:37:56.530
an additional CCN process
03:37:56.530 --> 03:37:59.880
and so as you have through the day asked
03:37:59.880 --> 03:38:03.360
what could what could you
do differently or more efficiently
03:38:03.360 --> 03:38:05.483
I think that's pretty low hanging fruit.
03:38:07.480 --> 03:38:10.963
Thank you for that clarification
now that makes sense.
03:38:12.780 --> 03:38:14.720
Not everybody wants
to read the CCN rule
03:38:14.720 --> 03:38:16.260
as closely as we have.
03:38:19.881 --> 03:38:20.949
Non thank you.
03:38:20.949 --> 03:38:22.870
All right thank you panelists
anything else Warren.
03:38:22.870 --> 03:38:23.703
Thank you.
03:38:25.850 --> 03:38:27.150
Thank you all very much.
03:38:29.090 --> 03:38:34.090
That will conclude that portion
of our programming for today
03:38:34.710 --> 03:38:38.690
item number four I do
not have anything for items
03:38:38.690 --> 03:38:41.794
five through 19 either of you?
03:38:41.794 --> 03:38:42.850
No thank you.
03:38:42.850 --> 03:38:43.683
Yes ma'am.
03:38:47.730 --> 03:38:51.230
We will meet in
closed session today
03:38:51.230 --> 03:38:53.780
so having convene and duly
notice open meeting Commission
03:38:53.780 --> 03:38:58.780
will now at 2:09 pm on July 26th 2021
03:38:59.520 --> 03:39:00.880
hold a closed session pursuant to
03:39:00.880 --> 03:39:02.980
Chapter 551 of the Texas government code
03:39:02.980 --> 03:39:07.980
section 551.071, 551.074 and 551.076.
03:39:27.770 --> 03:39:32.770
Closed session concluded
at 2:36 p.m on July 26, 2021
03:39:34.210 --> 03:39:36.740
Commission will now
resume its public meeting.
03:39:36.740 --> 03:39:39.810
No action will be taken by the
Commission regarding matters
03:39:39.810 --> 03:39:41.720
discussed in closed session
03:39:42.730 --> 03:39:43.950
and having no further business
03:39:43.950 --> 03:39:45.920
this meeting of the Public
Utility Commission of Texas
03:39:45.920 --> 03:39:48.320
is hereby adjourned thank you all.
03:39:48.320 --> 03:39:49.153
Thanks sir.